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ABSTRACT 
 
FIGHTING FOR THE NATION: MILITARY SERVICE, POPULAR POLITICAL 
MOBILIZATION AND THE CREATION OF MODERN PUERTO RICAN 
NATIONAL IDENTITIES: 1868-1952 
 
MAY 2010 
 
HARRY FRANQUI 
B.A., UNIVERSITY OF PUERTO RICO, MAYAGÜEZ 
 
M.A., TEMPLE UNIVERSITY, PHILADELPHIA 
 
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST 
 
Directed by: Professor Jane Rausch 
 
This project explores the military and political mobilization of rural and urban 
working sectors of Puerto Rican society as the Island transitioned from Spanish to U.S. 
imperial rule.  In particular, my research is interested in examining how this shift occurs 
via patterns of inclusion-exclusion within the military and the various forms of 
citizenship that are subsequently transformed into socio-economic and political 
enfranchisement.  Analyzing the armed forces as a culture-homogenizing agent helps to 
explain the formation and evolution of Puerto Rican national identities from 1868 to 
1952, and how these evolving identities affected the political choices of the Island.  This 
phenomenon, I argue, led to the creation of the Estado Libre Asociado in 1952. The role 
played by the tens of thousands of Puerto Ricans in the metropolitan military in the final 
creation of a populist project taking place under colonial rule in the Island was threefold.  
Firstly, these soldiers served as political leverage during WWII to speed up the 
decolonization process. Secondly, they incarnated the commonwealth ideology by 
fighting and dying in the Korean War. Finally, the Puerto Rican soldiers filled the ranks 
of the army of technicians and technocrats attempting to fulfill the promises of a modern 
industrial Puerto Rico after the returned from the wars.   
In contrast to Puerto Rican popular national mythology and mainstream academic 
discourse that has marginalized the agency of subaltern groups; I argue that the Puerto 
Rican soldier was neither cannon fodder for the metropolis nor the pawn of the Creole 
political elites.  Regaining their masculinity, upward mobility, and political 
enfranchisement were among some of the incentives enticing the Puerto Rican peasant 
into military service.  The enfranchisement of subaltern sectors via military service 
ultimately created a very liberal, popular, and broad definition of Puerto Rico’s national 
identity.  When  the  Puerto Rican peasant/soldier  became  the  embodiment  of the 
Commonwealth  formula,  the political leaders  involved in its  design  were in fact 
responding to these soldiers’ complex identities, which among other things  compelled 
them to defend the “American Nation” to show their Puertorriqueñidad.    
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INTRODUCTION 
Every day tens of thousands of Puerto Ricans drive by the Monumento al Jíbaro 
in Cayey Puerto Rico.  Unbeknownst to them, this monument, hidden in plain view, 
guards a key for understanding Puerto Rico’s past.  The monument overlooks the modern 
highway P.R.52, which cuts through the Cordillera Central and its extension, the Sierra 
de Cayey, linking the San Juan metropolitan area with south-western Puerto Rico.  Very 
tellingly, the monument depicting a humble but proud peasant family, with a mountain 
range as its background and faced by the highway system and the Caribbean Sea rests in 
a foundation of Korean dirt drenched in Puerto Rican blood.  More than a bridge between 
the “Island” and the capital, this highway and the monument guarding it serve as a 
historical bridge.   Far from being a sad reminder of the disappearance of the Jíbaro 
before the juggernaut of industrialization, this monument actually recognizes the 
indebtedness of modern Puerto Rico to the Island’s common folk.   
The political entity we know as the Estado Libre Asociado de Puerto Rico or the 
Commonwealth came into existence during the Korean War.  Tens of thousands of Puerto 
Ricans, who came mostly from the mountains and sugar cane plantations, participated in 
this conflict.  The war they fought in Korea was a battle for the decolonization of the 
Island as the soldiers became a living symbol of the philosophy behind commonwealth 
status.  In this sense, the foundation of the statue is also the foundation of the modern 
Puerto Rican state and of modern Puerto Rican national identities.   There is no intention 
of my part, however, to rewrite a nationalist history, but rather to tell a history left out by 
nationalists and even by anti-colonial narratives.  In essence, I try to tell the story of the 
Puerto Rican soldier’s contribution to the political and socio-cultural histories of the 
Island.   
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In this study I intend to analyze the military as an institution in an attempt to 
comprehend its impact on the converging socio-cultural and political histories of Puerto 
Rico.  In particular, this project explores the military mobilization of popular sectors of 
Puerto Rican society, especially the rural sectors, under two different metropoles, Spain 
and the United States.  Such experience, I argue, affected the political and socio-
economic histories of the Island and its cultural development.  Thus, the subject of this 
study is the military mobilization and demobilization of rural and urban working-class 
sectors of Puerto Rican society from the mid-eighteenth hundred to the mid-nineteenth 
hundred.  The analysis of patterns of inclusion-exclusion within the military as these 
forms of citizenship subsequently transformed into socio-economic and political 
enfranchisement is of particular interest.   
After the failed insurrection against Spanish rule, el Grito de Lares de 1868, the 
barring of natives of Puerto Rico from the Spanish colonial armed forces, a very 
restrictive polity, and dearth of a common education were some of the patterns of 
repression and exclusion that led to the slow development of a distinct national identity in 
the Island.  However, this was embryonic as Puerto Ricans still retained many cultural 
affinities with Spain such as language and religion.  The disjuncture created by the 
Cuban-Pilipino-Spanish-American War of 1898 left a mark in the developing of Puerto 
Rican national identities.  Moreover, the inclusion of Puerto Ricans into the U.S. Armed 
Forces and mass political mobilization profoundly altered the national character of the 
Island.  The former provided a unifying and pro-state experience as well as the chance for 
social mobility while the latter accounted for a wider polity and a flexible national 
discourse.  Under United States’ rule the military, and to a lesser degree political 
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participation, were open to the masses.  The U.S. also embarked in a comprehensive build 
up of the public education system which was intended to Americanize the inhabitants of 
Puerto Rico.  Hence, although cultural affinity was absent between Puerto Ricans and 
Americans in 1898, the fact that military institutions, the political arena, and the public 
school system were opened to the masses deeply influenced the islander’s national 
character.1     
 Attempting to tighten its control over the Island, Spain decided to exclude Puerto 
Ricans from military service after a failed insurrection attempt in 1868.  Under American 
rule thirty years later, the military became a tool for the “Americanization” of the Island 
as part of a broader nation-building project in the circum-Caribbean.  In essence we are 
comparing a project of anti-nation building by virtue of exclusion, the Spanish 
authorities’ response to growing discontent against their rule in the Island, with a U.S. 
project of nation building via limited inclusion (both politically and militarily) and 
cultural assimilation.  In this regard, analyzing the armed forces as a culture-
homogenizing agent and as a vessel for socio-economic and political empowerment helps 
                                                 
1Attention will be given to the role played by the public education system in the 
Americanization of the Island. However, this last factor has been well covered by several 
authors, and since it is a supporting argument, it will be treated by examining secondary 
sources.   See, Aida Negrón de Montilla, La americanización de Puerto Rico y el sistema 
de instrucción pública, 1900-1930, 2da Ed. (Río Piedras, P.R.: Editorial de la 
Universidad de Puerto Rico, 1990).  Negrón de Montilla documents the attempts of the 
metropolis to reproduce in Puerto Rico an education system similar to that of New 
England in which English was the mandatory, and only, language; and the teaching of 
U.S. history and American mainstream cultural values came to be the cornerstone of the 
system.  More importantly perhaps is her detailed study of the department’s 
memorandums and guidelines which openly called for policing those native teachers that 
strayed from the approved curriculum and included Puerto Rican culture in their lessons, 
as well as those who criticized the colonial regime.   And, Roamé Torres González, 
Idioma, bilingüismo  y nacionalidad: La presencia del inglés  en Puerto Rico, (Río 
Piedras, P.R.: Editorial de la Universidad de Puerto Rico, 2002). 
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to explain the formation and evolution of Puerto Ricans’ national identities from 1868 to 
1952.  Hence, studying the mass participation of popular sectors in military institutions 
should provide us with a new understanding of the development of Puerto Rico’s national 
identities and how these evolving identities affected the political choices of the Island.  
In fact, I argue that the “modern Puerto Rican nationality” is a hybrid born out of 
the perceived cultural affinity and political and military exclusion offered by the Spanish 
authorities coupled with the perceived lack of cultural affinity and partial political and 
socio-economic inclusion offered by the United States.  Participation in U.S. institutions 
provided unifying experiences for the Puerto Rican masses which allowed for the 
strengthening of their national identities but with an American touch.  Access to 
education and military positions also offered an opportunity for mobility and the chance 
to overthrow old socio-economic hierarchies, a phenomenon that led to the creation of 
new elites that owed their well being and thus their allegiance to the new metropolis.  
Hence, one of the purposes of this study is to put into historical context the role played by 
popular sectors in creating a national identity of their own and in developing a political 
space that fit their identities.  Studying the patterns of inclusion-exclusion within the 
military and the degree of political participation of the masses, under both Spanish and 
American metropoles, helps to explain how Puerto Ricans’ national identities developed 
during the late nineteenth and the first half of the twentieth century.  This phenomenon, I 
argue, eventually facilitated the creation of the Estado Libre Asociado in 1952. 
Historian Florencia Mallon has argued that the degree of military, paramilitary, 
and political mobilization of peasants and indigenous groups contributes to the depth of 
the liberal spirit of a country’s polity.  She believes that political groups considered as 
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class not only sense a stake in nation-state formation but also seek to participate on its 
design.  Participation, she argues, is contested at the local level and filtered through 
regional politics until it moves towards the national level where negotiation continues and 
a contract is reached among contesting forces.  Mallon calls this stage hegemony, a 
process that will continue endlessly as counter-hegemonic forces keep challenging the 
hegemonic entity or polity.2 
 The contestation of hegemony is not a new phenomenon. Mallon argues that 
indigenous, peasants and other subaltern groups have always harbored ideas of social 
justice and legal equality.  It is not, however, until periods of crisis that these groups get 
the opportunity to strengthen their political stand and gain more inclusion and 
participation in developing or re-defining the nation and its institutions, either by being 
included in political coalitions or by being mobilized for war.   Mallon thus emphasizes 
the construction of alternative national projects, (popular, inclusive and liberal), through 
the political and military mobilization of peasants and other subaltern groups during 
periods of crisis.  When subaltern groups are successfully integrated within the new 
                                                 
2
 Florencia, Mallon, Peasant and Nation: The Making of Post Colonial Mexico 
and Peru, (Berkley:  University of California Press, 1995), 4,6, 9-10.  Traditionally, 
Mallon argues, national democratic discourses have included promises of universal 
potential for autonomy, dignity and equality for all peoples.  In practice, however, entire 
groups of people have been barred from access to citizenship and liberty according to 
Eurocentric class, racial, and gender exclusionary criteria.  Mallon associates this type of 
nationalism with the historical mission that the upper classes in a given country have 
reserved for themselves, the creation of the nation and control of national identity.   
Subaltern groups, she contends, have nonetheless initiated projects for “collective identity 
based on a premise of citizenship available to all, and with individual membership 
beginning with the presumption of equality.”2  In other words, subaltern groups have 
taken the challenge of national democratic discourses and attempted to create their own 
version of a more egalitarian practice trying to make real the unfulfilled promises of 
nation and democracy.2 
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hegemonic coalition, the popular sectors are incorporated into the country’s polity and 
economy, and the state becomes a real negotiator between labor and capital while 
embarking on land reform.  The combination of these factors attests to the liberal spirit of 
a hegemonic political alliance based in a national populist discourse.   Applying these 
criteria to the case of Puerto Rico should help us determine whether the popular sectors 
were really integrated into the Island’s polity and economy and hence, as part of a truly 
national popular project.    
Mallon’s approach is useful for understanding how subaltern groups affect the 
development of national and democratic discourses and the creation of state’s polities.  
However, her model has been applied only to sovereign countries.  Can we find similar 
patterns in non-sovereign countries, colonies, territories, protectorates, provinces, or 
semi-autonomous states?  More specifically, can elements of these models be applied to 
the case of Puerto Rico, a late-colonial state?  If we treat the metropolis simply as 
contenders in the political arena, we may find Mallon’s approach useful.  Benedict 
Anderson has argued that the origin of nationalism is the belief that a nation in fact exists.  
In turn the nation is an imagined political community, “and imagined both inherently 
limited and sovereign.”3  If we followed standard definitions of “political sovereignty,” 
we will be hard pressed to accept Puerto Rico as a nation and also the existence of Puerto 
Rican nationalities.  As a matter of fact there is no “national period” in Puerto Rican 
history since most historians subscribe to political independence as a determinant factor 
to switch from the “colonial” to the “national” period.  Nancy Morris, however, has 
                                                 
 
3
 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and 
Spread of Nationalism, Rev. ed., (London and New York: Verso, 2002), 6-7. 
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argued that a group’s self recognition as a nation is usually based on “some combination 
of objective characteristics of history, language, culture, and territory” which may lead to 
a desire for self-determination but which not necessarily is “equal to a desire for political 
independence.”4   Based on this premise, this study will try to show how national 
sovereignty has several different meanings in the case of Puerto Rico, and how the 
Island’s double colonial experience led to the creation of very flexible national identities 
and political communities in which a case for autonomismo (political freedom without 
outright separation from the metropolis), annexation, or independence could be made 
using the same symbols usually identified with the Puerto Rican nation and 
independence.  More importantly, it is the empowerment of the popular sectors that 
accounts for this broad and inclusive definition of national identity. 
Studying military mobilization as political enfranchisement requires us to answer 
the question, who controls military and political institutions and mobilization?  In the 
case of Puerto Rico, Spain sought and mostly succeeded in completely controlling the 
military in the Island and in exercising tight control over the colonial political apparatus.  
The story under United Sates rule quite different.  The U.S. exercised direct control of the 
armed forces in the Island, but it always needed the unwavering support of local 
politicians to foment enrollment among the popular sectors.  Thus, from very early on 
Puerto Rican politicians and local leaders wielded a degree of indirect control over the 
military, even if they responded directly to Washington.  The same can be said of the 
political institutions.  While the U.S. retained most of the political power during the first 
half century of the twentieth century, it also had to rely on local politicians in order to 
                                                 
 
4
 Nancy Morris, Puerto Rico: Culture, Politics, and Identity, (Westport, Ct: 
Praeger Publishing, 1995), 12-17. 
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present a more palatable colonial rule to the inhabitants of the Island.   This situation 
allowed for the gradual creolization and eventual popularization of metropolitan 
institutions and projects. 
In the early 1940s, it would be Luis Muñoz Marín, the first elected governor of 
the Island and main architect of the final commonwealth formula, who would galvanize 
the new electoral power of the masses into a popular project of social justice but with the 
personal goal of obtaining the independence of the Island.  Moreover, he would use the 
participation of Puerto Ricans in the U.S. military as bargaining tool to advance the de-
colonization project, and finally to sell the concept of the commonwealth formula to the 
electoral masses.  But this is not a story of the manipulation of the masses to obtain a 
political goal: it is actually the opposite.  Muñoz Marín sought to use the electoral power 
of the masses, and that of the military, to gain his objective, but he ultimately had to yield 
to the masses’ will and renounce independence.  Thus we have a rural and lower class 
mass mobilized by a political party, the Popular Democratic Party, and a military, which 
due to its colonial nature was under metropolitan control but also responded to local 
leaders and local realities.  The result of this combination was a very flexible and open 
definition of national identities in the Island and a very pluralistic and social-oriented 
state. 
The role played by the tens of thousands of Puerto Ricans in the metropolitan 
military in the final creation of a populist project taking place under colonial rule in the 
Island was threefold.  I argue first that these soldiers served as political leverage during 
WWII to speed up the decolonization process; that they incarnated the commonwealth 
ideology by fighting and dying in the Korean War; and finally, that the Puerto Rican 
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soldiers would thereafter join the army of technicians and technocrats attempting to fulfill 
the promises of a modern industrial Puerto Rico.   In contrast to Puerto Rican popular 
mythology and mainstream academic discourse that has marginalized the agency of 
subaltern groups; I argue that the Puerto Rican soldier was neither cannon fodder for the 
metropolis nor the pawn of the criollo political elites.  Regaining their masculinity, 
upward mobility, and political enfranchisement were among some of the incentives 
enticing the Puerto Ricans into military service.  The empowerment of popular sectors by 
enfranchisement and participation in the political and military institutions of the 
metropolis ultimately created a very liberal, popular, and broad definition of Puerto 
Rico’s national identity.  It is important to stress the point that if these soldiers were used 
to complete a national populist project centered on industrial modernization and a new 
modern national identity, they were not mere puppets.  When the Puerto Rican Jíbaro 
soldier became the embodiment of the Commonwealth formula, the political leaders 
involved in its design were responding to the open and flexible identities evident among 
popular sectors of Puerto Rican society, which among other things compelled them to 
defend the “American Nation” to show their Puertorriqueñidad.    
 Thus, I seek to put into historical context the role played by popular sectors in 
creating a national identity of their own, how such identity became hegemonic(however 
briefly), and why it was necessary to develop a political status to accommodate the new 
Puerto Rican identities.  In other words, this project attempts to illustrate the influence of 
the masses in altering the conceptualization of Puertoricaness in a never ending contest 
for control of Puerto Rico’s national identities and how this phenomenon has translated 
into the political arena culminating with the creation of the Estado Libre Asociado in 
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1952.   This project will explore the overlapping areas of cultural and political identities, 
or when popular national identities meet political national identities.  To reiterate, the 
subject of this study is the political and military mass mobilization and inclusion-
exclusion patterns of popular sectors in Puerto Rico under both metropoles and how such 
processes altered the character of Puerto Rican national identities and thus the Island’s 
political history.  This work should contribute to our understanding of the history of the 
United States and Puerto Rico, as well as of the development of national identities and 
popular projects among colonial subjects. 
The structures and processes I have chosen to study have dictated that I take a 
longue durée approach- at least to define the timeframe of this study, but without 
disregarding archive-specific research.  To do so, I have not followed a perfectly linear 
narrative but an exponential one.  Generally speaking, times of crisis, such as wars, 
famines, and economic depressions, have served as accelerators of historical processes.  
Periods of crisis tend to lead to the fall or rise of empires and political systems, to the 
cyclical realignment of the world or, in a more local way, to the inclusion or exclusion of 
disenfranchised groups within a state’s or empire’s polity.  Therefore, this project focus is 
on critical historical junctures.  It will examine periods of political, military and 
economic upheaval under Spain and the U.S. and the policies followed by both 
metropolitan powers and local leaders, in an attempt to map the intersection of local, 
national, and international histories and their effect on the structures under study.   The 
Lares Revolt of 1868, the Cuban-Pilipino-Spanish-American War of 1898, the First 
World War and the Great Depression, the Second World War and the Korean War will 
serve as the historical junctures that allows us to see with more clarity the contestation of 
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hegemony in the Island.   Furthermore, this study tries to combine history from above and 
history from below.  Interviews, personal letters, memoirs, and journals would be used as 
much as newspapers, government (U.S. and Puerto Rico) and military records, census 
data, and congressional hearings on the political status of the Island (from 1910s-1950s). 
Chapter 1, Birth of a Nation: From 1868 to 1898, a labor of Thirty Years, begins 
by analyzing the scholarly and popular debate about the significance of the Lares’ revolt 
of 1868 and the policies followed by Spain before and after the event.   Special attention 
will be given to the socio-economic and political situation of the Island leading up to and 
after this event.  Was this revolt a national movement, a popular uprising, or an attempt to 
revolution?   In this chapter I argue that the revolt may have not been a national 
revolution, but that the policies followed by the Spanish colonial authorities after the 
event fueled the emergence of a unique national Puerto Rican identity.  Furthermore, the 
chapter traces the importance of military institutions under Spanish sovereignty and how 
the metropolis, seeking to limit Puerto Rican participation in the military to forestall 
insurrection and the development of a distinct Puerto Rican national identity, 
accomplished the opposite. 
Chapter 2, Puerto Rican a là Americana: An Alternative Nation? 1898-1914, 
deals with the transfer of sovereignty over Puerto Rico from Spain to the United States in 
1898 by examining the factors that facilitated or hindered the transition.  In this chapter I 
argue that passing from one metropolis to another was a relatively easy task due to 
several factors:  the war in Puerto Rico was relatively bloodless; Spain officially 
relinquished control over the Island; the U.S. slowly increased access to political power, 
and Puerto Rican elites and the popular sector participated actively on the institutions of 
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the new metropolis.  Without a real opposition, the new metropolis attempted to 
“modernize” the Island and its inhabitants through a nation-building project supposedly 
guided by “benevolent assimilation” and “compassionate uplifting”, in short, a 
comprehensive plan to “Americanize” the Island and its inhabitants.  This nation-building 
project, which for the first two decades of U.S. control over the Island was firmly in the 
hands of the metropolis, relied heavily, both directly and indirectly, on the military.   
Chapter 3,  “A New Day Has Dawned for the Puerto Rican Jíbaro”: World War I 
and Mobilization of the Puerto Rican Peasant, begins by addressing the debate for 
vesting Puerto Ricans with American citizenship in 1917, just as the United States 
prepared to enter the First World War.  I will argue that the unwillingness of the vast 
majority to resist becoming American citizens reflects the impact that the institutions of 
the new metropolis already had on Puerto Ricans and ultimately doomed the 
independence movement’s hopes, at least by political means.   Moreover, the first mass 
participation of Puerto Ricans in the U.S. military and the newly created Puerto Rico 
National Guard, and the support of the newly elected Puerto Rican legislature for the war 
effort momentarily cemented U.S. control over the Island, and more importantly, over the 
islander’s loyalty.  However, overreliance on the criollo elites to mobilize and control the 
peasantry and urban working classes had started to undermine the metropolis’ control 
over the military apparatus, the political structures in the Island, and over the nation-
building project via military service.  
Chapter 4, Economic Wretchedness and the Nationalist Challenge: Prelude to the 
Battle over Modern Puerto Rico, addresses the socio-economic and political situation of 
the Island during the Great Depression and in the eve of the Second World War.  During 
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this period, mostly due to economic hardship, but also because of the emergence of the 
Nationalist Party led by Pedro Albizu Campos and the violent response of the U.S. 
colonial authorities to the nationalist challenge, the Island experienced real political 
instability.   This chapter analyzes how the economic distress afflicting the Island fueled 
political discontent and how such discontent was in turn used by two emerging political 
leaders, Pedro Albizu Campos and Luis Muñoz Marín, to further different decolonization 
processes.  I argue that what transpired during these years of political violence, especially 
the shooting war between Nacionalistas and the Insular Police, was also a battle for 
control of Puerto Rican identities.  
Chapter 5, Education, Industrialization and Decolonization: The Battlefields of 
the Puerto Rican Soldier During the Second World War, explores how once more, war 
brought the promise of political and economic advancement by rekindling Puerto Rico’s 
strategic position.  Again, the Puerto Ricans were called to arms and responded with 
overwhelming enthusiasm.  Different projects of decolonization and modernization, 
which included the revitalization of the economy and of the Puerto Rican’s self esteem, 
rested on the roles these soldiers were about to play.   This chapter analyzes the military 
mobilization of tens of thousands of Puerto Ricans during World War II and how such 
mobilization responded to military and diplomatic necessities and local political realities.  
Emphasis is put on what Continental and Puerto Rican politicians and opinion makers 
expected to gain from military collaboration and participation.   
In this chapter I argue that the metropolis sought to secure the loyalty of natives 
of the Island by allowing their mass entry into the U.S. military and by conferring upon 
them the same benefits as Continental veterans.  Furthermore, a return to the idea of 
14 
 
Americanization through military service (and public education) made a comeback as 
WWII engulfed Europe.  The metropolis was also more inclined to granting a higher 
degree of self-government to Puerto Rico since it would enhance its standing in the 
international arena and could very well quench political unrest in the Island.   The 
metropolis’ plans, however, had to compete with those of local politicians.  Aware of 
Puerto Rico’s military and diplomatic relevance, Luis Muñoz Marín, leading the Popular 
Democratic Party, followed a strategy that supported the war effort and placed the socio-
economic restructuration of the Island above everything else while using the participation 
of Puerto Rican soldiers in the war, and the Island’s strategic position as leverage to 
extract political concessions.  Furthermore, Muñoz Marín and the Populares tried to 
secure veteran’s benefits so that these men and women could attempt to change the dire 
socio-economic condition of the Island.   Unlike WWI veterans, before WWII ended, the 
Puerto Rican soldier, just like his Continental counterpart, could count on generous 
package of benefits designed to ease the soldier’s re-entry into civil life.  A march 
towards a “modern” Puerto Rico had started, and these Jíbaro soldiers would be spearing 
such movement.  That Luis Munoz Marín came to depend on the votes of the peasantry 
and rural working classes to attain political power and on their military mobilization to 
advance the socio-economic restructuration of the Island would force him to change his 
personal political views, first tactically and later definitively. 
Chapter 6, Fighting for the “Nation”? War at Home and Abroad and the Creation 
of the Estado Libre Asociado de Puerto Rico, analyzes the state of political forces in the 
Island and in the U.S mainland at the end of the Second World War.  I will address 
political and diplomatic factors and how they affected the process of decolonization in 
15 
 
Puerto Rico.  I will argue that faced by the indifference of Congress and ever increasing 
complex Puerto Rican national identities, Luis Muñoz Marin opted for the path of 
autonomismo, leading to the creation of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.  The viability 
of the Estado Libre Asociado would be proved in the local confrontation with the 
Nacionalistas, and the free association pact would be sealed in blood on the battlefields 
of Korea as the Puerto Rican soldier became the incarnation of the ideals of the 
commonwealth; the coexistence of the “the two great cultures of the hemisphere” in one 
space.  In the process, new modern Puerto Rican identities emerged and briefly became 
hegemonic, and they would prove impossible to be controlled by the state.   
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CHAPTER 1 
 BIRTH OF A NATION: FROM 1868 TO 1898, A LABOR OF THIRTY 
YEARS 
Puerto Rico necesita reformar su instrucción pública españolizandola 
convenientemente y para ello se hace indispensable prescindir por completo de 
los profesores naturales de este país… [y] de prescindir  de ciertos puestos de 
empleados hijos de este país.  En esta Provincia  sólo deben  admitirse los 
empleados [born in the Island] más subalternos, siempre que hayan dado pruebas 
inequívocas de un acendrado españolismo.5   
 
Historian Florencia Mallon has argued that during periods of crisis subaltern 
groups get the opportunity to strengthen their political stand and gain more inclusion and 
participation in developing or re-defining the nation and its institutions, either by being 
included in political coalitions or by being mobilized for war.6  Focusing on the creation 
of national discourses and identities and how they alter state formation, Fernando López-
Alves argues that political and military mass mobilization of peasants and lower classes, 
the type, duration, timeframe, purpose, and who leads such mobilization affect the 
creation of a region’s polity and leads to a higher or lower degree of democracy within a 
                                                 
5
 “Puerto Rico needs to reform its public education conveniently Hispanizing it, 
and to this end it is necessary to get rid of the professors born in this country… [and] to 
ban the people of this country from certain positions.  Those born in this province should 
only be allowed to occupy the most subaltern positions, and only after unequivocally 
proving their unyielding españolismo.”   See, Leg. 5112. Expediente 15 Memoria 
presentada por el Gobernador supr. Civil  de Puerto Rico D. Laureano Sanz, in Gautier 
Dapena, Trayectoria del pensamiento liberal, 46-47. 
 
6
 Mallon, Peasant and Nation, 4, 6, 9-10. 
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given state.7   Both scholars try to measure to what extent marginalized groups become 
parts of the hegemonic group in a given society by virtue of political and military 
mobilization.  This chapter analyzes the policies followed by the Spanish metropolis and 
its colonial apparatus in Puerto Rico during periods of crises with regard to political and 
military mobilization, and how those policies affected those born in the Island.  Thus, the 
questions in this chapter are; did military participation transformed into political 
enfranchisement?  Is the opposite true?  Did demobilization of the inhabitants of Puerto 
Rico mean political and socio-economic disenfranchisement?  Did disenfranchisement 
and displacement encourage the development of a distinctive Puerto Rican national 
identity?  And, if so, how did the development of a unique national identity affect the 
choices of the criollo elite in the Island.   
This chapter outlines patterns of inclusion-exclusion from the Spanish military 
and paramilitary institutions in nineteenth-century Puerto Rico and how they influenced 
the political choices of the criollo elite, and altered the self perception of those born in 
the Island.  I try to show a link between Spanish policies aimed to demobilize the Puerto 
Ricans, in an effort to destroy the basis of a potential rebel army while providing cheap 
labor for the incipient export-oriented agricultural enterprises, and colonial policies 
seeking to curtail the emergence of a Puerto Rican national identity.  I argue that the 
combination of these policies weakened the criollos and liberals politically (as the 
colonial administration intended) but also made more evident the differences between 
peninsulares and those born in the Island and thus fueled the emergence of  unique 
Puerto Rican national identities.   
                                                 
7
 Fernando López Alves, State Formation and Democracy in Latin America, 
1810-1900, (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2000), 8-9, 32-33, 44-47. 
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The sine qua non in discussions about nationalism and national identity in Puerto 
Rico is without doubt, El Grito de Lares of September 23, 1868, the biggest revolt 
against Spanish rule ever staged in the Island.  On January 6, 1868, prominent Puerto 
Rican separatists exiled in New York, under the guidance of Ramón Emeterio Betances, 
founded the Comité Revolucionario de Puerto Rico.8  They aimed to overthrow the 
Spanish regime in the Island and to create a democratic republic.  The revolutionary 
committee proceeded to organized cells in the Island for this purpose and to secure 
weaponry for the rebel army.9  A series of setbacks doomed the plans of the 
revolucionarios.  They managed to secure 500 rifles, six canons, ammunitions and the 
small transport ship, “El Telegrafo”, to arm the revolutionary army; however, their ship 
was confiscated in Saint Thomas.10   And, Betances, who had planned to land in Puerto 
                                                 
8
 Note on translation and language usage: All translations are mine unless 
otherwise indicated.  I have tried to use the original Spanish version for titles, offices and 
names throughout this narrative as long as it did not cause confusion to do so.  
Translations and abbreviations are offered and used throughout the text but their use is 
limited.  When referring to Puerto Rico, Island is capitalized since it actually does not 
refer to its geographical shape.  “Island” is more of a nickname for Puerto Rico. criollo is 
used throughout this work, unless citing works where creole is used, for the sake of 
accuracy.  In Puerto Rico, criollo refers to a mostly white elite differentiated from the 
peninsular elite by their place of birth, the Americas.  
 
9
 Since the exiles in New York had a ‘revolutionary” agenda, including the 
abolition of slavery I use the term “revolutionaries” to refer to them.  The leaders of the 
revolt in Puerto Rico, which included slave owners who disagree with the abolition of 
slavery, are referred to as “rebels”. 
 
10
 For the military aspect of the Lares revolt see; Héctor Andrés Negroni, Historia 
militar de Puerto Rico: en conmemoración del encuentro de  dos mundos, (España:  
Ediciones Siruela S.A., 1992), 296-301.  For an exhaustive study of the rebels who led 
the revolt and their motivations see; Olga Jiménez de Wagenheim, El grito de Lares, sus 
hombres y sus causas, 4th ed, (Río Piedras, P.R.:  Ediciones Huracán, 1999).    
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Rico with men and weapons the first day of the revolution, set originally for September 
29, was detained in Santo Domingo and never made it to the Island.11   
Meanwhile, the leaders in Puerto Rico faced problems of their own.  On 
September 19 a rebel agent, Pedro García was captured by army colonel Don Antonio 
Balboa, while raising funds for the insurrection in the western city of Mayagüez.  Balboa 
alerted the Capitán General Julián Juan Pavía, who launched a full investigation.12  The 
next day, the miliciano Carlos Antonio López, informed his commander Juan Castañón in 
the northwestern town of Quebradillas, that he had come to know of revolutionary plans 
being drawn in the house of Manuel María González in Camuy, further north.  Castañón 
informed the mayor of Quebradillas who in turn alerted the mayor of Camuy.13   In the 
first hours of the morning of the 21, Spanish authorities detained the rebel leader Manuel 
María González and searched his house.  The Spanish authorities found a list of members 
of the rebel cell and a copy of their reglamento.  The Camuy rebels who were not arrested 
moved to Lares and warned the rebel cell in that town.  From Lares, messengers were 
sent to alert the rebel cell in Mayagüez that their plans had been compromised and of the 
need to launch the rebellion as soon as possible. They also wanted the Mayagüez cell to 
                                                 
11
 By order of the Dominican president Buena Ventura Báez, Betances and his 
men were precluded from sailing to Puerto Rico., See; Jiménez de Wagenheim, El grito 
de Lares,192, and; Negroni, Historia militar, 297. 
 
12
 See; José A. Gautier Dapena, Trayectoria del pensamiento liberal 
puertorriqueño en el siglo XIX, (San Juan, P.R.: Instituto de Cultura Puertorriqueña, 
1975), 103-105, and; Negroni, Historia  militar, 298. 
 
13
 The milicianos’ commanders in Quebradillas and Camuy believed that the 
mayors of their respective municipalities, Carlos Gonzalez and Pablo Rivera were 
involved in the conspiracy and were conspiring to alert the rebels.  See; Jiménez de 
Wagenheim, El grito de lares, 160-62, and; Gautier Dapena, Trayectoria del pensamiento 
liberal, 105. 
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try and to alert the rest of the cells throughout the Island.  Reckoning that time was of the 
essence, the leadership of the rebel cells in Camuy, Lares and Mayagüez decided to 
launch their revolt six days before originally planned.    
On September 23, 1868, hundreds of rebels started to converge at the farm of 
Manuel Rojas, a coffee grower in the mountain town of Lares and rebel leader.  On their 
way to Lares the rebels exhorted slaves and jornaleros14 to join them in some cases 
threatening to kill them if they did not do so.15  That evening the rebels marched into the 
town itself and took it without resistance.  They proceeded to form a provisional 
government of republican character.  The Republic of Puerto Rico, with a president and a 
cabinet appointed by the chief military leaders present in Lares, Manuel Rojas and Juan 
de Mata Torreforte, was officially established on the morning of September 24.16   Rojas 
                                                 
14
 Juan de la Pezuela y Ceballos, Gobernador y Capitán General of Puerto Rico 
(1848-52) created the Reglamento Especial de Jornaleros on June 11 of 1849 in order to 
provide a cheap labor force for the plantations and other enterprises.  Free Blacks, people 
of mixed race, and poor whites age sixteen or over, were subjected to the reglamento 
which forced to work for others.  Even those who own land but could not provide for all 
their needs were forced them to work for others either for wages or goods.  The 
jornaleros were obliged to carry a notebook at all times where their daily activities were 
to be written. Their freedom of movement was also severely hindered. Though the 
reglamento included penalties for employers’ abusive behavior, all kinds of exploitations 
were the norm. See; Luis A. Figueroa, Sugar, Slavery, and Freedom in Nineteenth-
Century Puerto Rico, (Chapel Hill, N.C.: University of North Carolina Press, and San 
Juan, P.R.: University of Puerto Rico Press, 2005), 142-48 166-173.  See also, James L. 
Dietz, Economic History of Puerto Rico, Institutional Change and Development, 
(Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press 1986), 43, 45-52. 
 
15
 Jiménez de Wagenheim believes that those threatened were the slaves and 
jornaleros working for landlords who were not part of the rebellion.  The rebels 
apparently killed Agustín Venero, a freed black, for refusing to join them.  See; Jiménez 
de Wagenheim, El grito de Lares, 170-74, and;  Gautier Dapena, Trayectoria del 
pensamiento liberal, 108. 
 
16
 Francisco Ramírez was named President of the Republic of Puerto Rico, 
Clemente Millán as Minister of Justice, Federico Valencia as Minister of Treasury, 
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and Torreforte instructed the new government to recruit and organize more rebel soldiers 
and to secure funding by forcing the merchants to loan monies to the republic.17  By 
decree, the rebel government declared null the hated jornalero (passbook) system that 
forced landless peasants to work as peons, and promised freedom to those slaves who 
joined them in the fight against the Spaniards.  The rebels also welcomed foreigners to 
join their ranks and become patriots of the republic.  Another decree gave Spaniards in 
Puerto Rico three days to swear allegiance to the new republic or to leave the Island if 
they did not.  The decree also warned of extreme repercussions if the Spaniards decided 
to stay and did not support the rebels and the republic.18   
The chief rebel commanders, Rojas and Torreforte, proceeded to name the 
officers of the Ejército Revolucionario, which at that point consisted of roughly 600 men.  
They named eight brigadier generals plus colonels for the infantry, artillery and cavalry.  
Apparently these colonels were quickly promoted to generals.19  The rebel leadership 
seemed to have ignored the absurdity of such chain of command for such a small number 
of rebels for the sake of unity.  Late in the morning of the 24, the rebels proceeded to the 
                                                                                                                                                 
Aurelio Méndez Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Bernabé Pol as Secretary of State.  See 
Jiménez de Wagenheim, El grito de Lares, 179-80, and; Negroni, Historia militar, 298-
300, and; Gautier Dapena, Trayectoria del pensamiento liberal, 107-08.   
 
17
 Jiménez de Wagenheim, El grito de Lares, 179. 
 
18
 See the original decrees in: Gautier Dapena, Trayectoria del pensamiento 
liberal, 102-103.  For an analysis of the decrees see; Jiménez de Wagenheim, El grito de 
Lares, 179-84.  See also; Negroni, Historia militar, 29, and; María Asunción García 
Ochoa, La política española en Puerto rico durante el siglo XIX, (Rio Piedras, P.R.: 
Editorial Universidad de Puerto Rico, 1982), 150-52. 
 
19
 Negroni counts at least twelve generals vs. ten in Jiménez de 
Wagenheims’work.  See Jiménez de Wagenheim, El grito de Lares, 179-80, and; 
Negroni, Historia militar, 299.  
 
22 
 
town of San Sebastian del Pepino. The commanders of the Milicias Disciplinadas in 
Pepino, Lieutenant Manuel Cebollero and Eusebio Ibarra, who were part of a rebel cell, 
had spent the previous night organizing slaves and jornaleros into a fighting force to join 
the rebel column coming from Lares.  They had also promised the rebel leadership that 
their milicianos would join the rebellion.20   Later that morning, roughly forty rebels on 
horseback entered Pepino’s plaza shooting and chanting “death to the Spaniards and the 
Queen”, while exhorting the milicianos to join them.   To their surprise, and that of the 
Spanish authorities present, the milicianos responded to the rebels with intense fire 
ignoring the calls of Cebollero and Ibarra.21   More rebels continued to pour into Pepino, 
but their efforts bore no fruits against the effective fire of the milicianos, and the town’s 
civilians who fired rifles and guns and threw dynamite against them from the rooftop of 
buildings surrounding the plaza.  The battle lasted over an hour before the rebels, 
repulsed twice and driven off the Plaza by the milicianos, decided to head back to 
Lares.22  The confrontation left eight rebels dead and two milicianos wounded.   Fighting 
against milicianos and civilians, the rebels lost the only engagement of the revolt.   
Disconcerted by the unwillingness of the milicianos to join them and recognizing that 
without them on their side, they could not possibly defeat the peninsular troops in the 
                                                 
20
 See; Jiménez de Wagenheim, El grito de Lares, 185-86, and; Gautier Dapena, 
Trayectoria del pensamiento liberal, 106. 
 
21
 See; Jiménez de Wagenheim, El grito de Lares, 187-88, and; Negroni, Historia 
militar, 298. 
 
22
 See; Jiménez de Wagenheim, El grito de Lares, 188-90; and, Negroni, Historia 
militar, 298-99. 
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Island, the rebel army quickly melted away.23  Scattered in the mountains, and with no 
hope of a general uprising or aid coming from the exterior, the rebels who initially 
escaped eventually surrendered.  Over 500 rebels found themselves imprisoned.  Eighty 
died while in custody due to poor sanitary conditions.  Seven were sentenced to death, 
but by virtue of a general amnesty, all rebels were set free by January 1869.24  
From a strictly military standpoint the revolt was a fiasco.  Lares was the only 
town taken by the rebels and the Spanish authorities crushed the revolt in roughly twenty-
four hours.  The brevity of the uprising is even more damning when taking into account 
that the rebel army was defeated by milicianos, who were an auxiliary corps manned 
almost exclusively by Puerto Ricans.25  Furthermore, the rebels did not enjoy broad 
support from the inhabitants of the Island, who were either unaware of the events or 
chose either to remain neutral or loyal to Spain.  Lack of communication and 
coordination, and poor leadership just accentuated the absence of support from the 
Island’s community in general.  Over sixty percent of the participants were jornaleros, 
peasants, or slaves, many of whom declared that they were forced to joining the rebels 
under pain of death.26    Though a failure from a military point of view, many Puerto 
Rican historians consider the Lares’ uprising as a defining moment for Puerto Rican 
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 See, García Ochoa, La política española 151-52; and, Jiménez de Wagenheim, 
El grito de Lares, 188-192; and, Negroni, Historia militar, 299-300. 
 
24
 Jiménez de Wagenheim, El grito de Lares, 17-18. 
 
25
 Warned of Cebollero and Ibarra’s plans, Pepino’s mayor, Luis Chiesa, decided 
to arm the civilians and to put the milicianos under the command of a retired Spanish 
officer, Colonel Pedro Miguel San Antonio, whom restricted the milicianos to their 
barracks until the rebels entered the plaza. Ibid., 188-90.  
 
26
 See; Ibid., 78, 174, 182, and; García Ochoa, La política española, 151. 
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nationality, a moment when the Island’s people ceased to see themselves as Spaniards.27   
While one school of thought, and the Island’s mainstream media, regards this revolt as 
the birth date of national consciousness in Puerto Rico and as a true national uprising, 
others see it as a group of criollos and recently arrived hacendados seeking to correct 
what they perceived as economic and political injustices.28   Economic historian James L. 
Dietz interprets the revolt as “the point at which the development of Puerto Rico’s 
productive forces came into fundamental conflict with Spain’s sociopolitical 
domination”.29  Though most of the academic work falls into the second category, the 
most popular view is that describing Lares as a national revolution.   
                                                 
27
 See; Jiménez de Wagenheim, El grito de Lares, 82-85.   
 
28
 For those who see the revolt as the birth of Puerto Rico’s national identity see;  
Antonio Correjter,  “The Day Puerto Rico Became a Nation”,  The San Juan Star Sunday 
Magazine, 22 September 1968, and; Vicente Géigel Polanco,  El Grito de Lares: gesta de 
heroísmo y sacrificio, (Río Piedras, P.R.: Editorial Antillana, 1976).  A more balanced 
history of the revolt is found in Lidio Cruz Monclova, El Grito de Lares, (San Juan: 
Instituto de Cultura Puertorriqueña, 1968).  Economic historians follow the second trend, 
see; Laird W. Bergard, Coffee and the Growth of Agrarian Capitalism in Nineteenth-
Century Puerto Rico (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1983), 41-45, 
140, and; Dietz, Economic History, 72-74, Bergard and Dietz agree that “Lares was a 
concrete manifestation of the attempt by members of the more powerful creole class to 
end the dominance of the hated Spanish merchants.”   Ricardo Camuñas-Madera also 
emphasizes the economic nature of the uprising.  He argues that commercial relations 
between non-peninsular (criollos and foreigners) farmers and peninsular monopolists 
supported by the colonial regime in the Island were dominated by the later leading the 
hacendados from the coffee zone to opt for revolution to correct the unequal relationship.  
See, Ricardo Camuñas-Madera, Desplazamiento y revolución en el Puerto Rico del siglo 
XIX, (San Juan, P.R.: Instituto  de Cultura Puertorriqueña, 2000), xi-xii, 97-107.  For a 
discussion of stated and unstated causes of the revolt and a synthesis of the economic, 
displacement and discrimination  theories  see; Jiménez de Wagenheim, El grito de 
Lares, 82,117. 
 
29
 Dietz explains that as the strength of large landowners and small merchants 
increased, “Spanish domination and in particular, peninsular control over the largest 
commercial establishments and credit, it became an obstacle rather than an ally to the 
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In fact, despite its short life, El Grito de Lares has inspired many politicians and 
poets, whom often were the one and the same in Puerto Rico’s political history.  Writing 
for the San Juan Star in celebration of the first centenary of the revolt, Juan Antonio 
Corretjer (1908-1985), one of Puerto Rico’s greatest poets and untamable fighter for 
Puerto Rico’s independence, described the revolt as “[t]he day Puerto Rico became a 
nation”.30   Of course that vision is possible in hindsight which also allows for the 
reformulation of Puerto Rico’s national mythology, its stories and histories, and 
Puertoricaness itself.   The failed revolt became an obscure footnote in the Island’s 
history until the 1930s when the Partido Nacionalista Puertorriqueño (Nationalist Puerto 
Rican Party) adopted the Lares revolt as a national icon.  Even more tellingly, in 1969, 
Luis A. Ferré, the first governor of the Island presiding over a party seeking federated 
statehood, declared the event a national holiday.  At first glance it may look contradictory 
that such opposing political camps embraced the same event as part of their national 
iconography.  However, Puerto Ricans from different sides of the political spectrum 
understood that control of the national symbols had and still has an important role in 
Puerto Rican politics.   As argued by Arlene Dávila, command of the national mythology 
and its icons provides for influence over national identities and wields significant 
political power.31   This point was not lost on the Spanish authorities.  Just about 7% (39 
                                                                                                                                                 
members of this class, as well as educated professionals, just as it had in the rest of the 
New World. ” See; Dietz, Economic History, 73. 
 
30
 Correjter befriended the nationalist leader Pedro Albizu Campos and became 
secretary general of the Nationalist Party in the 1930s. He was imprisoned in 1937, 1947 
and 1950. 
 
31See; Arlene Dávila, Sponsored Identities: Cultural Politics in Puerto Rico, 
((Puerto Rican Studies) Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1997).  
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out of 551 detainees) of the Lares’ rebels were born outside the Island.  However, 
foreigners occupied important positions within the rebel cells, a fact that became the basis 
for the Spanish colonial government’s portrayal of the revolt as being foreign-inspired 
and led.32    
While the Lares uprising may have not been a national movement, the policies 
followed by the Spanish colonial authorities in its aftermath fueled the emergence of 
unique Puerto Rican national identities.  From this standpoint Lares had undeniable 
important consequences.  If the revolt itself did not separate Puerto Ricans from 
Spaniards, clumsy Spanish colonial policies would make the differences all too clear.   
Following the insurrection the newly appointed Governor and Capitán General of Puerto 
Rico, General Laureano Sanz, moved to exclude natives of the Island (“los hijos de este 
país”) from teaching positions while promoting the españolización of public and private 
instruction.   Sanz also sought to exclude Puerto Ricans from the clergy and from all 
administrative posts except the most “subaltern ones”33  These measures created even 
more friction between peninsulares and the criollos, especially the elite, for they closed 
traditional routes to socio-economic and political improvement.   
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 Jiménez de Wagenheim, El grito de Lares, 78.              
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 Sanz wrote; “Puerto Rico necesita reformar su instrucción pública 
españolizandola convenientemente y para ello se hace indispensable prescindir por 
completo de los profesores naturales de este país”.   He also argued for the  
“conveniencia de prescindir  de ciertos puestos de empleados hijos de este país.  Nunca 
pueden dar  aquí buen resultado”.  He added “… en esta Provincia [Puerto Rico] sólo 
deben  admitirse los empleados [born in the Island] más subalternos, siempre que hayan 
dado pruebas inequívocas de un acendrado españolismo”.  See, Leg. 5112. Expediente 15 
Memoria presentada por el Gobernador supr. Civil  de Puerto Rico D. Laureano Sanz, in 
Gautier Dapena, Trayectoria del pensamiento liberal, 46-47. 
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Exclusionary policies were not restricted to the political realm and the colonial 
administration. “Los hijos de este país”, who had not only served faithfully for over 300 
years but had also suppressed the Lares revolt, found themselves excluded from the 
military.  Soon after the revolt the colonial administration proceeded to ban Puerto Ricans 
from its armed forces in an attempt to forestall other insurrections.  The criollos leading 
the Lares’ revolt had not been able to mobilize the masses to support their cause even 
after appealing to the national spirit of Puerto Ricans.34  In an Island were different 
languages could be heard by moving from one barrio to another; where Corsicans, 
Italians, French, Germans, Irish and others had settled in colonies with their families and 
created enclaves, by all means and purposes isolated from the rest of the Island; and with 
few roads connecting the different towns, and with no common experience or common 
education to share beyond their immediate community, it was difficult if not impossible 
to appeal to national identity feelings.35   
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 See: Manifiesto de los patriotas borinqueños que dirigen el movimiento 
revolucionario, in  Gautier Dapena, Trayectoria del pensamiento liberal, Apéncice Núm. 
4, 102-103.   
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 Estela Cifre de Loubriel argues that the principal element in the formation of 
the Puerto Ricans as a people (pueblo) was the exponential progression of the Island’s 
population during the nineteenth century which itself was the result of mass immigration.  
She identifies three distinct immigration waves during this century, 1800-1850, 1850-
1880, and 1880-1898.  The first stage was characterized by an influx of immigrants from 
Santo Domingo, as well as French elements from Haiti and political émigrés from 
Venezuela. Foreign immigration, triggered by the real Cédula de Gracias of August 10, 
1815, accounted for much of the immigration to Puerto Rico during this first period.  
Military personnel and loyalists started to arrive after the defeat of the Spanish armies in 
the former empire and soon monopolized the Island’s bureaucracy.   32% of the total 
immigration for the whole century occurred between 1851 and 1860. During this second 
period, there was a marked increase of peninsular immigration, but Lares and Yara soon 
made Puerto Rico less attractive to this group.  The third period was characterized by a 
slow decrease in immigration, especially of peninsular origin.  Though it never overtook 
the peninsulares, foreign immigration held steady throughout the century.  Immigration 
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After 1868, and especially under Sanz’s leadership, the Iberian metropolis 
embarked on a project of anti-nation building.  Political exclusion, demobilization of the 
population, and the españolización of the Island were the tools with which to avoid the 
emergence of a strong Puerto Rican national identity; an identity that could be used to 
rally those born in the Island against the Spaniards.  However, Sanz’s plans had the 
opposite effect.  By closing the military to natives of Puerto Rico the Spaniards created a 
common denominator for those born in the Island; exclusion by birthplace.  Barring “los 
hijos de este país” from the military was more damaging than any other form of 
exclusion by the colonial administration since it affected the majority of the population 
not just a small criollo elite.  By following exclusionary policies the Spanish colonial 
authorities made more obvious the differences between peninsulares and Puerto Ricans, 
lost the opportunity to co-opt Puerto Ricans into serving Spain, and ultimately fueled the 
development of a Puerto Rican national identity.  In effect the combined exclusion of 
Puerto Ricans from the colonial administration and the military undermined the loyalty of 
the inhabitants of the Island and put them on the path of a separate and unique national 
identity.   
                                                                                                                                                 
of peninsular origin (or of Spanish insular possession) accounted for 88.2% of the 
century’s immigration while foreigners accounted for 8.5%.  It is noteworthy that foreign 
immigrants were mostly farmers, professionals and artisans while peninsular immigrants 
were for the most part military personnel (including guardias civiles), merchants and 
public employees.  See;  Estela Cifre de Loubriel, La inmigración a Puerto Rico durante 
el siglo XIX, (San Juan, P.R.: Instituto de Cultura Puertorriqueña, 1964), XLIX-LIII, 
LXXXIX, XCIX-CI, and; Estela Cifre de Loubriel, Catalogo de extranjeros residentes en 
Puerto Rico en el siglo XIX, (Río Piedras, P.R.: Ediciones de la Universidad de Puerto 
Rico, 1962), XXXV-XXXVII, XXXVIII-XLI, L-LVI.  The vast majority of foreigners 
living in Puerto Rico resided in the South/South-West, the West and North-West tip of 
the Island, and the coffee region adjacent to these areas.  
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The development of this identity was slow.  Political exclusion intertwined with 
short-lived political reforms after 1868. This pattern would not change until the end of 
Spanish sovereignty over the Island in 1898.  Soon after the Grito de Lares, most of the 
criollo leadership, which comprised the liberal movement, disenchanted with the results 
of the revolt, opted for a policy of watered-down autonomismo or a higher degree of 
political freedom, instead of independence from Spain. 36 The reluctance of the criollo 
leadership to sever its ties to Spain, and degrees of cultural affinity with Spain, may have 
slowed the development of a unique Puerto Rican national identity.  This is not to say 
that the criollos that stayed in the Island had many other options. The demobilization of 
the Puerto Ricans reduced, if not arrested altogether, the political choices of the criollo 
leadership.  In fact the criollos’ position was weakened by the sudden absence of Puerto 
Rican militias.  Military exclusion provided Puerto Ricans with a common experience 
that may have moved them towards a shared identity but it also weakened the criollos 
and liberals.   
Controlling access to the military and paramilitary apparatus and seeking to 
curtail the power of the liberals and criollos in the Island were not new colonial 
strategies.  Nor was military service a marginal issue for the inhabitants of the Island.  A 
review of the political trajectory and of the development of the Puerto Rican militias 
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  Román Baldorioty de Castro and Luis Muñoz Rivera, leaders of the 
Autonomist Liberal Party (pro-autonomy) in Puerto Rico talked openly about the 
impossibility of obtaining independence through war. One of the reasons was the state of 
illiteracy and poverty of the peasantry which they thought would not allow for an 
effective revolt or the survival of an independent republic.   According to Jiménez de 
Wagenheim’s findings, of the men taken prisoners after the revolt who were asked about 
their literacy 40% responded negatively.  This number was probably higher as the 
authorities probably did not question the slaves involved in the revolt.  Jiménez de 
Wagenheim, El grito de Lares, 79.   
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during the nineteenth century should help to illustrate how Spain sought to neutralized 
the liberals and the criollo elite in the Island by disarming the population in addition to 
showing the military character of the colony and of those who made it their home.    
Puerto Rico has had an intimate history with military institutions.   From 1582 to 
1897, the Island was ruled either as a presidio, a camp, or a military plaza, and, it was not 
until 1897 that Puerto Rico enjoyed a civil government. 37  In 1582 the first garrison of 
regular Spanish troops was assigned to the Island, and the functions of Governor and 
Alcaide (keeper) del Morro were fused into one position effectively making the Island a 
Capitanía General.38  The duties of the Capitán General included the command, 
organization and jurisdiction of the army and militias. The post was usually reserved for 
areas deemed of strategic military importance.  Within the Spanish Empire these 
administrative positions were separated from, and subordinated to, the offices of the 
viceroys or governors.  In the case of Puerto Rico, however, this office also entailed the 
administration of all affairs of the Island.  In the late eighteen century, as part of the 
Bourbon reforms, Intendentes de Ejército y Provincia  were added to the imperial 
bureaucracy and existed along the positions of Governor, Viceroy or Captain General 
throughout the Spanish Empire, but not in Puerto Rico were the Capitán General 
remained as absolute ruler.39  For most of its history Puerto Rico was first and mostly a 
military bastion and everything else was secondary. 
                                                 
37
 Negroni, Historia militar, 60. 
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  Puerto Rico’s Capitanía General formed part of the Viceroyalty of the New 
Spain and of the Real Audiencia de Santo Domingo until the Real Audiencia de Puerto 
Rico was created in 1831.   
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 See; Negroni, Historia militar, 66-67, 24-26.  The Capitanías Generales were 
located in strategic areas to protect the sea routes and the empire against indigenous 
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As Héctor Andrés Negroni argues, since the Island was but a military camp the 
islander could be nothing but a soldier or at least be influenced by Puerto Rico’s military 
baggage.40  In 1887, in a study of the Puerto Rican Jíbaro, Francisco del Valle Atiles 
declared: “Since those remote days when Spain fought wars with England and the 
Netherlands, [he refers to the sixteenth, seventeenth and eighteenth centuries a period 
during which no less than fifty-six invasions took place] until this very day, the jíbaro has 
been a good Spanish soldier, willing to die for the motherland (patria); called by the 
government  or volunteering, he has heeded the call of duty…”41  Such was the military 
nature of the Spanish colonization of the Island that the most common form of 
communication between the Capitán General and the inhabitants of Puerto Rico was the 
Bando, a type of general orders usually employed by a military commander to let his 
troops know what was expected of them.42  The military nature of the Island can also be 
illustrated by its budget.  Even in 1842, when the population had increased from roughly 
80,000 inhabitants in 1783 to almost half a million; and with coffee, sugar and tobacco 
production rising to unseen levels, and a favorable trade balance, military expenditures 
still accounted for 50% of the Island’s budget rapidly rising to 69% in 1846, and finally 
                                                                                                                                                 
peoples, foreign powers and contraband.  As part of the defensive perimeter designed by 
the Spaniards in the eighteenth century, Puerto Rico came to be known as the 6th Key 
(Llave de las Antillas y de las Indias).  As such, the Island received priority for military 
matters, especially the building of fortifications. There were another nineteen keys 
throughout the empire.  
 
40
 Ibid., 29. 
 
41
 Ibid, 218-220.  Negroni is citing Francisco del Valle Atiles, 30, (42:537). 
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leveling at 50% by 1865.43  Even though Puerto Rico prospered economically, and its 
population grew exponentially during the nineteenth century, the military nature of the 
colony remained mostly unchanged.     
As Spain strengthened its hold of the territories in the Americas, it sought to 
regulate the administration of its possessions.  Milicias Irregulares (irregular militia) 
existed in Puerto Rico since the very first days of Spanish colonization and conquest in 
1508 until 1692, when they were replaced by the Milicia Irregular Urbana.44  Field 
Marshall, Campo Gaspar de Arredondo, Capitán General between 1690 and 1695, 
resolved to create a territorial division in the Island called partidos urbanos instead of 
villas due to the cumbersome process established by the Council of Indies to create the 
later.  These partidos urbanos (the equivalent of towns and villages) were to be 
administered by governor’s appointees with the title “Teniente a Guerra”.   The functions 
of the Teniente a Guerra included that of auxiliary mayor, justice of the peace and police 
chief.  With the title of “Sargento Mayor de la Milicia Urbana”, the Teniente a Guerra 
was in charge of organizing and training a militia within his jurisdiction.45  In turn, the 
Milicias Urbanas were composed of white free males between the ages of sixteen and 
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 The Real Cédula of October 7, 1540, signed by Felipe II of Spain ordered all 
Spaniards (age twelve to sixty) living in the West Indies to form part of the militias, 
before that cédula, the militias had  organized themselves voluntarily  in times of need. 
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 Negroni, Historia militar, 62-63. The Milicia Urbana was to be composed of 
white free males between the ages of sixteen and sixty and was entrusted with public 
order and territorial defense. 
 
33 
 
sixty.  Their mission included safeguarding public order and territorial defense. 46  The 
milicia was the only military body opened to those born in the Island until 1741 when 
those born in the Island were permitted to join two of the units of the permanent garrison.   
In 1700 there were 1000 men in the Milicias Irregulares Urbanas.  As Negroni suggests, 
since the permanent garrison of the Island during this period never exceeded 400 men, 
the militia was the core of Puerto Rico’s defenses.47  By 1763, the militias counted 5,611 
men out of a total population of only 46,197 including women and children.48  One out of 
every nine inhabitants was directly involved in the militias.  Furthermore these militia 
men, unlike the regular army garrison troops, had settled in the Island, were part of 
communities, and perhaps more importantly, they were part of families.  The men of the 
Spanish army were rotated in and out, but the militia was organic to the Island and had 
grown roots in it.   
In 1765, the Milicia Irregular Urbana was itself replaced by two bodies, the 
Milicia Urbana and the Milicia Disciplinada (urban and disciplined militia respectively), 
by virtue of the reforms launched by Field Marshall Alejandro O’Reilly.49   O’Reilly 
arrived in Puerto Rico on April 8, 1765 entrusted by Carlos III de Borbón to inspect the 
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 In 1783 Governor Juan Daban assigned the cavalry units of the Milicias 
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way to justify the expenses incurred in providing for this recently created body. Negroni, 
Historia militar, 66, 112. 
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defenses and garrisons of the Spanish Antilles.  In his report on the conditions of the 
Island, O’Reilly dedicated only eleven sections to the political and economic situation of 
the Island while writing fifty-three on military matters.50  Finding the defenses in poor 
state, the troops demoralized, and the absence of relevant data regarding the Milicias 
Irregulares, he recommended their dissolution and the creation of a disciplined entity 
divided in two corps using the Reglamento of the Cuban Militias.51  Out of O’Reilly’s 
recommendations emerged the Milicia Urbana as a type of police force, and the Milicia 
Disciplinada which became the equivalent of a military reserve and the main auxiliary 
corps for the regular troops stationed in the Island.  The Milicias Urbanas created as a 
reserve or auxiliary corps and replacement pool for the Milicias Disciplinadas, and in 
charge of police duties and coastal watch, came to consist of roughly 38,000 men by 
1832 or 11% of the Island population.52   This figure is impressive by itself but more so 
when taking into consideration that it does not include those serving in the Milicias 
Disciplinadas which had roughly 7,000 men under arms, or those serving in the 
Battallones Fijos (battalions of the Spanish army assigned permanently to the Island).53    
Manning the regular garrison of the Island with “hijos de este país”, or those born 
in the Americas, was not an accepted practice within the Spanish Empire.   Nonetheless, 
more often than not, reality superseded legislation.  By the 1640s, “hijos de este país” 
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 Since 1741 there had been artillery and infantry battalion in San Juan, both fijos 
(permanent) and half the positions in it were opened to those born in the Island.  Ibid., 
106-07. 
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were being used to garrison the fortifications in San Juan.  Reprimanded for this practice, 
Capitán General Fernando de la Riva Agüero (1643-48) responded that without those 
born in the Island there would be no one to guard the walls.54  It was not until 1741 that 
those born in Puerto Rico were legally accepted into the regular forces assigned to the 
Island.  By royal decree natives of the Island were allowed to fill up to half the allotted 
military positions for the garrison in Puerto Rico.  Consisting of a force totaling 400 men 
this troop came to be known as the “Batallón de Veteranos” or “Fijo”.55  The Fijo was to 
be reinforced by peninsular troops attached to it and supported, initially, by the Milicias 
Irregulares and later by the urbanos and disciplinados.   After his inspection of the 
Island’s defenses, O’Reilly discharged half the soldiers of the Fijo and promoted 
augmenting the garrison in the Island with peninsular troops which started to rotate in 
regimental strength in 1795.56  
The expansion in size and role of the militias and regular troops in Puerto Rico 
did not occur in a political vacuum nor was this phenomenon just the result of O’Reilly’s 
report and recommendations.  Events in Europe and in the Spanish Empire in the 
Americas precipitated the growth and relevance of the Puerto Rican militias.  The French 
Revolution and subsequent revolutionary and Napoleonic wars propelled the wheels of 
change in the Americas as much as it did in Europe.57  Undoubtedly, the Napoleonic 
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 In 1808 the Spanish Empire in the Americas extended from California to Cape 
Horn and from the mouth of the Orinoco to the Pacific Ocean.  This empire was divided 
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invasion of Spain provided for the brief rise of liberalism in the peninsula and in the 
Island.  By the decree of January 22, 1809, after three centuries of absolutist rule, the 
Junta Suprema y Gubernativa de España e Indias provided for the election in the Island 
of one diputado a cortes (representative to the courts).   The decree also recognized the 
American colonies as Spanish provinces.58   It is at this point that political tendencies in 
the Island became more contrasting, and not surprisingly this is also the beginning of a 
                                                                                                                                                 
in four viceroyalties and was inhabited by seventeen-million people.  Roughly two 
decades afterwards, Cuba and Puerto Rico were all that was left of such vast empire.  
Many scholars have tried to explain what caused Spain to lose its empire so abruptly.  
The most common explanations include Spain’s economic stagnation within the frame of 
the industrial and commercial revolutions, and the commercial expansion of Europe 
(particularly England), the creole-peninsular competition, the coming of nationalism, the 
Bourbon reforms, as well as the impact of the Enlightenment, the French and American 
revolutions, and the Napoleonic Wars.  A work that emphasizes the role of the Bourbon 
reforms in bringing about insurrection, by among other things, ending the de facto 
autonomy  if not independence of the American territories is; John Lynch, The Spanish-
American Revolutions, 1808-1826: A Unified Account of the Revolutions that Swept Over 
South America and Central America in the Early Nineteenth-Century, (2nd  edition) 
Revolutions in the Modern World, (New York:  W.W. Norton and Company, 1986), 
1,2,7-9,23.  For the role of the Napoleonic Wars in bringing about independence to the 
former Spanish empire see; Jay Kinsbruner, Independence in Spanish America: Civil 
Wars, Revolutions and Underdevelopment, (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico 
Press, 2000), 3, 6, 37, 157.  See also; Timothy E. Anna., Spain and the Loss of America, 
(Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1983).  Anna argues that “the massive weakening 
of the old principles of society and government in the peninsula,” which started with the 
Napoleonic invasion of 1808, “made American independence possible” (xii).  It was, 
however, the restitution of the constitutional regime that made Spanish-American 
independence inevitable by “destroying the cohesion of the central government in 
Madrid” (245).  For a work of synthesis see also; Peggy K. Liss, Atlantic Empires: The 
Network of Trade and Revolution, 1713-1826, John Hopkins Studies in Atlantic History 
and Culture (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1983). The French and American 
revolutions, as well as the commercial and industrial revolutions play major roles in this 
comparative synthesis.  She rejects the role of panaceas for diverse historical events that 
have been given to structural, neo-Marxists and dependency theories, as well as general 
explanations based on capitalism, imperialism and modernity.  Liss rather emphasizes the 
role of ideas and individuals and seeks to show how the material and ideological elements 
of revolutions, especially how they interplay, are equally important (222).   
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long campaign to demobilize those born in Puerto Rico.  Criollos and some reform-
minded peninsulares grouped under liberal and reformist ideas while the merchant class 
and the colonial administration became markedly conservative.59  The liberals and 
reformists won the general elections held between 1809 and 1813, and during this period 
Puerto Ricans earned Spanish citizenship.   
The rapid growth of the militias and the political power gained by the liberals in 
the Island alarmed the Spanish authorities.  In 1810, Capitán General Salvador Meléndez 
(1809-20) tried to dissolve the Milicias Urbanas but failed to do so.  In effect the Milicia 
Urbana expanded from roughly 17,000 men in 1810 to 33,000 in 1813.  Furthermore, the 
militias in Aguadilla and Mayagüez (North-West and West part of the Island 
respectively) came to include batteries with over forty pieces of artillery.60  The urbanos, 
which were composed in its entirety of “hijos de este país” had become a formidable 
force.  With the peninsula in despair due to the French invasion and fearing insurrection 
in the rest of the empire, Melendez could not push too hard and risk alienating the 
Island’s population nor could he really rescind of the urbanos manpower.   
The French invasion of the Iberian Peninsula and the wars of independence in the 
Spanish Empire compelled political fluctuations and created military needs which at first 
benefited the Island.  The milicias expansion and the weakness of the crown and the 
cortes, allowed the liberals briefly to gain the upper hand, both on the peninsula and in 
the Island.  That does not mean that the Spanish colonial administration in the Puerto 
Rico did not try to curtail the power of liberals and separatists alike.  In what is known as 
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the “Falso motín de Santa Teresa”, Governor Melendez planed to stage a mock uprising 
so he could use the opportunity to move against separatists and liberal elements.  The 
newly created constitutional government, warned of Melendez’s intentions, alerted the 
population which stayed in their houses during the mock uprising of October 15, 1813, 
and the ruse failed.61   However, after France’s defeat and the restoration of the absolutist 
monarch Fernando VII, the militias came under attack as well as the liberals.   
Fernando VII moved quickly to reduce the power of liberals and the role of the 
militia in the Island.  On May 4, 1814, he returned Puerto Rico to colonial status.  Those 
born in Puerto Rico lost political representation and their Spanish citizenship.  The return 
of the king also doomed regular military units in the Island.  El Fijo which had 
participated in the Haitian Revolution between 1792 and 1793, and was again sent to 
Santo Domingo in 1809-12, came under suspicion when it was dispatched to Venezuela.  
Sending the Fijo to Venezuela to aid the royalist’s armies drew criticism from criollos in 
Puerto Rico which prompted Fernando VII to suppress the body in 1815.62  Despite the 
protest of prominent criollos and even the secretary of government in the Island, the Fijo 
was not to be reinstated.  It is important that even the colonial administration recognized 
that dissolving the body was not just unnecessary but counterproductive since it offended 
the sensibility of loyal Puerto Ricans.63  Seven decades would pass before the “hijos de 
este país” were again accepted into the Spanish army units serving in the Island.      
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Emboldened by the return of the absolutist king, Melendez sought to neutralize 
the Milicia Urbana and in 1817 created a new reglamento which stripped the urbanos of 
firearms restricting them to the use of machete and spears.  Moreover, he sought to put 
the urbanos under the direct control of the Capitán General circumventing local 
authorities.  The reglamento also established the separation of whites and morenos who 
until then had fought in the same units.64  Thus, the only regular military unit in the 
Island which accepted Puerto Ricans, el Fijo, had been suppressed and the all-Puerto 
Rican Milicia Urbana was seriously weakened by removing its firearms.  As if these 
measures were not enough, Melendez proceeded to create a force mirroring the milicias.  
The Insituto de Voluntarios existed in the Island between 1812 and 1898 as a 
paramilitary corps made of mostly peninsular volunteers.  The origin of this corps lay in 
the fear of the colonial authorities that sooner or later both the Milicias Urbanas and 
Disicplinadas would become the nucleus of a rebel army.   Hence the Instituto was 
intended to counterbalance and eventually replace the militias.65  In its inception this 
volunteer corps was exclusively for civilians born in Spain.  Later the Instituto was 
divided in two battalions of “Voluntarios Distinguidos”, one for those born in the Island 
and another for peninsulares.  Merchants and landowners from San Juan made the bulk 
                                                                                                                                                 
suponen; y es preciso conocer su carácter pundonoroso para graduar hasta qué extremo se 
creen lastimados por la extinción del regimiento”.  Tomás de Córdoba also pointed out 
that disbanding the Fijo, closed the military as a career for most of the “hijos de este 
país” who could not afford to send their sons to the peninsula.   
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of these corps.66  In 1813, Capitán General Melendez dissolved the battalions and 
reorganized them into the Cuerpo de Voluntarios Distinguidos.  Melendez also decreed 
that the new corps was to be integrated by those born in Spain or their first generation 
born in the Island and authorized the use weaponry, including firearms, and uniforms 
similar to that of the regular Spanish Army while simultaneously banning the use of 
firearms among the urbanos.67  The voluntarios, who hailed from the most conservative 
families, served as a counterbalance to the urbanos.   
The other militia corps, the disiciplinado, was probably saved by the fact that it 
was essential for the defense of the Island as to curtail its effectiveness, and by the sheer 
lack of peninsular manpower to substitute it.  Though the disciplinados survived 
Melendez’s purge of Puerto Rican elements from the Spanish military, the demobilization 
of the inhabitants of the Island would continue until the whole military and paramilitary 
apparatus was firmly controlled by peninsulares and their offspring.  The urbanos, 
weakened as they were in 1817, continued to fulfill their duties for another five decades 
until 1853 when the Capitan General, Lt. General Fernando de Norzagaray (1852-1855) 
ordered the suppression of the urbanos in several towns.  In 1855 the official order came 
to disband the rest of the corps which was finalized in 1860.68   Eventually, Puerto Rican 
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militias would be replaced by the Instituto de Voluntarios and the Guardia Civil (Civil 
Guard).   
In 1820, there was yet another brief wave of liberalism and constitutional 
government. With the triumph of the constitucionalistas in Spain that year, the 
Constitution of Cadiz of 1812 once more ruled the Island, and the liberales, who 
continued to dominate the elections, actively sought to curtail the power of the Capitán 
General by separating military matters from civilian affairs.69   The Spanish cortes passed 
a law presented by the Puerto Rican representative, Demetrio O’Daly providing for the 
separation of civil and military commands in Puerto Rico, and Francisco González de 
Linares became the first civil governor of the Island in 1822.  This separation of powers, 
however, was short-lived; it was annulled in December 1823 with the return of the 
absolutist regime of Fernando VII.70  After Fernando VII’s death on September 1833, 
María Cristina de Borbón became regent queen on behalf of Isabel II, and named 
Francisco Martínez de la Rosa as prime minister.  The new peninsular regime 
reestablished the cortes and called for new elections to be held on July, 1834.71  The 
liberals continued to dominate the elections until 1836 when for the first time 
conservative representatives were elected, mostly due to the restrictive system of 
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“electores pudientes” or well-to-do voters, which favored the conservatives.72  Even after 
the triumph of the conservatives in 1836, Spain saw fit to end American representation in 
the cortes and to vest the military governor of the Island with dictatorial powers known 
as “facultades omnimodas”.73  This absolutist period lasted until the Revolución Gloriosa 
of 1868 which resulted in the overthrowing of Isabel II and her eventual abdication on 
June 25, 1870.  The return of a semi-constitutional period occurred as the result of a 
combination of revolts which shocked the Spanish Empire in 1868.  And, at least in 
Puerto Rico, constitutionalism was severely limited by the weakness of the liberals who 
had witnessed the military and paramilitary apparatus in the Island gradually fall into the 
hands of the peninsulares and their conservative allies.  
In 1864, the Cuerpo de Voluntarios Distinguidos, which since 1812 had acted as a 
counterbalance for the Puerto Rican militias, was reorganized and expanded with the 
name of Instituto de Voluntarios.   Negroni agrees that the expansion was necessary to 
replace the permanent garrison in the Island much of which had been sent to La Española 
to suffocate the Dominican rebellion which followed that island’s reincorporation to the 
Spanish empire in 1861.74  The need to replace the troops was indeed real.  However, 
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nothing but the peninsulares’ fear and their mistrust of those born in the Island justified 
the replacement of regular troops by the volunteers.  Though the urbanos had been 
demobilized a few years earlier, the disciplinados were still in place and could have taken 
the place of the regular troops.  The colonial authorities, nonetheless, decided once more 
to insult the militia by strengthening the peninsulares and those born in Puerto Rico who 
were known conservatives and ultra loyalists.     
On June 7, 1867, an event known as the Tercer alzamiento de artilleros, occurred 
in San Juan.  Disgusted by not enjoying the same privileges as the artillery men serving 
in the peninsula, a group of soldiers from the artillery regiment rioted.  Though the 
uprising was triggered by the economic inequalities between peninsular soldiers serving 
in the Island and those in the peninsula, the governor, Lt. General José María 
Marchessi(1865-1867) ordered the execution by firing squad of a corporal and took the 
opportunity to exile several separatists, among them, Ramón Emeterio Betances and 
Segundo Ruiz Belvis.75  Ironically, exile put these separatist leaders directly in touch with 
Cuban revolutionaries in New York and may have triggered the events that led to the 
Lares revolt of 1868.  
It is noteworthy that the Spanish Glorious Revolution (Revolución Gloriosa or 
Septembrina) of September 18, 1868 in the peninsula combined with the Grito de Lares 
of September 23 in Puerto Rico and  the Grito de Yara of October 10 in Cuba to bring a 
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liberal government  to Spain.  However, even though Spain was flirting with liberalism, 
the governor of the Island, General José Laureano Sanz (1868-1870 and 1875) was 
markedly reactionary.  Sanz engaged heavily in political persecution and banishment to 
quiet the liberals, and went so far as to create a Guardia Civil and to vest the Instituto de 
Voluntarios with military protections (fueros) while serving as a political body.  Under 
Sanz the main mission of the voluntarios was to keep the liberals under surveillance and 
to counter the Puerto Rican milicias which the colonial authorities had never fully 
trusted.76  Furthermore, when the Spanish cortes approved a new constitution on June 6, 
1869, it was not extended to Puerto Rico.  At this point, the cortes were bent upon 
following a colonial policy of assimilation regarding insular possessions.77   
After the Lares insurrection, the Insituto de Voluntarios began to expand while 
the milicias were being extinguished.  Between 1868 and 1870, Sanz reorganized the 
Instituto into nine battalions roughly divided by districts.  On 27 July 1869, at Sanz’s 
urging, the Reglamento de Voluntarios was published.  Among other things it allowed its 
members to be protected under the “fuero activo de Guerra” during time of war, and the 
“fuero criminal” after fifteen years of service.78  These protections effectively awarded 
legal impunity to the voluntarios.  Furthermore, on November 1, 1868 at the urgency of 
Sanz, the Spanish minister of overseas possessions authorized the creation of the Guardia 
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Civil in Puerto Rico.79  The Guardia Civil was always limited to internal affairs, meaning 
that its mission was to control the population and civil order.  Sanz immediately moved to 
make of the guardia a loyal and effective repressive tool.  Since its inception its members 
were from the conservative faction in the Island who immediately proceeded to persecute 
the liberals.  In its first years, the guardia was composed of roughly 300 men, all of them 
peninsulares.   Like the voluntarios, the Guardia Civíl soon came to be protected by all 
the fueros protecting the military.80   
Immediately before the Lares revolt, the Milicias Disciplinadas  were composed 
of 7,900 men, which as Negroni points out  was about the same strength of the Puerto 
Rico U.S. National Guard in 1992 when the Island’s population approached four million 
inhabitants.  Since a lieutenant, an alférez (second lieutenant in the Spanish military) and 
a few soldiers from the militia participated in the revolt, the loyalty of the whole corps 
was put in doubt.  On February 12, 1870, Governor General Sanz ordered the suppression 
of the Milicias Disciplinadas’ active service effective March 1870.  The troop was 
discharged.  The cadre of officers was allowed to continue wearing their uniforms and to 
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receive monthly payments for service and pension, but for all purposes they had no 
reason d’être.81   
Military education also came to be reserved for peninsulares and their 
conservative allies.  Out of O’Reilly’s recommendations a military academy had been 
founded in the Island in 1765.82  In 1874 the Academia was reorganized and renamed the 
Academia de Infantería with room for sixteen cadets.  Though in theory anyone between 
the ages of sixteen and twenty-five could apply for admission (fourteen, if the applicant 
was a member of a military family), the acceptance requirements effectively banned 
those not belonging to the elite from studying in the Academia.83  Moreover, two thirds of 
the positions were to be filled by the children of military personnel leaving the remaining 
third children of civilians.  Since Puerto Ricans were effectively banned from the military 
(until 1884) two thirds of the cadets were actually the children of peninsular officers,  
and, given the rigorous requirement for admittance, only those in position to secure an 
extraordinary education for their children could hope to send them to the Academia.  This 
elite academy, which provided the best education in the Island until the change of 
sovereignty in 1898 was in effect reserved for peninsulares, their offspring, and the 
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elite.84  In 1880 the Island was allowed to send students directly to the military academies 
in Spain, but being that the admittance process was as rigorous and with the added 
economic constraint, the military schools were for all purposes reserved for the Island’s 
elites.   
For practical purposes, the elimination of el Fijo in 1815, the urbanos between 
1855 and 1860, and the disciplinados in 1870, coupled with the strict requirements and 
exclusionary policies of the military academy, combined to demobilize the inhabitants of 
Puerto Rico with the exception of the peninsulares and their conservative allies.  
Moreover, as Puerto Ricans were being excluded from traditional military and 
paramilitary institutions, the colonial administration used every opportunity to strengthen 
the Guardia Civíl and the voluntarios.  The dearth of a military force that could 
counterbalance the military institutions in the hands of peninsulares weakened the 
liberals who had to be content with whatever liberal reforms emerged from the political 
crises which periodically took place in the peninsula.  
Out of the reforms that followed the critical period of September1868, emerged 
the first political parties in the Island.  On November 20, 1870 the Partido Liberal 
Reformista (PLR) was founded in Puerto Rico.  Farmers, cattle ranchers, industrialists, 
storekeepers, professionals and the middle class made the bulk of the party.85  The 
liberal-reformists were divided between two philosophies: autonomy and assimilation.  
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The latter became dominant breaking with a long tradition of liberals seeking autonomy 
dating back to the first Puerto Rican delegado a las cortes, Ramón Power y Giralt.   
Undoubtedly, the quick suppression of the Lares’ rebels, and the political persecution and 
banishment of separatists and liberals alike provided the ground for this apparent rupture 
with autonomist ideals.    
A few days after the establishment of the PLR, the conservatives followed suit 
and created their own party.  New elections were held in 1871 and were completely 
dominated by the liberals.  These general elections conformed to the Spanish constitution 
of 1869 which allowed for fifteen diputados a cortes to be elected.  The liberals obtained 
over 90% of the votes (9,773 versus 1,004) and elected 14 diputados.   Sanz, who had 
been replaced by the liberal governor Lt. General Gabriel Baldrich (1870-1871) on May 
20, 1870, was the only conservative elected running for the district of San Juan where 
most conservatives concentrated.86  The conservatives responded promoting instability by 
causing riots and accusing governor Baldrich of harboring liberals.  Their efforts bore 
fruit, and Baldrich was relieved of his charge on September 13, 1871 and replaced by yet 
another conservative, Ramón Gómez Pulido, in order to placate the influent 
conservatives.87  New elections were held on April 1872 but instead of following the 
electoral law of 1870, they were run under a decree recognizing the voting rights of only 
free Spaniards, who were at least twenty-five years old, and who were literate or could 
instead pay eight pesos to the colonial authorities.  Nine of the fifteen delegates elected 
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were peninsulares and eight were from the conservative faction.  This phenomenon was 
known as cunerismo or election by birthplace.88  
The liberal delegates elected in that election succeeded in presenting the 
irregularities of the 1872 elections before the cortes paving the way for new elections to 
be held in August of the same year.  The liberals won every district but that of San Juan 
where the conservatives concentrated to elect Sanz once more.  This period was followed 
by a series of reforms including the final abolition of slavery, more extensive male 
suffrage, freedom of the press and association, and the elimination of the governor’s 
facultades omnimodas.  In 1873 the liberals controlled every district as the conservatives 
abstained from participating.89  None of these reforms would had been possible without 
Amadeo I de Saboya’s abdication to the throne which prompted the Spanish Cortes to 
declare the first Spanish Republic on February 11, 1873.90  The government of the new 
republic moved to make of Puerto Rico one of the eighteen states included in the Spanish 
federal republic and extended all the protections of the Spanish constitution of 1869 to 
those born in Puerto Rico.91  These measures were short-lived.   
The fall of the Spanish Republic on January 3, 1874 brought the accession of 
Alfonso XII and a parliamentary monarchy to the peninsula, but the Island regressed to a 
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more absolutist reality.  Once more, Laureano Sanz was sent to Puerto Rico as governor 
with restored facultades omnimodas.  He immediately eliminated constitutional 
guaranties as well as freedom of the press and association.  Sanz also imposed a new 
Bando (decree) banning vagrancy and expelled from the government and teaching 
positions those deemed to be liberals.  Moreover, following Sanz’s steps, on March 4, 
1873, the Capitán General Juan Martínez Plowes had promoted the Instituto de 
voluntarios to “active reserve of the Army” and expanded the corps to thirteen battalions 
with four companies of 100 men each.  The voluntarios were composed of the most pro-
Spanish elements in the Island, and since its members belonged to the conservative party 
(later Incondicional Español), they effectively became a political party in arms.92  After 
his return to power in 1875, Sanz obtained permission to double the guardia civil, and 
used both corps to persecute the liberals.93  Even though Sanz was removed in 1875, 
mostly due to international pressure, his successor, General Segundo de la Portilla (1875-
1877) was able to help elect “cuneros” from the conservative families.  The conservatives 
(“Incondicionales” after 1880) without the participation of the liberals won all the seats 
in the general elections of 1876 and dominated all six general elections between 1879 and 
1896.94   In just eight years after the Lares Revolt the liberals in the Island had been 
weakened to the point that participating in general elections became pointless.   
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In 1887, out of the havoc created by the colonial administration’s persecution, the 
introduction of “compontes” or corporal punishment and imprisonment of hundreds of 
liberals, under the governorship of Romualdo Palacio emerged the Partido Autonomista 
Puertorriqueño (PAP).95 Though Román Baldorioty de Castro, founder of the party and 
arguably one of the most influential Puerto Rican political figures of the nineteenth 
century, desired a more flexible and autonomous relation with the metropolis, the 
autonomistas’ assembly chose the views of Rafael María de Labra.  Thus, the goals of 
this new party were to obtain the same political and legal identity and protections as those 
living in the peninsula and to seek the greatest degree of decentralization within the 
framework of national unity.96   Even Luis Muñoz Rivera, soon to emerge as one of the 
dominant political figures in the Island and faithful friend of Baldorioty de Castro, did 
not believe that full autonomy was an attainable goal and urged instead for 
decentralization.  Weighting the options of the liberals, Muñoz Rivera rejected 
annexation to the United States on the grounds that “all Puerto Ricans feel proud of their 
Latin blood”.  He also rejected the “…separatist rebellion which no one amongst us 
defends, and, given the people’s circumstances is an impossible utopia.” 97   
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The autonomistas did not participate in the general elections of 1893-96.  The 
whole period was marked by constant dissension amongst the autonomist leadership and 
of electoral boycotting in protest of what they perceive as unfair electoral laws which 
severely limited the number of voters.  However, on August 8, 1897, an anarchist 
assassinated the Spanish Prime Minister Antonio Cánovas del Castillo setting the stage 
for Práxedes Mateo Sagasta to assume the presidency of the Spanish government.  
Sagasta, as leader of the Partido Liberal Fusionista Español, had agreed with Muñoz 
Rivera to grant an autonomous government (régimen autonómico) to Puerto Rico in 
exchange for the autonomistas support of his party.98   To reflect the nature of the new 
alliance with Sagasta, the autonomist party changed its name to Partido Liberal 
Fusionista Puertorriqueño. The republican faction within the autonomist party, led by 
José Celso Barbosa abandoned the party and created the Partido Autonomista Histórico  
(Ortodoxo).99  Soon after coming to power Sagasta made good his promise to the 
autonomistas by securing the Carta Autonómica (Autonomous Charter) on November 25, 
1897.   
The Carta Autonómica of 1897 was liberal indeed.  Sixteen Puerto Rican 
delegates were to be elected by popular vote to represent the Island in the cortes of the 
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kingdom while three senators were to be chosen by an assembly of elected officials to 
serve in the Peninsular Congress.  The assembly also elected the eight members of the 
Consejo de Administración (Administrative Council), which together with the 32 member 
and popularly-elected Cámara de Representantes (Chamber of Representatives) 
constituted the Puerto Rican Parliament or legislature.   Title VII , article 43 of the charter  
guaranteed  veto power to  the Puerto Rican parliament over decisions reached  by the 
Peninsular Congress, while  Article 2 declared that the “present constitution shall not be 
amended except by virtue of a special law and upon petition of the insular parliament.”100  
The charter also provided for the creation of a cabinet by the wining coalition or party.  
The seven ministries of the new cabinet were of extreme importance and included: 
Treasury; Agriculture, Industry and Commerce; Public Works, Communication and 
Transportation; Public Education; and Justice and Government, plus a presiding cabinet 
member.101   However, as established by Article 41, the governor retained command of 
all the armed forces in the Island, and all authorities and offices remained subordinated to 
his office.102  Moreover, the charter was declared by royal decree and not by a law passed 
by the cortes.  Thus, while seeking liberal reforms, Sagasta and the liberals had to 
circumvent the most republican of Spanish institutions. 
The new regime was inaugurated On February 8, 1898 and general elections were 
held in March 27 of the same.  Of roughly 120,000 votes the autonomistas obtained over 
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97,000 versus the conservatives 3,729 votes.103   Sixteen autonomistas, ten from the 
liberal faction and six from the orthodox, were elected as diputados a cortes.  On April 
10 of the same year the first cabinet was formed and the three senators chosen.104  On 
April 21, 1898 scarcely two months after the inauguration of the autonomic government, 
the Governor General of the Island declared Martial Law.  On July 17, 1898 
constitutional guarantees were reinstated and the Insular Parliament was inaugurated.  
Eight days later the United States invaded Puerto Rico. 
The Carta Autonómica and the subsequent electoral victory represent the triumph 
of the autonomistas, and throughout the following century it would capture the 
imagination of different political groups seeking autonomy or other decolonization 
formulas.  However, the circumstances of such success must be examined.  The granting 
of the Autonomous Charter had as much to do with chance (the assassination of Cánovas 
del Castillo) as with international and colonial problems plaguing Spain.  By 1897, the 
Cuban war of independence was in full swing and diplomatic relations between the 
United States and Spain had reached a historical low.  In 1895, when the Cuban rebellion 
started with the Grito de Baire, the U.S. followed a path of neutrality, which actually 
favored the Spaniards.105  Support of the Spanish regime, however, was conditional. The 
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Spaniards had to  facilitate Cuban trade with the U.S. and were not to relinquish Cuban 
sovereignty to any foreign country or the Cubans.  Moreover, any modification of 
sovereignty that “did not result in U.S. acquisition of the island was unaceptable.”106    
When it became evident that the Spaniards could not bring an end to the war, the 
Cleveland administration took a firmer stand seeking to gain concessions for the Cubans 
hoping that such measures would stop the conflict and prevent the independence of the 
island.  The Cuban rebels themselves had become an unwanted third party.107  By 1897 it 
was evident that sooner or later the Cuban rebels would win the war.  For three years the 
Cubans had been destroying the logistic infrastructure of the island, rendering the 
Spanish army incapable of launching major military actions.  The rebels “had brought the 
Spanish army to the brink of defeat.”108  They were so certain oftheir inminent victory 
that they rejecetd Spain’s offering of autonomy.109  Unlike their  countreparts in Puerto 
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eventually so did the autonomistas in Puerto Rico, who also decided not to participate in 
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Rico, the Cuban leaders had the military means to obtain independence.  This situation 
left McKinley’s administration with two choices: to accept Cuban independence or to 
sanction military intervention.  McKinley followed Cleveland’s latest approach.  In his 
inaugural address he referred to the unrest in Cuba, and stated that a “firm and dignified 
policy that would protect the rights of Americans everywhere was needed.”110  The 
increasingly aggressive posture of the United States government put Spain in a precarious 
position and made the ceasing of hostilities imperative.   It is within this context that the 
autonomic charter of 1897 came into existence.  
Soon after the second class battleship Maine exploded in Havana harbor on 
February 15, 1898, the U.S. entered the war and quickly defeated inferior Spanish forces 
weakened by years of fighting in Cuba and the Philippines.  As a result of its victory over 
Spain, and by virtue of the Treaty of Paris of December 10, 1898, the United States 
gained full control over Puerto Rico, Guam, Wake Island, and the Philippines, and 
limited control – by the Teller Amendment - over Cuba.111  As it had been with the short 
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lived political reforms obtained throughout the nineteenth century, the lifespan of the 
Carta Autonómica was at the whims of the military and political rulers from the 
peninsular metropolis.  The Puerto Rican delegates were excluded from the peace 
negotiations even though the future of the Island was at stake, and according to the 
Island’s legal political relations with Spain, as stated in the charter of 1897; they had veto 
power over such decisions.  That they did not have a voice in the Paris protocols 
evidenced the ephemeral and capricious nature of liberal overtures within the Spanish 
political establishment.  
The failure of the liberales and later of the autonomistas to secure a stronger 
presence within the Spanish military in the Island or to restore the Puerto Rican militias 
left them in a very weak position from which to negotiate with both Spain and the United 
States.  The autonomistas were also undermined for reasons beyond their control.  
Throughout the nineteenth century the separatists consistently failed to become a 
significant threat to the colonial authorities in Puerto Rico.  More likely, their failed and 
sometimes stillborn attempts to overthrow the Spanish authorities served as an excuse to 
demobilize the inhabitants of the Island, to arm the most loyalists and conservative 
elements of Puerto Rican society, to curtail civil rights, and to persecute those liberals 
who stayed in the Island.  Thus, separatists’ attempts served to erode the position of the 
liberals who had to prove their loyalty and endure cyclical waves of retrograde political 
persecution.    
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During the periods of crises that periodically visited the peninsula and the rest of 
the Spanish Empire, especially between 1808 and 1824, and 1868, Puerto Rico did not 
obtain its independence.  Instead of more inclusion, these periods of crisis provided 
opportunities for the metropolis to exclude from the Island’s polity groups which had 
previously enjoyed limited inclusion, while giving bureaucratic positions and putting the 
military into the hands of newly-arrived peninsulares and royalists from the American 
mainland.  Actually, with the exception of some short-lived liberal openings, those born 
in the Island were gradually demobilized and coerced into working for agro-capitalist 
enterprises.  The demobilization and peonización of those born in the Island were but two 
sides of the same coin.  Not surprisingly, demobilization occurred while new policies, 
such as the reglamento de jornaleros, were established to provide cheap, and in some 
cases free labor for the developing agro-capitalist industry.    
When the Americans invaded on July 25 of 1898, neither the will nor the skills to 
resist them or to overthrow the colonial regime were present among the population of the 
Island which had been finally demobilized in 1870.   Even, Ramón Emeterio Betances, 
who had dedicated his life to winning Puerto Rico’s independence, lamented that Puerto 
Ricans were not rising in arms to overthrow the Spaniards and warned that such lack of 
initiative would doom its political future making it a perpetual American colony.  
Betances lamented: 
“What are the Puerto Ricans doing?  Why don’t they take advantage of the 
blockade to rise en masse?  It’s extremely important that when the first troops of 
the United States reach shore, they should be received by Puerto Rican troops, 
waving the flag of independence and greeting them.  Let the North Americans 
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cooperate in the achievement of our freedom; but not push the country to 
annexation.  If Puerto Rico does not move quickly, it will become an American 
colony forever.” 112      
Eugenio María de Hostos, another exiled Puerto Rican revolutionary and independence 
advocate, always decried not been allowed to become an artillery officer because though 
he had the will to fight for freedom he did not know how.113   
With the suppression of the disciplinados in 1870, civilian participation in the 
defense of the Island came to an end and would not be fully restored until the creation of 
the United States Puerto Rico National Guard in 1919.  The “hijos de este país”, with the 
exception of the most unconditional loyalists, were excluded from this vital access to 
socio-economic and political power.  Captaincies had been passed down from father to 
son to grandson, and the capitán de milicias was a respected community member.   
Moreover, even though conservative well-to-do volunteers replaced the milicias, they did 
not capture the imagination of the Puerto Ricans, nor did they instill the pride the milicias 
once did and continue to do.  For, if the milicias had existed to protect the Island, the 
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entities which replaced them were intended for the suppression of the local population 
and the persecution of the liberals.  As a matter of fact, every work of Puerto Rican 
military history traces the existing U.S. Puerto Rico National Guard units to these militias 
which came to be known as milicias puertorriqueñas and purposely exclude the Guardia 
Civíl  and the Instituto de Voluntarios from their lineage.114   
In 1870, with the dissolution of the disciplinados, Puerto Rico’s military and 
paramilitary apparatus came to be completely in the hands of peninsulares, and later 
shared with their offspring.  It has been pointed out that displacement of those born in the 
Island by peninsulares precipitated the Lares Revolt and subsequent attempts  to 
overthrow the Spanish colonial regime, as well as the emergence of  a distinguishable 
Puerto Rican identity; ironically exclusion from the military has not been analyzed as 
displacement, disenfranchisement and hence, a cause of severe grievance against Spain.  
In effect, after 1870, as Negroni rightly points out, los hijos de este país were relegated to 
the role of prisoners with the Island as their prison.115    
The exclusionary policies of the Spanish colonial administration, as early as the 
1810s, when the rest of the empire, but Cuba and Puerto Rico, revolted and finally won 
independence, created tensions between criollos and peninsulares at the highest levels of 
power.  The emergence of the Instituto and the final suppression of the milicias sent a 
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message to those born in the Island; they were not to be trusted for they were not really 
Spaniards.  More importantly, the male population that did not belong to the elite found 
itself ever more excluded from access to socio-economic power, and even adulthood for 
if they could not defend their land, they remained in childlike state, especially given the 
colony’s military character and tradition.  Removing the natives of Puerto Rico from the 
colonial armed forces, a very restrictive polity, and dearth of a common education were 
some of the patterns of exclusion that led to the slow development of a distinct national 
identity in the Island.  Thus it was not the Lares Revolt itself, but the policies followed by 
the colonial authorities afterwards what fueled the developing of a distinctive Puerto 
Rican national identity or identities.  However, this was embryonic as Puerto Ricans still 
retained many cultural affinities vis-à-vis Spain such as language and religion.  The 
developing of a separate identity was also slowed by the criollo elite’s reluctance to move 
toward independence, which itself was a consequence of the weakening of the criollo 
elite by the demobilization of the inhabitants of the Island.  Nonetheless, the landslide 
victory of the autonomistas in 1898 shows that the majority of the inhabitants had moved 
away from the incondicionalismo español.  This is even more important when 
considering that the autonomistas of 1898 were not sponsoring the water-down version 
defended by the liberals right after the Lares revolt, but a more radical stance which 
among other things declared the right of the Puerto Ricans to govern their Island as they 
saw fit. 
When the first U.S. soldiers landed in the Island, most Puerto Ricans had no 
reason to support the Spanish colonial administration.  As a matter of fact, initially, the 
majority of the people openly embraced the invaders.  Soon afterwards resistance against 
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the American occupation materialized.  Most of the resistance as well as much support 
given to the new imperial master was to come from the criollo elites who had played the 
power game with the Spanish metropolis and would continue to do so with the U.S.  This 
time, however, separatistas, autonomistas and anexionistas had learned their lesson.  
There would be neither independence, nor autonomy or inclusion into the Union if the 
Puerto Ricans did not bear arms either as part of the armies of the new metropolis or as 
native militia.  Under the new regime, enfranchisement, regaining masculinity and 
decolonization were to be sought by all means, including and in fact emphasizing, 
military service. 
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CHAPTER 2 
PUERTO RICAN A LÀ AMERICANA: AN ALTERNATIVE NATION? 1898-1914 
The native [Puerto Rican] soldiers have become  an object  lesson to the 
communities in the neighborhoods of their posts… and  from that standpoint, as 
from  many others have undoubtedly been  a very potent education influence.  
Each man of the battalion will be a committee in himself to spread among the 
natives, stories of American prestige…     The soldiers feel a pride in their service 
and there is an undoubted stimulant by it toward general loyalty.”116 
 
In the aftermath of the Spanish-Cuban-Pilipino-American War of 1898, the 
United States engaged in its first overseas nation-building projects.  As de facto ruler of 
the Philippines, Cuba and Puerto Rico, the United States sought to transform the socio-
economic and political structures of these countries into something more in tune with 
mainstream American tenets.  In few places were these efforts as intense and prolonged 
as in Puerto Rico.  As the United States took over Puerto Rico, it immediately began 
sanitary and relief efforts while building a public education system in the image of the 
New England school system.  The transformation of the Island was not limited to 
humanitarian projects.  The American colonial administration sought to change the socio-
economic and political structures in Puerto Rico too.  In essence the structures created or 
re-imagined by the colonial authorities were intended to mold the Puerto Ricans in the 
image of Americans.  Indeed, the new metropolis’ early attempts to “modernize” the 
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Island and its inhabitants through a nation-building project supposedly guided by 
“benevolent assimilation” and “compassionate uplifting”, were part of a comprehensive 
plan to “Americanize” the Island and its inhabitants.117  This nation-building project 
relied heavily, both directly and indirectly, on the military.   
The American colonial administrators, however, were not the only actors in this 
play.  The criollo leadership, from diverse political tendencies and for different reasons, 
initially welcomed the Americans, participated actively in the institutions of the new 
metropolis, and urged the acceptance of Puerto Ricans into the U.S. military as well as 
the creation of a native militia to garrison the Island.  Furthermore, the criollo leadership 
developed and championed its own versions of Americanization for the Island. This 
chapter analyzes the role of the U.S. military as part of the metropolis’ nation-building 
project and the motivations of the criollo elite for supporting Puerto Rican participation 
in the new military institutions.  Did the combination of an American nation-building 
project and criollo encouragement of participation in the institutions of the new 
metropolis affect the self-perception of Puerto Ricans and hence their national identity?   
Did early U.S. efforts to Americanize the Puerto Ricans transcend cultural differences?  
And, did any alteration of Puerto Rican national identities transmute into political 
movements or alter political loyalties among the inhabitants of the Island?  Furthermore, 
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did the new metropolis succeed in reversing perceived patterns of political exclusion 
among the Island’s population?  By answering these questions this chapter seeks to 
underline the links between the military remobilization of the Puerto Ricans, political 
enfranchisement, and the development of cultural and political identities in the early 
years of American dominance over Puerto Rico.  
Several factors facilitated the transfer of sovereignty over Puerto Rico from Spain 
to the United States in 1898 and in fact eased the nation-building project as envisioned by 
U.S. officials.   The war in Puerto Rico was relatively bloodless which eliminated much 
of the trauma usually associated with this kind of event.   American troops landed in 
Puerto Rico on July 25, 1898, and their campaign extended until August 12 of the same 
year when Spain and the United Sates signed an armistice.  During this period the U.S. 
forces engaged the Spaniards on six occasions suffering thirty-six wounded and seven 
killed in action while the Spaniards suffered eighty-eight wounded and seventeen killed 
in action.118  Moreover, U.S. Army Major General Nelson Miles, commander of U.S. 
troops in Puerto Rico, took great pains not to alienate the local population.119  He even 
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went so far as to try to obtain the release of Puerto Rican political prisoners in Spain and 
Africa in an attempt to win the goodwill of the Puerto Ricans.120    
General Miles took into account the support, or at least the neutrality, of the local 
population when designing his plan of action in Puerto Rico.  Surprising even his closest 
aides, he changed the initial landings, scheduled to take place in Fajardo in the northeast 
tip of the Island, to Guánica which is located in the southwest.  Much emphasis has been 
put on inter-service rivalry and Miles’ obsession with relegating the Navy to a secondary 
role in this campaign to explain the landing at Guánica.  It is likely, however, that 
military and political matters weighed more on Miles than inter-service rivalry.  As Miles 
informed the naval commander of the expedition, the population of the southern part of 
the Island was more inclined to side with the Americans than those near the capital and 
that landing in the south would take the Spaniards by surprise, tipping their defenses off 
balance.121   
Regardless Miles intended to limit the role of the Navy in the Puerto Rican 
campaign that was indeed the result of his strategy.  After landing at multiple sites along 
the southern coast the invading force moved west and north in four different columns 
advancing without naval cover.  That it was the army which received the most exposure 
during the campaign, was part of Miles’ plan.  He had informed Secretary of War Russell 
A. Algers of the benefits of marching across the country as opposed to marching under 
the protection of the fleet’s guns along the coast.  He insisted that his troops’ visibility 
would attract the support of the Puerto Ricans.  In this regard he even opposed the naval 
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bombardment of San Juan on the grounds that it would cause unnecessary harm to 
civilians and needlessly alienate a population willing to assist the Americans.122  In 
effect, Miles undertook a campaign for the hearts and minds of the Puerto Ricans.  His 
gamble paid off.   The immense majority of Puerto Ricans sided with the invading force 
and welcomed the American soldiers as liberators. Puerto Ricans also volunteered as 
scouts, provided intelligence, and organized small foot and mounted raiding parties 
across the Island which scourged the Spaniards and their allies by burning their 
plantations and stores and seizing their property.  These actions hindered the Spanish 
defense and accelerated Miles advance.123  In early August, the Gobernador General of 
Puerto Rico Manuel Macías y Casado, complained to the Spanish Minister of War that:  
“The majority of this country [does not] wish to call itself Spanish, preferring American 
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domination. This, the enemy knows and is proven to him by greetings and adhesions in 
towns that are going to be occupied.”124   
Miles’ carefulness in not aggravating the population responded to U.S. designs for 
the Island.  On May 26, Captain Alfred T. Mahan,125 Secretary of War Alger, Secretary 
of the Navy John D. Long, and General Miles held a war council.   The U.S. had 
considered invading Puerto Rico before Cuba to force the Spaniards to support the war in 
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Cuba from their own home shores.  The navy, however, discarded this plan because it did 
not need Puerto Rico to win the war in Cuba. Furthermore, the navy was concerned with 
dividing the fleet between Cuba and Puerto Rico which could lead to an unfortunate sea 
fight that could alter the balance of maritime power in Spain’s favor.  Thus, the U.S. 
decided to mount two expeditions in the Caribbean, but not simultaneously.  Santiago in 
Cuba would be the first target, and Fajardo, Puerto Rico would follow.  Once Santiago, 
where Admiral Pascual Cervera y Topete’s fleet had anchored, had fallen there would be 
no need to attack Havana.126   
On July 3, the U.S. Flying Squadron destroyed Cervera’s fleet when it attempted 
to escape the American blockade, and on July 13, the Spanish garrison in Santiago de 
Cuba and its department surrendered.  At that moment the war was practically over.127  
There was no need to invade Puerto Rico to win the war.  The U.S. had achieved such 
military superiority over Spain that even Admiral William T. Sampson opposed Miles’ 
request for armored vessels to escort his transports to Puerto Rico.128 Still, Miles received 
the order to proceed to Puerto Rico on July 18, and the Island was invaded seven days 
later.  The motive for such action was to occupy the Island before the end of hostilities 
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prevented the U.S. from doing so.  President McKinley’s administration had decided in 
early June, to annex Puerto Rico “in lieu of indemnities” and the physical presence of the 
U.S. military in the Island would undoubtedly strengthen the U.S.’ position.  That Puerto 
Rico came to be a colonial possession of the United States did not stem from historical 
accident but rather from a calculated design.129 
On July 18, the Spanish asked the French government to approach the United 
States with a request for a cease of hostilities as a preliminary to peace negotiations. The 
French ambassador to the U.S., Jules Cambon, communicated the Spanish request to the 
White House in the afternoon of July 26.   President William McKinley rejected the offer 
for it did not say anything about the Puerto Rico or the Philippines.  On July 30, through 
the office of the French ambassador, McKinley delivered armistice terms to Spain 
demanding that it relinquish control of Cuba and cede Puerto Rico, other islands in the 
Caribbean and the Ladrones in the Pacific.  Spain answered on August 1, inquiring if any 
other territorial indemnification could be substituted for Puerto Rico to which 
Washington responded negatively.  Defeated in the Philippines and in Cuba and unable to 
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win in Puerto Rico, the Spaniards agreed to American terms, and an armistice went into 
effect on August 12, 1898.130    
By virtue of the Treaty of Paris of December 10, 1898, which officially ended the 
state of war between the United States and Spain, the former gained full control over 
Puerto Rico, Guam, Wake Island, and the Philippines, and control limited by the Teller 
Amendment over Cuba.  Spain had officially relinquished control over Puerto Rico and 
on October 18 of the same year the change of sovereignty was completed with the 
evacuation of the last Spanish troops and the raising of the American flag in all public 
buildings.  That day witnessed the inauguration of a military government which lasted 
until May 1900.   
The way in which the Puerto Rican campaign had been conducted and the high 
esteem that Puerto Rican leaders and politicians had for the United Sates and its 
republican institutions allowed for a widespread sense of goodwill towards the new 
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metropolis amongst the general population.131  There was a belief that the Island would 
be given independence or be incorporated as a state of the Union.  The latter option 
seems to have had the most support among both the elite and the masses.  As a matter of 
fact the annexionist movement dates back to 1898 when the former autonomist leadership 
formed two parties, the Federal and the Republican, both with statehood as their goal. As 
discussed by Rafael Bernabe, both Republican and Federal leaders in Puerto Rico 
believed that the U.S. was not a nation but a political entity, a republic providing space 
for many nations and peoples to coexist in equality while enjoying the benefits of 
constitutional democracy.132   The leaders of these two parties saw in the Union the most 
ample and perennial way of sovereignty.   Unsurprisingly, roughly ninety percent of the 
population in Puerto Rico (and of course for this number we use the archives and reports 
of the metropolis) favored annexation to the United States during the first years after the 
war.133    Nonetheless, neither independence nor federated statehood was granted to 
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Puerto Rico.  Instead the U.S. installed a military government and replaced it with a 
civilian colonial administration less than two years later. 
As it is evident from the diplomatic correspondence during the war, the United 
Sates intended to keep Puerto Rico as a permanent possession.  Furthermore, the political 
elite and the popular sectors overwhelmingly favored becoming a state of the Union.  
This situation begs the question; why did Puerto Rico become a colony as opposed to an 
incorporated territory on its way to federated statehood?   The type of territorial and 
political expansion of the United Sates helps to understand the U.S.’s reluctance to 
incorporate Puerto Rico as a territory.  As the U.S. expanded westward the indigenous 
inhabitants of the continent were eliminated, displaced or forcefully removed.  Settlers of 
mostly European background re-peopled the new territories and Congress moved towards 
statehood once the socio-economic and political structures of such territories were firmly 
in the hands of Euro-Americans.134  Though the leaders of the annexionist movement 
knew this history, they believed that as a “civilized”, and “Christian” people fit for self-
government, the Puerto Ricans would be smoothly incorporated into the Union.135   What 
escaped the annexionist leaders was that among the leadership and opinion-making 
                                                 
134
 See, José López Baralt, The Policy of the United States Towards its Territories 
with Special Reference to Puerto Rico (San Juan, P.R.: Editorial de la Universidad de 
Puerto Rico 1999),  and, Foreign in a Domestic Sense: Puerto Rico American Expansion 
and the Constitution, ed by Christina Duffy Burnett and Burke Marshall 
(Durham/London: Duke University Press, 2001). 
 
135
 See; Bernabe, Respuestas al colonialismo, 16-18.  Also see; Roberto Barreto, 
“Appurtenant [sic] and belonging… but not a part of”:   ¿Por  qué el gobierno de los 
Estado Unidos le negó  a los puertorriqueños el  derecho al gobierno propio?” in 1898: 
Enfoques y perspectivas: Simposio Internacional de Historiadores, Cuba, España, 
Estados Unidos, Filipinas y Puerto Rico, (San Juan, P.R.: Academia Puertorriqueña de la 
Historia-First Book Publishing of Puerto Rico, 1997), 447-463. 
 
74 
 
groups in the U.S., Catholicism was not considered the religion of the “civilized”, nor did 
they  believed that Catholics had an aptitude for democratic self-government.136  Worse 
yet, the Puerto Ricans were considered to be the result of miscegenation; an unholy mix 
of Indian, Black and Spaniard.  That the U.S. came to control Puerto Rico in 1898, when 
the dictums of Social Darwinism, pseudo-scientific racism, the White Men’s Burden and 
Manifest Destiny combined to guide U.S. policies upset the plans of the annexionist 
movement in the Island.137   
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Even the most influential American military strategist during this period believed 
that the racial composition of the new territories posed a threat to the social fabric of the 
United States. One of the most important points in Mahan’s theory was that sea power, 
“as a national interest, commercial and military, rests not upon fleets only, but also upon 
local territorial bases in distant commercial regions.”  These territories, Mahan believed, 
had to be extensive and densely populated by a population bound to the sovereign 
country by “those of interest which rest upon the beneficence of the ruler; of which 
beneficence power to protect is not the least factor.”138  According to Mahan’s definition 
the purpose of acquiring colonies should be limited to strategic naval bases, rather than 
turning them into a dump for the unwanted-as he believed was the case of Australia.  For 
this reason, Mahan harbored doubts about annexing the Philippines.  He was solely 
interested in obtaining the military bases needed to reach the Asian and Latin American 
markets, and protecting the sea lines and the racial integrity of the United States.139    
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Regarding the new colonies, Mahan argued that the U.S. should follow the 
“beneficial and parent-like approach of the British instead of the inhumanly oppressive 
Spanish model” for “alien subjects were still in race-childhood.”  He concluded that ultra-
maritime territories could only be secured when “the advantages and interests of the 
inhabitants are the primary object of the imperial administration.140   In short, Mahan 
proposed to use “uplifting benevolence” to pay for the acquisition of the bases needed to 
ensure the prominence of the Anglo-Saxon race.  In the process he established a dictum 
in U.S. extra-continental expansion.   
The McKinley and successive administrations, as well as much of the American 
public, came to believe that colonies were needed from a military and economic 
perspective but that their inclusion as states of the Union would threaten the racial 
integrity of the U.S.141  Consequently,  in 1898 U.S. imperialism needed to become 
colonial and depart from republicanism.  In essence that transformation was also the 
decision of the U.S. Supreme Court during the infamous Insular Cases which tested the 
relationship between the metropolis and the new territories.  In the case of Downes v. 
Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901), Justice Edward D. White stated that  following the doctrine 
of automatically incorporating into the Union newly acquired territories would curtail the 
ability of the U.S. to obtain  territories needed to advanced its foreign policy but 
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undesired as part of the Unión.142   That Puerto Rico was simultaneously wanted and 
unwanted by the U.S.  had an impact on the American as well as the criollo plans for the 
Island.   
An independent or federated Puerto Rico was not a political option for the 
McKinley administration.  This situation had led to the passing of the Foraker Act of 12 
April 1900. According to historian Estades Font, the situation in Puerto Rico, where 
political factions and the population supported the Americans and where a military native 
corps and a native Insular Police led by American officers guaranteed U.S. sovereignty, 
facilitated the transition from a military to a civilian government.143  Secretary of War 
Elihu Root, who initially opposed ending the military government, chose Puerto Rico to 
try out the new colonial policy of no incorporation based on the aforementioned 
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conditions, and, as recommended by Mahan, he emphasized following the British 
imperial model.144  
Known for its sponsor’s last name, Ohio senator Joseph B. Foraker, the Foraker 
Act of 1900 established a civilian government for Puerto Rico.   The colonial 
administration was headed by a governor and an executive council appointed by the 
President of the United States.  Six members of the council were Continental Americans.  
The people of Puerto Rico, as defined in Article 7 of the act, would elect thirty-five 
members for the insular Chamber of Delegates and a non-voting representative 
(comisionado residente) to Congress.145  The Foraker Act also established a political 
body to be known as the Puerto Rican people.  According to this article, those Spanish 
subjects who resided in Puerto Rico by April 11, 1899, and their offspring, would be 
recognized as citizens of Puerto Rico, unless they opted for keeping their allegiance to 
Spain.  By virtue of named citizenship, this political body, the Puerto Ricans, was under 
the protection of the United States.  The act also declared Puerto Ricans to be American 
nationals.146 
The Foraker Law disillusioned the leadership of both the Republican and the 
Federal parties.  When general elections took place on November 6, 1900 to elect the 
Puerto Rican representative to Congress and members of the Insular Chamber of 
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Delegates, the Federals abstained from participating.147  The Republicans, on the other 
hand, immediately took part in the colonial government.  The Republicans accused the 
Federals of being anti-Americans.  Mobs of Republican supporters, known as Turbas 
Republicanas, organized under the name of “Comite para la Defensa del Partico 
Republicano” (Committee for the Defense of the Republican Party).  These mobs 
harassed the Federals and the members of the Federación Libre del Trabajo, forcing 
Muñoz Rivera and Iglesias Pantín to flee the country.148    
Some Federals participated in the elections of 1902 breaking the monopoly of the 
Republicans.  In the elections of 1904 and 1906, the Federals, former members of the 
FLT and some dissenters from the Republican Party, joined together in the creation of 
Partido Unión de Puerto Rico, and gained control over the Insular House of 
Representatives.  Between 1908 and 1914 Unión would not lose a single district or the 
office of comisionado residente.   In 1912, disenchanted with U.S. colonial policies, 
Unión discarded statehood as a solution.  Independence, added as a possibility in 1913 
would be renounced in 1922.  The concept of the Libre Estado Asociado (Free 
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Associated State) which had been the dominant one among members of Union since the 
1910s became its only solution to the status question in 1922.149 
As argued by Rafael Bernabe, the early colonial policies of the U.S. government 
paved the way for de facto autonomismo.  Even when the anexionistas controlled all the 
positions opened to Puerto Ricans in the colonial administration, they could not do more 
than to engage in the administration of the colonial regime.150  As discussed above, 
criollo political leaders timidly challenged the metropolis and eventually shifted their 
political goals.  However, they did so within the parameters established by the 
metropolitan power.  Ironically, by participating in the colonial administration, Puerto 
Rican leaders, many of whom were ardent anti-colonialists, showed acceptance of the 
colonial regime and, in fact, further legitimized American control over the Island.    
There were other reasons for accepting, or at least not opposing, the American 
presence in the Island.  Puerto Rico may have not moved politically in the direction that 
the native political leadership desired, but there had been real political changes for the 
masses.  One of these changes was the creation of the Partido Obrero Socialista in June 
of 1899, led by Santiago Iglesias Pantín.  For the first time workers in the Island enjoyed 
organized representation.  This development was followed by the creation of labor 
organizations such as the Federación Libre de Trabajadores.  Moreover, suffrage was 
extended under American rule.  There were roughly 132,000 registered voters in 1898; 
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159,000 in 1902;  221,000 in 1910; and over 273,000 in 1914.  The voting population of 
the Island more than doubled in a single generation.151   
The U.S. slowly increased access to political representation, and urban and rural 
workers found themselves suddenly enfranchised.  Such headway would have not been 
possible if the McKinley administration, its successors, and the U.S. courts did not 
believe in upholding the principles of freedom of the press, assembly, speech, and 
freedom of worship in the territories.  The U.S. was engaging in colonialism, but it was 
liberal colonialism.152  As argued by Ángel Quintero, the criollo leadership of Unión lost 
appeal due to the metropolis’ influence amongst the working class.  The working classes 
used the liberal aspects of the metropolis, such as suffrage and free-association, to oppose 
the “conservative and senõrial,” independence project of Unión and the unflappable pro-
Americanism of the Republicans.153   Whether intended or not, the new metropolis was 
creating political spaces which weakened the economic and political power of the criollo 
elites  
Puerto Rico, like the other territories acquired during the war, was not to be 
incorporated into the Union but that did not mean that the population and the territory 
itself should not be molded into something more “American”.  In this regard on February 
16, 1899, President McKinley accepted the “burden of the Philippines, to safeguard the 
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happiness of their inhabitants,” and later included the other territories, as he proclaimed a 
campaign of “benevolent assimilation”.154  The United States would rule the new 
territories, and in exchange it would civilize and modernize the natives via 
Americanization.   From socio-economic structures to individuals, the U.S. colonial 
administration attempted to reshape the new territories in the image of the continental 
United States.  The main difference between the continental nation-building project that 
led the United Sates across North America to the shores of the Pacific and the one taking 
place in the Caribbean was that the new territories would not become fully integrated into 
the Union nor would the natives become fully Americans.  The new project of extra-
continental nation-building would seek to Americanize but not to include the natives as 
part of the American nation.  In fact, the U.S. colonial policies of assimilation were 
aimed at creating satellite nations orbiting the new universe which had the U.S. as its 
center.  For such a project to succeed the elites in the territories had to be loyal to the 
metropolis.  
In 1898, the immense majority of the Puerto Ricans were Catholic, spoke 
Spanish, and had deep cultural differences with mainstream Americans who were 
perceived as being English-speaking, Anglo-Saxon, and protestant, and as discussed in 
Chapter 1, the population of the Island was well on its way to develop a strong national 
identity mostly due to the exclusionary policies followed by the Spanish colonial 
authorities after the Lares Revolt of 1868.   It has been noted that the development of 
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strong national identities occur in opposition to a more discernible Other.155  In the 
aftermath of the War of 1898, the American soldiers in the Island and the subsequent 
colonial administrators presented the Puerto Ricans with a different Other.  However, if 
there were cultural differences between the new metropolis and the natives of the Island, 
they were cast aside by U.S. material superiority which allowed the new metropolis to not 
only overcome those differences but to project cultural superiority.156   
U.S. material superiority enabled it to embark on infrastructure projects, to launch 
health and relief campaigns, and to create a public education system where the Puerto 
Rican youth could be Americanized.  Moreover, political enfranchisement became a 
reality for previously marginalized groups, and the criollo elite actively participated in 
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the political institutions of the metropolis.  More importantly, perhaps, is that the military 
remobilization of the Puerto Ricans started during the first months of the American 
occupation.   Thus, health and relief campaigns, the creation of a public education 
system, more political inclusion, and the remobilization of the Puerto Ricans worked as 
perceived inclusion especially when contrasted with Spanish policies of exclusion and 
displacement.      
More tangible things than political rights created a favorable opinion of American 
rule among the working classes and especially among the peasantry.  The popularization 
of education in the Island by the creation of a comprehensive public education system 
was one of the most important policies followed by the metropolis.  As one of the most 
effective tools to promote the culture, ideals and beliefs of the hegemonic group in a 
given place, the public school system became a major battleground for control of Puerto 
Rican loyalty.  The metropolis attempted to reproduce in Puerto Rico an education 
system similar to that of New England with English as the mandatory and only language.  
The teaching of U.S. history and American mainstream cultural values were the 
cornerstone of the system.  In that regard, the metropolis had the help of criollo elites 
which clamored for the establishment of such system.157  On October 30, 1898, less than 
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two weeks after the transfer of sovereignty, an assembly of Puerto Rican educators and 
prominent figures decided that the American method of schooling should be adopted as 
soon as possible if Puerto Rico were to become  a state of the Union.  Furthermore, as 
historian Rosario Natal details, Puerto Rican newspapers were beginning to publish 
advertisements in English promoting American universities.158  It would not take long 
before the Island’s elites began to send their youth to study in the mainland.    
The prompt creation of a public education system by the American colonial 
administration was intended to Americanize the population of the Island and to impede 
the emergence of a Puerto Rican national identity.  For over two decades, the Department 
of Education in Puerto Rico remained firmly under American control.  The department’s 
memorandums and guidelines openly called for policing those native teachers that 
strayed from the approved curriculum to include Puerto Rican culture in their lessons, as 
well as those who criticized the colonial regime.159  Ironically, the school, a place for 
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learning, became a tool for cultural assimilation and political repression.  That is not to 
say that the public school only served the interest of the metropolis.  By popularizing 
education the colonial administration weakened the position of the criollo elites, which 
served the metropolis, but also created the opportunity for socio-economic mobility 
among groups with no previous chance for such a thing.160 
Of all the means used by the American colonial administration to promote the 
Americanization of the Puerto Ricans one has always been neglected by scholars: the 
military.  The militarization of the Island under U.S. rule has been  studied  from a 
diplomatic and strategic point of view, however, the role that military institutions 
rendered in altering national identities and the influence of these soldiers in the political 
development of the Island have been mostly ignored.161    Since the early days of 
American rule over Puerto Rico, military institutions played a pivotal role. The Island 
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was under direct military rule between October 18, 1898 and May 1900. Even after a 
civilian government replaced the military regime, Puerto Rico continued, but for a few 
exceptions, under control of the Bureau of Insular Affairs.162  The BIA was an organ of 
the U.S. War Department created in the aftermath of the War of 1898 to administrate the 
overseas colonies.  Puerto Rico was under direct control of War Department from 1909 
until President Franklin Delano Roosevelt placed it under the Department of the Interior 
in 1934.  
There are two aspects of the role of the military in the Island that need to be 
considered.  The U.S. military involvement in Puerto Rico had a direct approach and an 
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indirect approach, and both roles fomented ties with the Puerto Rican peasantry and 
further Americanization.  Direct involvement refers to the remobilization of the Puerto 
Ricans and their inclusion in the armed forces of the metropolis.  Indirect involvement 
concerns any interaction of non-military nature between the U.S. Army and the people of 
Puerto Rico.  While fulfilling the later the military is adopting the role of a governmental 
entity.  It was the authority on the Island (at least during direct military rule) but it was 
also in charge of offering relief to the population especially during catastrophes.   In this 
regard, the military government soon found itself fulfilling that function after August 8, 
1899, when hurricane San Ciriaco destroyed the majority of the crops, thousands of 
peasants’ dwellings, and killed roughly 3,400 Puerto Ricans.163  The population received 
military rations from the troops garrisoning the Island, as well as medical care.  The role 
of the U.S. military, however, went beyond immediate relief.  As estimated by military 
authorities, the Army had to assist a vast portion of the population for several months.164 
It was during the relief effort after San Ciriaco that a junior medical officer 
discovered the cause of chronic anemia, the worst ailment afflicting the Puerto Rican 
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peasantry in the early twentieth century.  While in charge of the medical detachment in 
Ponce, Bailey K. Ashford, a U.S. Army doctor, realized that the poor physical condition 
of the Puerto Rican Jíbaro, was not due to the climate but to hookworms.  Bailey found 
that the worm Ancylostoma duodenale was the cause of the epidemic anemia in Puerto 
Rico. The remedy was simple enough; purging the parasites by administering the patients 
a concoction of Thymol-a phenol found in the oil of thyme- diluted in alcohol.165  
 The medical establishment in the Island had long argued that the chronic anemia 
or “laziness” affecting the peasants, which was responsible for one third of all deaths in 
the Island, was due to the climate, nutrition, bad hygiene or malaria, or a combination of 
these factors, and as such, it was endemic in the mountains and coastal plains where the 
Jíbaro lived.  Ashford recounts that when asked how their relatives had died, most 
peasants would respond, and physicians would confirm: “De la anemia- la muerte natural, 
of anemia- natural death”.166  Even his wife, who came from prominent criollo families, 
explained to him “… that is the anemia of the country.  They all die of it eventually.”167  
Ashford could hardly believe that a whole “agricultural class” was dying of 
anemia.168  He was even more dumbfounded by the upper classes’ lack of interest in 
treating such a preventable and curable disease.  After years of trying to persuade the 
medical establishment to adopt the relative easy cure for pandemic anemia, Ashford was 
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finally able to secure the creation of the Porto Rico Anemia Commission with a budget of 
5,000 U.S. dollars in 1904.169 After initially setting up the anemia camp in Bayamón, 
Ashley decided to move to Utuado, almost at the center of the Island but with roads 
connecting to the Northwest, so those more in need of treatment could reach him. That 
first campaign treated 5,490 patients.   
Not everyone was content with the sanitary campaign of the Porto Rico Anemia 
Commission.  The effect that curing the Jíbaros could have on the socio-economic and 
political realm frightened some elements of Puerto Rican society.  Bailey writes that a 
would-be assassin, who also had hookworms, entered his hospital in Utuado but was 
quickly subdued by him and his assistant and treated for the anemia.  The cured man 
returned months later to the hospital, and asked Ashford to decide what to do with the 
man who had hired him to harm the doctor.  Ashford asked him to make sure the Jíbaros 
from Utuado did not elect him to any political position.170   
For the year 1905-06 the Anemia Commission moved its base to Aibonito, 
another mountain town but near the southeast.171  By the end of the second year the 
Commission had treated 170,000 patients, and the death rate had been reduced to .12 of 
one percent for those treated.  Deaths from anemia fell from 11,875 in 1900-1901 to 
1,758 in 1907-1908. The campaign lasted seven years. Between 1904 and 1911 over 
310,000 people were successfully treated for the anemia.  In Doctor Ashford’s account 
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that number represented “1,600,000 visits over mountain trails and hot coast-lands to see 
the doctor.” 172    
Ashford also stated that after compiling the answers given to him by planters in a 
survey he devised, the planters estimated a gain of 61% in workers efficiency.173  A 
planter from Aguadilla wrote to him that:  
I have observed that some of our peasants at a certain period of the year were left 
completely without support, for this terrible disease prevents them from working, 
and they had to beg in order to live. To-day, however, after cure of their anemia, 
they [the peasant and agricultural workers] own something -a little business, a 
cow, a nice little house, and, in addition subsist happily and work constantly.174 
Ashford also discovered that if the cause of the anemia was parasitical, it was 
severely aggravated by the peasants’ malnutrition.  He  recommended that socio-
economic problems such as extremely low income, which he believed accounted for 
malnutrition and ignorance plaguing the Jíbaro, should be addressed to finally eradicate 
once and for all preventable diseases crippling the Puerto Rican peasantry.175  Only that 
way, he believed, would the Jíbaro awaken from his long sleep and small world and 
become an integral part of Puerto Rican society.  He wrote: “Yet this is the man of whom 
we have to make a citizen, a man with a vote and a say in the affairs of the Island.  He has 
been the awakening of Rip Van Winkle, and he has awakened into a world that leaves 
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him gasping, stunned. He is neither a degenerate nor a fool”176  Adopting a paternalistic 
stance, the military establishment in the Island, from infantry to medical officers took the 
Jíbaro as a ward to be protected, and reshaped. 
A special relationship between the U.S. military and the peasantry started to 
develop during the early days of the American occupation as a result of the relief efforts 
and sanitary campaigns launched by the military government.  As discussed by historian 
Estades Font, the motives behind such practices were not exclusively humanitarian. She 
explains that controlling tropical diseases was economically and militarily vital for 
American expansion.  The labor force of the new territories, the occupation troops, and 
the civilian population of the mainland needed to be protected from such diseases.177  
Most of the relief, sanitary and humanitarian campaigns carried out by the military and 
civilian colonial authorities in Puerto Rico targeted formerly disenfranchised groups: the 
peasants, Jíbaros, and urban workers.  In this respect, these efforts were part of a broader 
strategic agenda-- securing the loyalty of the inhabitants of the Island and promoting pro-
American feelings.  These sectors of Puerto Rican society were also the main target of 
Americanization efforts.   Either consciously or unbeknownst to them, the metropolitan 
administrators were playing a game of divide and conquer.  Be that as it may, the 
question remains whether these efforts were rewarded.  This type of military involvement 
could not be perceived but as a positive gesture.  In many respects, the services provided 
by the military and its interactions with the population facilitated the development of a 
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special relationship between the native population of the Island and the U.S. military and 
thus eased the acceptance of American rule. 
Military involvement in the Island was not limited to providing aid or functioning 
as de facto government.   As early as 1899 Puerto Ricans were serving in U.S. army 
units.178  This phenomenon was the result of several factors.  American politicians begun 
to feel the pressure from their constituencies to bring the troops home as soon as the war 
was over. Consequently, the elected officials of the states of the American Union, which 
had pressured the War Department to send their volunteers into battle before the war 
ended, started to urge the McKinley administration to bring back the troops.  By August 
23, 1898, General Miles was proposing to return as much as a third of the invading force 
to the mainland.  Shortly after, the War Department decided to send fresh regular and 
volunteer troops to conduct the occupation.179  However, after the transfer of sovereignty, 
continental politicians demanded the return of these fresh troops too, especially the 
volunteer state militias.  
The manpower situation was further complicated due to the Pilipino insurrection 
which aggravated the shortage of regular U.S. troops.  With state officials clamoring for 
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the return of their respective states’ militias and a well organized insurrection against the 
American occupation forces in the Philippines, there was little support for continuing to 
occupy Puerto Rico with continental troops, especially when the Americans faced no 
organized political resistance and enjoyed the goodwill and support of the general 
population. The Island, however, secured from Spain mostly for its military value, had to 
be defended.  It is within this framework that Puerto Ricans began to serve in the U.S. 
military in organized corps.  
Puerto Rican politicians were only too eager to volunteer the population for 
military service. Cayetano Coll y Toste, a prominent figure in Puerto Rico and a civilian 
secretary to Brigadier General George W. Davis, the military governor of Puerto Rico, 
claimed that he encouraged Davis to form a battalion of native volunteers to replace the 
American troops in the Island while touring Spanish military installations.180  In fact, the 
process of organizing a native military had been initiated under Davis’ predecessor, 
Major General Guy V. Henry.  Additionally, the first proponent of Puerto Rican military 
service in the U.S. military was a most unlikely figure, Eugenio María de Hostos.  
Historian Rafael Bernabe has discussed many of the political responses to American 
imperialism developed by Puerto Rican leaders by the turn of the nineteen century. In a 
work that demystifies early independence and statehood defenders, Bernabe argues that 
many of the latter where in fact radical anti-colonialists.  Even Eugenio María de Hostos 
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proposed Americanization of the Island and its inhabitants as a way to lead toward self-
determination, democracy, and modern republicanism.181   
On January 20 1899, Eugenio María de Hostos, as one of the Puerto Rican 
commissioners traveling to Washington to discuss the future of the Island, urged 
President McKinley to reduce the American occupation forces and to create a native 
militia of at least 300 men.182  The same petition included the replacement of the military 
government by a civilian one while Congress decided, with the consent of the Puerto 
Ricans, the future of the Island.  
Regarding education, Hostos proposed that “the military schooling of the people 
of Puerto Rico be considered as one of means we need for the education of our people.”   
Military instruction, he argued, “is a tool for the physical strengthening and discipline of 
the life and character of the Puerto Rican people” 183  He also proposed the establishment 
of seven institutes in which military training would be used to promote discipline of the 
body and soul, teach strong work ethics and concepts of rights and obligations.  In 
essence, Hostos believed that the right type of military training promoted civic virtues.  
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He envisioned “civilian schools to be military schools and the military training in our 
schools to be civic learning for life.”184   
Hostos also defended the Americanization of the Puerto Rican which he 
understood as the political modernization of the inhabitants of the Island.  In 1900, 
disillusioned with the policies of the McKinley administration, he stated that the 
president had betrayed the goal of Americanizing the Island.185  Though Hostos preferred 
an independent Puerto Rico and ideally part of an Antillean Confederation, he considered 
that if the people of Puerto Rico so desire it, the Island should become a state of the 
American Union.  Furthermore, he believed that Americanization “would prepare Puerto 
Rico to effectively assert its independence”.   Those thoughts were not contradictory. 
Hostos believed in self-determination but feared that centuries of oppression had 
weakened the Puerto Ricans to the point to where they might not even constitute a 
people. According to Hostos, to exercise self-determination the Puerto Rican needed to 
adopt the ideals guiding the creation of the United States,  which he considered the “the 
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most complete civilization in existence.”186  For Hostos, military education and service 
might very well serve to speed the Americanization- understood as political 
modernization- of the Puerto Ricans and their eventual self-determination. 
Other prominent politicians adopted Hostos’ philosophy. Rosendo Matienzo 
Cintrón, one of the founders of the Republican Party in Puerto Rico, and initially an 
intractable promoter of statehood for the Island, shared some of the ideas espoused by 
Hostos with regard to Americanization.  For Matienzo Cintrón Americanization meant 
democratic modernization.  Political freedom, democratic rights, secular education, 
separation of Church and State, workers’ and women’s rights, and the utilization of 
research and science for the betterment of all aspects of human life were all part of his 
understanding of democratic modernization.187  This radical position, as argued by Rafael 
Bernabe, would eventually lead him to organize the Partido Independencia in 1912.188  
Just as many others who admired the founding principles of the United States of 
America, Matienzo Cintrón grew disillusioned with the colonial apparatus established in 
the Island by the McKinley administration via the Foraker Act of 1900.  Like Hostos, he 
denounced the “false Americanization” taking place in the Island.  He believed that if 
Americanization was “democratic modernization” then by imposing a colonial regime to 
the Puerto Ricans the government of the United States was engaging in false 
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Americanization and thus betraying its founding principles.189  However, strong 
opposition to American policies in the Island came late and was, in many occasions, 
drowned out by the majority of the criollo political establishment.   
With no initial opposition from the criollo leadership, with the blessing of the 
military governors, and the real need of manpower elsewhere, the remobilization of the 
Puerto Ricans under American rule proceeded swiftly.  On March 2, 1899 Congress, 
through the Army Appropriation Bill, authorized the creation of a native corps in Puerto 
Rico.  On March 24, Major General Guy V. Henry, commanding officer of the Porto 
Rico Military Department ordered the recruitment of natives to form a battalion.  In early 
May, the 400 men needed for the Porto Rico Battalion had been recruited, equipped and 
trained. On May 20, 1899, General George W. Davis, who had replaced General Henry, 
published General Order No. 65 activating the battalion of Porto Rican Volunteers.190   
In many respects, the battalion of volunteers was primarily regarded as colonial 
troops and only expected to defend the Island.191  The military authorities added a cavalry 
battalion and changed the name of the Porto Rico Battalion to the Porto Rico Regiment 
United States Volunteers (P.R. U.S.V.) in 1900.192  The name change in name is 
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significant if only for the fact that the words “United States Volunteers” drove home the 
point that Puerto Ricans were now United States nationals as established by the Foraker 
Act.  Over the following year, the Puerto Rican volunteers replaced the Continental 
Americans troops garrisoning outposts throughout the Island.193  In 1905 all American 
soldiers in the Island, but their commanders, were natives of Puerto Rico. 
The native corps became a regiment of the United Sates Army in July 1, 1908 by 
an act of congress.194  It is very interesting that this was the same year when Unión 
consolidated its political power.  Unión represented a challenge to the American colonial 
administration since the party advocated more autonomy or even independence, and as 
the polls showed, the ardently pro-American Republicans were losing their appeal.  Was 
transforming the native regiment into a regular army unit an attempt to secure the loyalty 
of the troops or even intimidate the political opposition?   These soldiers never indicated 
discontent with the political arrangement, but then again, even during World War II, the 
colonial authorities had many of the regiment’s members, including officers, under 
surveillance. Thus, it is more than feasible that the colonial authorities were in fact trying 
to send a message to both their political opposition and the troops.195  These native troops 
played a very important role in the acceptance of American rule and on the 
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Americanization project itself.  Losing their allegiance could seriously weaken the 
American position in the Island. 
The challenge to American rule did materialize.  In 1909, Unión, which 
dominated the Chamber of Delegates in Puerto Rico, directly challenged the colonial 
administration by refusing to pass the governor’s budget.  President William Howard Taft 
(1909-1913) moved swiftly to curtail the means of political opposition and obtained from 
congress an amendment to the Foraker Act enabling the governor to use the budget from 
the previous year if the Puerto Rican Chamber of Delegates did not approve his proposal.  
This amendment also authorized the president to place the Island under the War 
Department’s Bureau of Insular Affairs.196  Estades Font has emphasized that it was in 
the interests of the metropolis and its colonial administrators to weaken Unión, which 
was heavily dominated by coffee growers, who after gradually losing socio-economic 
influence since 1898 and aggravated by the perpetuation of the colonial status, had turned 
anti-American.197  Moreover, she argues that the militarization of the Island was an 
integral component of American colonial domination.  President Taft’s decision of 
putting the Island under direct control of the War Department when local politicians 
demanded more autonomy and a path towards self-determination surely supports her 
argument.   
The question remains, however, why was the metropolis so decisive and harsh in 
dealing with the Puerto Rican Chamber of Delegates?  Had it not been elected by a vast 
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majority of Puerto Ricans and presumably held their allegiance?  Furthermore, the U.S. 
soldiers in the Island and the police, with the exception of most officers, were Puerto 
Ricans in American uniforms.  Was not there a possibility that these soldiers and 
policemen in charge of the security apparatus might turn against the metropolis if its 
policies became too unpalatable?   In 1909, the native regiment and the insular police in 
Puerto Rico were commanded by American officers.  This situation surely strengthened 
Taft’s determination to deal harshly with the Chamber of Delegates.  As governor of the 
Philippines, President Taft had opposed creating a Pilipino regiment led by Pilipino 
officers but supported creating it under the command of American officers.   He argued 
that under U.S. commanders Filipino soldiers would be “entirely loyal” to the U.S. and 
would perform efficiently while Pilipino commanders could lead the troops “into either 
ladronism [sic] or insurrectoism[sic].”198  The colonial administration’s policies to deal 
with Unión show that in fact the metropolis was confident in having the upper hand 
regarding the loyalty of not only of the troops and the police but of the majority of the 
population.   
As previously discussed, Americanization campaigns targeted mostly previously 
disenfranchised groups.  Likewise the military remobilization of the Island pinpointed 
disenfranchised groups and in fact exploited anti-Spanish sentiments. It is very telling 
that the first volunteers to serve in the native corps came from the town of Lares, where 
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anti-Spanish and pro-independence sentiments had been strong since the second half of 
the nineteenth century and the only place where the 1868 revolt against Spain succeeded. 
199
  Moreover, the majority of those enlisting in the U.S. military were of humble 
origin.200 The U.S. military, an institution usually associated with repression, became a 
vehicle for social mobility and political enfranchisement in early twentieth-century 
Puerto Rico.  As part of the Americanization campaign and as a form of colonial 
domination that was overt regarding the political classes but nuanced with respect to the 
individuals who went through the institutions of Americanization- the military 
remobilization of the Puerto Rican served the metropolis very well during the first 
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decades of American rule.  The American colonial administrators knew this only too 
well. 
Military Governor, General Davis, in his report to congress stated:   
The native troops…  may be relied upon for  performance of the principal military 
service for Porto Rico.  They are a selected body of men, and exercise a most 
beneficial influence.  The inhabitants of the island generally are proud of them, 
and the criminals hold them in wholesome fear. 201 
Since its inception the Puerto Rican volunteer corps was relied upon to perform 
three core missions.  First, these soldiers were in charge of defending the Island against 
foreign threats.  Second, they acted as deterrence, first against criminals and later against 
domestic political opposition. And, lastly, and probably more importantly; they were 
supposed to provide an example to be followed by the general population.  
So impressed was Davis with the performance of the native troops and  with how 
well the population regarded them that  he recommended further reductions of continental 
troops which at the time represented less than half or 735 of the 1,635 U.S. troops in the 
Island. 202  He believed that with the added 475 officers and men of the Insular Police, a 
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third of the previous Spanish police agents, the Island’s security needs could be easily 
met.203 
The American leaders liked showcasing their apparent colonial success by 
bringing the Puerto Rican troops to Washington.  The band and first battalion of the 
native regiment participated in the inaugurations of President McKinley in 1901, and in 
Theodore Roosevelt’s in 1905.204   But, the main role of these troops was to highlight the 
virtues of American rule before their compatriots. The native troops had a very visible 
role. They performed as firemen, had their own baseball team, which participated in the 
local tournament, while the regiment’s band appeared in public and communal events. 
In a telegram dated March 11, 1901, Charles H. Allen, the first appointed civil 
Governor of Puerto Rico, communicated to the U.S. Secretary of War, Elihu Root, that it 
was advisable to make the Porto Rico Regiment of Volunteers a permanent outfit.  Allen 
believed that native troops, under the command of continental officers, would be 
adequate to garrison the Island.   Commenting  on troop loyalty Allen  wrote:  “They  
have  been  tried  in almost every emergency except  that  of meeting  in arms  people of 
their  own  country.  Whether or not they would be found wanting as such an important 
moment, should it ever arise, I do not feel competent to say”.  Allen continues:  “But  it 
can be said  that in many discussions on the subject with  the officers that they  would  be  
loyal to  the sovereignty  of  the U.S. and implicitly  obey  the  orders of  their  
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commanding  officers. As an arm of safety their presence is therefore desirable.”205    The 
question, whether they would fight against their fellow countrymen, would not have to be 
answered until 1950. 
Not just their loyalty was expected but   by wearing the U.S. Army uniform, 
Puerto Rican soldiers were to spread pro-American feelings among the population.   The 
native soldier, Allen stated, had become: 
  …an object  lesson to  the communities in the neighborhoods  of  their  posts… 
and  from  that  standpoint, as from  many others, has  undoubtedly been  a very 
potent  education  influence.  Each man of the battalion will be a committee in 
himself to spread among the natives, stories of American prestige…   The soldiers 
feel a pride in their service and there is an undoubted stimulant by it toward 
general loyalty.206 
Several trends that would mark Puerto Rican participation in U.S. Military 
institutions are identifiable in Allen’s statements.  First, a professional and loyal military 
integrated by natives of the Island would guarantee stability for the metropolis.  Second, 
service  in the military was identified  with progress and modernity  Third, the  native  
soldiers, by  becoming  a model  for  the  population, would be an instrument  for  the  
Americanization  of  the Island further consolidating the command of the metropolis over 
its colonial subjects.  When a real impasse emerged between the criollos leading Unión 
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and the American colonial administrators in 1909, the metropolis flexed its muscles for it 
was certain that it could count on the native military apparatus and the general public’s 
support.  These trends would become more obvious and would be further developed and 
challenged by the native leadership during the First World War.   However, before the 
Great War, the military and paramilitary apparatus in the Island was firmly in the hands 
of the metropolis. 
Under United States’ rule, access to military institutions for the “hijos de este 
país” was reestablished while political participation- to a certain degree- was opened to 
the masses.  Soon after the war ended, natives of the Island started to replace U.S. 
continental soldiers.  From the beginning the new insular soldiers did not become part of 
a home militia or National Guard but elements of the United States Army tightly 
controlled by the American colonial administration.   Additionally, the new metropolis 
gradually allowed for a higher degree of political participation eventually creating the 
space for mass electoral enfranchisement.  These two apparently disconnected trends 
facilitated the transfer of sovereignty over the Island from Spain to the United States, and, 
more importantly, they transformed the character of Puerto Rican nationality.   The 
inclusion of Puerto Ricans in the armed forces of the new metropolis, and mass political 
mobilization, especially of the rural sectors, gradually led towards competing national 
identities.   
The U.S. also embarked in a comprehensive build up of the public education 
system, which was intended to Americanize and modernize the inhabitants of the Island, 
while launching massive sanitary and relief campaigns.  Hence, although cultural affinity 
might have been absent between Puerto Ricans and Americans in 1898, the metropolis’ 
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control of the education system allowed for the projection of American material 
superiority disguised as cultural supremacy.  Furthermore, sanitary and relief campaigns 
allowed for positive interaction between the new metropolis and its colonial subjects.   
Whether these attempts were successful in “Americanizing” the Puerto Ricans is not the 
issue.  What is important is that even the people living in the most remote corners of the 
Island started to learn about the United States and the culture of its dominant groups.   
The fact that the military institutions, the political arena, and the public school 
system were opened to previously disenfranchised groups began to profoundly alter the 
islander’s national identity.  Participation in American institutions provided unifying 
experiences for the Puerto Rican masses which allowed for the strengthening of their 
national identity but with an American touch.  Public schools offered a homogenized pro-
metropolis oriented experience for hundreds of thousands of Puerto Ricans while the 
opening of the U.S. military to groups previously excluded from it and other sectors of 
Puerto Rico’s society conferred these groups with a sense of inclusion.  Access to 
education and military positions also offered an opportunity for mobility and the chance 
to overthrown old socio-economic hierarchies, a phenomenon that led to the creation of 
upwardly mobile classes and neo-elites who owed their well being and thus their political 
allegiance to the new metropolis.   
Puerto Rican politicians’ participation in the military and civil governments of the 
new metropolis further legitimized the American presence in the Island.  The former 
autonomists became anexionistas and roughly ninety percent of the population in Puerto 
Rico favored becoming a state of the Union during the first years after the war. 
Recognizing the pro-American sentiments of the population during the early stages of the 
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American occupation, the political leadership in Puerto Rico decided to exploit it by 
supporting participation in the political institutions set by the new metropolis and 
emphasizing military service.  Puerto Rican elites and the popular sector participated 
actively in the institutions of the new metropolis further legitimizing U.S. sovereignty.   
The early American attempts to create a new Puerto Rican via military service- 
which were supported by the criollo elite, including supporters of independence- were 
curtailed by the limited scope of the project.  There was no dearth of interest or lack of 
enthusiasm amongst American officers and criollo leaders to embark on this project, nor 
was the general population unenthusiastic.  However, the small size of the United Sates 
military apparatus, which because of its mission did not require massive armies, limited 
the size of the military in Puerto Rico and its effect on the population.  Nonetheless, the 
re-mobilization of the Puerto Ricans begun during the first years of American rule as 
Puerto Ricans came to wear U.S. Army uniforms and replaced Continental troops 
garrisoning the Island.  Furthermore, a special relation started to emerge between the 
military and Puerto Rico’s population as military doctors and engineers combed the 
mountains and towns of the Island building sanitary facilities, roads, and schools and 
launched massive health and relief campaigns.  The First World War would provide the 
grounds to retry the projects of Americanization and modernization via military service at 
levels previously unimaginable and with more players involved.   
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CHAPTER 3 
 “A NEW DAY HAS DAWNED FOR THE PUERTO RICAN JIBARO”: WORLD 
WAR I AND MOBILIZATION OF THE PUERTO RICAN PEASANT   
 
Downtrodden, unthought [sic] for as he [the Jíbaro] has been, he is now in the 
limelight.  The testing and refining process will be hard for him. But he and his 
brother will become the nucleus of a new Porto Rico.  The anemic disease warped 
man will be a thing of the past.  And the domain of the Jíbaro will at last come 
into its proper place in the great Economic and Social scheme of this island.207 
 
In 1908, the U.S. government had sought to secure its control over the military 
apparatus in Puerto Rico by making the native military corps a regular regiment of the 
United States Army by an act of Congress.208  As a corollary to this measure, the Taft 
administration attempted to augment the political power of the colonial bureaucracy in 
Puerto Rico by giving full control over the Island to the War Department’s Bureau of 
Insular Affairs (BIA) and by curtailing the ability of the Puerto Rican Chamber of 
Delegates to challenge the presidential-appointed governor.209   After taking these steps, 
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the U.S. colonial administration enjoyed but a few years of relative political calm.  Under 
American rule, as it had been the case under Spanish control, a crisis tended to highlight 
the military importance of Puerto Rico and to accelerate its political development.  These 
lessons were not missed by Puerto Rican politicians.  Another quandary, this time the 
First World War, once again provided for faster negotiations between the metropolis and 
the colonial administration, the criollo elites, and to a certain degree, the general 
population.   
In 1917, as the United States prepared to enter World War I, the metropolis 
imposed American citizenship upon the natives of Puerto Rico.  American citizenship 
preceded the first mass military mobilization of Puerto Rican peasants, agro-workers and 
urban working classes in Puerto Rico.  Since the very early days of American presence in 
the Island, the metropolis’ leaders and its colonial administrators had argued that military 
training and values would “Americanize” and “modernize” the Puerto Rican.  During 
WWI, Puerto Rican leaders, who had supported military instruction and service since the 
days of the American invasion in 1898, joined the chorus of those who argued that 
serving in the military would create a new man out of the Puerto Rican peasant.  In this 
regard, Puerto Rican politicians and leaders talked openly of using military service to 
create a “new modern man out of the Jíbaro”; one modern individual, integrated into the 
socio-economic structures of the Island as a productive agent by virtue of his military 
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training.  In a very real sense, both the criollo elites and the metropolis were engaging in 
reshaping the very essence of the Puerto Ricans’ individual and collective identities.   
The metropolis and the criollo elites found themselves locked in a battle for 
control of the nation-building project via military service.  Unlike the early days after the 
American invasion, the native political leadership was no longer monolithically blindly 
pro-American which led to the emergence of different “Americanization” and 
“modernization” projects from the ranks of the criollo elite.  Moreover, several factions 
sought to transform active participation in the war effort into political gains.  During the 
First World War, Puerto Rican politicians encouraged military participation of the 
Islanders in the U.S. military and support of the war effort, while promoting and 
facilitating workers migration to the continental U.S. hoping to alleviate the dire 
economic situation of the Island.  Supporting the war effort, some thought, would prove 
the Puerto Ricans’ loyalty to the U.S. and to the ideals of democracy and freedom.  
Others believe that participating in the war would prove Puerto Ricans’ manhood and 
adulthood which would put the metropolis in a very awkward position if it continued to 
deny them political equality and to ignore their capability of self-government and of self-
determination.210  Whatever their final reasoning, mass military service became a tool for 
different factions which sought to achieve their goals by modernizing  the Puerto Rican 
Jíbaro- and by extension Puerto Rico- through military training and service.   
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This chapter analyzes the projects and goals of the metropolis and its colonial 
administrators  vis-à-vis those of the criollo elites and the response of the masses to the 
political changes occurring during this period.  Was extending American citizenship to 
the Puerto Ricans and the subsequent mass mobilization of the peasantry and the urban 
working classes a transformative experience?  Did a new Puerto Rican emerge from this 
experience?  Was the military-trained Jíbaro integrated into the modern socio-economic 
structures of the Island?   Did the competition between the criollo elites and the 
metropolitan colonial authorities evolve into a shift of allegiances among the Puerto 
Ricans by the war’s end?  In other words, was American colonial rule in the Island as 
strong as it had been before the war?  And, was the first mass mobilization of Puerto 
Ricans accompanied by true political transformations? 
On June 28 1914, the assassination of the Hapsburg heir, Archduke Franz 
Ferdinand in Sarajevo by the Bosnian-Serb nationalist Gavrilo Princip activated several 
European alliances finally triggering the First World War.  By August 4, five European 
empires were at war and would soon drag many other nations into the conflict.211   On 
April 6, 1917, after years of carnage and with both belligerent alliances unable to win a 
decisive victory in the Western Front, the United States entered the conflict on the side of 
the Entete.  On March 2, 1917, Congress had passed the Jones Act, also known as the 
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Jones-Shafroth Act.  This law granted American citizenship to the natives of Puerto Rico, 
and served as the Island’s constitution until 1952.212  Unlike its antecedent, the Jones Act 
allowed Puerto Ricans to elect their own territorial legislature and provided for universal 
male suffrage.213   That Puerto Ricans became American citizens in 1917 have been 
attributed by many to the need for soldiers as the U.S. entered the First World War.214  
However, citizenship was as just one of the provisions included in the Jones Act.  The 
passing of the Jones Act was the result of years of constant negotiations between Puerto 
Rican and American leaders.   
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American citizenship for the indigenous people of Puerto Rico- known then as 
Porto Rican citizens- had been contemplated by U.S. leaders well before 1917.  President 
Theodore Roosevelt continually proposed granting American citizenship collectively to 
Puerto Ricans, but did not find much support in Congress.   As a result of the political 
crisis of 1909 in Puerto Rico, officials at the War Department studied the possibility of 
granting citizenship to the Puerto Ricans.  They came to the conclusion that even though 
the status would be well received, collective citizenship was a premature step since the 
majority of Puerto Ricans, they argued, were illiterate and unprepared for full political 
rights.   As an alternative, the Office of the Secretary of War suggested facilitating the 
individual acquisition of U.S. citizenship by natives of the Island who were educated and 
owned business or land.215  This recommendation was aimed at appeasing the local 
landlords and merchant class.  Senator Elihu Root opposed collective U.S. citizenship on 
the grounds that Puerto Rico could not be admitted as a federated state and hence such 
move would create two classes of citizens- a practice he believed to be inconsistent with 
U.S. democratic traditions.216   
Despite opposition from prominent Congressmen, projects to grant U.S. 
citizenship to the Puerto Ricans were presented before Congress in 1912 and 1913.  
President Taft, (and later President Wilson) the BIA and most of Congress supported 
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such measure.  Taft’s appointee, Governor George Colton (1909-1913), also endorsed 
taking this step which he thought would improve the United States’ image in Latin 
America.217  Colton’s support for citizenship was not an aberration.  His successor, 
Arthur Yager (1913-21) was even more vociferous regarding this matter.218  These 
projects, as well as the support for granting American citizenship to the Puerto Ricans 
shown by Taft, Wilson, the BIA (reluctantly), Congress, and opinion-making groups in 
the mainland responded to both local and international considerations.   
In Puerto Rico, the emergence of a radical wing within the dominant political 
coalition- Unión, which under the leadership of José de Diego demanded independence 
under an American protectorate, coupled with the creation of the Independence and the 
Socialist parties in 1912 and 1915 respectively to underline the socio-political unrest 
festering in Puerto Rico.219  Furthermore, in 1913 Unión, though still working towards 
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autonomy, had made independence its final solution to the status question after a period 
of self-government under American tutelage.220   However, as early as 1915, convinced 
that the U.S. would never grant independence, nor statehood to Puerto Rico, Luis Muñoz 
Rivera-  moderate leader of the Unionistas and Resident Commissioner in Washington 
between 1910 and 1916- came to believe that a type of self-government or autonomy in 
the likes of Australia’s or Canada’s was the best option for the Island.221   That the 
dominant party in the Island had renounced inclusion into the Union highlights the 
growing discontent with American rule in Puerto Rico.  The metropolis, it seemed, had 
squandered the general goodwill and pro-Americanism prevalent in the aftermath of the 
war of 1898.   
On the eve of World War I it certainly looked as if the metropolis’ control over 
the Island was becoming precarious.  Many Puerto Rican political leaders opposed the 
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granting of American citizenship without statehood or a general referendum on it.  
Muñoz Rivera, though originally one of its main architects, opposed passing the Jones 
Act if it included U.S. citizenship.  He believed that such action would freeze the political 
development of the Island while doing little to eliminate the colonial relationship between 
the U.S. and Puerto Rico.  Nevertheless on May 23, 1916 the U.S. House of 
Representatives approved the legislation and sent it to the Senate, but it did not reach the 
Senate floor before the Congress recess.222  
 Some of the provisions of the Jones Act irked Muñoz Rivera. One of his main 
concerns was that the version sent to the U.S. House of Representatives included 
restricted suffrage based on literacy and taxation.223  Also, while extra powers would pass 
to the Puerto Ricans, such as the right to have a two house elected legislature; the bill 
included veto power for the governor who remained a presidential appointee.  Moreover, 
collective U.S. citizenship was in fact imposed on the Puerto Ricans who were not 
allowed to have a referendum on this matter.  They had the right to reject U.S. citizenship 
but doing so would turn them into foreigners in their own land.  The Unionistas, who had 
abandoned statehood as a goal in 1913, saw collective American citizenship as a 
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drawback.224   Muñoz Rivera probably understood that the irreversible nature of 
collective U.S. citizenship for the Puerto Ricans could have a defusing effect with regard 
to political tensions, which could hinder the chances of advancing his party’s political 
goals.  By then, the colonial administrators also understood the political value of granting 
collective U.S. citizenship to the people of Puerto Rico.     
Probably no one was more adamant about granting American citizenship to the 
Puerto Ricans than Governor Yager.  Yager’s campaign to bring U.S. citizenship to all 
Puerto Ricans was closely followed in the continental United States.  In 1914 the 
American Review of Reviews observed that Puerto Ricans should be granted American 
citizenship and measures of self-government to reward their “continued improvement 
under American tutelage.”  Additionally, American citizenship, the journal stressed, 
would eliminate “the germ of nationhood” fostered by the ill-conceived Porto Rico 
citizenship.225  The article continued by stating that complete self-government- meaning 
independence- was not an option because the Puerto Ricans “… are a Latin American 
people with the characteristics and traditions of their forebears still clinging about 
them.”226   This journal also made clear the dominant attitude towards the Island among 
opinion-making groups and the true reasons for the change of heart regarding granting 
U.S. citizenship to the Puerto Ricans:   
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The interest of our own country and Porto Rico demand this perpetual connection.  
It is for Congress therefore to make the people of this tropical isle reasonably 
satisfied with our rule; for the Stars and Stripes cannot permanently wave over a 
discontented and rebellious people.227 
Quenching social and political unrest in the Island and restoring a positive image 
of the United States in Latin America had moved American leaders and opinion makers 
to favor U.S. citizenship for the Puerto Ricans as early as 1909.228  The outbreak of 
World War I probably accelerated the passing of the Jones Act, however, it is doubtful 
that Congress granted citizenship to one and a half million Puerto Ricans just to have 
more manpower for a war in which they were not yet involved, especially when at the 
time “dark races”, including Puerto Ricans, were not trusted as fighting troops.229  When 
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instead of combat ones.  The all-Black 93nd division distinguished itself fighting 
alongside the French Army, but this was poorly received by the Southern-dominated 
Wilson administration and military commanders who argued that the French were giving 
away military accolades to Black soldiers unnecessarily and unmerited. The American 
Expeditionary Force Command in Europe even insisted that the French banned African 
Americans from fraternizing with white French women because they worried of the 
social unrest the return of these Black soldiers might cause in the United States.   After 
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accounts of the African-American performance during WWI, the military developed 
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Sibley Butler, “African Americans in the Military”  The Oxford Companion to American 
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the United States took over Puerto Rico in 1898, the rationale used to retain the new 
colony, as well as the Philippines, was that Puerto Ricans were not capable of self-
government mostly due to their racial composition, and centuries of Spanish 
obscurantism.  Contemporary imagery of the inhabitants of Cuba, Puerto Rico and the 
Philippines, presented them as ape-liked black beasts, or as black children in need of 
Uncle Sam’s guiding (white) hand.230  It is not coincidental that the U.S. Armed forces 
began to heavily restrict the role of African Americans in the military after the Spanish-
American War.  Precluding African Americans from combat positions was but the local 
manifestation of an imperial ideology justified on the grounds of the incapability of 
darker races for self-government.  Conversely, all the prejudices used to explain 
segregation and the “inferiority” of African Americans were applied to the new 
territories.  In this sense, Puerto Ricans became Blacks and Blacks became Puerto Ricans 
with all the prejudices and structural disadvantages that such conversion entailed for both 
groups.231  Racial prejudice led military planners to prefer excluding Puerto Ricans from 
the military, at least as fighting troops. 
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Neither is it feasible to argue that Congress granted citizenship to Puerto Ricans 
in order to deter a German attack on the Island.232  Attacking Puerto Rico, regardless of 
the citizenship of its inhabitants, would have meant both an attack on U.S. soil, and a 
flagrant violation of the Monroe Doctrine, and hence a major causus bellis.  The U.S. did 
not need Puerto Ricans to become American citizens to exercise its right to protect the 
Island which was an American possession recognized as such under international law.   
However, the strategic location of Puerto Rico at the heart of the archipelago of islands 
blocking access to the Panama Canal indeed influenced the rapid passing of the Jones Act 
in1917.   A friendly native population that could assist in the defense of the Island, 
mostly by not joining or welcoming invading forces, was deemed imperative by the U.S. 
Navy and the War Department.233  Thus, is more than likely that the need to prevent 
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unrest in such an important possession accelerated granting American citizenship to the 
Puerto Ricans.  It is clear that American politicians recognized the calming effect that 
granting citizenship and somewhat broadening political rights would have in the Island.   
Moreover, by granting them American citizenship, Congress and President Woodrow 
Wilson were affirming that the U.S. intended to hold the Island in perpetuity since there 
was no precedent for an American territory populated with American citizens to be 
allowed to separate from the Union.234  Puerto Rico had to be held as an American 
possession for its militarily value, and American citizenship might very well do the trick.   
Finally, Wilson’s approach to international mediation, his “New diplomacy” 
based among other things on “Self-Determination,” was incompatible with the outright 
colonial status of Puerto Rico.  In December 7, 1915, Wilson declared before Congress 
that it was imperative to solve the Puerto Rican question by granting them a higher 
degree of self-government. More importantly, Wilson tied the passing of the Jones Act 
being drafted to national security and defense preparedness.  He argued that it was also a 
matter of credibility; the world was watching whether the U.S. was serious about self-
                                                                                                                                                 
first argued in 1890 by Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan, who later rose to the rank of 
admiral and served as president of the Naval War College.  Mahan believed that a U.S. 
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See Alfred Thayer Mahan, Lessons of the War with Spain and Other Articles (Freeport, 
N.Y.: Books for Libraries Press, 1899, reprint 1970), 29, 245, 247-49.  
 
234
 The type of citizenship granted by the Jones Act is known as statutory 
citizenship, meaning that citizenship was granted by an act of Congress and not by the 
Constitution; hence it was not guaranteed by the Constitution.   
 
123 
 
determination and freedom.235  In his October 26, 1916 closing campaign speeches, 
Wilson became the first statesman to commit his government to the pursuit of a League 
of Nations and to “articulate a comprehensive synthesis of Progressive Internationalism 
and the New Diplomacy”236 based upon the principles of the equality of nations, self-
determination, peaceful settlement of disputes, freedom of the seas, disarmament and 
collective security while making a call for social justice for women, children, and 
workers.237  Securing the loyalty of the Island’s population and international credibility 
moved Wilson to adamantly support U.S. citizenship for the Puerto Ricans and some 
measures of self-government in 1915.238  Wilson’s promises would be well-received and 
tested in Puerto Rico.  The Jones Act was finally signed into law on March 2, 1917 and, 
                                                 
235
 Wilson also made reference to the Philippines in his speech. See Bolívar 
Pagán, Historia de los Partidos Políticos Puertorriqueños (1898-1956), 172. 
 
236
 Thomas J. Knock, To End All Wars: Woodrow Wilson and the Quest for a New 
World Order (Princeton University Press, 1992), 97-98, 116-17.   
 
237
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of many liberals, progressives and radicals at home and abroad. One welcomed measure 
was the Revenue Act of September 8, 1916, which practically placed the entire burden of 
preparedness on the country’s wealthiest class.  Wilson neither obtained a liberal 
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for the most part, it was welcomed by the Puerto Ricans.239  Muñoz Rivera did not live to 
see the passing of the bill.  He had returned ill to the Island in September 1916 and died 
on November 15.  At least, his concerns about restrictive suffrage, which were shared by 
all political factions, especially by the Socialists, were addressed in the Senate and the act 
finally approved came to include male universal suffrage.240 
On April 6, 1917, triggered by Germany’s resumption of unrestricted submarine 
warfare and the public outrage created by the Zimmerman telegram, the Unites States 
declared war on Germany.241  Three days later the Porto Rico House of Delegates, in a 
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message to President Wilson offered the “…absolute solidarity of the people of Puerto 
Rico to you and the great American Nation in the conflict with Germany”242  
Immediately after the declaration of war, Puerto Rican leaders volunteered their service 
and that of their fellow countrymen, expressed their desire to enlarge the Porto Rican 
Regiment to brigade, and requested the acceptance of Puerto Ricans as volunteers.  The 
Secretary of War, while praising their loyalty and patriotism declined the offer.243  
On May 18, Congress passed the Selective Service Act of 1917 calling for all 
males between the ages of 18 and 32 to fill out registration cards.244  The territories of 
Alaska, Hawaii, and Puerto Rico were not included in the original Selective Service Act.  
Amid the furor and the demonstrations of patriotism taking places across the United 
States, the Puerto Rican legislature asked Congress to extend the draft to the Island.245  
The local newspapers regarded this request as an act of patriotism from the Puerto Rican 
legislature, and President Wilson promised to remedy the situation.246  The date for the 
initial registration day in Puerto Rico was not a matter decided solely by Wilson and 
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Congress.  On June 6, Yager informed the chief of the BIA, Arthur McIntyre247, that his 
administration was working out the system of registration and that they could be ready 
“to have the date fixed during the later part of July although it would be necessary to 
have 10 or 15 days for publicity work among the Jibaros [sic] and illiterate men of the 
mountain”248 Yager’s statement underlines the fact that the colonial administration was 
indeed eyeing the peasantry to form the bulk of the National Army in Puerto Rico.  A 
presidential proclamation set registration day in Puerto Rico for July 5 of the same.249   
Puerto Ricans responded enthusiastically to the draft.250  On that first registration 
day, 104,550 Puerto Ricans registered for the draft.  Eventually, 236,853 men inscribed 
for selective service and 17,855 were called to service.  All of those called, except for 
139, reported for duty.  A few days after the first registration day Governor Yager 
declared: “This [the number of registered men] is larger than the official estimate and I 
think it is a great compliment to the people of Porto Rico that they should have met this 
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situation so patriotically.”251  The first training camp for Puerto Rican officers began in 
August of the same year. The 200 slots allowed for the officers’ camp had been filled 
with celerity by the elite and professional class.252  The speed with which the war effort 
in the Island advanced and the eagerness to show support led Yager to comment that the 
“patriotism of the island has been stirred and intensified by America’s entrance into the 
Great War as shown by the eagerness with which the people responded to the recent 
draft”.  Yager was quick to find the root of these demonstrations of patriotism stating that 
Puerto Ricans were “as eager to get into the “big war game” as any other class of citizens 
under the Star and Stripes.”253  For Yager it was clear that citizenship, even if of a 
different class, had bought much goodwill and secured the loyalty of the Puerto Ricans at 
a critical historical junction. 
There were challenges to Yager’s narrative of patriotism among the Puerto 
Ricans. In a letter to Frank McIntyre, Chief of the BIA, the Governor expressed his fear 
that an independence leader may attempt “some propaganda in the matter of renouncing 
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American citizenship for the purpose of avoiding the draft law.”254   Even after the show 
of “patriotism” during registration day to which he made reference in previous letters, 
Yager suggested having the first draft after September 2, 1917, when the allotted time for 
renouncing U.S. citizenship would have expired.255  He was also concerned about having 
a representative of labor on one or more  of the General Board of Exemptions under the 
selective draft because Santiago Iglesias Pantín, “would be the one and he would do it 
selfishly.”256   As his correspondence indicates, Yager and the metropolitan authorities 
were not oblivious to the challenges to American sovereignty and policies in the Island.  
However, the plans for mobilizing the Puerto Ricans continued inexorably and for the 
most part, undisturbed. 
On late September, 1917, in the Tapia Theater in San Juan, behind a banner 
reading “Go Ahead Porto Rico” and surrounded by members of the colonial government, 
the mayors of the Island and Antonio R. Barceló, the Unionista president of the newly-
created Puerto Rican Senate, two white-dressed women escorted Governor Yager’s 
daughter while she drafted the first ballot in the island.”257  This overly-symbolic 
ceremony marked the beginning of Puerto Rican mass participation in the armed forces 
of the United States.  Most of the press, both in the continental U.S. and the Island 
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reported that the day had been marked by “rejoicing and celebration through the 
Island.”258    
In accordance with the Jones Act, elections were held in the Island on July 17, 
1917.  Again Unión came up as the dominant political force obtaining over half the votes 
casted (90,155 out of 175,006) while the Republicans  tallied 60,319; and the Socialists 
24,468.   More importantly, the Unionistas elected Félix Córdova Dávila as Resident 
Commissioner in Washington D.C., a position held by Muñoz Rivera until his death.  
Unión also elected 13 senators and 24 representatives to the new Insular Legislature, 
which gave them a majority in both houses.259  José de Diego, leader of the separatist 
faction within Unión, became speaker of the Insular House of Representatives and 
Barceló, Unión’s president, became leader of the Senate.    
Since Yager supported more self-government for the Island and liberal reforms 
but not statehood, an unwritten alliance developed between the Governor and Unión 
during the war period.  Ironically, the Republican Party, which preached 100 percent 
Americanism and desired nothing but federated statehood, found itself at odds with 
Yager who seemed to favor some liberal reforms for the colony but not much else.  The 
Socialists, however, suffered the harshest antagonism from the governor- the attitude was 
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reciprocated.260   This not to say that participating in the war was opposed by political 
groups alienated by Yager’s courtship of the Unionistas.  The situation only provided for 
far more complex approaches towards the war effort, but nonetheless favorable ones.  
Mobilizing the Puerto Ricans came to be the means to different ends for the Republicans 
and Unionistas, as well as for the metropolis, which sometimes found itself at odds with 
Yager’s own project. 
President Wilson envisioned the creation of a National Army that would unify the 
multi-ethnic United States into one nation.  Fearing that the more than 15 million 
immigrants who had reached the United States between 1900 and 1915 might not support 
the United States (especially the German-American population), Wilson’s administration 
launched a campaign promoting 100 percent Americanism.  He believed that the war 
would end the hyphenations of ethnic and national groups in the United States.  Wilson 
proclaimed: "Any man who carries a hyphen around with him carries a dagger that he is 
ready to plunge into the vitals of the republic.”261   The blind patriotic mind-set promoted 
by the Wilson administration under the “100 percent Americanism” rubric is evident in 
the efforts of the Committee on Public Information to promote “unanimity of thought and 
action that would translate into victory on the battlefield and the realization of the melting 
pot ideal at home.” 262   If the war was to bring an end to all hyphenations and the 
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emergence of a single American Nation, it would have to be fought on cultural grounds 
as well as on actual battlefields.263  The War Department took Wilson’s unifying rhetoric 
to heart.  
As the war in Europe continued, military plans accelerated in the U.S., and the 
War Department authorized the creation of the 94 Infantry Division to be composed of 
four Porto Rican regiments.264  Though unconvinced of their value as first line combat 
troops, the War Department believed that mobilizing the Puerto Ricans would prove 
useful.  These soldiers could relieve Continental American soldiers from non-combat 
assignments freeing them for combat duty, while inspiring loyalty among the population 
of the Island.  The political and economic value of mobilizing as many Puerto Ricans as 
possible was well understood by the War Department.  Frank McIntire, Chief of the 
                                                                                                                                                 
Information seeking to create patriotic consensus in the U.S. ethnically diverse 
population. “While Creel did not use the term officially, the ideology of 100 percent 
Americanism permeated his writings and speeches”.  Creel wrote that what the war 
required was: “no mere surface unity, but a passionate belief in the justice of America's 
cause that should weld the people of the United States into one white-hot mass instinct 
with fraternity, devotion, courage, and deathless determination.”   Tischler, “One 
Hundred Percent Americanism,” 164-176. 
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Bureau of Insular Affairs, wrote a memorandum to the chief of War Plans Division 
informing him of the political, economic, and social benefits of mobilizing Puerto Rico’s 
“…large surplus population, that is, a population for who in the present there is no 
continuous employment.”265  Dealing in strict utilitarian terms and after making clear that 
his views were not of  a military nature, McIntire reported that the men who had gone 
through military training in the Island  “…have been very much improved, physically and 
otherwise, and are better off for having had it and to that extent  are of greater economic 
value.”266   
Not only did the colonial administration expect military training to improve the 
value of the trainees as workers, but while in service, their absence from the employment 
pool should alleviate the Island’s chronic unemployment.  With regard to the impact 
these men would have in the Island’s socio-political structures, McIntyre argued that their 
training “will have given them a new point of view, their return to the civil life will 
establish a different and better element in the body politic.”267  It is clear that the BIA 
believed that the trainees, even if full Americanization proved impossible, would be at 
least more pro-American after receiving military training with the added bonus of also 
becoming more productive. 
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The Republicanos, who continued to preach complete Americanization and 
becoming a State of the Union as Puerto Rico’s only choice, were quick to adopt the “100 
Percent Americanism” campaign launched by the Committee on Public Information.   
This was evident by their leaders’ actions and words as recorded in the Insular 
Legislature. More importantly, through their newspaper, El Águila de Puerto Rico, the 
Republicanos more than echoed Creel’s campaign of blind patriotism and 
Americanization.268   Exhortations and instructions to: “Prove that you are a 100% 
American” and slogans such as: “Today is an honor to say: ‘I am an American’” were 
accompanied by drawings of whole Puerto Rican families, boys dressed in military 
garment, an older father with his hat off, and a mother carrying a baby; all, solemnly 
watching the Puerto Rican troops marching under the American flag.269    El Águila, like 
many other local newspapers, routinely published long stories about recruitment, Puerto 
Ricans serving in Continental units, “heroes” who had fallen in Europe, the training of 
the Puerto Rican troops, and the commissioning of officers in the Island.270  Throughout 
the war period, the narrative espoused by the Republicanos was of full cooperation with 
the war effort while underlining what they believed was the unbreakable ties between the 
United States and the Island.  They also defended the idea of modernizing the Jíbaros 
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through soldiering.  The Republicanos were among the most ardent proponents of 
showing the Puerto Rican’s Americanism, social and political maturity, and readiness to 
become a state of the Union by participating in the war. 
The Unionistas, divided between separatistas and autonomistas, wanted the war 
effort and the mobilization of the Puerto Rican to lead to independence or more self-
government respectively.  Hence, they approached every aspect of the mobilization in the 
Island as if they were raising a Puerto Rican Army and not a contingent for the U.S. 
Army.   As plans were put into action, and the Puerto Ricans started to mobilize for war, 
Córdoba Dávila attempted to secure that the units raised in Puerto Rico were truly Puerto 
Rican that is, composed, trained and led by Puerto Ricans.  In this regard, he wrote to the 
Secretary of War, Newton D. Baker (March 9, 1916-March 4, 1921), offering the creation 
of new regiments but also requesting that more Puerto Ricans be trained as officers and 
that those serving in the regular army be allowed to transfer to the Island.271  By mid-
May, 1918, the War Department approved the voluntary transfer of Puerto Ricans serving 
in the continental U.S. to Puerto Rico.  Soon, Puerto Rican officers and non-
commissioned officers serving in the regular army began to apply for transfers to the 
“Porto Rican detachment, National Army, Porto Rico”.272   Meanwhile, Yager was trying 
to secure the creation of a Puerto Rican national guard despite the opposition of the War 
Department which preferred that all resources be directed towards the creation of the 
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 House of Representatives U.S.,  Félix Córdoba Dávila to Newton D. Baker, 
Secretary of War, January 10, 1918, C.I.H.P.C., Caja 30 Cartapacio 7  Documento 1, C. 
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Puerto Rican division as part of the National Army.273  Yager’s attempts to secure the 
creation of a Puerto Rican National Guard followed the initiative of his predecessor, 
Governor Colton, in 1910.274  Like Colton, Yager believed that the creation of the 
National Guard in the Island would enhance the islander’s loyalty toward the U.S. by 
instilling a sense of national pride, which the the added bonus that such action would also 
be beneficial regarding the Puerto Rican’s political attitude towards the metropolis and its 
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 Yager to McIntyre, July 10, 1917, C.I.H.P.C., Caja 30 Cartapacio 7 
Documento 1, I. 
 
274
 Responding to Governor Colton’s inquiries with regard to the legality of 
establishing a National Guard in the Island, the office of the Attorney General of Porto 
Rico responded affirmatively based on recent decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court, i.e. 
Kopel vs. Bingham, 211 U.S. 469, which stated that: 
It may be justly asserted that Porto Rico is a completely organized Territory, 
although not a Territory incorporated into the United States, and that there is no 
reason why Porto Rico should not be held to be such a territory as is comprised in 
Section 5278. 
The office of the Attorney General also informed the governor that the means for 
appropriation of moneys to support a territorial militia in the Island already existed.  
“Your present inquiry obviously relates to the word “Territory” as used in Section 1661 
U.S. Revised Statutes as amended by the Act of February 12, 1776, and the act of June 
30, 1906:  
That said appropriation shall be apportioned among the several states and 
Territories, under the direction of the Secretary of War, according to the number 
of senators and Representatives to which each state, respectively, is entitled is 
entitled in the Congress of the United States, and to the Territories and District of 
Columbia such proportion and under such regulations as the President may 
prescribe. 
If Porto Rico is a Territory within the meaning of Section5278, Revised Statutes, it would 
seem to follow that it is likewise a Territory within the meaning of Section 1661 as 
amended.”  He also informed Colton that the Comptroller of the Treasury had decided 
that under the Act of July of 1862 and August 30, 1890, and March 4, 1907, that Porto 
Rico was entitled to allotments for territorial organized militia.  This letter responded to 
the War Department’s reasoning that it could not make the required appropriations for a 
territorial militia in Puerto Rico because the Island did not constitute a territory of the 
United States.  See, Acting Attorney General of Porto Rico, I.R. Brown to Governor of 
Porto Rico, March 26, 1910, C.I.H.P.C., Caja 29 Cartapacio 12 Documento 9. 
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relation to the Island.275   In 1910, just as in 1917, the Department of War did not heed to 
the governor’s plans.276   
                                                 
275
 With regard to the creation of a native militia Colton argued: “Certain things 
have occurred and are occurring which, I believe, will remove any anti-American spirit 
that may have existed in the island.  I am certain that no such spirit is prevalent today, 
and while I do nor deem it a matter of supreme importance, still I think the organization 
of a body of territorial militia here would have a very beneficial effect and tend to support 
and increase the sentiment of national pride in the fact that Porto Rico is a part of the 
Unites States which is arising among the people of the island. It would be unfortunate if 
this trend of affairs should be checked by the appearances of distrust on the part of the 
Federal Government.” See, Governor Colton to Colonel McIntyre, Acting Chief Bureau 
of Insular Affairs, September 24, 1910, CIHCP, Caja 29 Cartapacio 12 Documento 8.   
Among the benefits of instituting a National Guard in the Island were the promotion of 
loyalty and patriotism by giving the “Porto Ricans the same opportunity to serve their 
country, and also knowledge of the principles of the U.S. military tactics, which would be 
of great benefit to the Federal Government in case of need in the tropics of ___ troops”   
would encourage Porto Ricans to learn English.  I.R. Pierson  to Governor Colton, April 
9 1910, CIHPR, Caja 29 Cartapacio 12 Documento 16.  
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 Frank McIntyre, Acting Chief of the BIA, informed Colton that the “Acting 
Secretary of War [Jacob M. Dickinson] is not altogether favorable to this proposition 
[creation of a National Guard in the Island].”  On the other hand, McIntyre stated that the 
Army Chief of Staff, Major General Leonard Wood “is wholly favorable to the proposed 
organization, and not only believes in the propriety of it, but believes, from a military 
point of view, it would be an extremely valuable organization.  I think, therefore, it is a 
question of short time when the department will adopt General Wood’s views.”  McIntyre 
also suggested the Governor to begin working in passing the necessary militia law in the 
Island to initiate the process and assure him that the department will be ready to assist 
him with the appropriations. See, Frank McIntyre Acting Chief of Bureau to Governor 
Colton, September 16 1910, CIHPR, Caja 29 Cartapacio 12 Documento 5, B.   General 
Wood’s views were at odds with the War Department’s.  Appointed by President Taft in 
1910 as Army Chief of Staff (a position that among other things provided advice to the 
Secretary of War) Wood tried unsuccessfully to break the bureau system currently 
favored by the War Department.  The Secretary of War, Jacob M. Dickinson, had earlier 
notified Taft that   “the Department has been consistently opposed to the establishment of 
a militia force in Porto Rico for the reasons indicated by the Judge Advocate General [the 
judicial arm of any of United State Armed Forces including the Air Force, Army, Coast 
Guard, Marine corps and Navy] and is to-day of the same view.”  See, Acting Secretary 
of War to President William H. Taft, July 23, 1910. CIHPR, Caja 29 Cartapacio 12 
Documento 7.   After their original reasoning for denying the Island the right to a 
territorial militia was debunked, the officers of the War Department found a new 
rationale to oppose such measure.  Supporting the secretary’s position the Judge-
Advocate-General wrote that the “military force, largely composed of natives of the 
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Where to train the Puerto Rican soldiers was one of the first battles the Unionistas 
fought over control of the mobilization process.  For the metropolis the issue became a 
matter of economic value, racial prejudice, and part of the Americanization campaign.  In 
November 19, 1917, the Washington Post announced that 8,000 white Puerto Ricans 
were to be sent to Camp Jackson in South Carolina- to the 81st Division, while “4000 
[Puerto Rican] negroes” would be sent to Camp Upton Yaphank in New York as part of 
colored division.277   Based on comments from War Department’s officials the article 
stated: 
It is also felt that by training them in connection with our own citizens the Porto 
Rican soldiers will come to feel themselves as part of the Army of the United 
States. The psychological influence will be considerable factor in making the 
Porto Rican American soldier in no way distinguishable from the men from New 
York, Michigan, or California.  They will be led in English under native Porto 
Rican and American officers.278  
                                                                                                                                                 
island, has been continuously stationed there, and as this force has been found adequate 
to all emergencies, it has not been regarded by the Executive as a measure necessary to 
the general welfare or to the preservation of civil order in the island that the organization 
of a new and untried military force should be attempted…”  Therefore “…it is not 
advised that the time is opportune for the establishment of a militia force in the island of 
Porto Rico.”   Apparently, the Secretary of War did not consider prudent to arm more 
Puerto Ricans, who may or may not be completely loyal to the metropolitan authorities.  
See, Militia in the Island of Porto Rico: Memorandum by the Judge-Advocate-General. 
Elbert F. Baldwin to President Taft, July 13, 1920, CIHPR Caja 29 Cartapacio 12 
Documento 6.   
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 Washington Post, November 19 1917, C.I.H.P.C., Caja 30 Cartapacio 7  
Documento 1, F. 
 
278
 Ibid.  
 
138 
 
These men were not only expected to look like any Continental Americans but they also 
were supposed to come out of their training thinking and behaving like them.  The War 
Department was indeed bent on fulfilling Wilson’s idea of creating one American nation 
through the military.    
 Though Yager himself believed that military training would create a new Puerto 
Rican he came to oppose sending the recruits overseas for training.  In a letter to the 
Chief of the BIA, Frank McIntire, Yager urged him to train the troops in Puerto Rico. He 
stated that it would be humiliating to the soldiers and their officers to send them straight 
to the Continental U.S.  because: “Perhaps, 1/3 of these men who will be accepted  for 
service never worn shoes in their lives.  They wear nothing but a cotton shirt and cotton 
trousers and have nothing else to wear unless it is furnished to them.” 279  What Yager 
described was the typical clothing of the Puerto Rican Jíbaro from the mountains and the 
agro-worker of the sugarcane fields.  He had faith in the redeeming qualities of scientific 
military training but feared that to the common Continental observer they would look 
“like a bunch of ragamuffins and tatterdemalions out of which an observer who doesn’t 
know the actual condition here would think it utterly impossible to make them 
soldiers.”280  He insisted that  if training  in Puerto Rico was not possible, then, whatever 
the cost, the Puerto Rican recruits should be given “at least some preliminary training and 
organization, equipped, uniformed and fed for  a while and on regular army rations.”281  It 
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is evident from Yager’s statement that the bulk of the Porto Rican soldiers were coming 
from the files of the malnourished peasantry.   
 Yager, with the aid of the Unionistas also made the case for the unfairness of 
training abroad when the Island could use the economic injection of building training 
facilities and hiring the required civilian staff and services to run the camps.  McIntyre 
responded by informing Yager that it was too expensive to train in the Island and that 
““wherever [Puerto Rican] troops are trained they will be a great economic advantage to 
Porto Rico due to large war pay, allotment to dependants, and insurance.” 282  Moreover, 
playing on Córdova Dávila’s request that the Puerto Ricans be allowed to fight in a truly 
Puerto Rican unit, McIntyre  informed him that were they to train  in the Island “… they 
would be sent abroad in small units contingents to fill vacancies in units abroad and 
would lose their  identity as Porto Rican troops.” 283  He also reminded Yager that 
training in the U.S. would “ make them better men on returning to Porto Rico, physically 
and otherwise, this, even though they should not go abroad at all for service.”284    This 
statement, besides pointing out the transformative experience the BIA believed military 
training to be,  is also indicative of the expected nature of a Puerto Rican contingent’s 
participation in the war- they were not considered fit to join the fight in Europe, even 
after training in the U.S. alongside Continental Americans.  Despite the BIA’s opposition, 
Yager’s and the Unionistas’ efforts, especially Córdova Davila’s personal plea to 
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President Wilson, paid off and the War Department agreed to train the Puerto Ricans in 
the Island.  Córdova Dávila soon took credit for keeping the troops on the Island.285  
To house the trainees, a large military training facility was built in Puerto Rico 
between 1917 and 1918.  Located in Santurce, east of San Juan, and with an area of 537 
acres, Camp Las Casas served to train over 500 Puerto Ricans as officers of the United 
States Army and roughly 18,000 soldiers.286  It is very telling that the camp bore the 
name of  fray Bartolomé de las Casas- the Dominican friar who in 1522 wrote  A Brief 
Account of the Destruction of the Indies” (Brevísima relación de la destrucción de Las 
Indias) detailing the Spaniards’ atrocities committed against the indigenous population of 
the Americas.  Las Casas’ defense of the native peoples of the Americas earned him the 
title “Champion of the Indians”.  By choosing his name for the training camp, both the 
colonial administration and the criollo elites were satisfied.  The former, subordinated to 
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 Córdova Dávila claimed that with the support of hundreds of cablegrams from 
businessmen, and the mayors and legislators of the Island, he insisted to be allowed to see 
Wilson who granted him a short interview.  He finally convinced Wilson to support 
training Puerto Rican troops in the Island.  Córdova Dávila also tried to convince the War 
Department to buy Puerto Rican coffee for the military.  Due to the inexpensive nature of 
Brazilian coffee and the high cost of the coffee produced in Puerto Rico, the War 
Department refused Córdova Dávila’s proposal but accepted to at least buy local coffee 
for the Puerto Rican troops.  See, Porto Rico Progress, 8 March 1918.  
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 After the second training camp at  Las Casas (February 1-15 May 1918) came 
to an end 13 Captains; 46 First Lieutenants; 133 Second Lieutenants (classified as 
Caucasians);  and  6 First Lieutenants  and 49 Second Lieutenants (Classified as Blacks) 
obtained commissions to served in the Infantry Section of the National Army.   The first 
camp (27 August-27 November 1917) conducted at Henry Barracks graduated 27 
Captains, 47 First Lieutenants, and 106 Second Lieutenants- all Caucasians.   The third 
and last training officer Camp ((21 June-6 November 1918) commissioned, 23 First 
Lieutenants and 255 Second Lieutenants.   A total of 726 officers were trained and 
commissioned in Puerto Rico between August 27 1917 and November 6 1918.  See, 
Report by, Capt. Luis Raul Esteves, Acting Adjutant General, May 27, 1918.  
Headquarters 2nd  Porto Rico Training Camp, Las Casas,  C.I.H.P.C., Caja 30 Cartapacio 
4 Documento 1, K.; and, Negroni, Historia militar de Puerto Rico, 440. 
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the Bureau of Insular Affairs, itself modeled on the Bureau of Indian Affairs, could very 
well see themselves as protectors of the Puerto Ricans, whom many regarded as Indians, 
at least institutionally.287  The latter could go beyond that role and pin the friar’s name to 
redeeming Hispanic and Catholic values.288   
                                                 
287
 Under the motto “Kill the Indian save the Man” Captain Richard Henry Pratt 
opened the fist Indian Industrial School in Carlisle Pennsylvania Indian School in 1879.  
Schools following this model multiplied throughout the United States until the early 
1910s.  Imagined as a social experiment its main purpose was to assimilate and 
acculturate young Native Americans.  In essence, by distancing them from their 
communities, the program sought to uproot the students’ “Indianess” and create a new 
man out of the Indian.   After the United States took over Puerto Rico in 1898, natives of 
the Island were sent to these schools. The "Porto Rican Indians", a group of sixty-plus 
Puerto Rican youngsters were sent to Carlisle Indian industrial boarding school.   A small 
group of men were the architects of the idea to send Puerto Rican children to the Carlisle, 
Tuskegee and Hampton Industrial Schools.  Richard Henry Pratt, John Eaton, and Nelson 
Miles knew each other well.  They had in common their service in the Civil War and 
Indian Wars, and were in charge of Indian Scout Units, as well as Buffalo Soldier Units. 
Pratt convinced leaders of the U.S. government of the worthiness of his social experiment 
with the children of Indian chiefs.  Eaton became the first Secretary of Education of 
Puerto Rico and was intellectually responsible for the plan to Americanize the Puerto 
Ricans using Pratt’s approach.  The way the idea was sold to the Puerto Rican families 
who agreed to send their children to the school made them believed that Carlisle was a 
type of university.  In fact those sent to Carlisle belonged to educated elite.  Ill-treated 
even while in route to the schools, the students wrote letter complaining that they were 
being treated as “Indians despite [them]selves”.  Those who could, sent their children to 
other schools, and Pratt himself sent some of the students to regular schools.  However, 
though maltreated the majority of the “Porto Rican Indians” sent to Carlisle stayed in the 
school and finish their courses.   Sonia M. Rosa-Vélez, ¿Qué pasó con los becados? La 
saga de los estudiantes puertorriqueños en la Escuela Industrial para Indios de Carlisle 
(Innedited Essay) Author’s Library; and,   Sonia M. Rosa-Vélez, The Puerto Ricans at 
Carlisle Indian School: An Experiment in Americanization Through Education. 
(Forthcoming Essay)  Author’s Library; and, Sonia M. Rosa-Vélez, Acquiring the 
American Spirit: Americanization Through Education and the Puerto Ricans in the U.S. 
Government Minority Boarding Schools, 1899-1930, (Forthcoming Essay) Author’s 
Library. 
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 Benedict Anderson has pointed out that the final replication of the former 
master’s ways came in the obsession of the new states with legitimizing themselves 
through archaeological excavations that allowed scholars and administrators to connect 
them vertically to vanished civilizations and horizontally to European metropoles. 
Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities, 120-127.  Puerto Rico was not the 
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Yager and Córdova Dávila were also allied in their efforts to secure the opening 
of spaces in the military for traditional and emerging criollo elites.  In July 1915, the War 
Department’s judge advocate had to send a memo stating that there should be no different 
legal status between Puerto Rican West Point graduates and their Continental American 
counterparts.  Citizenship, the judge argued, was not a requirement to serve as an officer 
of the U.S. Army.  The appointment of Luis Raul Estevez as a 2nd Lt. in the Porto Rico 
Regiment of Infantry quickly followed this decision.289   The Porto Rico Regiment, 
however, with all its excess personnel, the waiting lists to join, and its colonial nature was 
not the best place to advance in rank.   As soon as the United States entered the war, 
officers of the regiment started to resign their commissions so they could enter the regular 
                                                                                                                                                 
exception.  In fact a courtship with the indigenous past began way before the creation of 
the Commonwealth in 1952.  After the creation of the Commonwealth, public-funded 
archeological excavations tried to recover the Pre-Columbian past.  These efforts have 
continued and in present day they include DNA testing to find the percentage of native 
blood in the Island’s population. Dr. Juan Martinez Cruzado, a geneticist from the 
University of Puerto Rico Mayagüez, conducted a DNA survey for this purpose. 
According to the study funded by the U.S. National Science Foundation, 61 percent of all 
Puerto Ricans have Amerindian mitochondrial DNA, 27 percent have African and 12 
percent Caucasian. (Nuclear DNA, or the genetic material present in a gene's nucleus, is 
inherited in equal parts from one's father and mother. Mitochondrial DNA is inherited 
only from one's mother and does not change or blend with other materials over time.) 
According to Martinez Cruzado’s study a majority of Puerto Ricans have native blood.  
Moreover, there is further evidence that Taínos were not extinguished in the 1600s.  After 
200 years of absence from official head-counts, a 2,000 people Taíno community 
appeared living in a north-western mountain region in a military census from the 1790s.  
See, Juan C. Martínez Cruzado, “The Use of Mitochondrial DNA to Discover Pre-
Columbian Migrations to the Caribbean: Results for Puerto Rico and Expectations for the 
Dominican Republic,”  [KACIKE: Journal of Caribbean Amerindian History and 
Anthropology]; accessed 28 December 2008; available from 
http://www.kacike.org/MartinezEnglish.pdf. 
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army and advance in promotion.290  The need of instructors for Las Casas also opened the 
door for non-commissioned officers (sergeants) of the Porto Rico Regiment to obtain 
commissions as officers. 291   
The mass mobilization of the Puerto Ricans, the manpower committed to the war 
effort in Europe, and the occupation of Haiti and the Dominican Republic made the 
metropolis and especially the colonial administration in Puerto Rico more dependent on 
the criollo elites.  Mobilizing the Puerto Rican peasantry, and carrying out other extra-
insular services for the BIA became a means for the elite to assert their political power 
and to move forward their political goals.292   Securing the training of the traditional 
Puerto Rican elites and the emerging professional classes as officers would serve to 
preserve a certain social hierarchy since such training would place them in command of 
the thousands of peasants and workers mobilized for war.  The criollo elites and the 
emerging professional classes were to have a role in the war as long as it was a leading 
one.  
Yager, who was not shy to use colonial subjects to run his share of the American 
Empire, fought hard to secure that they received the training that would allow them to 
carry out their colonial duties.  As early as May of 1917, he had tried to arrange for an 
extra five presidential appointees from the Island to attend the U.S. Naval Academy at 
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 Yager informed  the BIA’s Chief that he was, “… looking  for someone to  aid 
the Governor of Saint Thomas to deal with Mr. Jackson and sugar laborers but the war 
and Santo Domingo have taken many of Porto Rico’s best men.”  Ibid.  
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Annapolis.  The Governor was not alone in these efforts.  As Puerto Rican representative 
to Congress, Córdova  Dávila also pressed this matter and  wrote to President Wilson 
asking that  he give five of his fifteen presidential Annapolis appointments to Puerto 
Ricans claiming that Hawaii and Alaska, territories smaller in population than Puerto 
Rico, had already that many.  In July 24, 1918, Wilson responded (to Yager) negatively 
but expressed willingness to remedy that situation.293  By early 1919 new legislation was 
in placed allowing for an extra five appointees to be nominated by the Resident 
Commissioner.294 The Resident Commissioner made good use of his power of 
appointment.   
Again, as with any other opening of the U.S. military to Puerto Ricans, the press 
celebrated the event.  On July 3, 1919 the newspaper El Tiempo, published an editorial 
congratulating Córdoba Dávila “for his efforts to secure this new evidence of confidence 
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 La Democracia (San Juan), 2 August 1918, C.I.H.P.C., Caja  30,  Cartapacio 7, 
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 P.G. Miller, Commissioner  of  Education to Córdova Dávila,  August 7, 1919, 
C.I.H.P.C., Caja 30, Cartapacio 6,  Documento  6, G.    Public Law 160 – with 6700-6  of  
March 3, 1903  allowed  the  Governor  of  Puerto Rico to nominate one midshipmen  to  
Annapolis while the  Resident  Commissioner could select five nominees. (PL 8, 66th  
Congress  6700-With-27 of July 11 1919); See C.I.H.P.C., Caja  30,  Cartapacio 7, 
Documento  2,  A.  The colonial administrators also sought to secure equal treatment to 
their children born or residing in the Island.  See, P.G. Miller, Commissioner of 
Education, to Col. C.B. Hodges, asst. to the Chief  of  the Bureau  of Insular Affairs, 
D.C.:  Requesting  his son and Osvaldo de la Rosa be admitted to West  Point.  Puerto 
Ricans were not the only colonial subjects attending the elite military institution, Emilio 
Aguinaldo Jr. was among the Pilipino cadets sent to the West Point.  By 1924, eleven 
appointees from the Philippines and four Puerto Ricans had received commissions from 
the military institution. Osvaldo de la Rosa and Virgil Miller graduated from West Point 
in 1924.  Luis Raul Esteves had graduated from West Point in 1915 and Francisco 
Cintrón in 1918: both remained in the Puerto Rico National Guard in the post war years. 
See Frank McIntire Letter to Governor Horace Tower, June 16, 1924, C.I.H.P.C., Caja 
30, Cartapacio 6, Documento 6, B. 
 
145 
 
in the American citizens of Porto Rico.”295  The article stated that the new legislation and 
Córdoba Dávila’s  work indicated a “ veritable  union  between  the Island  and  the  
Nation,  and  which;  at  no distant day,  will be  crowned  by  the  complete  felicity of  
our people.”296  Gauging the meaning of the event El Tiempo reminded its readers that the 
only ones entitled to nominate candidates for Annapolis were the senators and 
representatives of the U.S.  and the delegates  from  the  incorporated territories.  That 
Puerto Rico was “put on the same level as the states and territories in so far as the quota 
for the Naval academy” should show the “Independentistas of the tropical republic”297  
how the: 
Great  Republic, of  which we  form a part, is each day giving us another  proof  
of   confidence in us,  opening  the  doors  of  all institutions  of the  country  to 
Porto Rican American  citizens  and putting them  on the  same  place as citizens 
of the mainland…298  
Obtaining capable personal to help the BIA fulfill its colonial duties was one of Yager’s 
priorities when he fought for more access to military institutions for the Puerto Ricans.  
Securing the loyalty of the criollo elites and the Island’s population while bettering the 
international image of the United States were added bonuses.  For the most part, Yager 
played his cards right throughout the war period, and his efforts to secure more spaces in 
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the military for the Puerto Ricans were generally applauded.  Only the issue of race 
gained him real criticism during this period.  
The United States military was still a segregated organization during WWI.  In 
this regard Continental officers and Yager himself expressed pro-segregationist views to 
McIntyre.   In one of his letter Yager informed him that it had been necessary to “keep 
the blacks out because of prejudice [sic] amongst the soldiers of the regiment themselves 
who did not want blacks in the regiment.” 299   However, Yager argued,  “blacks are 
anxious to join regiment and I’m told they make excellent soldiers under white officers 
and I’m confident a full regiment of them could be formed in the island.”300  In further 
correspondence Yager complained: “Many Porto Ricans seem to feel that the Governors 
and officials in the states consider all Porto Ricans as Negro troops: but that of course 
touches the sensibility of the white people here.”301    
Judging by the local press and politician’s statements, Yager’s worries seemed 
unfounded.  It is more than likely that he was expressing his own fears of racial mixing 
than that of the Puerto Ricans.   The Governor, referring to  “our race problem, just as 
they have it in South Carolina”  agreed to train Black and White soldiers together if 
absolutely necessary but warned that “they must be separated.”302   To be fair, whether or 
not Yager wanted to segregate Puerto Ricans in the military by race was mostly irrelevant 
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since it was the policy of the U.S. Army to segregate troops racially.  To that effect the 
Regiment 375 was designated to train and field Black Puerto Ricans.303    
Regarding the decision to segregate the troops in the Island, the newspaper 
Justicia, commented:  “Under the administration of Arthur Yager the line separating the 
men of color is finally established in Puerto Rico” followed by   “…the old racist fart 
from Kentucky accused of being the instigator”.304  The editorial continued by arguing 
that “the complete triumph [of the U.S. and the Allies] will also defeat all privileges.”305  
These comments, in a newspaper that consistently challenged Yager’s administration 
show the complex nature of the Puerto Rican opinion-making groups with regard to the 
war effort.  Puerto Rican participation in the armed forces of the metropolis was strongly 
encouraged, and there was consensus about wanting to see the U.S emerge victorious, but 
that did not blind leaders from the leading political parties to the fact that many of the 
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freedoms espoused by Wilson were not enjoyed by Puerto Ricans.  Moreover, local 
politicians continuously sought to link inequalities, prejudices and injustices at home with 
the ideals espoused by Wilson when making the case to go to war.   
The attitude of Puerto Rican leaders and opinion-making groups was similar to 
that of African-American leaders, including W.E.B. DuBois, who during World War I 
supported the war effort by encouraging black participation.  Black leaders, who had 
argued that disdain of dark races was the real cause of the war, identified the United 
States and the Allies as the lesser of two evils, and thus, as their best chance for 
advancement.  African-American leaders adopted a policy of “first your country, then 
your rights” and of “Close Ranks” with “our fellow white citizens.”306  In Puerto Rico, 
the narratives were similar.  The differences in the movements can be seen in the fact that 
the issue of race, as determined by skin color, was not the main concern of Puerto Rican 
leaders.  Furthermore, since the Island had an undecided political status, there were 
several approaches to what came after closing ranks “with our co-citizens from the 
North”.  Nonetheless, just as African-American leaders, so Puerto Rican leaders hoped to 
advance their respective agendas after showing the willingness and readiness of their 
people to come in the defense of the U.S., and the ideals of freedom and democracy in 
times of need.   They expected that participating in a war sold as crusade against 
totalitarianism, colonialism and militarism would bring decolonization and equality at 
home. 
 Another difference between Puerto Rican and African-American leaders, even if 
both wanted to use military training to erase racial biases and prejudice, was that the 
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former wanted to remake the very essence of the Puerto Rican through military training.  
The criollo elites were not the only ones bent on reshaping the Puerto Ricans.  As the 
recruits began to make their way into Las Casas for training, an editorial in The Porto 
Rico Progress, a publication adamantly pro-metropolis, observed: “So a new day has 
dawned for Porto Rico’s Jíbaro.”307   The training acquired in the military, the editorial 
argued, would prepare the Jíbaro to join the drive towards a modern Puerto Rico.    
Downtrodden, unthougt [sic] for as he [the Jíbaro] has been, he is now in the 
limelight.  The testing and refining process will be hard for him. But he and his 
brother will become the nucleus of a new Porto Rico.  The anemic disease warped 
man will be a thing of the past.  And the domain of the Jíbaro will at last come 
into its proper place in the great Economic and Social scheme of this island.308 
The same journal, and other newspapers reported  that  the majority  of those  
joining  the U.S. Army  were Jíbaros  who wore shoes  for the first  time in Camp Las 
Casas after induction.309    El Buscapié affirmed:  “After the War, these soldiers will be 
our greatest leaders, teachers, and champions of freedom and democracy.”310  
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Commenting on the attitude of the public when seeing the Porto Rican soldiers, the 
editorial continued:   
…nobody can watch them without feeling a revolution in their blood and in the 
spirit which moves them to support in any possible way our soldiers, be it with a 
simple smile or with exhortations of courage and steadfastness.311   
Addressing the poor physical state of the inductees Francisco del Valle Atiles, 
wrote for Buscapié,  a publication that constantly celebrated the expansion of the U.S. 
into the Caribbean and Latin America and the role of Puerto Rico as the center of the 
imperialist venture; that military training would correct the “organic poverty” shown by 
the physical examination of the recruits.  He was quick to add: “While the Puerto Rican 
may be lacking in physical condition due to malnutrition and disease, he 
overcompensates in spirit” a trait he identified with Hispanic gallantry.  Moreover, in a 
Puerto Rican version of Arielismo,312 this editorial argued that the Puerto Rican “requires 
of the material and industrial might of the Continental American,” (identified as the 
                                                 
311
 Ibid.    
 
312
 Ariel was published in 1900 by Uruguayan writer José Enrique Rodó and gave 
way to Arielismo as a literary and political movement.  Arielismo offers an idealized 
picture of Latin American culture which is marked by noble spirituality and gallantry as 
opposed to the United States which represents materialism.  Rodó took William 
Shakespeare’s The Tempest to represent this cultural and spiritual divide between the 
United States and Latin America.   The main characters in Rodó’s versión are Ariel and 
Calibán.  Ariel symbolizes Latin Americas’ noble spirituality rooted in the Greco-Roman 
ideal of beauty and the Christian value of charity.  On the other hand, Calibán (which is 
an anagram for Canibal) represents U.S. expansionism and utilitarianism.  Latin 
America’s spirituality, according to Arielismo, would help to create a better society by 
allowing the best men to flourish and lead the masses.  The U.S., however, engrossed in 
materialism, and lacking Ariel’s spirituality, is presented as utterly unable to escape 
mediocrity.  See, José Enrique Rodó, “Ariel,” [Brevario de la Juventud (Valencia, 
España: Editorial Cervantes, 1920): The Project Gutenberg EBook]; accessed 28 
December 2008; available from http://www.pgdp.net. 
151 
 
Anglo-Saxon), to correct such deficiencies.313  After assimilating such Anglo-Saxon 
characteristics, the Jíbaro inductee would create a space for the “two great cultures of the 
American hemisphere–the Hispanic and Anglo-Saxon- to coexist.”314   
According to these narratives military training would fuse material and moral 
progress, national, and cultural identity into one being, the Jíbaro.  These ideas gained 
strength throughout the war.  This interpretation of the potential role of military training 
for modernizing Puerto Rico via the military training of its peasantry was found in almost 
all the local newspapers and was voiced by all political parties, especially the Republican.  
The autonomist faction within Unión, however, benefited more from it than any other 
political group.  Indeed the Unionistas, who held political control during the war years, 
benefited more than any other political faction from the ambivalent narratives used to 
promote the war effort in the Island.   
Soon after the Armistice, The Porto Rican Progress reported derisively that the 
Unionistas claimed that the “Puerto Rican soldier has created a New Americanism”, one 
that allowed for “these two great cultures” to co-exist.315   In fact the New Americanism 
espoused mainly by the Autonomistas and certain Separatistas from Unión, challenged 
both the Republican criollos- who would accept nothing but the complete assimilation of 
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the Puerto Ricans, and the assimilation project of the metropolis.  The Unionists’ 
approach to the constructed identity of the new Puerto Rican and the New American was 
so appealing that those publications which were in fact organs of the Republican Party or 
staunchly pro-metropolis, published several editorial and commentaries which essentially 
made the case of the Unionistas,   mostly due to the ambivalent or conflicting nature of 
national discourse and patriotism.  
Eager to cooperate with the war effort and the defense of the “Nation”, the Red 
Cross, Club de Damas (women’s clubs or associations), and in many cases, the 
townspeople made sure that the departing recruits received care packages.  A newspaper 
commented that “all soldiers arrive with a bill book with the inscription “Adelante 
Soldado Portorriqueño.”   And many of them received, besides the normative ration of 
cigars, cigarettes, and some cash, items which appealed to their national spirit, such as 
cloth with the inscription “Recuerde el Carolina” (Remember the Carolina) and the words 
of La Borinqueña, considered at the time a  national hymn that would  become the 
national anthem in 1952.316  It is obvious that the feelings towards the nation and the 
understanding of the nation itself were, to say the least, complex.  A Jíbaro told a 
reporter that his wife and children were crying when he left for training, but that he said 
to them that “it was for the Patria and the Patria would protect them if I fought to protect 
her.” 317    It is clear that this Jíbaro-soldier expected his sacrifice not to be in vain. In his 
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understanding, he was not fighting for a foreign power; he was fighting for his 
motherland, and in case he made the ultimate sacrifice, the motherland would take care of 
his offspring.   Luckily, he would not have to make such sacrifice. 
By October 31, 1918 three of the four regiments authorized for the Porto Rican 
division had been trained and manned with 10,600 officers and soldiers.   On November 
11 an armistice between the Allies and the German Empire came into effect ending 
hostilities in Europe.318  Amid fireworks, dancing, the colors of the U.S. and of the allied 
nations, out of the gates of Las Casas came marching the 12,000 soldiers and trainers of 
the Porto Rican contingent of the National Army.  The celebration climaxed with a 
military review of the Porto Rican Division in the Plaza 2 de Marzo in Condado-
commemorative of the Jones Act of 1917.319    Knowing that demobilization would come 
rather sooner than later The Porto Rico Progress upped the ante and announced that  the 
men from Las Casas  “ no matter what their future  may be, cannot help being  better men 
for the few months of training they have had.”320 
On December 18, 1918 demobilization orders arrived, and on January 1919, the 
Puerto Rican division had been completely demobilized.  The soldiers training in the 
Island did not see combat.  A soldier lamented after receiving his discharge papers and 
examining the document and the blank space reserved for “battles, engagements, and 
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skirmishes”:  “If there were only three or four names in that line, how proud I’d be.”321  
The political leaders who sought to advance their goals through war participation would 
have strengthened their positions tremendously if the Puerto Rican Divisions had reached 
the European theater and bled alongside the Continental-American and Allied soldiers.322    
The old Porto Rican Regiment at least saw its role extended during the war.  
Brought to full strength in 1914, the regiment had been sent to defend the Panama Canal 
in 1917.323  It is significant that these troops were sent outside the Island to take over 
defense of Isthmian Canal.  Not only was the Canal vital for American projection of 
power and national security, hence the importance of receiving such assignment, but the 
role of Puerto Rican troops ceased to be solely of a domestic nature.  The local press 
deemed sending the regiment overseas a gesture of confidence in the Puerto Ricans.   
Reflecting their new political identity, upon their return to Puerto Rico, the men of the 
“Porto Rican Regiment” found their unit’s name changed to the “65th Infantry, U. S. 
Army,” courtesy of the National Defense Act of 1920.324  Significantly, the term Porto 
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El Águila reported that in some cases when asked their names from recruitment purposes, 
some Puerto Ricans answered, “Yo soy Puertorriqueño” to which the recruiter answered: 
“All right, puertoricans [sic] are Americans: so, you most fight for your Nation.”322   
According to the article, after being told they were U.S. citizens, most went willingly. 
Many of the Puerto Ricans recruited in New York were sent to the 396th,  African-
American units. They fought attached to French units in the Western Front in France.  
Among them was Rafael Hernandez, one of Puerto Rico's greatest composers.  
 
323
 In three days the 654 vacancies of the Porto Rico Regiment were filled with 
volunteers.  McIntyre to Yager, March 13, 1914, C.I.H.P.C., Caja 30 Cartapacio 4, 
Documento 1, I; and  Muratti, Historia del Regimiento 65, 9. 
 
324
 On July 1, 1908, under authority of an Act of Congress approved on May 27, 
the Porto Rico United States Volunteers became officially part of the regular army and 
155 
 
Rican was dropped as the regiment was included in the renumbering of federal units.  
World War I brought Puerto Rico American citizenship, and the Island’s regiment 
received a permanent niche in the regular army of the United States. 
Demobilization came swiftly but that was not to be the end of the “Porto Rican 
contingent.”   The three regiments from Las Casas were reorganized in 1922 as part of 
the Army Reserve Corps.  In 1919, Secretary of War Baker authorized Yager to organize 
an infantry regiment and a cavalry battalion, officially creating the Porto Rico National 
Guard.  In 1923, this corps was reorganized into the 295 Infantry Regiment, P.R.N.G.  
Responding both to the prestige that came from wearing a military uniform and to 
economic hardships, neither the National Guard nor the regular army units in the Island 
lacked volunteers to fill their ranks, and, in fact, there were waiting lists to join such 
units.325   
 As the victory celebrations subdued, Puerto Rican politicians tried to cash on any 
political leverage they believed to have earned because of their support of the war effort.   
Still convinced that the soldiers who trained in the Island would become the nucleus of a 
new Puerto Rico, some moved to secure that any benefits granted to the Great War’s 
veterans in the U.S. were also extended to the Puerto Rican veterans.  Roughly  a month 
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after the Armistice, Diluvio, which had been very critical of Yager’s administration 
throughout the war period began a campaign promoting the inclusion of Puerto Rican 
soldiers as beneficiaries of the Secretary of Interior Dane’ proposed benefit for veterans- 
which sought to provide soldiers with the opportunity to buy farmlands with low-interests 
loans.  Diluvio’s editor, Norberto Escabí, argued that in Puerto Rico there were over 
200,000 cuerdas326 of public lands- and hundreds of thousands more in private absentee 
idle hands that could very well be put to good use by the more than 15,000 soldiers whom 
in their majority were peasants.  The editorial warned that the majority of the Puerto 
Rican soldiers had developed new worldviews, habits, and ideas through the hard training 
and labor of the military camps, and, consequently, the old standards of living would not 
satisfy them now. 327  It is clear that the editorial was appealing, and not so subtlety, to the 
perennial fear of socio-political unrest harbored by the colonial authorities.  Diluvio also 
called for putting a stop to the Puerto Rican labor exodus.  It argued that the training of 
the soldiers and the farmland legislation should help to create the necessary conditions so 
the labor exodus would become unnecessary.328    
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 Some steps were taken to prepare the soldiers for their return to civilian life.   As 
part of the demobilization process the soldiers attended a series of talks and seminars.  C. 
Hendrickson, director of Agriculture of the Food Commission, Félix Reina and F.G. 
Rodil, a functionary and the Director of Education respectively, spoke to the men of the 
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opportunity of   “making Porto Rico a self-supporting country.”329   The soldiers indeed 
received a tall order.  Moreover, it is very telling that the publications advocating the 
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Progress.  Unionistas and Republicanos were too busy positioning themselves in order to 
further their respective political goals. 
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The Unionistas were quick to demand a solution to the status issue suggesting that 
Puerto Rico be allowed to send a delegate to the Peace Assembly to demand 
independence for the Island.  As the Unionistas started to call for resolving the status 
question, Republicans and colonial administrators attacked them as selfish and 
irresponsible in view of the earthquake and tidal wave that punished the Island in 
November 1918, and the subsequent cholera epidemic that crippled the west coast.330  
The next month, Representative Cayetano Coll y Cuchí, who after de Diego’s death in 
1918 became the most prominent separatist among the Unionistas, passed a memorial 
and resolution in the Insular Legislature urging President Wilson to support self-
determination for the Puerto Ricans.  Coll y Cuchí’s resolution stressed that failing to act 
positively would undermine the moral grounds of the American representatives in the 
peace negotiations and thus jeopardize their mission.  Puerto Rico, he argued, “… has 
demonstrated it s fitness and capacity for self government, that is being at present and 
always has been denied the island.”331  
Coll y Cuchí reminded the president that Porto Ricans:  
…let out a cry of joy when the American Congress extended its laws to the island 
territory and called its sons to arms in order that they might play part in the great 
task of giving liberty to the world.    And our soldiers gathered in the camps and 
our riches flowed into the vaults of the government without the slightest doubt 
delaying the decided impulse of our spirit.  Thus was seen the rare spectacle of a 
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people who was itself not free hastening to give the blood of its sons to defend 
other nations.332 
The Porto Rican soldiers, he continued, “…left their homes to fight for democracy, 
resting in the belief that when the war was over, victory won, and peace established, 
Porto Rico would be given the same freedom for which it fought.”333  He skillfully linked 
Wilson’s international rhetoric to Puerto Rico’s issues.  The resolution continued: “Our 
culture and civilization and the pride of our glorious race oblige us to decline to accept as 
legitimate a government that does not spring from our own will.”  He proceeded by 
denouncing that the elected representatives of Puerto Rico were subject “to the veto of 
one man who was neither born in our land nor expects to find here the final peace of 
death.”334 
 The easy passing of the non-binding resolution emboldened the Unionistas who 
the next week tried to pass another one. This time they sought approval for a resolution 
calling on the President and Congress to allow the organization of a Republican form of 
government in the Island.335   Don Manuel Rossy, Republican leader of the house, still 
espousing 100 percent Americanism, declared while denouncing the bill: “I am an 
American citizen and I stand for American sovereignty. That is my Americanism.”336  He 
argued that Unionistas had poorly worded the resolution to disguise their true goals, 
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independence.   The Speaker of the House, Miguel Guerra, had tried to convince 
legislators to pass it unanimously by appealing to the need of a more liberal and 
democratic government.  Defending democratic and nationalist aspiration he declared 
that the day for Puerto Rico to voice its desire for self-government had indeed arrived.  
Frustrated by the intransigence of the Republicanos, Ponce’s Representative Manuel 
Lastra challenged Rossi to claim full responsibility before the people of Puerto Rico for 
the defeat of a plan for a more liberal government.337   Rossi riposted:  
You, [the Unionistas] stand for the Republic of Porto Rico, and we stand for 
statehood in the Union.  We travel different roads and we seek different ends.  We 
will not be on [sic] at this late hour to content ourselves with a loosely worded 
proposition that leaves in doubt the kind of sovereignty we want.338 
 After a heated discussion, Guerra replied to Rossy’s comments.  He made a distinction 
between the old Americanism, which Rossy represented, and the new spirit of 
Americanism.  Guerra explained that while holding in high esteem the old Americanism, 
and while being loyal to the teachings  of American statesmen, the younger generation 
and their new Americanism believed in the future of Puerto Rican nationality.  Indeed the 
debate turned upon who was more American in an attempt to show who best understood 
the path that the Puerto Ricans ought to follow. 
Officially, Unión did not demand independence.   However, their leaders spoke 
openly about it and spared no effort in fighting against statehood.  Undeterred by the 
failure of the resolution, Coll y Cuchí challenged the metropolis declaring to the press 
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that, “year after year we have demanded independence or statehood… Without achieving 
any…”  and,  “the Jones Act, let’s be honest, does not satisfy the aspirations of the 
portorrican [sic] people.”339  Coll y Cuchí linked Puerto Rico’s need of “independence 
nationhood” to Wilson’s “self-determination” rhetoric.  He added that Córdova Dávila’s 
proposal in the U.S. House of Representatives to create a referendum to decide the 
political status was not a surprise and that “we [the Unionistas] had always believed that 
after the war ended, there would be the opportunity to move the Island towards that goal 
[independence].”  The reporter himself was quick to link the goal of the separatistas in 
Unión to a long line of revolutionaries and champions of independence.340   There was 
much opposition to any referendum on the status question, especially while Unión 
retained political power.  During the war Buscapié had derided the idea of having a 
plebiscite to define the status arguing that the hundreds of thousands of Puerto Ricans 
who enlisted in the military draft had already decided that issue.341 
For a while it seemed as if the Unionistas would be able to realize their goals with 
considerable support from the general public.  The general election of 1920 witnessed a 
triumph for Unión.  Of 249,431 votes cast, the Unionistas obtained 126,446.  They re-
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elected Córdova Dávila, 15 senators and 26 representatives.  Their two candidates were 
elected to the new executive positions of Public Service Commissioners.  Only the 
senatorial district of Ponce remained in Republican hands, which with 63,845 votes cast 
in their favor also won in 16 municipalities, and elected 3 senators and 9 representatives.  
The Socialists won 8 municipalities with 59,140 votes and elected 1 senator and 4 
representatives.     
Unión was the dominant political party in the Island, but its success hid the deep-
rooted divisions splitting its members into almost irreconcilable bands: those who wanted 
independence- initially led by José de Diego, and succeeded by Cayetano Coll y Cuchí, 
Barceló and Córdova Dávila among others; and those who wanted to secure autonomy 
and who still spoke of pro-Americanism, led by Juan B. Huyke and Martín Travieso.  The 
Unionistas had personal divisions as well.  Córdova Dávila himself, however, spoke of 
the possibility of becoming a state of the Union if statehood was granted with the “same 
dignity and grandiosity” of the other 48 states.342   In 1920, Barceló traveled to the United 
States with the purpose of gauging how much had changed in Washington with the 
election of the Republican candidate Warren H. Harding as president.  He proudly 
declared: “Let me go to Washington to demand independence”.  But once in New York 
he showed the ambivalence and division of his own party by declaring that the 
Unionistas’ immediate goal was to obtain the right to elect their own governor and that 
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they were happy and proud of having U.S. citizenship.  Moreover, he declared that Puerto 
Rico would accept independence or statehood, as final solutions to the status question.343 
 In his inaugural speech in July 29, 1921, Harding’s appointee, E. Montgomery 
Reily, let Puerto Rican leaders know that he would not tolerate foreigners inciting 
political unrest among Puerto Ricans or demanding independence.  Reily stated that as 
long as the Stars and Stripes flew over the United Sates, it would continue to fly over 
Puerto Rico.  He also warned the Socialists by declaring that he would not allow labor 
leaders to incite unrest among workers.  Montgomery Reily’s inaugural speech was well-
received by the Republicans. It made the Socialists weary and left the Unionistas feeling 
betrayed.   On August 3, the leadership of Unión met in assembly.   At the end of the 
meeting, a crowd accused Córdova Dávila of collaborating with the new governor and 
knowing beforehand what Reily would say in his inaugural speech.  As the crowd 
chanted “Viva la independencia,”  Córdova Dávila yelled back: “Viva Puerto Rico 
Americano.”344  Though this was not the end of Unión, Reily’s persecution of Unionistas 
whom he deemed separatists and his exaltation of those he believed wanted only limited 
self-government would finally destroyed the party, at least as a counterweight to the 
Republican Party.    
On January 1922, Congressman Philip Campbell, Republican from Kansas, and 
Senator William King, Democrat from Utah, introduced the Campbell Bill.  This bill, for 
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the first time mentioned openly the creation in Puerto Rico of a Estado Libre Asociado, 
which unlike the one created in 1952, included an American Commissioner in Puerto 
Rico and a governor to be chosen by the elected Puerto Rican legislature, not by the 
people.345   With the leaders of Unión in disarray as a consequence of internal divisions 
and the latest political developments, they temporarily adopted the Estado Libre 
Asociado as their goal.  Soon the bill showed signs that it would produce no results.  In 
April 1922, a faction of Unión decided to create the Partido Nacionalista 
Puertorriqueño, which was constituted on September 17.   Fearing that a Socialist-
Republican alliance might end their political dominance, the Unionistas sought an 
alliance with their archrival, the Republicanos.  For the elections of 1924, Republicans 
and Unionistas formed an alliance- Alianza Puertorriqueña.  Republican Party dissidents, 
incensed by the alliance with a party dominated by autonomists and separatists, allied 
themselves with the Socialists to form a coalition.346   The Puerto Rican soldier and the 
heavy burdens put on him, as well as the promises made to los hijos de este país quickly 
disappeared from the politician’s mind as they ushered the Island into an era of political 
alliances.  Incessant fighting for political survival and dominance left no room or interest, 
for little else.  
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The combination of political developments, in the form of American citizenship 
for the Puerto Ricans and an elective legislature in 1917, and the military mass 
mobilization of the Island’s peasantry and urban workers, further complicated the 
relationship between the metropolis and the colony.   The War Department, through the 
BIA, would have preferred to continue treating the Island as a giant reservation.  
American citizenship, however, invested the Puerto Ricans with more legal rights and 
recourses, making unilateral and unpopular policies easier to challenge by the different 
political groups in the Island.  The immediate goals of the War Department and the 
Wilson administration (securing the loyalty of the Puerto Ricans by granting them 
American citizenship and silencing critiques of imperialism) were achieved.  But this 
victory would prove a double-edge knife in the long run.   
Mass participation of Puerto Ricans in the U.S. military, the newly created Puerto 
Rico National Guard, and the willing support of the newly elected Puerto Rican 
legislature for the war effort, temporarily cemented American control over the Island, and 
more importantly, over the islanders’ loyalty to the metropolis.  As some supporters of 
the metropolis argued during the war years, the unwillingness or inability of the vast 
majority of the Puerto Ricans to resist becoming American citizens and their 
determination to participate in the war reflected the impact that the institutions of the new 
metropolis had had on the Puerto Ricans.  That same institutional influence would lead 
the Puerto Ricans to expect more political and socioeconomic opportunities, if not 
equality.  Oblivious to the transformation occurring in Puerto Rico, the metropolis was 
slow to respond to these challenges and no major political changes would take place after 
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1917 until yet another war, the Second World War, highlighted, once again, the strategic 
importance of the Island.   
The mass mobilization of the Puerto Rican peasantry and urban workers, and the 
initial enthusiasm shown by the inductees hid the fact that control over the military 
apparatus in the Island was no longer the exclusive prerogative of the American colonial 
administrators.  The traditional and emerging criollo elites, as well as the professional 
classes, had to be called upon to train and lead the massive army of peasants soldiering in 
the Island.  Out of sheer necessity, the metropolis broadly opened the officer’s corps to 
los hijos de este país providing in the process the tools for the local elites and emerging 
professional classes to attain and consolidate political power.   criollo leaders, which for 
different reasons and with different goals in mind supported the war effort, by the war’s 
end, had succeeded in wresting exclusive control over the nation-building project via 
military service from the metropolitan authorities.  This situation, even if not immediately 
apparent in the post-war years, would eventually put the local elites in a better political 
position than they had been before the WWI. 
The passing of the Jones Act and the imposition of American citizenship upon the 
Puerto Ricans coupled with the death of Luis Muñoz Rivera temporarily weakened the 
Unionistas.  The coming of the war brought the temporary resurgence of the Republicans 
who were the first to marry the war effort and the 100 percent Americanism campaign, to 
their own political goal, statehood.  By the war’s end, however, by turning President 
Wilson’s promise of ending the hyphenations in the American nation into a call for a 
New Americanism that promoted creating a new Puerto Rican out of Hispanic gallantry 
and Anglo-Saxon industrialism, the autonomistas within Unión had found an image they 
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could use to sell their third way, the Libre Asociación, to the general population.  This 
was in essence a return to Hostos and Matienzo Cintron’s idea of Americanizing the 
Puerto Rican, which meant creating a modern political individual without losing the 
essence of Puertorriqueñismo,347 only this time, economic modernization superseded 
political modernization.  The autonomistas had found a new philosophy and an agent to 
incarnate it.  There could be a space for the Anglo-Saxon and Hispanic cultures to 
coexist.  The Jíbaro would be that new man and Puerto Rico that new space.  The 
autonomistas of the 1920s were not able to fully exploit or develop their new popular 
philosophy, but the seed had been planted for the generation coming of age during the 
war, and they would retake this narrative decades later. 
Over 18,000 Puerto Ricans served in the U.S. armed forces during WWI.348   
After the Armistice these soldiers were quickly demobilized and returned to the hills and 
coastal valleys.349  Neither the metropolis nor the colonial administration created 
vocational or capacitating projects to make good on the promises of creating a new 
modern Jíbaro.  The promises of a new Jíbaro, integrated into the economy as its driving 
force, and as the “new teachers of freedom and democracy,” remained mostly unfulfilled.  
However, the creation of the Puerto Rico National Guard in 1919, and transforming the 
provisional regiment into a regular U.S. Army regiment, (el 65), absorbed some of the 
best soldiers and restarted the military in Puerto Rico as a professional career.    
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Many of the future career officers (and certainly the vast majority of the troops) 
identified themselves simply as Jíbaros from Cabo Rojo, Cayey, Lares, here and there… 
and became an important emerging socio-economic and political group.  These soldiers 
and officers did not interfere directly in politics, as they followed the strict subordination 
to civilian authority practiced by the U.S. Army.  criollo politicians, however, tried to 
employ the soft enticements of the military (prestige, manliness, heroism) and its tangible 
aspect (economic improvement) to boost different political projects, from simply 
redefining the parameters of the colony to full decolonization.  But this would have to 
wait. 
The metropolis had secured the islanders’ loyalty in part by giving them 
citizenship but the fact that the Island remained mostly dormant after WWI, even after 
the promises of integrating the Jíbaros as the axis of progress did not materialize, was a 
function of the temporary economic boom brought by the war.   The Great Depression 
would bring unrest to the circum-Caribbean basin in the 1930 and mark the end of 
economic and political stability in the American informal empire and its Caribbean 
colonies, especially Puerto Rico.  Yet another war would force the United States to once 
again mobilize the Puerto Ricans.  The challenges to the metropolis would be stronger 
and more direct.  Overreliance on the criollo elites to mobilize and control the peasantry 
and urban working classes would continue to undermine the metropolis’ control over the 
military apparatus and the political structures in the Island.  A new challenge in the form 
of nationalist clandestine paramilitary units would be, more than a military challenge, 
recognition of the political value of the military in the Island’s society.  
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In his late years and by then a general, Luis Raul Esteves commented that he 
believed that Camp Las Casas served as the “first blood transfusion received by our tired 
people. Not only did it [military training] awaken our Jíbaro, but it taught him how to 
live a better life.”350   Esteves had doubted that the “malnourished jibaritos” he 
encountered at Las Casas would ever be ready to serve as combat troops and longed 
serving with his Continental unit- the 23rd Infantry.  However, his opinion changed:  
I witnessed our boys’ physical transformation becoming aware of their disciplined 
spirit and military pride inherited from our ancestors; I changed my mind and felt 
proud of serving with Boricua troops...351   
Esteves’ assessment may have been lost to the dominant political leaders in the early 
1920s, but the emerging leadership, among them Luis Muñoz Marín and Pedro Albizu 
Campos, were not to forget what they witnessed or experience during the Great War.  
The Jíbaro, who had been presented at best as a romantic figure and at worst as a reason 
for the Island’s backwardness had proven that his alleged shortcomings were a function 
of the structural social inequalities inherent to the Island and not a characteristic of his 
persona.  As mature leaders, both Albizu Campos and Muñoz Marín would try again to 
re-create the Puerto Ricans’ national identity and the Island’s socio-economic structures 
by virtue of military training.  Their different paths would eventually lead to an armed 
struggle between los hijos de este país.   
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CHAPTER 4 
ECONOMIC WRETCHEDNESS AND THE NATIONALIST 
CHALLENGE: PRELUDE TO THE BATTLE OVER MODERN PUERTO 
RICO 
Nationalism [has] organized and mobilized the vital strength of Puerto Rico to 
counter the enemy.  The nation has passed from passive resistance to 
counterattack.  The entire nation has condemned these killings and it is firm in its 
resolution that they will not repeat themselves...  It is the plan to exterminate the 
Puerto Ricans.  [But]Nationalism has destroyed all Yankee inventions.  The 
enemy has now left only the traditional arms of assassination.  The country will 
vindicate the killings of its heroes, Pagán, Quiñones, Rodríguez-Vega, and 
Santiago.  The Yankee Chief of police, Colonel Francis Riggs, has declared to the 
nation that there will be war.  The Nationalists recognized his frankness and pick 
up the glove.  There will be war.  War against the Yankees!352 
 
The 1930s in Puerto Rico were marked by economic distress and political 
instability.  The economic misfortunes of the Island were not simply a matter of the 
metropolis’ economic problems extending to its colonies.  Puerto Rico’s problems had 
started previously to the Great Depression and were linked to the exploitative colonial 
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nature of its situation.   As the depression castigated the U.S. mainland, it simply 
aggravated a preexisting condition in the Island.  Puerto Rico’s dire economic picture; an 
alternatively unemployed or overworked, underpaid, malnourished rural population and a 
rapidly impoverishing urban sector, stirred discontent which was ultimately aimed at the 
metropolis and its colonial administrators.   
As the most recognizable face of poverty, hunger became the rule for the Puerto 
Rican urban workers and peasantry, the economic situation turned into a political one.  A 
rapidly deteriorating situation gave way to a reign of political violence in the mid and late 
1930s.  A virulent Nacionalista anti-American campaign and the colonial authorities’ 
belligerent and sometimes criminal persecution of the Nacionalistas marked this 
historical period.  The Nacionalistas, however, were not passive victims; they fought 
violently to the point that the Island came to be called “America’s Ireland” or the “Ireland 
of the Caribbean.” 353   In fact, before U.S entrance into WWII, the metropolis and its 
colonial administrators used the militarized Puerto Rico Insular Police to fight a brief war 
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in Puerto Rico against the Nacionalistas leaders, their paramilitary units, and simple party 
members. The fear of social unrest during the early 1930s, followed by a brief reign of 
political violence forced the federal government to take a closer look at the Island’s 
economic and political situation.  Hence, while violence closed some roads to Puerto 
Rico’s socio-economic and political development, it also opened other avenues.      
This chapter analyzes how the economic distress afflicting the Island fueled 
political discontent and how such discontent was in turn used by emerging political 
leaders, Pedro Albizu Campos and Luis Muñoz Marín, to further different decolonization 
processes.  The history of the rise of Pedro Albizu Campos and the Nacionalistas is well 
known.354  An electrifying leader decides that only a violent struggle would free the 
                                                 
354
 Albizu Campos was born in Ponce on September 12, 1891 as the grandson of a 
slave on his mother’s side, a domestic worker who died in his childhood.  His father, 
Alejandro Albizu Romero, came from a rich family of Spanish immigrants.  Albizu 
Campos received a scholarship to study at the University of Vermont after graduating 
with honors from the Ponce High School in 1912, a school mostly reserved for Puerto 
Rico’s southern white elite.  After two years in Vermont he transferred to Harvard 
University and graduated in 1917.  On May 17 of the same he volunteered to serve in the 
U.S. Army during WWI.  After completing the Officers Training Camp at Las Casas, he 
earned the rank of First Lieutenant in 1918.  He was honorably discharged in April, 1919 
from the 375th Regiment, an outfit created in the Island for Black Puerto Ricans.  Albizu 
Campos resumed his studies in Harvard after the war eventually graduating with a law 
degree in 1923.  During his later years at Harvard he became an admirer of the Sinn Fein 
Irish separatist movement.  He returned to Puerto Rico after marrying Laura Meneses, a 
Radcliffe-educated Peruvian, and joined the Unionistas as a staunchly pro-independence 
champion. However, when he was not selected by the Unionista leadership as candidate 
to the legislature in 1924, he left Unión to join the Nationalist Party created by Unionist 
dissenters in 1922.   His tactics were such that eventually he forced the founding 
leadership to leave the Party.  Cayetano Coll y Cuchí, cofounder of the Nationalist Party, 
declared that Albizu Campos’ “intolerance and fanatism [sic] was going to alienate 
Puerto Rican people from the independence ideal”.   See, FBI, Nationalist Party of 
Puerto Rico, Vol. 4., 54-55; and El Águila, 8 November 1918:  and, April10-14, 1917, 
October 10, 1918; and December 6, 1918; and Maldonado, Puerto Rico’s Democratic 
Revolution, 85-86, 87, citing Luis Ángel Ferrao, Pedro Albizu Campos y el nacionalismo 
puertorriqueño 1930-1939, Vol. II (San Juan, Puerto Rico: Editorial Cultural, Inc., 1990), 
395. 
173 
 
Island of the American grip (which he believed was the cause of all of Puerto Rico’s 
troubles).  He thus wages war against the metropolis and the colonial authorities hoping 
that the Puerto Rican masses will rise and expel the Americans.  On the other hand, Luis 
Muñoz Marín, the bohemian “Bard of politics” and patrician heir of Luis Muñoz Rivera, 
would spend the 1930s vacillating between socialist ideals (especially the socio-economic 
restructuration of the Island) and his belief in independence, but always condemning 
violence.  Both Albizu Campos and Muñoz Marín benefitted and suffered immensely 
from the same conditions plaguing the Island. 
I argue that what transpired during these years of political violence was also a 
battle for control of Puerto Rican identity.  It is obvious that Albizu Campos had no 
chance of militarily overthrowing the colonial government.  Although tactically 
insignificant from a military point of view, the Nacionalistas’ daring attacks against the 
metropolis’ agents fulfill their intended role; these attacks gained local and international 
attention to Albizu Campos’s cause.  His movement, however, had little possibility of 
success if it could not polarize the Puerto Rican’s self perception vis-a-vis Continental 
Americans.  Using Hispanic and Catholic iconography for his party and paramilitary 
units, and emphasizing Spanish traditions and conservatism, were but a call to the Puerto 
Ricans to see themselves as completely different from Continental Americans.  Albizu 
Campos was appealing to what he believed was Puerto Rico’s true national identity.   
Eventually the Nacionalistas would challenge not only the American presence but also 
the legitimacy of the Insular Police and the U.S. Army and National Guard Units in the 
Island as truly Puerto Rican or as national institutions representative of the Puerto Ricans.    
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On the other hand, Muñoz Marín, though a self-proclaimed Nacionalista and 
ardent advocate of independence, rejected violence, preferring political means and 
preserving good relations with the United States to achieve that goal.  Though his 
fortunes indicated otherwise in the mid 1930s, shortly before U.S. entry into the Second 
World War Muñoz Marín would emerge as the dominant political leader.  However, his 
political goals would be compromised, both by the requirements of the global war and by 
his new source of political power; the tens of thousands of votes he received from the 
rural masses and from the urban working classes.   
Before Muñoz Marín emerged as the leading politician in the late 1930s (a role he 
continued to fill well into the 1960s), he had to fight his way to the center stage of insular 
politics, and in the process, he would find his own political path.  As explained in the 
previous chapter, for the elections of 1924 the Unionista leader, Antonio R. Barceló made 
a political alliance with the staunchly pro-American Republicanos to form the Alianza 
which faced the Coalición made up of Santiago Iglesias Pantín’s Socialistas and 
dissenting Republicanos who had created the Partido Constitucional Histórico (originally 
known as Republicano Puro).  This move secured the prevalence of Unionistas and 
Republicanos over the emerging Socialistas in 1924.355   Before the general elections of 
1928, however, the Alianza lost a significant number of Republicanos who joined the 
rank and file of the Coalición.  Though the Alianza again dominated the elections, the 
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Coalición, especially its Socialista wing, were weakening the Alianza’s grip on Puerto 
Rican politics.356  Soon after the elections, the Unionistas from the Alianza, unhappy with 
having to equally divide government positions with their minority Republicano partners, 
splintered into two groups, and Barceló moved to dissolve Alianza.357  On January 1932, 
what was left of Alianza joined the Republicanos Puros led by Manuel F. Rossy forming 
the Partido Unión Republicana.  With this stroke Barcelo’s Unionistas lost the right to 
continue calling their party Unión.  After failed legal attempts to regain their name and 
party insignias, the Unionist leaders rebranded themselves as Partido Liberal 
Puertorriqueño (PLP).358   
Shortly before the election of 1932, the reunited Republicanos, and some 
Autonomistas from the former Alianza, entered into a pact with the Socialistas in what 
came to be known as the Coalición Republicana Socialista.  It certainly seemed as if the 
political career of Barceló was coming to an end.  The dire situation faced by the 
Liberales left Barceló with no option but to act boldly, and he soon moved to embrace 
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publicly the ideal of independence.  Many within the Liberales were in fact Autonomistas 
but by taking up eventual independence as part of their platform, the PLP gave the 
impression of unanimous thought with respect to the Island’s political future.  During the 
campaign, a firebrand Independentista Muñoz Marín emerged as an inspiring young 
leader.  His articles in La Democracia, his father’s newspaper, gave him a tribune from 
which to attack the colonial administration and political opponents.  Running for the 
Liberal Party,  he was elected as “Senator at large” (por acumulación).  Though the 
Liberales obtained more votes than any other party, the Republican and Socialist 
coalition dominated the elections and split the most important positions in government 
(that of resident commissioner in Washington,  president of the senate, and speaker of the 
house) among them.359  The staunchly pro-American and anexionist Republicanos and 
Socialistas were returned to power.  Or so it seemed. 
Though the Liberales did not dominate the elections, their performance was quite 
impressive.  The electoral power gained by the Liberales derived from two sources.  
First, the popularity of their leading figures, the hardened veteran Barceló and the young, 
charismatic Muñoz Marín made the PLP a very recognizable organization.  Second, 
Muñoz Marín’s anti-monopoly and pro-labor rhetoric was very appealing to the masses 
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due to the extreme economic conditions plaguing the Island.  It did not take long for 
Muñoz Marín to identify the economy as the principal issue in the minds of most Puerto 
Ricans.   
Under American control, land concentration and the proletarianization of the 
peasantry had advanced hand in hand in Puerto Rico.360  The monopolization of lands by 
absentee-owned sugar corporations meant that most of the Island’s arable land was 
dedicated to grow and export that crop which in turn made the Puerto Ricans dependent 
on imports for foodstuffs.   Land concentration, high population density, and dependence 
on exports for foodstuffs exacerbated economic hardships in Puerto Rico.  This process 
gradually led to the pauperization of the Puerto Rican peasant, especially the cane worker 
and his family.361   
The economic situation in Puerto Rico deteriorated tremendously in the late 
1920s.  In 1928, hurricane San Felipe crippled the coffee industry which saw its 
production reduced from 32 million pounds to just five million the next year and the loss 
of its remaining European markets.362  In 1930, the Brookings Institution, an independent 
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public policy think tank, presented the 700 page study, Porto Rico and its Problems.363  
The study described the economic situation of the Island as “deplorable” with rural 
families’ annual income averaging between $250 and $275.364  Urban families earned a 
little more, but in these areas the cost of life was higher, and there were fewer 
opportunities to have home orchards to supplement dietary requirements.365  In addition, 
the Organic Acts used to govern Puerto Rico (Foraker and Jones) required that imports be 
carried exclusively by the U.S. merchant marine, the most expensive in the world, which 
made foodstuffs in the Island between 8 to 14 percent more expensive than in New York.  
The cost of food on the Island was aggravated by the fact that daily wages in Puerto Rico 
were less than $1 while in New York they were $4 to $10.366   In fact, manufactured 
goods were so expensive that “in 1930 only one person in four had ever worn shoes.”367   
On September 26, 1932, another hurricane, San Ciprián, caused 225 deaths, and left over 
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 Based in Washington the Brookings Institution was a non-profit public policy 
think tank.  In the 1930s it was recognized as both liberal and scientific. The Brookings 
Report, “Puerto Rico and its Problems”,  a 700 page document was written after two 
years of research by seven scholars and professionals under the guidance of Victor S. 
Clark, formerly Puerto Rico’s Education Commissioner.  The report stated that the 
Island’s condition was deplorable.  According to the Brookings Report, excessive, 
inefficient government, and partisan politics were to blame for Puerto Rico’s maladies. 
But the main cause of Puerto Rico’s troubles, according to the report, was 
overpopulation. See, Maldonado, Puerto Rico’s Democratic Revolution, 82-84. 
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 Ironically, Dr. Bailey K. Ashford’s crusade to eradicate the hookworm-caused 
chronic anemia of the Puerto Rican peasant was undermined by the lack of this basic 
item.  By 1925 a study found that although the death rate related to hookworm had been 
dramatically reduced, the incidence of the disease had not.  See Dietz, Economic History 
129; And Ashford, A Soldier in Science, 37-54. . 
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3,000 wounded and more than 100,000 Puerto Ricans homeless.  San Ciprián also ruined 
the small producers’ minor fruit crops on the north coast.368  When the Great Depression 
made its way to the colony, Puerto Rico was in no shape to withstand its assault.369   
 While most politicians continued to engage exclusively with matters of political 
arrangements and patronage- such as the political status of the Island and positions in the 
colonial bureaucracy, Muñoz Marín was preoccupied with the economic and social 
maladies affecting the peasantry and urban working classes. In fact, he challenged the 
Brookings Institution’s conclusions which blamed overpopulation as the main cause for 
Puerto Rico’s socio-economic distress, instead holding capitalism and the sugar 
corporations accountable for the situation.370   The Liberales benefitted immensely from 
Muñoz Marín’s early understanding of the masses’ dire situation.  Furthermore, on the 
mainland, Franklin Delano Roosevelt was elected president bringing with him a very 
liberal agenda to the White House.  The coalition of Republicanos and Socialistas would 
soon find their politics out of tune with the reformist drive of FDR’s administration.  The 
Socialistas and Republicanos may have dominated the elections in the Island, but it 
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 Mathews, La política Puertorriqueña y el Nuevo Trato, 28. 
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 In 1935 the percentage of the male population with no economic activity in the 
Island (10 years and over) reached and all time high of 24.2%.  The percentage of women 
engaged in economic activity, on the other hand, had slowly increase going from 15.8% 
in 1899 to 34.3 in 1935. 150,000 heads of families were unemployed Dietz, Economic 
History, 131, 153, Table 2.14.  
 
370
 The report’s recommended making the sugar industry more competitive 
instead of limiting land ownership, export quota or raising workers’ salaries. The report 
recommendations were in opposition to Muñoz Marín’s understanding of the problems.  
For him, the root of the problem was capitalism and the sugar corporations, and thus he 
was bent on enforcing the anti-monopoly federal law limiting corporation land ownership 
to 500 acres. See Maldonado, Puerto Rico’s Democratic Revolution, 82-84. 
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would be Muñoz Marín who would be seen constantly in Washington and as having 
FDR’s administration’s ear.371   
The Liberales were not the only political faction benefitting from economic 
hardships.  The Nacionalistas, who had reorganized their party in 1930 and elected Pedro 
Albizu Campos as their president, also participated in the elections of 1932.372  They 
hoped to elect Albizu Campos to the senate, which seemed  a reasonable proposition 
since his frequent public speeches were usually attended by a multitude of people.  The 
Nacionalistas, however, were extremely weak to the point of requiring the unrequested, 
albeit welcome, assistance of the Republicanos to obtain the 30,000 signatures needed to 
inscribe their party.373  After obtaining only 1.4% of the votes in the general elections of 
1932, and failing to elect Albizu Campos as senator at large (who with 11,882 votes 
doubled his party’s tally) the Nacionalistas withdrew from the electoral process.  
Obtaining independence for whatever means became the mission of the Nacionalistas.   
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 The Coalición found themselves as the Washington outsiders as their policies 
were incongruent with those of the New Dealers.  Muñoz Marín had many contacts with 
the continental press, including Eleanor Roosevelt’s biographer, Ruby Black and Ernest 
Gruening. The latter was the first director of the Office of Islands and Territories, an 
office which took over the War Department’s Bureau of Insular Affairs responsibility 
over Puerto Rico in 1935. See Maldonado, Puerto Rico’s Democratic Revolution, 113-
115. 
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 The Nacionalistas had obtained 329 votes in 1928 and where thus required to 
re-inscribe the party. The Republicanos sought to weaken the Liberales by splitting the 
pro-independence vote between the two.  Mathews, La política Puertorriqueña y el 
Nuevo Trato, 43. 
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The 1932 elections were the last ingredient in the radicalization of Albizu Campos 
and his followers.374  Soon after the elections Albizu Campus challenged the legitimacy 
of American sovereignty over the Island basing his claims on the legal relationship 
between Spain and Puerto Rico before the 1898 invasion as established by the 
Autonomous Charter secured by Luis Muñoz Rivera in 1897.375   If American 
sovereignty was illegal, then the U.S. had no right to exert any authority over Puerto Rico 
nor was the Puerto Ricans’ duty to obey or cooperate with what then constituted an 
occupation force.  Slowly but surely, what amounted to political tensions would turn into 
an open shooting war between the colonial authorities and the Nacionalistas.  
On July 1, 1933, the newly elected president of the United States, Franklin Delano 
Roosevelt, replaced the competent governor James Beverly with the inadequate Robert 
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 Members of the Nationalist Party, put off by Albizu Campos’ radical 
extremism, left the party and founded the Partido Independentista on October 21, 1934. 
On September 23, 1934 the Partido Comunista Puertorriqueño was also founded and 
later joined the International Communist. Bayrón Toro, Elecciones y partidos políticos  
de Puerto Rico, 183.   
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 Albizu Campos based his arguments on the provisions of Title VII, article 43 
of the Carta Autonómica of 1897 which guaranteed the veto power of the Puerto Rican 
parliament over decisions reached by the Cortes of the Kingdom where over a dozen 
Puerto Rican delegates sat with both voice and vote.  Article 2 declared that the “present 
constitution shall not be amended except by virtue of a special law and upon petition of 
the insular parliament.”  Since the military disbanded the Insular Parliament, and there 
were no Puerto Rican delegates present to sign the Treaty of Paris of December 10, the 
passing of sovereignty over Puerto Rico to the United Sates, the Nacionalistas argued, 
was a violation of the legal relationship between Spain and Puerto Rico and thus illegal. 
The discussion on this subject continued well into the 1940s and reached the U.S. 
Congress.  See House Committee on Public Lands, Subcommittee on Territorial and 
Insular Possessions, A Bill to Amend the Organic Act of Puerto Rico, Election of 
Governor: Hearings on H.R. 3309, 80th Cong., 1 sess., (Amherst, University of 
Massachusetts: Microform Collection), 19 May 1947, 15-16,19.  (Hereafter,  H.R 3309).   
To read the document in its entirity see Antonio Fernós López-Cepero, Documentos 
Históricos-Constitucionales de Puerto Rico, 19-37. 
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H. Gore.376  During Gore’s short term there were no less than eighty-five worker strikes 
and labor conflicts, and a bomb was found in the governor’s summer residence in Jájome. 
The Coalición, which had won the elections of 1932, threw its support behind the 
governor who sought to quench labor protests using the Insular Police.  The Liberales 
and most of the press openly challenged and ridiculed the incompetent governor.  The 
Coalición’s support of the governor, who defended anti-labor initiatives, started to create 
a schism between workers and the Socialist Party.  Within this context, Albizu Campos, 
however briefly, gained support among workers.  His harsh and well deserved attacks 
against absentee corporations, the Federación Libre de Trabajadores (which he accused 
of betraying the workers), and against the Insular government, gained him the attention of 
the sugar cane workers.  In 1934 a general strike of sugar cane workers in Puerto Rico 
allied this labor sector (for the very first time) with the Nacionalistas and effectively 
ended the era of political stability in the Island.377  The workers requested the assistance 
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 Gore had contributed $10,000 to FDR’s campaign and placed his three 
newspapers at the disposition of the president.  He did not have any real experience that 
prepared him to govern the Island.  He thought of Puerto Rico as Florida’s insular junior 
partner unaware that their economies were not complimentary but in competition with 
each other.  His lack of understanding of Puerto Rico’s political arrangement led him to 
make a series of early mistakes while his disregard for the islanders’ idiosyncrasies soon 
gained him many enemies.  See Mathews, La política Puertorriqueña y el Nuevo Trato, 
68-109; and  Luis M. Díaz Soler, Puerto Rico, sus luchas por alcanzar  estabilidad 
económica, definición política y afirmación cultural. 1898-1996 (Isabela, P.R., 2000), 
210-211.     
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 In 1937 Esteban Bird calculated the yearly wages of cane cutters in Puerto 
Rico and their average family. He concluded that the cane cutter dedicated 94% of his 
income to food.  At this rate the daily budget for food per family member was 12 cents.   
This was only 4 cents more than the daily food expense for feeding a hog in the United 
States.  See Ayala, American Sugar Kingdom, 159-161, 164-65, 239, citing, Esteban 
Bird, The Sugar Industry in Relation to the Social Economic System of Puerto Rico.  In 
1930, 400,000 or 25% of the population lived in lands dedicated to sugar cane production 
which were 13.3% of the total land. That translated into sugar cane taking 50% of the 
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of Albizu Campos, who negotiated on their behalf.  However, shortly after the strike was 
resolved, Albizu Campos lost their support.  Fixated in obtaining the Island’s 
independence, the Nacionalistas had not developed a labor ideology that could win them 
the loyalty of the working classes permanently.378   
Aware of Gore’s inability to govern the Island and the endless cycle of strikes 
FDR feared that Puerto Rico was on the brink of anarchy.  Persuaded by Muñoz Marín’s 
personal plea, he chose retired general Blanton Winship to replace Gore.379  Winship 
assumed this role on February 5, 1934, and brought Elisha Francis Riggs with him to 
serve as chief of the Insular Police.  Riggs had served in Nicaragua where he helped 
Anastasio Somoza with the organization of his police and paramilitary apparatus.  Under 
Winship, the militarization of the Insular Police acquired special relevance especially 
after 1935.  The police was issued machine guns and riot control gear and their training 
                                                                                                                                                 
arable land and 35% of the agrarian population.  See Mathews, La política 
Puertorriqueña y el Nuevo Trato, 150. 
 
378
 The Nacionalistas were “neither anticapitalists nor prosocialist.”  The Party 
made no demands for reorganization of the economic structure beyond the transfer of 
ownership of the means of productions to Puerto Rican capitalists. See Dietz, Economic 
History, 161-62; and Díaz Soler, Puerto Rico, sus luchas por alcanzar estabilidad 
económica, definición política y afirmación cultural, 214-15.  
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 Muñoz Marín had been the most vociferous  opponent of Gore, even 
publishing an article in La Democracia entitled, “Governor Gore You are a Damn Liar”, 
on September 6, 1933.  The article was in response to Gore’s denial to FDR that he had 
requested for undated letters of resignation from all appointees to important government 
positions.  Gore called the story a “Liberales fairy tale.”  Gore’s removal was attributed 
to Muñoz Marin’s efforts by the local press.  In effect, a local journalist wrote: “He has 
overthrown his first governor!” and over 50,000 people received him in San Juan when 
he returned from Washington on January 21, 1934 coinciding with the news of Gore’s 
replacement.  Maldonado, Puerto Rico’s Democratic Revolution, 107-08, 115; and 
Mathews, La política Puertorriqueña y el Nuevo Trato, 111-13.   
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was intensified under Winship’s personal supervision.380  One of the darkest chapters in 
Puerto Rican history was about to be written.   
Labor conflicts and the Nationalist challenge notwithstanding, there was little 
evidence to indicate that political violence in the Island would increase sharply.  FDR’s 
administration had taken some steps to relieve the political pressure in Puerto Rico.  
Besides removing the publicly ridiculed Gore, FDR changed the administrative 
arrangement of the Island.  On March, 1934, the president signed Executive Order 6.726, 
which transferred supervision of Puerto Rican affairs from the War Department to the 
Department of the Interior headed by Indian rights’ advocate Harold Ickes.381  Within the 
Department of the Interior the newly created Division of Territories and Island 
Possessions (DTIP) took over the role of the Bureau of Insular Affairs (BIA).  The DTIP 
was itself entrusted to Ernest Gruening, a long-time friend of Muñoz Marín.382   
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 By 1937 special training for the Insular Police was given by the Chief of the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation in Puerto Rico, Edgar K. Thompson and agent Myron E. 
Gurnes.  Machine gun marksmanship, firing with tracer bullets and from a cover position 
were among the subjects taught at Fort Buchanan by the FBI agents.  See, Ojeda Reyes, 
Vito Marcantonio y Puerto Rico, 76-78.  And Maldonado, Puerto Rico’s Democratic 
Revolution, 120. 
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 The BIA was completely abolished by the Reorganization Plan No. II in July 
1, 1939 and replaced by the Division of Territories and Island Possessions of the 
Department of the Interior which operated between 1939 and 1950.  It was later known as 
the Office of Territories and still later the Office of Territorial Affairs.  See “Records of 
the Office of the Secretary of the Interior” [National Archives and Records 
Administration, Center for Electronic Records]; accessed June 6 2009; available from  
http://www.archives.gov/research/guide-fed-records/groups/350.htm;  and  Estades Font, 
La Presencia Militar de Estados Unidos en Puerto Rico, 120-23.   
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 In the mid-1920s Gruening had published in The Nation a series of articles 
penned by Muñoz Marín.  Muñoz Marín drove Gruening to Washington for his 
confirmation. See Maldonado, Puerto Rico’s Democratic Revolution, 131. 
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War Department officials opposed the transfer which they blamed on special 
interests while defending the department’s record as Puerto Rico’s fair champion.383   The 
transfer, however, went into effect on May 22, 1935.  Removing the last vestige of 
military rule over the Island, however, was a symbolic gesture that appeased politicians 
but had little value for the vast majority who were more concerned with feeding, clothing 
and housing their families.  This is not to say that FDR’s administration was oblivious to 
the economic hardships troubling the Island and fueling political unrest.   
In 1933, to combat the effects of the Great Depression in the continental U.S. the 
Federal Emergency Relief Administration came to exist by virtue of the Federal 
Emergency Relief Act.  Initially, the program was extended to Puerto Rico in what came 
to be known as the Puerto Rico Emergency Relief Administration (PRERA).  Though the 
director of the PRERA immediately set to work, his efforts were hindered by Gore and 
the Coalicionistas who sought to control the institution for political ends.384   On May 28, 
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  An official from the War Department declared: “This transfer has long been 
agitated by special interests bent upon commercial and political exploitation of Porto 
Rico.  The sinister machine of the sugar lobby against Porto Rico has long been strongly 
resisted by the Secretary of War and the BIA.  The great demons of the politicians for 
Porto Rican patronage have also been resisted.  It was over their protests [the 
administrators of the BIA] that the Harding administration paid a political debt by 
appointing a Missouri politician [E. Montgomery Reilly- who was actually from Texas] 
as governor of Porto Rico.  It was over their protest that the present administration paid a 
political debt by appointing a Floridian [Robert H. Gore].”  C.I.H.P.C., Caja 30 
Cartapacio 10 Documento 4, A, Clip from The Washington Herald, June 7, 1934.   
Senator Millard Tydings was behind the creation of a single bureau for all insular affairs 
within the Department of the Interior. Harold Ickes and Santiago Iglesias Pantín, the 
Puerto Rican representative in Congress, had urged the change for years. 
 
384
 The Puerto Rico Emergency Relief Administration (PRERA) began its work in 
the Island in 1933 with the main objective of reducing unemployment.  Harry Hopkins 
named James R. Bourne as the agency’s director.  Though Bourne and his wife quickly 
set to work and to distribute aid, their projects were not on a big scale.  Furthermore, 
since they hired many people associated with the Liberals, Coalition leaders accused 
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1935, an executive order created another agency to tackle the deep-rooted economic 
problems in the Island.385   The new office, the Puerto Rico Reconstruction 
Administration (PRRA), was directed by a prominent Puerto Rican, Carlos Chardón.  It is 
worth noticing that in the case of Puerto Rico, “relief” was substituted for 
“reconstruction”.  The word selection underlined the extreme conditions vexing the 
Island.  The mission of the PRRA was ambitious, and its focus on reducing 
unemployment and poverty provided the chance to also remove causes of unrest.  The 
                                                                                                                                                 
them of using federal funding to strengthen the Liberales.  See Mathews, La política 
Puertorriqueña y el Nuevo Trato, 130-33, 150.   
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 “It was to meet these conditions --- to relieve unemployment ----  to remove as 
far  as possible the causes of agricultural depression — to create new sources of wealth 
and income — to establish new standards of living— that there was created by Executive 
Order on May 28, 1935, the Puerto Rico Reconstruction Administration (P.R.R.A.), as 
the agency through which sight be expended such Federal work relief and emergency 
funds as were available for Puerto Rico, towards the attainment of the above objectives.”    
The objectives of the program were defined by the President in a letter dated August 1, 
1935:  "The Administration's program intends not merely immediate relief but permanent 
reconstruction for the Island. To this end the projects in contemplation will see to insure 
every person on the Island a position of reasonable independence and security. The 
economy of the Island is, of course, agricultural and the solution of its problems must be 
in terms of agricultural rehabilitation. It will therefore be sought to secure for each citizen 
a place on the land which will give him a fair share in the fruits of his own labor and a 
position of independence and security. This will require the establishment of many 
persons on small farming units. It will also require that these small farmers be insured 
adequate processing and distributing facilities at reasonable cost. Diversification of 
agricultural production will be sought by the program in order that the Island may 
approach a self-sustaining status. Cheap and available electric power, good roads, 
reforestation and adequate housing are also essential to the Administration's program...I 
am anxious that the Government of the United States shall discharge fully its 
responsibilities to the Puerto Rican people...."   Immediately after the Executive Order 
was signed, by virtue of which the P.R.R.A. was created, the offices of the agency were 
established and in December 1935 the whole reconstruction administration program was 
already functioning.   See, “Information Research Section, Puerto Rico Reconstruction 
Administration, December, 1938” [National Archives and Records Administration, 
Center for Electronic Records]; accessed 19 March 2009; available from 
http://newdeal.feri.org/texts/578.htm. 
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socio-economic reconstruction plan for Puerto Rico was designed by Carlos Chardón, 
Rafael Menéndez Ramos and Rafael Fernández García, but it had much influence from 
Muñoz Marín and some even referred to it as Plan Muñoz.386  Yet, the PRRA’s offices 
were not fully staffed until the end of the year.  Meanwhile, political unrest continued to 
escalate.  
On July 4, 1935, the Nacionalistas initiated a bombing campaign by detonating 
bombs in the PRRA’s office in San Juan and several other government buildings.  A few 
weeks later a bomb went off at the U.S. Court Building in Puerta de Tierra followed by 
the bombing of a police station.  The bombings continued throughout the summer, but so 
far there had been no casualties.387  Meanwhile, ever more radical, Albizu Campos 
carried on with his island-wide tour.  On October 24, 1935, the Insular Police detained 
Nacionalistas armed with revolvers near the University of Puerto Rico in Río Piedras 
where students were protesting against Albizu Campos, who had called the male and 
female students “effeminate” and “prostitutes” respectively for failing to be at the 
vanguard of the fight for the Island’s independence.388  On their way to the police station 
a gunfight between the Nacionalistas and the police left four Nacionalistas and a 
policeman dead and forty wounded.  There had been outbursts of political violence in the 
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 See Mathews, La política Puertorriqueña y el Nuevo Trato, 167-196.  And 
Maldonado, Puerto Rico’s Democratic Revolution, 131-36.  
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previous years, but nothing came close to the outright war that had just started between 
the Nacionalistas and the Insular Police.389   
During the nationalists’ funeral, on December 8 of the same year the Nationalist 
Party declared the formation of the Ejército Libertador, and warned that for every dead 
nationalist an American would be killed.390  In fact, Albizu Campos declared that the 
whole party was now a liberating army and reminded his followers of the “Sacred Oath” 
they had taken to defend the fatherland.391  The next month, the Nationalist Party ordered 
the general drafting into the military of all nationalists over eighteen years old as an 
immediate necessity for “national security”.  Albizu Campos issued a party resolution “to 
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 There had been outburst of violence before but not like these acts.  On  April 
12, 1932, Albizu Campos and some 800 followers stormed the Puerto Rican legislature 
after being informed that  the single star with five stripes flag designed by Puerto Rican 
exiles in New York in 1895, had been made the official flag of the Island by the Insular 
Legislature. In the scuffle trying to reach the legislative chambers the rail of the stairs 
collapsed and a Nacionalista died.  Santiago Iglesias blamed  the police for being to 
lenient and attributed their leniency to the fact that the Nacionalistas were from middle 
and upper classes, had they been from the working class, Santiago Iglesias commented,  
“all their heads would have been cracked.”  Albizu Campos threatened the Insular Chief 
of Police with death if a single nationalist died during the 1932 elections. See Negroni, 
Historia militar de Puerto Rico, 450-54; Mathews, La política Puertorriqueña y el Nuevo 
Trato, 248-49; Bayrón Toro, Elecciones y partidos políticos  de Puerto Rico, 182; and 
Maldonado, Puerto Rico’s Democratic Revolution, 89-80.  
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 Puerto Rico Area, Headquarters 2nd Corps, Report  on Monthly Summary of 
Subversive Activities, December 1935- March 1936,  [Copy sent  to LTC Charles K. 
Nelson, GSC  Office of Assistant Chief  of Staff, G-2,  War Department, D.C. by Joe N. 
Dalton,  Major, General Staff Corps, Assistant Chief  of Staff,  G-2,  Written  by O.H. 
Cole, Col. 65th Infantry] March 2 1936, C.I.H.P.C. Caja 18, Cartapacio 4,  Doc. 2 A.  
Hereafter, Report on Monthly Summary of Subversive Activities, C.I.H.P.C. C.18, Ct. 4, 
Doc. 2 A. 
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 Albizu demanded that party members took an “Oath of Honor” in which they 
swore to defend the Nationalist’s ideal with their lives and belongings if necessary and to 
give unquestioning loyalty to “the leader”.  See Maldonado, Puerto Rico’s Democratic 
Revolution, 87, citing Ferrao, Pedro Albizu Campos y el nacionalismo puertorriqueño, 
395. 
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declare military service compulsory for all members of the party” who would join the 
nationalist paramilitary force, Cadetes de la República, trained by Albizu Campos and 
José Enamorado Cuesta since 1932.392    
What started as political unrest had turned into violence, and the situation 
appeared the control of the Insular Police, in fact threatening to become a military 
problem.  Albizu Campos had decided to defy U.S. sovereignty by force which made the 
creation of paramilitary units necessary.  The Cadetes de la República and the Ejército 
Libertador, however, were not much of a military challenge.  In fact, it seems that the 
role they would eventually play in Puerto Rican politics stemmed from Albizu Campos’ 
recognition of the political value of the military in the Island’s society.  It is apparent that 
Albizu Campos understood the symbolic power of military service and the impact it had 
on the self perception of Puerto Ricans.  After all, he was himself a WWI veteran and 
former U.S. Army officer.393  In order to fully exploit the symbolic power of the 
Nacionalistas’ paramilitary units, the Ejército Libertador had to be as conspicuous as 
possible.  He thus decided to call publicly for the creation of the Ejército, to have the 
Cadetes wear uniforms, to organize them as a regular army, and to have them conduct 
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 Report on Monthly Summary of Subversive Activities, C.I.H.P.C. C.18, Ct. 4, 
Doc. 2 A.   Enamorado Cuesta was the general military instructor in the Nationalist Party.  
He was a U.S. Army WWI veteran and served in the reserve with the rank of Captain 
until 1929.  He briefly served in the Republican Army in 1936 during the Spanish Civil 
War.  See FBI, Nationalist Party of Puerto Rico Vol. 4., 50. 
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 In 1917, Albizu Campos interrupted his studies at Harvard to volunteer for 
service during the First World War.  He was assigned to a Black regiment which trained 
in the southern U.S., which according to Gruening taught him “what it was to be a Negro, 
not only in the army, but in America.  All his love for America turned to hate.”   
Maldonado, 139, citing Ernest Gruening Many Battles, the Autobiography of Ernest 
Gruening (New York: Liveright Publishers, 1973), 196-97. 
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military exercises and parades in broad daylight and in public spaces.394   The 
paramilitary nationalist units’ main target was the Puerto Ricans’ sense of honor, duty, 
and manhood; in short Puerto Rican identity, which the Nacionalistas identified with the 
Island’s Hispanic legacy. 
According to a U.S. Army report on subversive activity, which was monthly 
conducted by the intelligence section (G-2) of the 65th Infantry Regiment, in late January, 
“units  [of the Nationalist Party  had]  begun  to drill in  violation of  Sections 7-8 Chapter 
1 of the Federal Penal Code  of 1910.”395  The nationalist units, sometimes armed with 
machetes, chose to have their own military exercises (drills) across from the Puerto Rico 
National Guard (PRNG) Armories which apparently unsettled the commanders of such 
units.396  That the Nacionalistas attempted to provoke and intimidate the PRNG was 
apparent.  These incidents were also a clear attempt to contest the legitimacy of the 
Puerto Rico National Guard as a true national corps.  Moreover, while the Nacionalistas’ 
drills sent the unequivocal message that they were preparing militarily, which was 
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 Albizu Campos emulated many of the policies and tactics of the Irish Sinn 
Fein, such as the oath to sacrifice life and property in order to achieve independence.  He 
also copied from the Fascist and Nazi movements in Italy and Germany.  The party’s 
organ “published Benito Mussolini’s ‘Ten Commandments of Fascist Youths’ which 
included “God and Fatherland” above all else; total surrender of the “body and soul” to 
the Leader”.  The use of black shirts by the Cadetes and a black flag with a white cross 
were unmistakable symbols of the conservative and right –wing nature of Albizu 
Campo’s ideology.  See Maldonado, Puerto Rico’s Democratic Revolution, 118-19. 
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 “National Guard Major Samuel F. Howard, reports that there are 2 Nationalist 
companies, one armed with machetes and another with no visible weapons, holding drills 
in front of armories disturbing  the National Guard exercises.” Report on Monthly 
Summary of Subversive Activities, C.I.H.P.C.  C.18, Ct. 4, Doc. 2 A.    
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probably intended to daunt the guardsmen, the fact that they did not carry weapons 
precluded the Insular Police from stopping their drills, and so they were free to continue 
harassing the PRNG units.    
Meanwhile, despite Albizu Campos’ diatribe against students of the University of 
Puerto Rico, his party was gaining a strong foothold in this institution.  A Puerto Rican 
captain in the 65th Infantry reported that he had gained the trust of a nationalist student 
“who informed  him  that he is a captain in a Nationalist company, part of  a battalion  of 
175 members in Río Piedras,” and that they “are raffling a submachine gun amongst them 
to raise funds to buy more weapons.”397   The report shows two weaknesses inherent to 
the Nacionalistas.  First, evidently it was not such a hard task to infiltrate the 
organization and to get their members to openly discuss their plans.  Second, and more 
importantly, the fact that they had to raffle weapons to obtain funds in order to secure 
more weapons indicated the financial weakness of the movement though not of their 
members. This second point is of the outmost importance because the Nacionalistas had 
seen their movement grow during times of economic hardship.  While pride and a sense 
of having a mission may for a while content the unemployed and malnourished to the 
point of even expressing fanatic support for a cause, in the long run, the leaders of such 
movements have to provide for the wellbeing of their followers or see their ranks 
dwindle.  The Nacionalistas were not ready to fulfill that role, and it would cost them 
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dearly.  While they could attract young middle and upper class Puerto Ricans, they did 
not have the same appeal among the masses.398 
According to Army intelligence, the Nacionalistas, who boasted to have 10,000 
members in the Ejército Libertador, had plans to take over the Island.   
The [nationalist] leaders are planning a coup to take place in the no distant  future, 
during  which  all police stations and National Guard armories, except San Juan 
and Cayey where the 65th is too strong, will be attacked simultaneously, to gain 
arms, ammo, and complete  control  of the island.  The Nationalists have made a 
black list of persons to be killed.399   
The plan was sensible indeed.  The National Guard, as a reserve component made of 
multiple units scattered throughout the Island, left its installations in charge of a skeleton 
crew when they were not conducting exercises.  Moreover, even when the PRNG 
conducted monthly exercises, they did not train in unison which meant that at any given 
time there were dozens of targets which could be quickly overtaken.  Once weaponry was 
secured from the PRNG armories, the planned assaults on police stations would have a 
better chance to succeed.  Taking on the 65th, which, as a U.S. Army regular unit, was 
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well-trained and armed, and manned to operational levels, was the Nacionalistas’ biggest 
challenge.  And, apparently, they had no plans to do so. 
While uniformed cadets openly challenged the colonial authorities and the PRNG, 
other Nationalist elements were targeting the Insular Police and Puerto Rican and 
Continental government officials.  Going after individual policemen became a favorite 
tactic employed by the Nacionalistas.  This trend continued until October 1936 when the 
Nacionalistas set their sights on political leaders from the other parties and high value 
targets from the colonial administration.400  On February 23, 1936, Nationalists Hiram 
Rosado and Elias Beauchamp killed the chief of the Insular Police, Colonel Riggs, and 
were in turn executed while in police custody.   The Intelligence Section of the 65th 
reported that roughly 8,000 people attended the funeral of the Nacionalistas held the very 
next day in Santurce.   Albizu Campos, who had sworn to avenge the death of the four 
nationalists killed by the Insular Police the previous October 24, 1935 near the University 
of Puerto Rico, addressed the crowd gathered at the cemetery late in the afternoon.  He 
declared that the death of the young nationalists had not been in vain since “for every 
nationalist killed we gain 100 adherents.”  The intelligence section agreed in principle 
with Albizu Campos.  The report stated that it was “evident that the public sentiment is 
running high against the Insular Police for the shooting of the nationalists after they had 
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been arrested.” 401  Emboldened by the growing support shown to the Nacionalistas 
Albizu Campos publicly celebrated the assassination:  
Colonel Riggs, a tyrant, has fallen.  Colonel Riggs ordered the murder of our 
comrades in Río Piedras last October…  On the occasion of their funeral a solemn 
promise was made, Beauchamp and Rosado have made good their promise.  They 
are dead but they have done their duty. 402     
He went further and implicated the governor and his superiors with the 
assassinations.  “General Winship is following higher authorities attempting to kill any 
nationalist sentiment which may be developing in the people.” 403  Local leaders were not 
exempt from Albizu Campos’ threats.404  He accused the whole directive of the Liberal 
Party- the other party seeking Independence- the local press, and the functionaries of the 
PRRA of complicity with Winship and Riggs.405  Ironically, the Liberales, just like the 
local press, had been extremely sympathetic and accommodating towards Albizu Campos 
and very supportive of the Nationalists.  The Liberal leadership went as far as 
condemning the political targeting of Nationalist leaders.  The Liberals, especially Muñoz 
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Marín, were in fact the lone effective opposition to Winship.  Nonetheless, Albizu 
Campos apparently considered that the existence of a party seeking independence by 
peaceful means, and of an agency bent on alleviating the economic situation in the Island 
(PRRA), would rob him of potential adherents and momentum.     
  The 65th intelligence section warned that: “Colonel Riggs was very popular but 
indignation against his assassination has been overshadowed by strong popular 
indignation against the police for what is considered the murder of the young assassins by 
them.”406   The report concluded by pointing out the weaknesses of the Nacionalistas but 
warning “that if this party movement is unchecked there will be others assassinations 
attempted.”  Furthermore, the intelligence section saw “no danger of general uprising but 
these young men and their organized companies encouraged and abetted by [Albizu] 
Campos may attempt such coup against police and National Guard armories.”407  The 
officers of the 65th, a mostly Puerto Rican unit tracing its lineage to 1899, evidently 
believed they would enjoy the support of the population and emerge victorious from a 
faceoff with the Nacionalistas.  The report also pointed out one of the roots of 
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nationalists’ support, police brutality.  The warning fell on deaf ears, and violence would 
only continue to escalate. 
The metropolis and colonial authorities responded to the Nationalist challenge by 
misusing the legal system to persecute the Nationalist leaders and by threatening the 
Island with independence.  The Federal Bureau of Investigation joined the surveillance of 
the Nacionalistas.  U.S. Marshalls and Insular Police carried out raids in March and 
found military equipment, weapons and a bomb in the possession of the Nationalists.408   
On March 5, 1936, Albizu Campos and other seven Nationalist leaders were arrested and 
charged with sedition and conspiracy to overthrow the government of the United 
States.409  The next month, a Federal Grand Jury submitted accusations against Albizu 
Campos and other leaders of the party.410   Local newspapers and politicians, as well as 
the American Civil Liberties Union were against trying the Nationalist leader for sedition 
instead of murder or conspiracy to commit murder.  Albizu Campos’ defense argued that 
it was preposterous to try him for sedition when the U.S. Congress was in the process of 
preparing an independence bill for the Island.411  The metropolis, however, had had 
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enough of the Nacionalistas and sought to strengthen federal authority in the Island by 
trying and convicting Albizu Campos in a federal court.  A predominantly Puerto Rican 
jury did not convict the defendants.  Albizu Campos’s standing among Puerto Ricans had 
reached its zenith.  On July 31, a second trial, with a jury composed of ten Continentals 
and two Puerto Ricans, concluded with a guilty verdict.412   Albizu Campos and Luis 
Velazquez were sentenced to seven years in the Atlanta Federal Penitentiary.  
A month after Riggs assassination, Senator Millard Tydings, a Democrat from 
Maryland, introduced a bill to grant independence to Puerto Rico.  Tydings presided over 
the Senate branch of the Committee of Territories and Insular Affairs in the U.S Congress 
and, as a close friend of Colonel Riggs, was enraged by his assassination.  If Riggs’ 
assassination was not enough to move Tydings to introduce a punitive independence bill 
for Puerto Rico, his racial beliefs undoubtedly drove him to propose such a measure.  As 
the co-author of the Tydings-McDuffie bill of 1934 to grant independence to the 
Philippines, he had declared that the Filipinos were a “burden for the federal budget and a 
menace to the racial composition of the U.S.”413  According to the bill introduced by 
Tydings, Puerto Rico would obtain its independence in four years at the end of which full 
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economic tariffs would be established between the two countries.  Moreover, if Puerto 
Rico voted for independence, all federal aid would cease immediately, and the 
transitional government would assume responsibility for the defense of the Island.   As 
the Island’s economic relief and reconstruction had come to rely solely on the federal 
monies channeled through the PRRA, the passing of such bill meant economic ruin for 
Puerto Rico. 
President Roosevelt, Secretary of the Interior Ickes, and Secretary of the Division 
of Territories Gruening gave lip service to the Tydings bill, although, in fact, they did not 
considered granting independence to the Island as a real option.  The president secretly 
gave his support to the Tydings bill since the harsh measures that were included in it 
guaranteed that it would be rejected, not only by most Puerto Rican politicians but by the 
masses, resulting in a de facto popular vote to preserve the colony intact.414  This strategy 
was designed to enhance the image of the United States in Latin America and to shield 
FDR’s administration from accusations of imperialism.  In that regard, Secretary Ickes 
declared to the New York Times that the administration would give sympathetic 
considerations to any “political demand which is responsibly backed by a majority of the 
people of Puerto Rico.”415  In other words, the responsibility for moving towards 
independence was put, falsely, on the Puerto Ricans.  Knowing that the bill would not 
pass in Congress, and that if for some reason it did, it would be rejected by the Puerto 
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Ricans, Ickes reasoned that introducing the bill in Congress would have a quieting effect 
among separatist elements in Puerto Rico.416     
Gruening, who had been a close friend of Muñoz Marín, felt even more 
aggravated by Muñoz Marín’s reluctance to condemned Riggs’ assassination than by the 
act itself.  In fact he believed Muñoz Marín had stabbed him in the back by refusing to 
publicly condemn Riggs’ assassination.  Muñoz Marín, on the other hand, thought that 
Gruening was in essence asking him to blame all Puerto Ricans for the assassination 
while keeping quiet in the matter of Rosado and Beauchamp’s execution while in police 
custody.  When Muñoz Marín finally condemned the assassination of Riggs and 
Beauchamp and Rosado’s execution, Gruening had already decided to wage war on 
Muñoz Marín and the Liberales.417 A former opponent of Winship, Gruening quickly turn 
into his ally.  Gruening hit where it hurt Muñoz Marín the most, with a purge of Liberal 
elements from the PRRA.418  According to a Continental PRRA employee, the purge 
created a sense of fear and killed the agency’s dynamism.  Furthermore, with Muñoz 
Marín out of political favor the PRRA became ineffective.  After all, to Puerto Ricans, 
even to his detractors, “Muñoz was the PRRA.”419  
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The Tydings Bill had the desired outcome and effectively killed the independence 
spirit among many Liberal leaders.420  Muñoz Marín thought that the intention of Tydings 
was to “obtain from the people of Puerto Rico under duress a mandate for a continuation 
of the colonial system.”421   The bill divided the Liberal Party by causing a schism 
between Muñoz Marín and Barceló.  Muñoz Marín believed that participating in the 
elections of November 1936 would be fatal for the Liberales who would lose the 
elections because they would be identified with an independence that meant economic 
ruin.  He reasoned that abstaining from the elections of 1936 would give the Liberales 
time to regroup and to secure economic guarantees that would make independence viable 
and thus more attractive to Puerto Ricans.  His plan then, was to participate in the 
elections of 1940 from a position of strength.422   Barceló, however, did not share Muñoz 
Marín’ convictions and led the party during the campaign for the November elections.  
Muñoz Marín, though he himself did not run for office, campaigned strenuously for the 
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Liberales.  Barceló, showing how disconnected he was from the socio-economic 
maladies afflicting the Island’s population, declared that he would welcome 
independence “even if we starve to death”.423  Such declarations did little to convince the 
already-starving peasantry and urban workers to vote for the Liberales.  
Soon after the defeat of the Liberales in the general elections of 1936, Barceló 
issued an ultimatum to Muñoz Marín urging him either to follow the party’s policies or to 
form his own party.424  After failed attempts at reconciliation, on March 31, 1937, Muñoz 
Marín and his followers were expelled from the Liberal Party.  Muñoz Marín and close to 
40% of the former Liberales founded the Popular Democratic Party (Partido Popular 
Democrático, PPD) on July 22, 1938.  An object of derision after its creation, the PPD 
would become an important force in Puerto Rican history.  Before Muñoz Marín and the 
Populares emerged as the dominant force in Puerto Rican politics, relations between the 
Island and the U.S., which had suffered tremendously due to the events of 1936, would 
deteriorate even further. 
Incarcerating Albizu Campos did little to silence the Nationalists.  Political 
violence in fact increased after his capture.  On October 25, 1936, a group of nationalists 
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wounded the Socialist leader Iglesias Pantín, during a rally in Mayagüez.  In November, a 
nationalist mob attacked a political meeting held by the Liberales because the latter were 
using the Puerto Rican flag.  Such acts, and the introduction of the Tydings Bill, had 
started to dissipate popular sympathy for the Nacionalistas, and many Nationalists 
leaders began to leave the party disgusted with the violent campaign.  These events, 
however, paled in comparison to the colonial response to the nationalist challenge.   
On March 21, 1937 the Insular Police opened fire on a group of unarmed 
Nacionalistas parading in the southern town of Ponce.  Originally the Nationalists had 
been denied permission to hold the parade.  The Mayor of Ponce José Tormos Diego later 
approved the event as a “civic parade” with the Nationalists’ promise that the event 
would not have a military character.  The new chief of the Insular Police, Colonel 
Enrique Orbeta, rushed to Ponce under Winship’s orders and convinced the mayor to 
revoke the permit.  Orbeta and Tormos notified the Nationalists and warned them not to 
proceed with the march.  Roughly eighty cadets in black shirts followed by the 
“Daughters of the Republic” and the “Nationalists Nurses” prepared to march.  Police 
Captain Guillermo Soldevilla, leading a contingent of more than 150 policemen armed 
with rifles carbines and submachine guns, ordered the Nationalist to stop as they initiated 
the march.  A single shot was heard followed by a police barrage.  When the shooting 
was over seventeen Nationalists and spectators had been killed and roughly 100 lay 
wounded.  Two policemen also died from bullet wounds.425 The slaughter of the unarmed 
nationalists, which came to be known as the Ponce Massacre, led to widespread 
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discontent  if not open hostility towards the police and Governor Winship.  The massacre 
did little to weaken the Nacionalistas.  In fact it won them more sympathizers.  El Mundo 
reported that over 15,000 people attended the funeral in Ponce and roughly 5,000 in 
Mayagüez.426  Even the American Civil Liberties Union concluded that the event had 
been a massacre.427 
Local newspapers published page-size pictures of the massacre on a daily basis.  
El Imparcial offered a $25 prize to the person making the best analysis of the shooting 
and providing “the best evidence of the first shot.” 428  The 65th Intelligence Section 
complained that El Imparcial “will not publish any theories blaming the nationalists.”429  
Such theories may have been hard to find.  Even members of the National Guard were 
openly critical of the Insular Police.  Asked by a reporter, Lieutenant Colonel Miguel A. 
Muñoz (PRNG) criticized police tactics such as encircling the crowd and failing to 
provide an avenue of escape to the nationalists.  In what eventually emerged as the most 
accepted explanation, he stated that the wounded and dead policemen (the prosecution’s 
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evidence that the nationalists initiated the shooting), had probably been hit by friendly 
fire.  Colonel Muñoz was not an anti-metropolis pundit.  In fact, he had served the 
colonial administration in several positions including that of Assistant Attorney General.  
There was no evidence at all to put into question the loyalty of this former commander of 
the American Legion in Puerto Rico and vice-commander of the National American 
Legion.  Nonetheless, the 65th intelligence officers stated that his analysis of the Ponce 
Massacre was “unbecoming of an officer of the guard” and believed that “he [would] be 
forced to resign” [presumably by Winship].430  Governor Winship was so determined to 
eliminate the nationalist threat that he would not tolerate the mildest dissent or 
opposition.   
Under Winship, the decapitation of the Nationalist leadership and the silencing of 
the opposition continued unabated.431  During the next April 16, the anniversary of the 
birth of Puerto Rican politician and poet Jose de Diego, who tirelessly fought for 
independence, the atmosphere was undeniably tense.  For the last few years the 
Nacionalistas had been holding a mass and a rally by de Diego’s tomb.  Winship was so 
decided to deny the Nacionalistas any opportunity to celebrate de Diego’s birthday that 
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he put regular army units and the National Guard on alert.  Across the Island, the Insular 
Police impeded groups larger than two persons from entering the cemeteries to present 
flowers to the “Puerto Rican patriots.”432  
The Nacionalistas, however, promptly wasted any sympathy obtained after the 
Ponce Massacre by perpetrating a series of attacks on judges and even the governor.  On 
July 25, 1938 Governor Winship sponsored the celebration of the 40th anniversary of the 
U.S. military invasion of Puerto Rico.  This yearly celebration was usually held in San 
Juan or Guánica- the place of the original U.S. landings.  In what could only be seen as a 
show of force and calculated provocation, Winship decided to hold the celebration in 
Ponce, roughly a year after the massacre of the unarmed nationalists.  More than 50,000 
people congregated to watch the parade and to listen to Winship’s speech.  A battalion of 
the 65th Infantry, led by Colonel, Luis A. Irizarry, a well-known and respected Puerto 
Rican officer, was marching before Winship and the parade’s guests of honor when a 
nationalist commando with at least five shooters opened fire.  Ángel Esteban Antongiorgi 
fired more than ten shots directly at Winship, who remained undisturbed as the rest of his 
entourage ducked for cover.433  A detective shot and killed Antongiorgi.  Irizarry died in 
the shooting which also left thirty-two wounded.  Once order was reestablished, Winship 
delivered his speech as planned.  Colonel Irizarry’s death provoked a wave of public 
outrage against the Nationalist Party.  On September 28, several nationalists were 
convicted in connection with the attempt against Winship further debilitating the party’s 
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leadership.434  The fallout of the shooting was even more troublesome.  Any chances of 
convincing FDR to remove Winship, a priority for Secretary Ickes and whom Muñoz 
Marín had continued to attack from La Democracia, dissipated after the attack.435 
 Police brutality had gained the Nacionalistas much support among the Island’s 
population.  However, they apparently did not understand that the islanders’ sympathy 
was also a repudiation of violence.  The events of July 1938 eroded the support they had 
amassed.  The press, criollo and Continental politicians were quick to point out that the 
blood spilled that day was Puerto Rican blood, and that fact undermined the nationalists.  
Even the remaining official leadership of the Nationalist Party sought to distance itself 
from the incident.  Rafael Medina Ramírez, speaker of the Nationalist Party in the Island, 
condemned  “anarchical” acts even if planned with “good faith” and “conducted 
patriotically and heroically” for they only  provide an excuse to the colonial 
administration to implement the “most barbaric of official terrorisms.”436  The nationalist 
leaders’ statements evidenced the breaking of communications between the political arm 
of the party and its armed wing, and a growing schism between Albizu Campos (who 
condoned any violent act against Continental Americans and their “allies”) and moderate 
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elements in the Nationalist Party.  As the party’s leadership crumbled, the ranks of the 
nationalists petered out.  Even more disheartening for the Nacionalista leaders was that 
whenever opportunities arose to obtain a job, even if it meant working for the colonial 
administration or for the metropolis armed forces, party members quickly applied for 
such jobs.437   
Shortly after the failed attempt to assassinate Winship, political violence subsided.  
Winship’s persecution of the Nacionalistas, which succeeded in incarcerating the most 
militant wing of the party, had much to do with decreasing violence.  Many remaining 
militants went underground to avoid Winship’s hunt.  Scores of nationalist leaders 
disenchanted with Albizu Campos’ radical tactics switched allegiance, mostly joining the 
Populares or the Independentista party.  However, the main reason for the abating 
violence was the Nacionalistas failure to mobilize a considerable segment of the 
population, especially the urban and rural working classes, to continue engaging the 
colonial authorities.   
The Nacionalistas’ failure to win the support of a sizeable portion of the 
population was also a rejection of their iconography and emphasis on Spanish traditions.  
After all, at the time, the majority of Puerto Ricans had been born under U.S. sovereignty, 
and those lucky enough to have been schooled had been exposed to a curriculum based 
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on the New England public school model.  In other words, the nostalgic discovery of the 
“Hispanic” past was an alien concept to the Puerto Rican masses of the 1930s, except for 
the elites who still traced their lineage to the Peninsula.  Moreover, for all means and 
purposes, the Nacionalista “rediscovery” of the Island’s Hispanic past was incongruent 
with the drive towards progress and a modern Puerto Rico.  Both progress and 
modernization, and hints at industrialization, were at the core of the PRRA’s effort to 
improve Puerto Rico’s socio-economic condition.  Many Continental and Puerto Rican 
politicians had accepted the PRRA’s plan as a solution for the Island’s maladies.  The 
Nacionalistas could not compete with the metropolis’ material superiority which implied 
a vague promise of a better future.   Hence, the combination of violent acts, the lack of an 
alternative path forward, the disconnection with the masses socio-economic realities, and 
the emphasis in Spanish tradition were as responsible for the Nacionalistas’ demise as it 
was political persecution. 
As the Island descended into a shooting war between the police and the 
Nacionalistas, the police ranks swell.  The National Guard also expanded during this 
period- though the expansion had little to do with the Nationalist challenge.  Nonetheless, 
it is very telling that whenever volunteers were requested for the National Guard or the 
65th Infantry, the Puerto Ricans, even Nacionalistas, quickly moved to fill those 
positions.438  While the Insular Police stained their record and lost much credence in their 
battle against the Nacionalistas, the National Guard and the regular U.S. Army in the 
Island stayed out of the fray, at least in the public’s eye.  The U.S. military in Puerto Rico 
had always functioned as a possible avenue of socio-economic advancement, which 
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appealed to a large segment of the Island’s population.  Its prestige remained 
unblemished by this period’s violence.  That the Puerto Rican units were not involved in 
the brutal repression of their fellow countrymen would ease the conscience of tens of 
thousands of Puerto Ricans who would soon join the armed forces of the metropolis.  
Albizu Campos had challenged the Insular Police and the legitimacy of the armed forces 
in the Island as true national corps and had lost the duel.    
Albizu Campos was not the only one losing in this battle.  The independence 
movement was seriously weakened by the Nacionalistas’ radicalism.  Locally, the 
separatist leadership was balkanized, and popular support for independence seriously 
waned due to the endless cycle of violence.  Outside the Island such violence worked as a 
self-fulfilling stereotype.  If there ever was any doubt in the minds of Continental 
politicians that Puerto Rico would descend into chaos if it became independent, there was 
the proof.   The independence movement would never recuperate from this blow.   To add 
to the Island’s calamities, the split of the Liberal Party and Muñoz Marín’s fall from 
Washington’s grace hindered the progress of the socio-economic reconstruction effort led 
by the PRRA.  In a sense, those who could afford to lose the least lost more than anybody 
else.439  
Muñoz Marín, unlike Nationalist leaders, understood that the islanders’ 
indignation was a rejection of all types of political violence.  He had condemned Riggs’ 
assassination and the subsequent execution of Beauchamp and Rosado by the Insular 
Police in 1936, as well as the Ponce Massacre of 1937.  This stand gained him the 
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antipathy of Tydings and Winship, and of many other metropolitan administrators.  It 
also cost him his friendship with Ernest Gruening.  Muñoz Marin’s political career almost 
ended after 1936 as a consequence of Riggs’ assassination and the Tydings Bill.  
Unfettered, Muñoz Marín immediately condemned Irizarry’s assassination but he also 
denounced what he considered to be the root of the incident.  He declared: 
We emphatically condemned and repudiate violence, as well as when it comes 
from the government as when it comes from individuals.  Our opposition to 
violence- as an evil itself, and as a danger to our people’s future democracy and 
freedom- is so strong and unequivocal, that we condemn it even in cases when the 
most extreme provocation may seem to justify it.440 
Muñoz Marín was slowly emerging as a better option to the endless cycle of violence 
between the Nacionalistas and the Insular Police.  He skillfully denounced the Winship 
administration for provoking the incident while also condemning the nationalists.  His 
attempts to appear fair and balanced endeared him with the Puerto Ricans, and while his 
actions may have irked colonial administrators and continental politicians, he presented 
the metropolis with a more palatable alternative to political violence.  Furthermore, 
though at the time he did not hold any official position, Muñoz Marín had been 
associated by the public with both the PRERA and PRRA.  Thus Muñoz Marín presented 
himself as fair-minded leader apparently in touch with the socio-economic problems of 
the Island while campaigning to end the colonial relation.  He would eventually rise to 
power with a popular mandate to tackle the first issue and with the personal conviction of 
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advancing the latter.  These two concerns were to eventually become the pillars of his 
new party’s platform.   
Whereas Muñoz Marín had initially amassed political power riding on his father’s 
brand name and thanks to his position as a Washington insider, his comeback to the 
political center stage was to be fueled by hundreds of thousands of votes coming from the 
Puerto Rican Jíbaros, rural and urban workers.  The young professional classes in the 
Island would dessert traditional parties and join his new party to try and lead the Island 
out of its economic malaise, but it would be popular support what gave Muñoz Marín and 
the Populares the moral and political strength to demand from Washington the needed 
economic reforms and the eventual decolonization of the Island.   
The high point of Muñoz Marín’s political trajectory lay ahead.  In great measure 
his rapid ascendance was facilitated by the outbreak of war in Europe on September 1, 
1939.  But that he emerged as the most prominent leader in Puerto Rico during the war 
years was also the result of the political chaos prevailing in the Island previous to the 
outbreak of the war.   The shooting war between the Nacionalistas and the Insular Police 
was detrimental to FDR’s Good Neighbor policy and forced Congress and the president 
to take a more pronounced interest in the political and socio-economic conditions of the 
Island.  In a sense, it was necessary to complement the Good Neighbor policy with a 
domestic corollary for Puerto Rico, which was after all a Caribbean and Latin American 
nation.  This newfound interest in Puerto Rican politics and socio-economic matters 
helped to bring Muñoz Marín to the insular political scene with strength that he did not 
enjoy before, and that he probably would have not held if FDR had not found it suitable 
to improve the relations between the U.S. and Puerto Rico.   
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During the Second World War, Muñoz Marín would use the military-diplomatic 
value of the Island to advance the decolonization project while extracting every possible 
economic concession with the intention of fixing socio-economic problems and readying 
Puerto Rico and the Puerto Ricans for eventual independence.  The Puerto Ricans, and 
especially the Jíbaros, were about to be mobilized both politically and militarily on a 
scale and fashion never seen before.  During the war years, the Island would undauntedly 
start its movement towards industrialization- as way to a modern Puerto Rico and 
towards decolonization.  The peasants and urban workers turned soldiers would 
spearhead the effort, and in the process change the meaning of decolonization. 
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CHAPTER 5 
EDUCATION, INDUSTRIALIZATION AND DECOLONIZATION: THE 
BATTLEFIELDS OF THE PUERTO RICAN SOLDIER DURING THE SECOND 
WORLD WAR 
 
After two years, the War Department has given Puerto Rican Americans the same 
opportunities as any other American, to enter the United State Army and fight for 
the Nation as well as to obtain such benefits as could certainly be of advantage to 
the underpaid, inadequately educated Puerto Rican, who has little opportunity to 
improve himself.  Puerto Ricans, it is stated, will now be able to enter the army 
and have their lots improved learning trades that will not enable them to help win 
victory, but will afford them a means to a better livelihood after the war, thus 
benefiting themselves and raising the standards of their communities and of 
Puerto Rico.441 
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With the end of the Second World War in sight, U.S. congressmen discussing a bill to 
make the office of the governor of Puerto Rico subject to election could not help but 
wonder what impact this measure would have in helping to modernize and democratize 
the Island.  Puerto Rican and Continental Americans residing in the Island testified before 
Congress that through their willingness to support and participate in the war effort, the 
Puerto Ricans, especially the tens of thousands who joined the U.S. military, had shown 
they could be trusted to carry out both tasks.442  Congressmen were notably worried about 
the possibility that the returning soldiers might cause unrest in the Island if reemployment 
opportunities were not readily available.  Those testifying on the matter were quick to 
stress the need to create economic opportunities, but they also pointed out that political 
development was necessary and ultimately linked to the returning Puerto Rican soldiers 
and the peaceful decolonization of the Island.443   Echoing the Island’s press and the 
dominant political thought, Elmer Ellsworth, a Continental American and Insular 
Senator, stated: “The G.I. Bill will help them [the Puerto Rican veterans] in the creation 
of a better Puerto Rico.”444  That better Puerto Rico, however, had to offer more than 
economic opportunities.  A congressman asked:  “Will the [1944 Governor’s] Bill 
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alleviate tensions in Puerto Rico and ease the comeback of Puerto Rican soldiers?”  Jesus 
T. Piñeiro, a leader of the Popular Democratic Party, promptly answered:  “That is the 
urgency of the Bill, so the boys feel that some steps have been taken in the right 
direction.”445     
World War II was a catalyst for socio-economic and political change in the Island.  
With the exception of Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s decision to transfer Puerto Rico from 
the War Department to the Department of the Interior on March 1934, no major changes 
to Puerto Rico’s political relationship with the metropolis had occurred since 1917, when 
Congress imposed U.S. citizenship upon the Puerto Ricans and created an elective insular 
legislature through the Jones Act.446   War, yet again, highlighted the strategic importance 
of the Island and provided for faster negotiation between the metropolis and the colony.   
As discussed in the previous chapter, the years preceding the U.S. entrance into 
World War II were marked by economic distress and political instability in Puerto Rico.  
In fact, a shooting war between the Nacionalistas and the militarized Puerto Rican Insular 
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Police briefly threatened to become a full military affair.  By 1939, however, the colonial 
administration had gained the upper hand over the Nationalists.  Puerto Rico did not 
become the dreaded “Ireland of the Caribbean.”447  Still, the political violence that 
reigned in Puerto Rico in the mid to late 1930s, forced the federal government to take a 
closer look at the Island’s socio-economic and political situation.   
The outbreak of World War II, even before the juggernaut of the German and 
Japanese militaries became apparent, and the U.S. slowly started to ready itself for war, 
made Continental politicians ever more open to finding solutions to the Island’s plight- 
and to avoiding a repetition of the 1930s.  Thus, war brought the promise of political and 
economic advancement by rekindling Puerto Rico’s strategic value.  Once more the 
Puerto Ricans were called to arms and, for many reasons, responded with overwhelming 
enthusiasm.  Different projects of decolonization and modernization, which included the 
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revitalization of the economy as well as the Puerto Rican’s self esteem, rested on the 
roles these soldiers were about to play during  and after the war.    
This chapter analyzes the military mobilization of tens of thousands of Puerto 
Ricans during World War II and how this process responded to military and diplomatic 
necessities as well as local political realities.  Emphasis is put on what Continental and 
Puerto Rican politicians and opinion makers expected to gain from military collaboration 
and participation.  In essence, the first question to be answered is: how did the metropolis 
and criollo politicians try to transform the strategic relevance of the Island and the 
massive enrollment of Puerto Ricans in the U.S. military into political gains?  I argue that 
the metropolis sought to secure the loyalty of natives of the Island by allowing their mass 
entry into the U.S. military and by conferring upon them the same benefits as Continental 
veterans.  Furthermore, among metropolitan agents, the idea of Americanization through 
military service (and public education) made a strong comeback as war engulfed Europe.  
Concurrently, the metropolis became more inclined to granting a higher degree of self-
government to Puerto Rico since it could enhance its standing in the international arena, 
and could very well quench any political unrest in the Island.   
The metropolis’ plans, however, had to compete with those of local politicians.  
Aware of Puerto Rico’s military and diplomatic relevance, Luis Muñoz Marín, leading 
the Popular Democratic Party, followed a strategy that supported the war effort and 
placed the socio-economic restructuring of the Island before anything else while using the 
participation of Puerto Rican soldiers in the war, and the Island’s strategic position as 
leverage to extract political concessions.  Furthermore, Muñoz Marín and the Populares 
tried to secure veteran’s benefits so these men and women could attempt to change the 
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dire socio-economic condition of the Island.  Muñoz Marín’s strategy was threefold: 
supporting the war effort; using the participation of Puerto Rican soldiers in the war and 
the Island’s strategic position to barter political concessions; and using the soldiers’ 
benefits and training to advance the socio-economic restructuration of the Island.   
In fact, the mass military mobilization of Puerto Ricans was essential to the 
Populares’ reconstruction and decolonization plans.  Once socio-economic problems 
were alleviated, Muñoz Marín believed that, Puerto Ricans would have enough self-
confidence to overwhelmingly support independence.   The Puerto Rican turned soldier 
was thus expected to bring more than economic respite or technical knowledge.  These 
soldiers were also supposed to erase a colonial inferiority complex by showing that they 
could bear the same burden as any other man.   
This chapter then analyzes two very different projects.  On the one hand, the 
metropolis sought to show Puerto Ricans that they were regarded as American as any 
Continental, which hopefully would generate loyalty towards the metropolis and 
simultaneously enhance the United States’ image as emerging leader of the Free World.  
On the other hand, the dominant political leader during this period, tried to use military 
participation to advance the decolonization of the Island by obtaining concessions from 
the metropolis and by ultimately decolonizing the Puerto Ricans themselves by turning 
the experience of these soldiers into a lesson on self-confidence, and, in more practical 
terms, by using their veteran’s benefits and skills learned in the military to reconstruct the 
Island and its socio-economic structures.   
 These political projects were not impervious to the needs of the masses being 
mobilized to carry them out.  Actually, I argue that both the metropolis’ and the 
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Populares’ projects were influenced, if not outright changed, by the sudden 
enfranchisement of tens of thousands of peasants and urban workers.  This 
enfranchisement was in part possible due to military mobilization. Thus, the military 
mobilization of the Puerto Rican, as we address it in this chapter, had a political, socio-
economic, and very popular character.  
 War in Europe seemed imminent by 1938, while Japan continued its inexorable 
march in China.  The American public, however, was not prepared to support 
involvement in a European war nor were the armed forces of the U.S. ready to participate 
in it.  If the Good Neighbor policy had put Puerto Rico’s problems in the sight of FDR’s 
administration in the early 1930s, the impending war and the reluctance of the American 
public to consider participating in it moved the Island to the center stage of U.S. 
preparedness and defense efforts. 448  FDR’s administration decided to base its military 
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strategy on the concept of Hemispheric Defense.449  The United States would stay out of 
the war and concentrate on preparing and strengthening the defenses of the western 
hemisphere to stop any assault on the Americas far from the mainland.  Puerto Rico was 
to play a vital role on this strategy.  For decades, the Island had been crucial to the 
defense of the Panama Canal. This time, however, its importance went beyond protecting 
the Canal.  This design was an extension of Alfred T. Mahan’s strategy for the defense of 
the American empire.450  The U.S. Navy planned to stop naval aggression far from the 
mainland in what it called the Caribbean Sea Frontier.  The waters surrounding Culebra 
Island, a Puerto Rican municipality lying off the east coast, would be the stage for such a 
battle.451  Puerto Rico effectively became the center of the Hemispheric Defense strategy, 
and the first American line of defense against German aggression.  The importance of 
Puerto Rico in the defensive plans of the United States is best expressed in a presidential 
letter to Congress dated September 28, 1943: 
When the present war became imminent, however, it was obvious that the chain 
of islands stretching in a great arc from Florida to the shoulder of South America, 
enclosing the Caribbean Sea, formed a vast natural shield for the Panama Canal, 
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suited in distance and conformation to the use of the military plane.  And of the 
island shield Puerto Rico is the center.  Its possession or control by any foreign 
power - or even the remote threat of such possession - would be repugnant to the 
most elementary principle of national defense.452 
The fortification of the Island became a priority, and by 1939 the construction of 
multiple army, naval, and air bases was well on its way.453  The Roosevelt administration, 
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Grande Naval station (originally intended for naval aviation) near San Juan Bay.  This 
facility housed the 10th Naval District and the Caribbean Sea Frontier headquarters.  
Protecting the Panama Canal, the Venezuelan Oil fields, and trade in the area were the 
main responsibilities of this naval command.   On September 6, 1939, a major air base 
known as Borinquen Field or Puerto Rico Air Base No. 1 and capable of handling all 
types of military planes became operational at Punta Borinquen in the northwest city of 
Aguadilla.  This installation provided the U.S. with a southern air route to Africa and 
Europe via Brazil.  Loosey Field was established on January 1, 1941 east of Ponce in the 
southern coast.  In 1940 and 1941 airports were built in Arecibo and Vega Baja 
respectively to support Camp Tortuguero and to provide an airbase for anti-submarine 
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however, was concerned about the possibility of American troops finding themselves 
without the support of the Island’s population, which in case of an invasion, might mean 
that these bases would become nothing more than isolated outposts.  Consequently, the 
administration sought to improve relations between Puerto Rico and the U.S. which had 
deteriorated to an unprecedented low due to the events of 1936, the Ponce Massacre of 
March 21, 1937, and the continuation of the shooting war between the Insular Police and 
the Nacionalistas.454  The first positive step taken by FDR was the removal of Governor 
Winship, himself the target of an assassination attempt in July 25, 1938.  President 
Roosevelt replaced him with Admiral William D. Leahy who took charge of that office 
on September 11, 1939.  Leahy was entrusted with supervising and supporting plans for 
military expansion in Puerto Rico and the Caribbean and with advancing military 
coordination with South American countries.455  Of equal relevance was his mission to 
promote social and political stability in Puerto Rico which the administration considered 
essential to its defense plans.  Urged by Muñoz Marín, Leahy went out of his way to 
prevent fraud in the general elections of 1940- the first in which the Populares would 
participate.456   
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The Popular Party was extremely weak after its creation in 1938.  Most analysts 
and political rivals dismissed Muñoz Marín’s intent on participating in the elections as a 
Quixotic if not an outright act of foolishness.  However, by 1940 the political picture in 
Puerto Rico seemed to favor the rise of the Populares.  Albizu Campos was still a federal 
prisoner in Atlanta and the nationalist movement had been seriously weakened.  The 
Nacionalistas remained dormant during the period of late 1938 and 1940.457  Meanwhile 
the dominant traditional parties faced a series of setbacks.  Barceló and Iglesias Pantín 
died in 1938 and 1939 respectively.458  After Barceló’s death the new president of the 
Liberales decided to make statehood the political goal of the party and most 
Autonomistas and Independentistas abandoned the PLP to join the Populares.  Unión 
Republicana’s principal leader, Martínez Nadal, was absent from most of the campaign 
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as he fought against cancer finally succumbing in 1941.  To make matters worse for the 
annexionists, García Méndez left the party and formed the Partido Unión Republicana 
Progresista months before the election.  Unión Republicana honored the pact with the 
Socialistas and continued the Coalición while Unión Republicana Progresista and the 
Partido Laborista Puro, which splintered from the Socialistas, joined what was left of the 
Liberales to conform Unificación Puertorriqueña Tripartita.459  This incessant 
splintering and confusing net of tactical alliances further weakened the traditional parties.  
The nature of their alliances also showed that political survival, not addressing the socio-
economic problems of the Island, was their priority.   
On the other hand, while campaigning for the 1940 general elections, Muñoz 
Marín opted for downplaying resolving the political status and spoke instead of 
alleviating the socio-economic problems of the Island.  The insignia of the PPD, a pava 
(the traditional hat of the Puerto Rican Jíbaro) and the slogan, “Pan, Tierra, Libertad” 
proclaimed the priorities of the Populares.  Claiming that the rural masses distrust him 
because of his association with independence, Muñoz Marín announced in a meeting in 
San Juan that “el status no está en issue”.460  Resolving the political status of the Island 
was not to be his party’s immediate goal.  This position was resented by much of the 
Popular Party’s independentista wing.  The outbreak of WWII in Europe a year before 
the elections helped Muñoz Marín convince the most pro-independence elements in his 
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party that it was not the right time to fight for independence.  Muñoz Marín was thus able 
to keep the masses’ support and avoid a schism in his new party.     
Muñoz Marín wasted no time in linking his campaign to the war effort.  Not only 
would the status question be put on hold for the duration of the conflict, but the 
Populares committed themselves to supporting the Hemispheric Defense plans and the 
war effort.  Recognizing the change in Roosevelt’s attitude towards Puerto Rico, as well 
as the cause for such change - the renewed military importance of the Island, Muñoz 
Marín would use the latter to promote social and economic development, which he 
thought essential in advancing the decolonization of the Island.461  The mass political 
mobilization of the Jíbaros and urban working masses had started but not as imagined by 
Albizu Campos who remained in jail.  Tactical decisions, however, tend to alter broader 
strategic views and goals.  Muñoz Marín may have temporarily adopted the Jíbaros’ 
point of view with regard to independence in order to win the political battle, but what he 
had learned from them during the 1936 and 1940 campaigns had started to erode his own 
independentismo.462   
With the votes of hundreds of thousands of peasants, Jíbaros and urban workers, 
Muñoz Marín and the Populares surprised the coalition of Socialistas and Republicanos, 
as well as the Unión Tripartita of Liberales, Progresistas and Laboristas Puros by 
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obtaining a pyrrhic, but important, triumph.  Though the PPD obtained fewer votes than 
the Coalición, it secured a majority in the Senate (10-9) and a tie in the House of 
Representatives (18-18).463  FDR publicly congratulated Muñoz Marín, who became 
president of the Puerto Rican Senate, and offered his full cooperation and support for his 
project of “social justice and economic rehabilitation.”464 Once in power, Muñoz Marín 
and the Populares sought to control the socio-economic reconstruction effort in the Island 
while carefully moving forward the process of political decolonization.   
In many respects Muñoz Marín benefitted from FDR’s concerns regarding the 
Island.  World War II was responsible for bringing the New Deal in full force to Puerto 
Rico.  Roosevelt took a significant step by naming Rexford G. Tugwell as governor of 
the Island in August, 1941.  Leahy, Tugwell’s predecessor, had secured clean elections in 
1940 and started Roosevelt’s plans to make of Puerto Rico an island fortress with a 
friendly population, but it would be Tugwell who would lead the Island during the war 
years.  Tugwell was more a scholar than a politician, and had become one of the foremost 
champions of the New Deal, as well as one of its leading ideologues.  His appointment as 
governor could only mean that FDR’s administration was serious about improving social 
and economic conditions on the Island.  Strategic considerations were behind the 
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appointment of Tugwell to whom the President told that his first duty as a representative 
of the United States in Puerto Rico was to “shape civil affairs… so military bases, which 
might soon have to stand the shock of attack, were not isolated in a generally hostile 
environment.”465   Moreover, Roosevelt and Secretary of the Interior Harold Ickes had 
made clear that sending such a prominent New Dealer like Tugwell to Puerto Rico would 
help to undermine the charges of imperialism emanating from Latin America since the 
early 1930s.  Whatever reasons brought Tugwell to Puerto Rico the fact of the matter is 
that he shared many of Muñoz Marín’s concerns.   
Tugwell and Muñoz Marín, though many times at odds, were natural allies.  They 
both believed that a restructuring of the of the Island’s economy and society were badly 
needed.  However, Muñoz Marín sought eventual independence for the Island while 
Tugwell did not believe such status to be practical.  In this regard Tugwell thought that 
liberalization of the political status, granting more autonomy and powers to the Island, or 
even moving towards statehood were the best options for both the Puerto Ricans and the 
metropolis.  In order to push his goal forward, Tugwell used the strategic importance of 
the Island to convince the President and Congress that political change was needed.    
In a letter to FDR dated March 10, 1942, Tugwell expressed concerns about the 
loyalty of the population in case of an attack.  In this letter Tugwell made clear that both 
the British and Dutch had lost their possessions in the Pacific to the Japanese because 
these countries never won the loyalty of the native population who saw them as foreign 
rulers.  The U.S. had to avoid that from happening in Puerto Rico.  To guarantee the 
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loyalty of Puerto Ricans in case of an attack, Tugwell recommended, that the President 
ought to support “a new status for Puerto Rico now.”  Moreover, he wrote that such a 
gesture would disassociate the U.S. from “the colonial empires” and could serve to avoid 
“the risk of a Malaya or Java here [in Puerto Rico].”466 
The Caribbean Advisory Committee (CAC), a local version of the Caribbean 
Committee established between Great Britain and the United States to study possible 
collaboration in the Caribbean, recommended to FDR in March 1942 that he should 
support an amendment to the Organic Act of Puerto Rico, which had remained 
unchanged in all major respects since 1917.  The suggested amendment would make the 
office of the governor an elected one.  This measure, the CAC believed, “would in fact 
have the effect of converting Puerto Rico into a state, except for income tax-purposes and 
for voting representation in Congress.”467  Moreover the letter expressed that that such a 
move would show that the “United States has no ambition to be a colonial power,” and 
that this measure was submitted more “for its general than for its local effect.”468   These 
events followed a unanimous request made on February 10 by the Puerto Rican 
legislature (a Muñoz Marín’s initiative) to Congress and the President to allow Puerto 
Ricans to find a solution to end the colonial regime on the Island.  The letter did not make 
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reference to the issue of the elective governor, which Muñoz Marín did not support as it 
could block the path to eventual independence.469  
FDR did in fact move to support the creation of an elective governor for Puerto 
Rico.  On March 9, 1943 the President asked Congress to consider “as soon as possible 
an amendment of the Organic Law of Puerto Rico to permit the people of the Island to 
elect their own Governor and redefine the functions and power of the Federal government 
and the government of Puerto Rico.”470  The previous day, Roosevelt had ordered 
Secretary Ickes to establish a commission of four Puerto Ricans and four Americans to 
make a study and report on the amendments required to provide for such measures.471  
Tugwell and Muñoz Marín were members of this committee which met in Washington 
D.C. from July 19 to August 7.  On September 28, in a special message to Congress on 
the status of progress in Puerto Rico, Roosevelt urged, once more, that Congress adopt 
the recommendations of the committee as a matter of “right and justice for Puerto 
Ricans.”472  FDR saw “no reason why their [the Puerto Rican’s] Governor and other 
officials should continue to be appointed from without.”473   
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In a letter to Senator Dennis Chavez (New Mexico), Chairman of the 
Subcommittee of the Committee on Territories and Insular Affairs of the Senate, Muñoz 
Marín expressed his support, although not enthusiastically, for the Governor Bill and 
added that it was essential to incorporate in such bill the necessary provisions so that 
Congress could not alter the Organic Act unilaterally.474  Muñoz Marín skillfully 
included the military participation of Puerto Ricans in the world conflict as well as the 
ideological icons used by Allied propaganda, especially democracy, national self-
determination, and the principle of the consent of the governed, to support his 
demands.475  In February 15, 1944, the bill, with the proposed amendments, was 
approved by the Senate.  It would not reach the House of Representatives until August of 
that year, when the war appeared to be nearing its end.  
With the bill sent to the House leaders from the PPD launched yet another 
campaign to secure the passing of the Governor Bill with the proposed amendments.  
Jesús T. Piñero declared before the House that doing so was essential for the peaceful 
decolonization of the Island by showing the returning Puerto Rican veterans that “some 
steps have been taken in the right direction.”476  Elmer Ellsworth, a native of 
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Massachusetts but longtime resident and Senator in Puerto Rico (PPD), accused Congress 
of excessive paternalism and urged the representatives to approve the bill.  Senator 
Ellsworth declared that Puerto Rico should be an example for “all the islands being 
liberated in the Pacific that they too would be free.”  Moreover, Ellsworth was quick to 
point out that approving the bill “will clear the atmosphere throughout all Latin America 
of accusations of Uncle Sam’s merciless exploitation of Puerto Rico.”477 Such strategic 
considerations as well as the impact that the Governor Bill could have regarding U.S. 
foreign relations did not escape federal officials.  Abe Fortas, Undersecretary of the 
Interior, declared during the hearings before the House that  approving “this substantially  
increased measure of  home rule”  would be seen  as an indication  of  goodwill being 
“most beneficial  in reaffirming the  leadership of the United States  in world affairs.”  
Fortas emphasized that “not only will it have that effect upon the people of Latin 
America but also throughout the world.”478   
The bill, however, died over the issue of denying Congress the right to change the 
Organic Act without the concurrence of the people of Puerto Rico or their elected 
representatives.  The House would not approve it without eliminating this provision, and 
Muñoz Marín, disillusioned with the limited nature of the bill, asked Secretary Ickes to 
let it die.  The proposal to allow Puerto Rico to elect its governor failed because of 
protests from Puerto Rico and the President’s indifference, who after his letter to 
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Congress of September 1943 did not make a single effort to push the bill.479  The 
President’s support might have convinced Congress to grant Muñoz Marín’s requests. 
The war situation, however, had changed by August 1944 on all major fronts, and hence 
Roosevelt did not even try to push the bill as it was not longer imperative to do so.  
In September 1943, the President had strongly endorsed the Governor Bill.  
Presidential support, however, was absent when the House convened in August 1944 to 
discuss the bill approved by the Senate in February.  The difference may have well been 
that the Allies were in full pursuit of the German armies across Europe.  War in Europe 
appeared to be nearing its end, and Japan was never a threat to the Caribbean.  Thus, once 
the danger in the Caribbean had completely dissipated, FDR forgot about Puerto Rico.  
As the military importance of the Island declined in comparison to other war theaters, 
promoting a change of its political status ceased to be a pressing matter for the 
administration.480      
Muñoz Marín had also had to contend with the most staunchly separatist wing 
within his own party.  The independentista faction within the PPD convinced Senator 
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Millard Tydings, to present yet another Independence bill, which he did in April 2, 1943.  
Hearings were held in the Senate on May of the same year.481  During these hearings, 
however, the Assistant Secretary of War, John J. McCloy, made it clear that the military 
was against the independence of the Island since Puerto Rico was still vital for the 
defense of the Panama Canal.  Moreover, McCloy labeled Puerto Rico as “irreplaceable 
for Caribbean defense” and informed the Committee that its independence “was not in 
the best interest of the military.”482  Senator Robert A. Taft, a member of the Committee 
on Territories and Insular Affairs, declared during the hearings that Puerto Rico was still 
necessary to secure the military control of the Caribbean.483  For all purposes, the fate of 
the 1943 Independence Bill was sealed with the testimony of McCloy, who, guided by 
Senator Taft, convinced the whole committee of the impracticability of granting 
independence to Puerto Rico during wartime. 
The Tydings bill not only lacked support among American officials but also 
among Puerto Ricans.  A letter from Muñoz Marín addressed to Senator Tydings, dated 
April 29, 1943, reminded Tydings of the resolution approved unanimously by the Puerto 
Rican legislature on February 10 requesting a referendum to end the colonial regime as 
soon as the conditions allowed it, and of the President’s decision to create a committee to 
work on reforms to the Organic Act.  Muñoz Marín made clear in this letter that he could 
not support the bill since doing so might break the delicate equilibrium that had led to the 
resolution from the Puerto Rican legislature requesting a referendum on the political 
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status.484   Muñoz Marín probably had in mind that he had been elected because he 
proclaimed that the political status would not be an issue, and that a vote for the PPD was 
not a vote for independence.  Moreover, the military had made clear that it would 
opposed independence for the Island during wartime.   
Furthermore, the new Tydings bill was only a slightly improved version of the 
one rejected by most Puerto Rican politicians in 1936.  Although the bill provided for a 
period of twenty years before full trade tariffs were implemented between Puerto Rico 
and the U.S., federal aid to the Island was to be cut almost immediately.  Moreover, the 
Armed Forces made clear that they would not support any Independence Bill that would 
not guarantee the retention of all military installations and their right to appropriate lands 
for expansion of those bases as needed.   In other words, independence under the Tidings 
bill would mean that the U.S. military, especially the Navy, would control much of the 
Island and that Puerto Rico would not enjoy the benefits of any federal aid nor special 
trade arrangements.  This was not independence but a de facto transfer of its sovereignty 
from Congress to the military, which would not have the responsibilities that Congress 
had but would enjoy all of its rights and then some more.  Lacking support from the 
military, the State Department, or even from members of the Committee, and with the 
backing of only the staunchest Independentistas in Puerto Rico, the bill did not survive 
for long.  
Many Independentistas in the PPD wanted the party to support Tydings bill 
openly, but Muñoz Marín considered that this option was the equivalent of political 
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suicide.  He was aware that not only the President but most Congressmen, the military, 
and almost every person with a voice in this matter were opposed to independence.  At 
any rate, explaining support for an independence bill to his constituency would have been 
extremely difficult- if not impossible, when even the Nacionalistas were remaining 
dormant and at least paid lip service to supporting the war effort.485  Furthermore, he had 
come to believe that independence had no future under the current economic and social 
situation.  As early as 1936, he noted that the reaction of thousands of Jíbaros whenever 
he spoke to them about independence was of fear and uncertainty.  Most of them were 
afraid of independence and would not vote for it.486  This realization had moved Muñoz 
Marín to run the first PPD campaign based on social and economic reform and avoiding 
the status issue.  Most certainly Muñoz Marín kept independence as his goal, but he knew 
that the social and economic situation of the Island had to be greatly improved, and that 
he had to secure enough economic guarantees from the United States for the survival of 
the new republic in order to persuade the Jíbaros to vote for independence.  
The new Tydings bill did not offer the economic guarantees or the full 
sovereignty that Muñoz Marín deemed necessary for independence to be viable and 
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real.487   Furthermore, during his first campaign he has asked the masses to let him 
borrow their vote and to remove him from office, along with the rest of the Populares, if 
they strayed from their campaign promises of socio-economic justice or betrayed them by 
moving towards independence.488   To that end and before the famous Operation 
Bootstrap (Manos a la Obra) was launched in 1948, Tugwell and Muñoz Marín 
embarked in several public-sponsored ventures seeking to promote the industrialization 
of the Island, and  the creation of  industrial jobs and small business.489  Additionally, in 
order to alleviate unemployment they promoted the military mobilization of the Puerto 
Ricans, especially the peasantry and urban workers (who were the backbone of Muñoz 
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carried out by private capital. The government of Puerto Rico bough and/or established 
cement, glass, boxboard, and shoes factories.  It also bought the Island’s electric 
companies, founded a development bank and mostly followed a socialist-style approach 
to the Island’s socio-economic problems, including land reform, administrative 
reorganization, and small scale public-led industrialization.  See Dietz, Economic History 
of Puerto Rico, 185.  
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Marín’s political power) which incidentally gave him another card with which to advance 
political decolonization in his dealings with Washington.  
If Tugwell and Muñoz Marín disagreed on the path to political decolonization, 
they certainly agreed on the importance of military preparedness and mobilization as a 
way to improve conditions in the Island.  The economic impact of the military 
preparedness was hard to miss.  In November of 1939, as the U.S. accelerated readiness 
procedures in response to the outbreak of WWII in Europe, the War Department decided 
to augment the army units in Puerto Rico which at the time consisted of the 65th U.S. 
Army Infantry Regiment and the 295th and 296th regiments of the Puerto Rico National 
Guard.  After announcements were made to that effect, the press reported a wave of 
volunteers congregating outside the induction centers in the Island.490  Mobilization in the 
Island moved speedily.  In 1940 and 1941 U.S. Army units expanded exponentially.  The 
Selective Service in the Island, with 122 local boards, led and staffed (mostly) by Puerto 
Ricans, registered roughly 525,000 men between the ages of 18 to 64.  During this first 
period Puerto Ricans were accepted under the same standards (with the exception of 
English literacy) as their Continental counterparts.491  To process the Puerto Rican 
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 Clip from New York Times, 11 November 1939, filed in C.I.H.P.C., Caja 21 
Cartapacio 4 Documento 1.  On July 1, 1939, the War Department created the 
Department of Puerto Rico to coordinate the effort in the Caribbean. 
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 Clip from 29 March 1944, filed in 65th U.S. Infantry Intelligence Report, April 
3 1944, C.I.H.P.C., Caja 21 Cartapacio 4 Documento 1.  The War Department ordered 
the local selective service unit in the Island to reinstate the 4th grade education 
requirement for admittance into the army, which was the standard for Continental 
Americans.  On July of 1942, the War Department had authorized the Commanding 
General of the Puerto Rican Department to require an 8th grade education from natives of 
the Island in order to be considered for service.  The Puerto Rican Department was also 
authorized to “weed out the most undesirable men” thought to be “inferior physically, 
mentally, and in other ways” to Continentals.  On October 1943, the Mayaguez Lion’s 
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recruits an army reception and induction center was established in Fort Buchanan, a basic 
training station at Camp O’Reilly (Gurabo), and an advanced training center at Camp 
Tortuguero (Vega Baja).492  The 65th was quickly brought to war strength, attached to the 
U.S. Army Second Army Corps and sent to Panama in January 1942.  The regiments 295 
and 296 of the P.R.N.G. were called into active service in 1940 and gradually took over 
the 65th’s responsibilities-first in the Island and latter on throughout the Caribbean 
Basin.493     
Continental and local politicians were not the only ones invested in the mass 
mobilization of Puerto Ricans.  Convinced that “Puerto Rican men inducted under U.S. 
standards were drastically inferior to Continental troops” the U.S. Army’s Puerto Rican 
Department unilaterally set higher standards for natives to be admitted in the service in 
July 1942, including twice the schooling of that of Continental Americans.494  More 
satisfied with the men selected after the new requirements were instituted, the War 
Department decided to use these men to replace Continental troops in the Caribbean area.  
                                                                                                                                                 
Club initiated the complaint that culminated with the War Department establishing same 
parameters for Puerto Rican and Continental recruits.  See, Clip from Periódico El 
Mundo (San Juan), January 13 1944, C.I.H.P.C., Caja 21 Cartapacio 4  Documento 1.   
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 C.I.H.P.C., War Department: Bureau of the Budget, Puerto Rican Induction 
Program, 15 April  1945,”  C.I.H.P.C., Caja 17 Cartapacio 1, Documento 1A-B, 1. 
 
493
 The 65th was sent to Panama, the southern Continental U.S., North Africa, 
Corsica, France and Germany and though it underwent chemical, amphibious and jungle 
warfare, infiltration and other intensive training, it remained restricted to security and 
service missions.  See  Melvin C. Walthall, We Can’t All Be Heroes: A History of the 
Separated Infantry Regiments in World War II (New York: Exposition Press, 1975), 24-
25; and Muratti, History of the 65th, 12-14; Vargas Interview.   The 295th, served mostly 
in the Caribbean, including Panama, Jamaica and the Dutch Caribbean Islands.  The 296 
trained for war in the Pacific but the war ended with them waiting deployment in Hawaii. 
 
494
 Puerto Rican Induction Program, 1. 
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The Puerto Rican monthly quota was raised as the reports on the new inductees’ 
performance showed improvement, and over 16,000 men were inducted using the new 
standards.495   Such policy, however, was taken as demeaning by the Islanders.  In March 
of 1944, under pressure from civic groups and local politicians, the War Department 
ordered the local selective service unit in the Island to reinstate the 4th grade education 
requirement for admittance into the army and to set the monthly inductee quota at 1,500 
men.  Between March 1944 and April 1, 1945 roughly 18,380 men were inducted in the 
army.  The War Department, however, decided that these new troops would be used as 
“fillers for Puerto Rican units and as service troops in overseas theaters”.496  Thus, the 
War Department found a way to still deny equal opportunity to those born in the Island.   
It was the general attitude that Puerto Ricans, as colored troops, were not suited 
for combat duty.  The Bureau of the Budget’s report on the inductee program on the 
Island declared that: “Puerto Ricans obviously are not as valuable as Continentals for 
                                                 
495
 The Free French, British and Dutch government opposed sending Puerto Rican 
troops to their Caribbean possessions believing it may stir racial tensions.  The presence 
of Puerto Ricans, who were considered Colored troops in these overwhelmingly Black 
colonies could undermined the racial structure of power and endanger the abysmally 
small white elite.  As a matter of fact that was the War Department’s reason for not 
sending Black Continental troops to the Caribbean.  At any rate, the War Department did 
not believe it could spare any white troops, especially for a war theater that had become a 
secondary concern after the Allied invasions of North Africa and Sicily in 1943.  
Nonetheless, to placate their European Allies, the U.S. War Department assured them that 
only white, highly-educated (referring to 8th years of schooling), English speaking Puerto 
Ricans would be sent to their possessions.  For instance see; British Joint Staff Mission, 
Offices of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, Washington D.C., June 2, 1943 to Secretary of 
War Stimson; War Department, “Outgoing Classified Message,” 18 September 1943, 
Operations Division W.D.G.S. Latin American Theater; United States Deputy Chief of 
Staff to Field Marshall Sir John Hill, Combined Chief of Staff Building, Washington 
D.C., October 12, 1943, C.I.H.P.C., Caja 22 Cartapacio 4 Documento 1, 3, 4.  
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Army service because of lower educational and physical standards, racial and historical 
traditions and background, aptitude, etc…”497  Not only did the War Department believed 
that their race poorly suited non-whites for combat duty, but that  it also made them 
intellectually inferior to Continental white soldiers.  Though the same regulations, with 
regard to schooling were applied to Puerto Rican recruits, and then doubled, Continental 
officials still believed that Puerto Ricans were deficient in intellect which they blamed on 
the recruits’ race.  Furthermore, the report reiterated the myth of Puerto Rican docility 
(created shortly after the 1898 invasion) and ignored the Island’s military tradition.    
The BoB report stated that the use of native officers in the Puerto Rican units was 
“a major reason for the retention of many men whose effectiveness and/or efficiency is 
questionable in comparison with Continental troops.”498  The conclusions of this report 
with regard to the protective role played by Puerto Rican officers, however, goes against 
many of the troops’ preference for serving under Continental officers as they were less 
demanding than their Puerto Rican counterparts.  According to these soldiers, Puerto 
Rican officers seemed to always have something to prove, the proverbial chip on the 
shoulder.499   
The War Department’s low opinion of the Puerto Ricans was set before 
recruitment began.  In the Puerto Rican Induction Report prepared by the Bureau of the 
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 See Víctor Vargas, interview by author, videocassette, Barranquitas, Puerto 
Rico, 6 August 2001.  Lupercio Ortíz, interview by author, videocassette, San Juan, 
Puerto Rico, 6 August 2001; Juan Mercado-Santana, interview by author, videocassette, 
Barranquitas, Puerto Rico, 6 August 2001.  All the interviews conducted by the author 
are in the author’s possession. 
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Budget in 1945, it is stated that  the Puerto Rican inductee “admittedly, was not generally 
suited for front line duty” but would valuable for  other duties and “thousands of potential 
actual  combat U.S. Continental personnel would thereby be released from secondary 
services.”500 A War Department adamant in showing that all “available sources of non-
father (pre-Pearl Harbor) manpower were being exhausted before fathers were called” 
thus proceeded to mobilize thousands of Puerto Ricans- which it did not trust nor did it 
intend to send into battle.501   
According to the Bureau of the Budget, the Puerto Rican Induction Program 
admittedly had another purpose “not directly related to the actual prosecution of the war.” 
502
  The War Department, through induction, sought to “provide employment for many 
idle Puerto Ricans classified as 1-A”. 503  FDR, members of Congress and the military, 
had continuously expressed their fear of local unrest.  Excluding able, and unemployed, 
Puerto Ricans from the military could have been taken as an outright insult especially 
considering that unemployment in the Island went from 99,100 in July 1941 to 237,000 in 
September 1942 because of the strain imposed on the Island by German U-boats, 
rationing, the prioritization of military needs, and the failure to establish war industries in 
Puerto Rico.504    
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  Lefebvre, “Puerto Rico: Quiet Participant”, 95; and Dietz, Economic History 
of Puerto Rico, 186.  
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That Puerto Rican soldiers were excluded from the battlefield was not the result 
of any refusal on their part.  Soldiers, local leaders, the press, and the general public in 
the Island demanded the opportunity to see action.505  Local leaders were interested into 
getting as many Puerto Ricans as possible in the military, and many were certainly aware 
of the economic and political effect of doing so.  However, Puerto Rican leaders and 
opinion makers did not want military participation to be a handout.  It was important for 
Puerto Rican leaders to debunk the myth of the Puerto Rican soldier inferiority (and thus 
of the Puerto Ricans’ in general) and so they pushed the matter of sending the troops into 
action- just as they had done during WWI.  The War Department may have wanted to 
save face by including Puerto Ricans in the military but restricting them to service duties, 
an opinion shared by Continental politicians and opinion makers, but local leaders and 
soldiers demanded a chance to prove their worth in the battlefield.  For once, there was 
the symbolic regaining of manhood.  This could be attained by first being able to support 
their families and secondly by sharing the burden of “national defense” by fighting, and if 
necessary, dying in war.  Furthermore, many local leaders, including Muñoz Marín, 
thought that active participation in the war would convince Puerto Ricans that they could 
stand on their own, individually and collectively, and that they could in fact run the 
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 Many Puerto Rican career officers tried unsuccessfully to receive combat 
assignments in Europe or the Pacific Theater.   See  J.A. Ulio, Major General, War 
Department Adjutant General, to Honorable Luis Muñoz Marín, President, Senate of 
Puerto Rico, February 2,1945; an Luis Muñoz Marín to Henry L. Stimson, Secretary of 
War, January 8, 1945; and  Colonel Miguel A. Muñoz to Luis Muñoz Marin, December 
26, 1944,  Archivo Luis Muñoz Marín (A.L.M.M.),  Sección IV: Presidente del Senado, 
Serie I: Gobierno Federal, Correspondencia, Subserie II, War Department, Cartapacio 29, 
Documentos, 1,3, 5-9. 
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Island by themselves.  In a very real sense, being allowed to fight was perceived as a 
mean to end psychological and sociological perceptions and complexes of inferiority.   
As local leaders encouraged the population to support and join the military, 
economic opportunity, personal and national improvement joined national duty as part of 
the rationale used to exhort the Puerto Rican peasantry and working urban classes to join 
the military.506  Economic hardships and the call for national defense-with everything that 
it entails, combined to drive the Puerto Rican masses into recruiting stations.   The War 
Department casually reported that: “The number of volunteers appears to be 
comparatively much higher than in the Continental United Sates. Some months, it is 
stated, volunteers supplied the complete quota.”507 
Economic distress was not missed by military officials when asked to comment 
on Puerto Rico’s exceptionally high volunteer rate.  Citing the senior commander of the 
U.S. Army Puerto Rican Department, Major General James Lawton Collins, an editorial 
in the Christian Science Monitor observed that:  
Since Puerto Rico’s economic problems are so acute, a grocery store clerk in a 
small coastal town would probably never have earned more than a few hundred 
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 Though the Nationalists had remained dormant during the period of late 1938 
and 1940, the passing of the Selective Service Law awakened its leaders who quickly 
boycotted draft registration.  By 1943, forty-five members of the party had been jailed for 
failure to register for the draft.  After serving parts of their sentences for draft dodging 
several Nacionalistas were released and later accused the officers at the correctional 
facilities of forcing them to complete registration cards.  FBI, Nationalist Party of Puerto 
Rico, Vol. 4., 42. 
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 Puerto Rican Induction Program, 4.  Some 23,000 Puerto Ricans volunteers 
were accepted by the War Department though more than 70,000 volunteered.    
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dollars a year before becoming a soldier.  His Army pay plus the Government’s 
allowance to his wife and family will be actually a raise in income.508   
Lawton Collins’ comments rang especially true to the peasantry and the Jíbaros.  
An old saying in the 65th declared, “Poverty takes me to war, if I had any money I would 
not go.”509  That seemed to be the case for many Puerto Ricans who joined the military 
before and during World War II.  Victor Vargas, who joined the 65th Infantry in 1940 at 
age sixteen, stated:  “I joined because of the economic situation.  I used to go downtown 
on a donkey to sell vegetables and tubers, but there wasn’t any money.  When the war 
[World War II] came, I took that opportunity and started to earn $21 per month.”510  
Francisco Salinas, who enlisted in 1939 declared:  “For many Puerto Ricans there is no 
better institution than the Army.  The Army gives the Boricuas housing, clothes, order, 
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 “Army orders given in Puerto Rico in English and Spanish” Clip from the 
Christian Science Monitor, April 7 1942, C.I.H.P.C., Caja  21  Cartapacio 4 Documento 
2A.  The comments were not off the mark.  Per Capita Net Income had taken a dive in 
1931 to $108 from a previous $122 and by 1933 it had hit bottom at $86.  Puerto Rico’s 
PCNI was less than a third of the poorest state’s PCNI, (Alabama with $270) and a sixth 
of the aggregated PCNI in the Continental U.S. which was $575.  Reconstruction under 
the New Deal and the coming of the war propelled a slow recovery and by 1940 PCNI 
was back to 1930’s levels.  As land reform and the war effort started to make an impact 
PNCI continued to rise; to $184 in 1942; $218 in 1943; $236 in 1944; and $270 by 1945.  
Underlining the correlation between the war effort and PCNI, after a relatively small 
increase to $271 in 1946, PCNI again started to decline; to $254 in 1947, and to $252 in 
1949.  PCNI would not rise to war levels until 1950 when it reached $279. See, Dietz, 
Economic History of Puerto Rico, 140, Table 3.2, 184, Table 4.1, 205.  
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 Translated from Spanish: “A la guerra me lleva la necesidad, si tuviera dineros 
no iría de verdad.”  See  Antonio E. Padrón, El 65 en revista (New York: Las Américas 
Publishing Company, 1961), 132-33. 
 
510
 Víctor Vargas, interview; Lupercio Ortíz, interview; Juan Mercado-Santana, 
interview.  Vargas was not the only one to mention the $21 payment.  Antonio E. Padrón 
stated that  “the stipend earned by the lower class Boricua, and even the middle class, is 
lower than that offered by the armed forces.”  Padrón, El 65 en revista, 1961, 132. 
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recreation, school, a pension, three hot meals [last tres calientes], and a decent pay.  
Where is the Boricua going to find all that?”511   The veterans who most frequently cited 
economic reasons for joining the army also stated that once in the army they were very 
happy and took pride in wearing the uniform.  Their pride, some of these veterans 
testified, came from   the respect and admiration they received from the rest of the 
community and a feeling of being important and needed.512  Lawton Collins, Commander 
of the Puerto Rican Department, identified other reasons besides economic improvement 
for Puerto Rican participation in the war effort.   He stated: “It would be hard to find any 
community where civilians have cooperated more wholeheartedly and unselfishly with 
the army than in Puerto Rico.  We have several gifts of lands from individual Puerto 
Ricans for army projects here”.513  The overwhelming support for the war effort and the 
numbers of Puerto Ricans joining the military even started to worry the Nacionalistas- 
whom as discussed in the previous chapter understood the symbolic value of military 
service with regard to national identities.514  
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 Padrón, El 65 en revista, 132-33. 
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 Vargas Interview; Ortíz, interview, Mercado-Santana, interview.  These 
veterans cited the poor economic situation of the Island as their reason for joining the 
army.  However, all of them mentioned that the respect and the treatment they received 
when in uniform was one of the motivations to remain in the military.   Also see “Army 
orders given in Puerto Rico in English and Spanish” Christian Science Monitor, 7 April 
1942. 
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 “Army orders given in Puerto Rico in English and Spanish” Christian Science 
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 The Great Assembly of the Nationalist Party appealed to the Pan-American 
Convention in Rio, and the Atlantic Charter, asked for the withdrawal of all U.S. armed 
forces from the Island, the recognition of national sovereignty and demanded “the right 
and privilege of having a military representative in the High Command of Democracies 
246 
 
The mobilization of tens of thousands of Puerto Ricans went beyond personal 
economic improvement- whole families and communities were affected by it.   
According to the Bureau of the Budget, federal payments in the form of dependant’s 
benefits and “readjustment payments” (a type of unemployment benefit after being 
discharge) were pumping $28,074.000 annually into the economy by 1944, and that 
excluding the regular army pay.515  The BoB estimated that after the war at least 30,000 
veterans would seek unemployment benefits under the Servicemen Readjustment Act of 
1944.  Entitled by this act to a weekly unemployment pay of $20 for 52 weeks ($1040 
annually), these soldiers’ readjustment pay meant a monthly boost to the local economy 
of $600,000 or 31,200,000 annually in wages. 516  The readjustment weekly benefit was 
substantially more than the $12 weekly pay a veteran could earn working as a waiter in 
Fort Brooks Officer’s Club, itself a higher pay than what most Puerto Ricans earned at 
the moment.517  Many veterans in fact made use of this provision.  Miguel A. Muñoz, 
                                                                                                                                                 
so as to accept equal risks in the war and have the same joy in victory.” FBI, Nationalist 
Party of Puerto Rico Vol. 4., 53-54.  
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 U.S. Army payment for a private was $21 a month in 1940.  In January, 1943 a 
new pay scale went into effect starting at $50 a month for a private.  Overseas pay meant 
an extra $10 a month.  Ironically, Puerto Ricans serving in Puerto Rico were entitled to 
overseas payment while in the Island (an overseas possession) but not while training in 
the U.S.  The Bureau of the Budget monthly figures included:  Administration Induction 
Programs, $5,800;   Dependants Benefits, (Exclusive of regular payment allotment): 
Monthly Benefit of Men Already in the Service, 1,850,000;   Initial Payment to 
Dependants of New Inductees, 118,000 for a total of 1,965,000.   Separation Payments: 
“Mastering out lump sum payment” 80,000; Weekly Readjustment Payment ($20/weekly 
for 52 weeks), 285,700.  The total monthly expenses were thus $2,539,500 for an annual 
rate of   $28,074.000.  Puerto Rican Induction Program, 3-10.                                
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 Ibid., 12. 
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 The Ley de Salario Mínimo de 1941 set the hourly wage in the Island at 25 
cents of a dollar.  In theory that meant that a fully employed worker should earn $10 per 
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Director of the Veterans Administration in the Island, informed Muñoz Marín that by 
June 30, 1948 roughly 49,000 veterans had received unemployment readjustment pay for 
a total of $40,755,971.518  However, those numbers show that although almost as twice 
the number of the expected veterans received unemployment payments, the total 
payments remained close to the Bureau’s 1945 estimate.  This in fact indicates that 
veterans were not sitting idle to receive a paycheck, as the BoB had feared, but were 
seeking employment or retraining under the provisions of the Readjustment Act. 
Regarding the Puerto Rican units being created the report concluded that “few, if 
any, foresaw the cost of creating this comparatively small segment of the Army.”   The 
Puerto Rican soldiers averaged 2.6 dependants which meant an annual dependant 
payment of $560 per men.  Moreover, Puerto Ricans were entitled to overseas payment 
while serving in the Island (an overseas possession) which translated into their pay being 
equal to those troops deployed around the world and between 10% to 20% higher than 
soldiers stationed in the Continental U.S.519  As illogical as they may be, those were not 
                                                                                                                                                 
week.  However, the law had so many exemptions that most agricultural and factory 
workers did not benefit from the minimum hourly wage at all.  Dietz, Economic History 
of Puerto Rico, 225-26;  see also Henry Wells, “La modernización de Puerto Rico: La 
política y los valores”, in Eduardo Rivera Medina, Rafael L. Ramírez, eds., Del 
cañaveral a la fabrica: cambio social en Puerto Rico (Río Piedras, P.R.: Ediciones  
Huracán-Academia, 1994), 87. 
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 “Memorandum,” Miguel A. Muñoz, Director, Oficina Insular de Veteranos to 
Honorable Luis Muñoz Marín, Presidente del Senado de Puerto Rico, 1948.  Archivo 
Luis Muñoz Marín, 1948, Sección IV, Serie 1, Sub-serie 1, Datos y Estadísticas, Sub-
serie 33, Cartapacio 29, Documento 2.  Hereafter  “Memorandum Muñoz to Muñoz 
Marín, 1948.” 
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 By the guidelines of the Service Men’s Dependents Allowance Act of 1943, 
enlisted men and warrant officers deployed overseas earned 20% more than those 
stationed in the Continental U.S while officers earned 10% more.  See Puerto Rican 
Induction Program, 7. 
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policies instituted by local officials but by the War Department based on Puerto Rico’s 
political status and geographical location.  Furthermore, anexionistasin the Island 
preferred the Island to be treated as a state, even if that meant a decrease of the War 
Department’s moneys assigned to the Island.520   
The BoB took special aim at dependant’s benefits.  It blamed the local Selective 
Service Boards, “whose member are predominately, if not entirely Puerto Ricans,”521 of 
failing to verify dependants’ claims and of fomenting the steady increase of inductees 
applying for dependants benefits.  The BoB report stated that it was “almost unbelievable 
that 97 out of every 110 men inducted (more of 60% being single) were supporting an 
average of 2.6 persons when joining the Army.”522   The report did not take into account 
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 Officials of the Bureau of the Budget went as far as proposing a pay reduction 
for Puerto Rican soldiers since they believed that it would make sense to treat the Puerto 
Rican soldiers different than Continentals since army regulations did not “take into 
account the much higher level of living of Continental soldiers’ families, nor the much 
lower cost of living in Puerto Rico.”  See Puerto Rican Induction Program,10.  However, 
as previously discussed, the cost of living in the Island was higher and wages much lower 
than in the Continental U.S., which had led to the pauperization of the peasantry and 
extreme poverty of the urban working class, and this situation further deteriorated during 
the early years of the war.  Prices of imported food went up 90% between 1941 and 1946 
while locally produced food increased 48% during the same period. Local food 
production was only increased thanks to the land-reform program carried out by Muñoz 
Marín and Tugwell.  Supported by a federal recognition of the “Law of the 500 Acres”, 
the government bought lands with over 500 acres and distributed them among landless 
peasants.  This program was credited with bringing the land area devoted to food 
production from 230,000 acres in 1940 to 300,000 acres by the war’s end.  Most 
interesting, yuca, and tubers such as names and batatas, plantains and yautías made the 
bulk of the increase in locally-produced foods.  All of them were staples of the Puerto 
Rican peasant’s diet.  Sugar producers were adamantly opposed to devoting some of their 
lands to food production, even during the 1941-42 period when the Island faced 
starvation fearing that they would lose their production quotas.  See Dietz, Economic 
History of Puerto Rico, 204-203; and Tugwell, The Stricken Land, 215.   
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that by 1933, families in Puerto Rico already averaged five members.523  Ironically, the 
BoB, which used the cultural and social conditions of the Puerto Ricans to argue against 
their usefulness as fighting troops, overlooked the extended Puerto Rican family, many of 
which were led and supported by the oldest son, whom among his patriarchal duties 
counted being the first to go to war.  The BoB ignored that, especially in rural areas, 
many Puerto Rican couples lived as concubines, which meant that many of those labeled 
as “single” likely had a partner and children from their unrecognized union.  Moreover, 
as it is evident from the BoB report itself, local members of the selective service board 
were strictly following this institution’s and the War Department’s guidelines, as well as 
the laws passed by Congress.524  The BoB also complained that the local government was 
bent on helping recruits to secure documentation for purposes of dependent benefits.  
However, this was no different than in any of the states on the mainland to the point that 
many of the initiatives devised by the local government in Puerto Rico to aid the veterans 
and recruits in securing benefits were verbatim copies of Continental states’ 
legislation.525 
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 There was a very important provision which allowed for veterans 25 years old 
and younger to claim that their studies were interrupted because of military service which 
entitled them to a monthly pension of $50 and $75 for single and veterans with 
dependants respectively while they continue their studies.  The same applied for veterans 
over 25 year of age but they had to prove that their studies were in fact interrupted.  
Another provision set a monthly pension of $80 and $90 for single and married veterans 
pursuing vocational rehabilitation 80 to single and married veterans respectively for up to 
a period of four years.  The local government aided in securing documents necessary to 
claim all these benefits and even created a manual of veterans’ rights in Spanish.  See 
Administración de Veteranos, Servicio Selectivo- Puerto Rico, Información para 
veteranos: derechos y beneficios, Mayo 8 1945, (Archivo Fundación Luis Muñoz Marín 
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The Bureau of the Budget’s report denounced that the induction program in 
Puerto Rico functioned as a “glorified WPA” or a “WPA in ‘uniform’”.  Proportionally, 
the report indicated, Puerto Rico received a larger monthly dependant benefit than any 
other state of the Union.526   The report accused local officials of treating mobilization as 
a workers’ program and of “expending large sums of money haphazardly” while “ground 
work is being laid [by the Puerto Rican senate] for continuing post-war expenditures in 
whatever form of pensions may be finally adopted.”527  The Populares were in fact 
counting on the Puerto Rican soldier to bolster the socio-economic reconstruction effort 
in the post-war years.   
The American soldiers who fought in WWII enjoyed some tangible benefits not 
expeienced by their WWI predecessors.  The Populares would make sure that no benefit 
(i.e., vocational rehabilitation, unemployment benefits, re-employment, discharge 
compensation, life insurance, medical assistance, mortgage loans) remained unclaimed by 
Puerto Rican veterans. The PPD leaders also fought to extend the same benefits to WWI 
veterans.  Altogether, the WWI and WWII veteran population residing in Puerto Rico in 
                                                                                                                                                 
(A.L.M.M.), Sección IV, Serie I Subserie 30 Subsección 2 Cartapacio 19 Documento 1), 
12, 14, 16.   Hereafter Información para veteranos: derechos y beneficios.  Some of the 
issues studied by the local government were state bonuses to veterans and they looked at 
Alaska, Illinois, Massachusetts, Michigan, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, Vermont, 
Connecticut, Georgia and North Dakota as guidelines for Puerto Rican veterans' bonus.  
A.L.M.M., Sección IV, Serie I, Subserie 33, Veterans Administration, Cartapacio 75 
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1947 totaled 70,426 men and 210 WACs or Women Army Corps veterans.528  Even 
though a fifth of WWII veterans were no longer residing in Puerto Rico in 1947, over 
14% of Island’s population consisted of veterans.  The sheer number of veterans eligible 
to participate on the several federal readjustment programs facilitated the Populares 
effort to change the nature of the Island’s socioeconomic structures and eventually to 
embark on the industrialization of the Island with native know-how.  
Arguably, the most important of those benefits was the Servicemen's 
Readjustment Act of 1944, better known as the G.I. Bill, which allowed almost eight 
million WWII veterans in the U.S. to go to college- a feat that has been credited with the 
dramatic expansion of the middle class in the mainland.529  The G.I. Bill had a similar 
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effect in the Island.  Understanding that many Puerto Rican soldiers would not be able to 
use the benefits of the Servicemen's Readjustment Act, for too many had little formal 
schooling, Muñoz Marín and the Populares designed trainig and vocational state 
programs for the returning soldiers so they could make use of these hard-earned benefits.  
The returning soldier was not to go back to the fields; high schools, vocational schools 
and the University of Puerto Rico were waiting for him.   
The Department of Education and the Veterans Administration worked closely to 
retrain and in most cases to help the veterans finish high school.  In 1946-47 the 
Department of Education in the Island had readied itself for the returning soldiers and 
trained 1,167 academic teams which employed 3,677 people to cater 36,584 veterans.  
Besides primary and secondary teachings the DoE conducted over 650 workshops and 
8,418 veterans received diplomas that first year. 530  The DoE was spending over 
$3,000,000 annually to run these programs. During the academic year of 1947-48 the 
local government helped over 40,000 veterans to obtain the necessary credentials or 
certifications necessary to receive education under the Servicemen Readjustment Act.  
That year the DoE again counted 36,584 veterans finishing high school, 1,798 in 
vocational (industrial) schools, and 936 pursuing vocational agricultural studies.531  
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According to a report from Pedro Gil, Director of Veterans’ Division the Department of 
Education, over 48,075 veterans were receiving some kind of secondary education.  Over 
2,000 were receiving vocational industrial training and roughly 1,200 were enrolled in 
vocational agricultural studies.532  The report boasted that over 50,000 veterans were 
receiving some kind of instruction. 
The enrollment in the University of Puerto Rico increased 24% from 5,869 
students in 1941-42 to 7,300 for the year 1944-45, and it would continue to expand 
mostly in part to accommodate a growing veteran population- which now had the means 
to go to college.533  The total veteran population for the academic year 1947-48, rose to 
2,074 students.534  The next year 2,307 were attending the U.PR.535  As the U.P.R. grew 
in terms of enrollment, it was also restructured to emphasize the teaching of social 
sciences with the intention of producing a harvest of economists, public administrators, 
social workers, and all types of professions associated with public service.  Moreover as 
explained by Henry Wells, strengthening the social sciences core did not diminished 
interest in applied sciences which in turn supplied the new commercial and industrial  
                                                 
532
 Ibid. 
 
533
 Wells, La modernización de Puerto Rico, 85. 
 
534
 Memorandum Muñoz to Muñoz Marín, 1948. 
 
535
 1,777 attended Río Piedras’ Campus and 530 attended the Mayagüez’s 
Campus.  Ibid. 
 
254 
 
enterprises’ demand for accountants, staticians, engineers, scientists, managers, and all 
types of technicians.536   
On August 1947, the University of Puerto Rico inaugurated an Industrial Arts 
School (Escuela de Artes y Oficios) with 1,200 students mostly veterans.  The school, 
which  when finished would have room for 7,000 students, covered twenty-two acres, 
included  twenty-five classrooms, one administrative building,  fourteen  buildings for 
practical workshops,  four classroom buildings, a bakery and a cafeteria.537  This school 
offered over fifty courses designed to train carpenters, electricians, experts on car 
bodywork, sheet metal work, and cast iron works, as well as auto, aviation, and general 
mechanics, plumbers, experts on refrigeration, and welders. Five more of these schools 
were eventually built.538 The director of the Veterans Administration in the Island 
understood the priority of these schools and stated that although they were not 
exclusively for veterans, former servicemen would receive preference for admission.539 
The importance of these thousands of soldiers who received technical training 
went beyond that of providing technicians.  They subsidize the schooling of thousands 
more since their tuition, books and other expenses were paid in full by the Federal 
Government which allowed the U.P.R. to expand in other areas while keeping tuition 
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rates low and offering scholarships.  Hence, it is not surprising that  the U.P.R. 
administration went out of its way to  make sure that “not a single veteran  who wished to  
enroll in the  University of Puerto Rico and who met the  admission requirements, was 
denied  the opportunity to attend either Río Piedras or Mayagüez because of lack of 
space.”540  These citizen soldiers, through vocational and college education, were to 
become the technicians and technocrats of a new political framework, the 
“Commonwealth” and of its main project, the modernization of Puerto Rico’s economy 
via industrialization.  
But before Muñoz Marín moved towards the Commonwealth formula, he had 
already engaged the military in promoting the Island’s industrialization and in providing 
essential services commonly reserved for state agencies or the private sector.  The 
National Guard (and the State Guard) were occupied with providing entertainment during 
towns’ Fiestas Patronales and helping public schools with extracurricular activities 
ranging from athletics and field days to conducting seminars on industrialization for 
civilians and veterans.541  Moreover, through their own radio show the National Guard 
sought not only to provide entertainment but to remain engaged with communities 
hosting guard units.  The P.R.N.G. also appointed godmothers and honorary officers in 
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these communities seeking to create a sense of belonging.542  The military was in fact 
busy with community and state building projects as it continued to take on civilian roles 
to fill the vacuum of non-existent civilian structures.  This added another dimension to 
the role of the military in the Island- beyond providing economic relief by direct and 
indirect employment and beyond its character and nation building role as proposed by 
local and Continental leaders. In many areas the military in the Island had taken a 
leadership role in the effort to reconstruct Puerto Rico.  Unsurprisingly many of the 
officers of the National Guard also worked for the relief and reconstruction agencies in 
the Island.  Furthermore, many of the enlisted men and officers had trained or were 
training to fill the needs of the coming insular industrial revolution.543 
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With the help of Tugwell, Muñoz Marín and the Populares had been able to plant 
the seeds of socio-economic change during the war years and the early postwar period.  
However, political advancement had been limited by an intractable Congress and by the 
most militant pro-independence wing within the PPD.  The PPD won the elections of 
November 1944 in a landslide, even after bitter accusations between Muñoz Marín and 
the Independentistas in the PPD were made public.544  The Independentistas had wanted 
the total rejection of the Governor Bill and a compromise to celebrate a referendum to 
vote for independence a month after the general elections of 1944.  Once again, Muñoz 
Marín ran the PPD’s campaign on the basis of social and economic reform, allegiance to 
the war effort, and assurances that a vote for the Populares was not a vote for 
independence.  The platform of the PPD, however, made clear the intention of the 
Populares to submit to the direct decision of the Puerto Ricans, “not later than the 
                                                                                                                                                 
Rican Housing Authority.  This government agency built low-income houses as part of 
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moment when the world peace is structured, the question of the final political status 
desired by the people of Puerto Rico.”545  Muñoz Marín, who followed the war closely, 
probably thought, as many did, that the war would be over before Christmas that year.  
Thus, the PPD platform of 1944 was a repetition of that of 1940 with an emphasis on 
ending the colonial regime, as soon as the fighting was over, via a referendum in which 
all the political sectors had a chance to promote their status preference.   
On January 10, 1945 Tydings presented yet another Independence Bill, identical 
to the one introduced in 1943.  During the public hearings held during March 5-8 of that 
year, the position of the different groups with interests in Puerto Rico remained the same 
as in 1943.  U.S Navy Captain G.B. Parks, representing the Office of the Chief of Naval 
Operations, officially declared that “from the viewpoint of national security Puerto Rico 
is of great strategic value as a site for naval operating base,” and that after the war the 
facilities in the Island were to be used to locate the “Task Force in charge of defending 
the Caribbean to deny the approach of any threat from east or south.”546  For that reason, 
the Navy was “opposed to any bill for Puerto Rico independence that does not provide 
for the retention of the naval and military reservations, and does not also provide for the 
right of expansion and the selection of new sites at any time in the future.”547   The armed 
forces’ position clearly indicated that the military leaders planed to continue using Puerto 
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Rico to project U.S. power over the Caribbean Basin after the war ended- and that they 
wanted a free hand with regard to expanding their foot print in Puerto Rico. 
The death of President Roosevelt in April 1945 brought an inexperienced and 
uninformed Harry S. Truman to the presidency of the United States.  This event could 
have not been more relevant.548  Truman was willing to support self-government for the 
Island- a position that FDR had abandoned.  He also made clear to Tugwell that he was 
against independence for Puerto Rico.  In an attempt to secure a fair referendum, Tugwell 
tried to convince Truman that “if there is a plebiscite, neither of us should say so in a way 
to influence Puerto Rican’s choice,” and Truman agreed that he thought the Puerto 
Ricans “should have the right to make even a disastrous choice.”549  Unbeknownst to 
Truman, he was, in fact, reversing his predecessor’s policy.  However, without outright 
support from the president there was little chance of convincing congress to grant 
independence to the Island. 
As it had been the case in 1943, Muñoz Marín could not support the 
Independence Bill of 1945.  He wanted economic guarantees and a chance for the Puerto 
Ricans to vote on status options.  Moreover, these options should be guaranteed by 
Congress.  Muñoz Marín was still operating under the assumption that once the war was 
over the sacrifices made by Puerto Rico and its loyalty towards the Allies’cause would be 
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rewarded with a referendum sponsored by Congress to find a formula to decolonize the 
Island.550   The Department of the Interior had come to believe that the Puerto Rico 
should not sever its ties with the United States but that home rule was a must.  Ironically, 
the position held by Muñoz Marín, who was already recognized by the U.S. government 
as the most influential and popular leader in Puerto Rico, strengthen the Interior’s 
opinion.551    
 On October 16, 1945, in a special message to Congress on Puerto Rico, Truman 
declared that it was the policy of his administration to promote the political, social and 
economic development of people who have not yet attained full self-government, “and 
eventually to make it possible for them to determine their own form of government.”552  
Truman went further and emphasized that it was time to “ascertain from the people of 
Puerto Rico their wishes as to the ultimate status which they prefer within such limits as 
may be determined by the Congress,” with the end of granting Puerto Ricans the kind of 
government which they desire.553  Truman probably did not intend to curtail the right of 
Puerto Ricans to choose their status, but he was concerned that they might vote for a 
formula that Congress was not ready to support.  Such occurrence would undoubtedly 
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have diplomatic repercussions for the United States at a moment when it was trying to 
assert itself as the leader of the free world.   Therefore, Truman suggested that Congress 
consider four different possibilities: “(1) the right of the Puerto Ricans to elect their own 
Governor with a wider measure of local self-government; (2) Statehood for Puerto Rico; 
(3) complete independence; and (4) a Dominion form of government [similar to the 
political arrangement between Canada and the United Kingdom].”554  Congress, which 
was not interested at all in a referendum, did not even hold public hearings for the new 
Tidings- Piñero bill.555 
Cornered by the Independentistas in the PPD, by another American President that 
did not support the independence of Puerto Rico, by a Congress that would not give 
Puerto Rico an independence that the Island could survive, and compelled by the loyalty 
he felt towards his constituency, which had elected him on the premise that a vote for the 
PPD was not a vote for independence, and aware of the Island’s growing dependency on 
federal funds- including veterans’ benefits, Muñoz Marín began to turn decidedly 
towards autonomismo.  In 1946, he expelled the Independentistas from the PPD, who 
responded by forming that same year the Partido Independentista Puertorriqueño, or 
PIP.  The third Tydings bill, and its sequel, the Tydings-Piñero bill, had an unexpected 
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effect.  It almost destroyed the PPD, and in the end, it forced its leadership to define the 
party’s status preference.  Muñoz Marín had come to the conclusion that the U.S. would 
not offer enough guarantees to make independence viable nor could he persuade the 
people to vote for it.  This experience finally moved Muñoz Marín to seek autonomismo, 
or a higher degree of self-government, a formula that he knew Truman would support.   
The reluctance of Congress to consider a referendum drove Muñoz Marín to 
endorse yet another Governor Bill in 1947.  This time, Muñoz Marín, expressed his 
enthusiasm for the bill in a long cablegram to Congress.556  The PPD immediately 
mobilized in favor of the bill.  Piñero, whom Truman had appointed as governor of 
Puerto Rico (the first Puerto Rican to serve in such position), and Antonio Fernós Isern, 
the new Puerto Rican Resident Commissioner in Washington and member of the 
congressional committee studying the bill, hurried to express their support and to educate 
the members of the committee on the benefits of approving the bill.    
Showing the new, although limited, decolonization spirit of the White House, the 
new Secretary of the Interior, J.A. Krug, declared that Article 76 of the United Nations 
Charter made the approval of the Governor Bill necessary.557   Krug also convinced the 
committee that approving it would send a message to “the nations of the world, and 
particularly of South America” that the United States adhered to the principles of 
democracy and self-government and had no colonial empire.”558  He also called on 
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Congress to commit itself to sponsor a referendum to decide the political status of Puerto 
Rico in the near future.559  In his deposition, Piñero followed the anti-colonial line and 
emphasized the prestige that this bill would bring to the United States throughout the 
world.  During the hearings he also promoted a Congress-sponsored referendum and 
hinted at the possibility of a third status.560  James A. Beverly, a former governor of the 
Island, informed Congress that over 99% of Puerto Ricans were intensely loyal to the 
United States (and that their war service was evidence of such loyalty) and that approving 
the bill would not affect national defense.  Moreover, he also advocated the idea of a 
holding a referendum as soon as possible.561   
During the hearings before the House a single letter from the Independentistas, 
and the personal testimony of Ruth M. Reynolds, Secretary of the American League for 
Puerto Rico’s Independence, expressed opposition to the bill.  Reynolds argued that 
Puerto Rico should be granted independence and that American sovereignty over the 
Island was illegal.562  In fact, of the eighty letters and cablegrams included in the records 
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of Congress, only the one sent by the PIP was against the bill.  The rest of the messages, 
signed by mayors, senators, independent organizations and common people supported 
it.563     
Representative Fred L. Crawford, who during the hearings expressed his 
preference for Puerto Rican statehood, made clear on the record that he was completely 
against independence. 
I do not propose to give Puerto Rico its independence.  Statehood is a different 
proposition, change of political status is a different proposition, but the United 
States will either defend Latin America, including Puerto Rico and Santo 
Domingo and Haiti and South America or we [the United States] will come under 
the domination of some power in Europe.564   
Adhering to an end of siècle rationale used to take over Cuba and Puerto Rico 
during the Cuban-Pilipino-Spanish American War of 1898, Crawford emphasized that 
although he trusted Puerto Ricans, he believed that some European power might attempt 
to gain a foothold there from which it could operate against the United States, and 
therefore independence for the Island would be a blow against national defense.565   
Unlike the Independence Bills’ hearings of 1936 and 1943, in which Senator Tydings 
made clear that Congress would never grant statehood to Puerto Rico,  in 1947 Congress’ 
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attitude towards  Puerto Rico had shifted  considerably to the point that statehood was 
actually being  considered by members of Congress and the military.566   
Undoubtedly, the first consequence of the Cold War was to revive, or more 
accurately, to increase the military importance of Puerto Rico, which made independence 
unthinkable for Congress.  The United States, however, had also emerged from World 
War II as the self-proclaimed leader of the free world, a position quickly challenged by 
the Soviet Union.  The decolonization of Puerto Rico thus assumed more relevance than 
ever before, especially with the intense propaganda that characterized the Cold War.  The 
diplomatic value of decolonizing the Island rivaled its military worth, a point that 
politicians on both sides were quickly to realize. 
The Governor Bill of 1947 was approved by Congress after the Department of 
Interior and the political leaders of the Island went out of their way to establish that its 
passage would not curtail the powers of Congress over Puerto Rico.567  This time Muñoz 
Marín did not try to obtain from Congress guarantees that it would not make further 
changes to the Organic Act except with the consent of the people of Puerto Rico.568  It 
was obvious that he had bigger plans for the Island and that he had been gaining support 
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of the Interior and powerful Congressmen to find a formula to decolonize Puerto Rico 
with a future referendum.  In August 5, 1947, President Truman signed the Governor Bill 
which became Public Law 382, providing for the election of the governor of Puerto Rico.  
The significance in passing the Governor Bill was that the Interior and powerful 
Congressmen established without doubt the military and strategic significance of Puerto 
Rico, but more importantly, they recognized the diplomatic gains that decolonizing the 
Island offered the U.S.    
In a visit to Puerto Rico in February 21, 1948, Truman reiterated his commitment 
to local self-government, and labeled the nomination of an island-born governor, that of 
Jésus T. Piñero, and the elected-Governor Bill, as significant steps toward the increasing 
measure of self-government in Puerto Rico.  More relevant, perhaps, was the fact that 
Truman pointed out that the relationship between Puerto Rico and the U.S. was mutually 
beneficial and that it was an example to the world of how well the “democratic approach 
to the problem of national existence in the modern world” worked.  Moreover, Truman 
stated that Puerto Rico represented “what the American people are trying to encourage in 
the world at large.”569   The president recognized the value of Puerto Rico in global 
politics, a point that Puerto Rican politicians did not miss.  In 1948, Muñoz Marín 
became the first elected governor of Puerto Rico.570  From this office, with firm 
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 Of 640,714 votes cast the PPD obtained 392,386, the Independentistas, 65,351; 
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command of the political apparatus and with overwhelming popular support Muñoz 
Marín would launch a new offensive to decolonize the socio-economic and political 
structures in Puerto Rico.  The Puerto Rican veterans and the military units still active in 
the Island in many ways would spearhead the new campaign. 
When men of the 65th returned home on November 9, 1945, they were received as 
heroes by an enthusiastic multitude crowding the streets of San Juan and waving both 
Puerto Rican and American flags.571  The Victory Parades did not stop until the spring of 
1946 as Puerto Rican units continue to return from overseas deployment.572  In several 
speeches Muñoz Marín made clear the reasons for sending Puerto Ricans to join the fight 
overseas.  The common Puerto Rican, Muñoz Marín argued, was forging democracy 
abroad and at home.  He did not hesitate to identify who those heroes were; “soldiers and 
citizens and Jíbaros…” 573   That the returning Puerto Rican “heroes” wore U.S. Army 
uniforms and that they were received  by crowds waving the Island’s unofficial flag and 
the stars and stripes evidenced the  intricate nature of  national identities in the Island. 
                                                                                                                                                 
town of San Lorenzo, two senators and a representative at large- positions which were 
won by Socialistas and Estadistas. See Bayrón Toro, Elecciones y partidos políticos 
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During the war, both the metropolis and the local politicians’ projects had in 
common their emphasis on creating a modern Puerto Rico.  Modernization had meant 
political Americanization as understood by some local politicians as early as 1898, and as 
late as the 1920s.  For the metropolis, however, Americanization was still intrinsic to 
modernization, but it also entailed cultural assimilation not just political.  Thus the initial 
projects of both the metropolis and the criollo elites had presupposed some type of 
modernization via Americanization with the meaning and extent of the latter varying 
accordingly.  These projects were nor completely rejected by the masses but re-imagined 
as they went through the metropolitan institutions usually cheered by a cacophony of 
modernizing discourses echoed and distorted by the Puerto Rican elites.   
Cultural and political assimilation had been at the core of modernization projects 
for four decades.  During WWII, however, the emphasis was on economic 
modernization- first suggested during WWI.574  The socio-economic reconstruction 
programs in Puerto Rico have been studied either by over emphasizing a pure economic 
or political focus.  They center on relief agencies such as the PRERA and PRRA, and  
economic strategies like the Plan Chardón, Rex G. Tugwell’s and Muñoz Marín’s 
promotion of local industry during WWII, and the subsequent and world famous 
Operation Bootstrap (“manos a la obra”) leading to the final industrialization of the 
Island.  Such narratives have left out the role of tens of thousands of Puerto Ricans 
serving in the U.S. military during WWII.  Initially they represented an economic boom- 
in the form of new wages and unemployment relief- just by serving in the armed forces.  
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Furthermore, as military mobilization advanced, their salaries and benefits came to 
eclipse the funds available to both the PRERA and PRRA.  However, through their 
service they provided more than temporary economic relief.   
Unlike WWI veterans, before WWII ended the Puerto Rican soldier could count 
on a generous package of benefits designed to ease the soldier’s re-entry into civilian life.  
A march towards a “modern” Puerto Rico had started and these soldiers would be leading 
such movement.  That Luis Muñoz Marín came to depend on the votes of the peasantry 
and rural working classes to attain political power and on their military mobilization to 
advance the socio-economic restructuration of the Island would eventually force him to 
change his personal political goals, first tactically and later definitively.  Fittingly, 
militarization and enfranchisement of the Puerto Rican masses during WWII coincided 
with a growing dependence in the Island on the federal government’s political, legal and 
financial intervention.575  
Old metropolitan ideas regarding the impact of military training on Puerto Rico’s 
social and economic structures resurfaced during the war.576  This was not a new theory.  
Immediately after the 1898 invasion  and during WWI, military service had been consider 
as a builder of character and national identity and as a way to remake the Puerto Ricans 
in the Continental’s image.  But even in WWI, the metropolis’ nation-building project, 
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which heavily relied on modernizing the Puerto Rican via military service, had started to 
escape the hands of the metropolitan administrators.  History repeated itself during WWII 
as the plans of the metropolis- including type, size, and length of mobilization had to 
contend with an empowered Puerto Rican senate led by a popular and skillful politician 
such as Muñoz Marín.  Moreover, Muñoz Marín worked incessantly to make the Puerto 
Rican soldier an integral part of the socio-economic restructuring of the Island.   
By the end of the war, control of the nation, and now state-building project via 
military service was firmly in the Populares’ hands.  Thus, while the U.S. military had 
envisioned service as a way to build a new Puerto Rican and thus a new Puerto Rico, as 
early as 1898- and most certainly during WWI, this project really came to bear fruit when 
it was appropriated by Puerto Ricans.  Nonetheless, the military in Puerto Rico, be it the 
National Guard or the regular Army units, remained part of the United States military and 
depended entirely of federal funds to function.  This could only allow for a third path as 
the Populares continue to employ the military for nation and state building.    
The first mobilization of the Puerto Ricans during WWII was more political in 
nature than military and it happened in 1940 with the Populares first electoral victory.  
The second mobilization of the Puerto Ricans was in fact military as the Island became 
an integral part of the U.S. war effort and Puerto Ricans were called to arms.  This effort 
had strong economic impact in terms of federal monies transferred to Puerto Rico and 
unemployment relief.   The third mobilization was social in nature as the Puerto Rican 
soldiers moved from the fields to classrooms and put to good use the skills learned while 
in the military and the benefits to which they were entitled.  Thus WWII ended with the 
Island moving towards socio-economic restructuration very rapidly and with LMM 
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accepting the third way.  The fourth mobilization would happen during the Korean War 
and would be socio-political in nature, becoming and creating the Estado Libre Asociado.  
Korea would become a propaganda war for sponsors of the third way which entailed a 
new Puerto Rican for a new Puerto Rico. 
It was the Jíbaro who started to convince politicians of the third way, a hybridism 
that allowed for a political identity and a cultural one.  Muñoz Marín’s change of heart 
with regard to independence was thus Jíbaro inspired and popular in nature.  Initially a 
tactical decision born out of the need of securing the vote of the peasantry and urban 
workers which did not see independence as a solution to their everyday problems, the 
idea that the “Status no está en issue” became a kind of end in itself as political 
decolonization took a backseat and socio-economic decolonization became imperative.  
Many have branded this change as a sellout or the cooptation of the people’s will, but in 
fact Muñoz Marín was responding to the masses’ needs and will, which at this historical 
junction coincided with one of the greatest social reconfigurations in U.S. and Puerto 
Rican history.  When WWII ended and during the immediate post war years the Island 
moved rapidly to achieve the socio-economic change envisioned by Muñoz Marín and 
Tugwell.  Shying from independence Muñoz Marín had started to adopt the third way, a 
place between independence and statehood.  The Korean conflict would become a 
propaganda war to support such third way which entailed a new Puerto Rican for a new 
Puerto Rico. 
 
 
  
272 
 
CHAPTER 6  
FIGHTING FOR THE “NATION”?  WAR AT HOME AND ABROAD 
AND THE CREATION OF THE ESTADO LIBRE ASOCIADO DE PUERTO 
RICO 
For fifty-four years we, the Puerto Ricans, have lived under the political tutelage 
of our co-citizens of the North.  We have assimilated their entrepreneur spirit and 
industrial skills; and fed our soul and thoughts with the most sacred of men’s 
attributes: their admiration and respect for freedom, justice and equality...   
…without adulterating our Hispanic heritage, nor have we soiled it with artificial 
trends of Sajonic assimilation: and without relegating our Hispanic culture, 
sentiments and traditions, which we conserve pure, like the most precious legacy 
of our gallant and noble ancestors.577 
 
During the Second World War and its immediate aftermath, military mobilization 
served both as a political bargaining chip and as tool with which to advance Puerto 
Rico’s socio-economic restructuring.  As discussed in the previous chapter, Luis Muñoz 
Marín and the Populares came to rely on the sheer electoral power the masses gave them 
to demand and embark on a reform of such grandiose scale.  As the military in Puerto 
Rico became an essential instrument for political and socio-economic modernization, 
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however, the Island shifted closer to the U.S.  Not only was Puerto Rico more dependent 
than ever on federal transfers to effectively run reconstruction and relief agencies (not to 
mention the military), but as shown by the tens of thousands of peasants and urban 
workers who became soldiers, there was a growing affinity and acceptance of U.S. 
institutions and values throughout the Island- which were then led and ran by Puerto 
Ricans.  This phenomenon curtailed the ability of Muñoz Marín to move towards 
independence, and soon after becoming Puerto Rico’s first elected governor in 1948, he 
began to earnestly consider a third option between federated statehood and 
independence.578   
That third option would eventually be known as the commonwealth formula or 
estado libre asociado.  The outbreak of the Korean War in 1950 would not only provide 
the opportunity to mobilize tens of thousands of Puerto Ricans and to make them part of 
the socio-economic reconstruction of the Island (as their WWII counterparts had been) it 
would also provide a space where the Puerto Rican soldier would incarnate the ideals of 
the Commonwealth formula.  During the Korean War the mobilization of tens of 
thousands of Puerto Ricans retained its relevance for the furthering of the political and 
socio-economic reconfiguration of the Island.  However, the symbolism of such 
participation with regard to national identities and the PPD’s project of decolonization, 
and thus the acceptance of the Commonwealth formula, was of the outmost relevance 
during this period.  That the estado libre asociado came into existence in 1952 is well 
known.  The part played by the Puerto Rican soldiers fighting in Korea to advance this 
                                                 
578
 In 1946, Muñoz Marín had expelled the Independentistas from the PPD, who 
wanted him to support another independence bill sponsored by Senator Tydings.  The 
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formula, however, has been almost completely ignored.579  This chapter thus studies the 
contribution of the Puerto Rican soldier in the establishment of the Commonwealth in 
1952 and in securing its survival. 
In his inaugural address of January 20, 1949, President Harry S. Truman made 
public to the world that the U.S., as leader of the free world, was bent onto combating the 
“false philosophy” of Communism, not just by strengthening its military alliances with 
“peace-loving” countries, but by its determination to “work for a world in which all 
nations and all peoples are free to govern themselves as they see fit, and to achieve a 
decent and satisfying life.”580   He emphasized that the U.S. sought no territory, that “we 
have imposed our will on none”, and that “the old imperialism-exploitation for foreign 
profit-has no place in our plans.”581  Moreover, the U.S. was to embark on a new plan to 
make available its technology and expertise, as well as its capital, to the underdeveloped 
world.  This policy, known as Point Four, was a global version of the Good Neighbor 
policy.  Truman believed that to defeat Communism, the U.S. had to convince the world 
that it did not intend to create a world empire, nor did it want to possess colonies.  
                                                 
579
 Few works hint at the connection between service in Korea and promoting the 
commonwealth formula.  See Silvia Álvarez Curbelo, “La bandera en la colina: Luis 
Muñoz Marín en los tiempos de la guerra de Corea”, 1-17, in Fernando Picó, ed., Luis 
Muñoz Marín, perfiles de su gobernación, 1948-1964 (San Juan, P.R.: Fundación Luis 
Muñoz Marín, 2003), and Harry Franqui-Rivera, Glory and Shame: The Ordeal of the 
Puerto Rican 65th U.S. Infantry Regiment During the Korean War, 1950- 1953 (Master’s 
thesis, Philadelphia, PA: Temple University), 2002.  
 
580
 “Inaugural Address, January 20 1949” [Truman Presidential Museum and 
Library, Harry S. Truman Papers Staff Member and Office Files:  White House Press 
Release Files: Dates: 1945-1953, Item 19]; accessed 23 February 2006; available from 
http://www.trumanlibrary.org/hstpaper/presshst.htm.   
 
581
 Ibid. 
 
275 
 
Accordingly, decolonizing Puerto Rico became a priority for his administration. 
  On March 13 1950 the new Puerto Rican Resident Commissioner in Washington 
D.C., and PPD ideologue, Antonio Fernós Isern, inspired by Truman’s Point Four, 
introduced a bill on the House (H.R. 7674) to provide for the organization of a 
constitutional government in Puerto Rico.   Senator Joseph C. O’Mahoney, then Chair of 
the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, introduced the bill on the Senate (S.3336) 
that same day.   In a statement before a joint Senate and House committee, Muñoz Marín 
declared that approving these bills would be of great value to the United States “which is 
constantly accused by the Latin American countries and the Communists of running a 
colonial system.”582   Unlike his remarks regarding previous bills, Muñoz Marín’s 
statements, though linking the situation of the Island to the greater fight against 
Communism and colonialism, were not adversarial.  In fact, after Truman’s inaugural 
speech, Muñoz Marín had offered to make of Puerto Rico a world showcase of Truman’s 
Point Four.583  The gesture was reciprocated.  The atmosphere during these hearings was 
congenial, at least between the Populares and the members of Congress.   
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Most of the Congressman agreed with Muñoz Marín’s views, and one even 
pointed out the positive effect that a recent visit to Haiti by elected Puerto Rican officials 
had had on their Haitian counterparts.584  Moreover, members of Congress noted that 
passing this bill could only “elevate our position before the United Nations”, especially 
since the United States was a signatory to the United Nations charter and therefore had to 
adhere to the calling for self-government which it included.585  Others emphasized that its 
adoption would advance the “defense of democracy in the eyes of the world, and 
especially with our fellow Americans south of Rio Grande.”586  Although the 
Independentistas tried to call into question the legitimacy of the legislation and of Muñoz 
Marín’s government, Congress gave its blessing to the Senate version of the bill.   On 
July 30, 1950 President Truman signed the Congress Act of July 3 (S. 3336), into Public 
Law 600 giving the Puerto Ricans the right to write their own constitution and to 
establish a relationship with the U.S. in the nature of a compact.  P.L. 600 authorized the 
people of Puerto Rico to organize a republican form of government pursuant to a 
constitution of their own choosing.  That act, adopted by Congress, would become 
effective only when accepted by the people of Puerto Rico in a referendum.  As these 
hearings were coming to an end, congressmen exhorted Inés Mendoza (Muñoz Marin’s 
second wife) to address the audience.  She declared:  “this growing solidarity [between 
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the U.S. and P.R.] will be paid back to the U.S. someday.”587   Her words could have not 
been more prophetic.  Soon los hijos de este país would be fighting in the hills of Korea 
alongside the United Nations and against each other in the hills and towns of Puerto 
Rico.588   
A referendum was set for June 4, 1951 in which the Puerto Ricans would cast a 
vote to “accept” or “reject” the provisions of P.L. 600.   Muñoz Marín and the Populares 
enjoyed broad popular support.  Having overwhelmed all the other political parties and 
alliances during the general elections of 1948 they were firmly in control of the political 
apparatus in Puerto Rico.589  Acceptance of P.L. 600 in the coming referendum was 
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hardly in doubt.  This is not to say that there was no opposition.  The staunchly pro-
American Estadistas opposed- at least in principle- what they regarded as a perpetuation 
of the colonial status and an obstacle to achieve federated statehood.  Nonetheless, even 
though they had come second in the 1948 elections, the PPD had obtained more than four 
times the Estadistas’s votes.  The only chance the Estadistas, had was to convince the 
voters to reject P.L. 600 and to have a congress-sponsored plebiscite including statehood 
and independence as options.  The Independentistas were in a similar predicament.  They 
had obtained even fewer votes than the Estadistas and their efforts to stop passing of P.L. 
in Congress were fruitless.  They chose to campaign against the acceptance of P.L 600 by 
exhorting their members to abstain from voting in the referendum, and if they voted, to 
do so against it.  However, even when combining their mass appeal with the rest of the 
parties opposing the PPD, they were still unable to match the Populares’ strength.  In 
fact, Independentistas, Estadistas and Socialistas had continued their exodus to the PPD 
after 1948.  Furthermore, the Socialist Party supported P.L. 600, which made its passing 
almost inevitable. 
The traditional parties were just too weak to stop the PPD by peaceful means.  
The Nacionalistas, however, had long ago shunned the electoral process as a means to 
obtain their goals.  A violent confrontation pitting the nationalists’ Ejército Libertador 
and the Puerto Rico National Guard and Insular Police was about to shock the Island.590  
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Albizu Campos, who had been convicted of sedition and conspiracy to overthrow the 
government of the United States in 1937, returned to Puerto Rico from New York City on 
December 15, 1947, four years after been released from federal prison on probation.591  
He immediately started a campaign to derail the PPD’s projects and ordered the 
mobilization of the Ejército Libertador once more.   Only a day after his return Albizu 
Campos held a press conference and warned the U.S. that after depleting all peaceful 
means to obtain independence, the “Nationalist Party would resort  to the use of force to 
attain its goals.”592  His threats also targeted Muñoz Marín.  Albizu Campos declared that 
“Muñoz must be stopped and we will stop him.”  Muñoz Marín publicly warned Albizu 
Campos to abstain from violence.  Albizu Campos resorted to question Muñoz Marín’s 
Puertorriqueñidad while demanding that the Puerto Ricans abstain from voting in the 
1948 general elections.  He also condemned the teaching of English language in Puerto 
Rico, declared that “every person serving in the Selective Service Boards should be 
shot”, and commanded the Nacionalistas to start arming themselves with “revolvers, 
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rifles, guns, shotguns, knives and daggers to defend the cause of the Revolution.”593  
Despite Muñoz Marín’s warnings Albizu Campos’s diatribe continued unabated.  On 
September 23, 1950, during the anniversary of the Lares Revolt of 1868, he addressed the 
crowd gathered in Lares’ Plaza Pública and spoke against P.L. 600 and the participation 
of Puerto Rican soldiers in the Korean War.  He ended his speech by calling the Puerto 
Ricans to defy the U.S. and its colonial pawns in the same way that “the men of Lares 
defied despotism, with revolution!”594  
That the Nacionalistas were planning a coup or insurrection was hardly a secret.  
Emboldened by the apparent inaction of the insular government, Albizu Campos 
continued his call to arms against the U.S. and its representatives in the Island- Muñoz 
Marín, the Populares, and anyone who served, worked, or were in any way related to the 
metropolis.  In his speeches, Albizu Campos defied the hated Gag Law of 1948, which 
prohibited planning or promoting by any means the overthrowing of the Island’s 
government by violent means.595  On October 27 1950, the Insular Police detained one of 
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signed it into law.  The Gag Law declared a felony to persuade people or to plead for 
overthrowing the Island’s government by violence or force.  Printing or publishing any 
material encouraging people to engage on such activities and creating any kind of 
organization to carry out any of these acts became felonies under this law.   The law, 
which was derogated in 1957, closely resembled the U.S. Alien Registration Act (also 
known as the Smith Act) passed by Congress on 29 June, 1940.  This act made it illegal 
for anyone in the United States to advocate, abet, or teach the desirability of 
overthrowing the government. The law also required all alien residents in the United 
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the cars of Albizu Campos’ motorcade and found explosives, weapons, and ammunition 
in the car’s trunk.596  Throughout the Island the Nacionalistas rushed to hide their 
weapons, and the chaos led to a gunfight with the Insular Police.  After this second event, 
the Police started a series of raids against known Nacionalistas.  Albizu Campos 
immediately ordered the Ejército Libertador to launch a general attack against the Insular 
Police, political leaders and elected officials at midday on October 30.    
The insurrection actually begun on October 28 as the Nacionalistas helped some 
112 inmates to flee from the Insular Penitentiary.  For a long time thought as a diversion, 
the mass escape was in fact design to secure additional manpower and weapons for the 
insurrection.  The leader of the inmates who escaped that day, Pedro Benejam Alvarez, 
who was in jail for stealing military weapons and ammunition from Camp O’Reilly, had 
promised the Nacionalistas to hand over the stolen weapons in exchange for his freedom 
in the Republic of Puerto Rico.597  After the plans of the insurrection had to be 
accelerated because of the events of October 27, the Nationalists helped Benejam Alvarez 
                                                                                                                                                 
occupational status and a record of their political beliefs.  Within four months a total of 
4,741,971 aliens had been registered. The American Communist Party and other left-
wing groups in the mainland were the main targets of this legislation.  On May 1948, the 
Insular Police established the Internal Security Unit, which worked closely with the local 
FBI unit to keep the Nacionalistas, Communists and Independentistas under surveillance.  
See Díaz Soler, Puerto Rico: Sus luchas por alcanzar  estabilidad económica, definición 
política y afirmación cultural, 319-323. 
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and others to escape.  The mass escape served in fact as a diversion as it kept the Insular 
Police occupied, but it also alerted them of the impending battle. 
 As ordered by Albizu Campos the Nationalists launched their attack on October 
30 on what is known as the Grito de Jayuya.  The revolt became a series of gunfights 
between Nacionalistas and the police in the cities of Ponce, Arecibo, Mayagüez, the town 
of Naranjito, and a more concerted attack in San Juan- including the attempted 
assassination of Muñoz Marín in La Fortaleza (the governor’s house).598   Albizu Campos 
designated the town of Utuado as the rendezvous point for all Nacionalistas to converge.  
He chose Utuado as the Nationalists’ main line of resistance believing its geographical 
location and the area’s topography would allow the Ejército Libertador to resist for at 
least a month.  In that time they expected to gain enough international attention and 
support as to force the General Assembly of the United Nations to intercede in their 
favor.599   The local Nationalists attempted to take the town, but after a firefight with the 
Insular Police, they had to take refuge in a few houses.  Aided by the National Guard, the 
Insular Police quickly overwhelmed the Nationalists in Utuado during the night of 
October 30.600   
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The Nacionalistas were able to take and briefly hold the central mountain town of 
Jayuya.  They proceeded to burn the Insular Police station, the United States Postal 
Service building, and the equipment and records found in the Selective Service offices.  
Just like the other Nationalist cells, they were supposed to make their way to Utuado but 
lack of vehicles, disorganization and the prompt mobilization of the National Guard 
prevented them from doing so.  During that first day Blanca Canales, (one of the few 
women involved in the insurrection) atop a hotel, proclaimed the Republic of Puerto 
Rico.  But in fact the Nacionalistas in Jayuya were trapped, and the revolt was coming to 
a quick end.  The Air National Guard bombed and strafed the town as a National Guard 
infantry company surrounded it.  Those Nacionalistas who were able to escape the 
encirclement fled to the hills.  With the National Guard in close pursuit, and alerted that 
their leader had surrender in San Juan, the remaining Nacionalistas came down the 
mountains to surrender on November 2, 1950.601   
The battle in Puerto Rico was over.  By no means had it been bloodless.  Eighteen 
Nacionalistas had been killed and eleven wounded.  Seven policemen and a Guardsman 
were killed while twenty-one police officers and eleven soldiers were wounded.  A 
fireman and two civilians also died during the gunfights.602  After his arrest, still defiant 
and inexplicably jubilant, Albizu Campos declared that the “nation was undergoing a 
                                                                                                                                                 
midnight line saw the approaching column, panicked and fired on both the soldiers and 
the prisoners.   
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glorious transfiguration.”603  Muñoz Marín instead talked of the “tragic and useless death 
of 31 Puerto Ricans.”  He was quick to link the revolt to the “island’s Communists” who 
had joined Albizu Campos and his diehard followers.  He warned the Nacionalistas that:  
"A government founded on votes cannot be destroyed."604  It is obvious that Muñoz 
Marín sought to link the revolt to what was perceived as the biggest enemies of western 
democracies; fascism and communism.     
The revolt also had an extra-insular chapter.  On November 1, 1950 Nacionalistas 
Oscar Collazo and Griselio Torresola, attempted to assassinate President Truman in front 
of the Blair House in Washington.  Torresola was killed in the attempt, and Collazo was 
seriously wounded and captured.  Pvt. Leslie Coffelt, a White House guard, was shot and 
killed by the assailants.  Two other White House guards were wounded during the 
gunfight.  During a press conference the next day, shrugging off the attacks and 
lamenting the unnecessary loss of life, President Truman reaffirmed his commitment to 
support the right of Puerto Ricans to write their own constitution.605   
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Governor Muñoz Marín passed his first test with flying colors as he quickly 
suppressed the revolt and succeeded in discrediting the Nationalists, especially after the 
assassination attempt on the president.  Furthermore, the local and continental press 
presented the insurrections as a local affair.  Even though martial law was declared- 
which entitled the White House and the continental U.S. Army troops in the Island and 
the Caribbean region to have a more prominent role in containing the insurrection- 
Muñoz Marín and the colonial administration made sure that only the Insular Police and 
the Puerto Rico National Guard participated in the affair.   The commander of the U.S. 
Army units in Puerto Rico and the Antilles, Brigadier General Edwin L. Sibert, turned his 
units’ ammunition over to the National Guard during the insurrection, but did not provide 
aid in any other way606   
The insurrection was in fact a Puerto Rican affair.  All of those involved, and all 
the dead and wounded were Puerto Ricans commanded by Puerto Ricans.  But besides 
the obvious nationality of the participants, the revolt was a Puerto Rican affair in the 
sense that it was the Nacionalistas’ last ditch effort to stop P.L. 600.  They had hoped to 
bring the international community on their side but succeeded in doing the opposite.  The 
revolt was suppressed quickly and with almost the same number of casualties on both 
sides (which showed restraint by the local authorities from abusing their power as they 
had overwhelming superiority and could have inflicted significantly more casualties on 
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the Nacionalistas).607    The outcome of the revolt served to prove the viability of a 
Puerto Rican autonomous state and to discredit those who arguing that the Island would 
descend into chaos if left in the hands of the Puerto Ricans.  Furthermore, locally, the 
insurrection made opposing P.L. 600 by peaceful means even more difficult.608  On 
November 3, Muñoz Marín made a personal radio call for all women to register for the 
coming referendum and the next day for all males.609  Far from blocking P.L. 600 the 
Nacionalistas had to deal with the fact that a record 779,695, including 157,393 new 
voters, registered themselves to vote in the coming referendum.610  The Nacionalistas’ 
military wing had been defeated, their leaders imprisoned, and their ideology popularly 
rejected.611 
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There was another battlefield in which Puerto Rican soldiers were engaged.  On 
June 25, 1950, war had broken out in Korea.  The North Korean People’s Army (NKPA) 
quickly overran most of the Korean peninsula, forcing South Korean and U.S. forces into 
a small perimeter in Pusan.612   The United States was caught unprepared to deal with the 
crisis as it had demobilized its huge military after World War II, and was suffering an 
acute shortage of manpower.613    Major General Edmond L. Almond, the commander of 
X Corps during the Korean War, believed that when war broke out, the U.S. Eighth 
                                                                                                                                                 
Pedro Albizu declared that he was being bombarded with radioactivity in his cell.  The 
Justice Department argued that he had premature senile dementia.  His trial took place 
between June 30 and August 5 of 1951.  He was sentenced to 12 to 54 years of 
confinement.  As Albizu Campos continued to complain of radiation a psychiatrist 
declared him insane and on September 30, 1953, Muñoz Marín conditionally pardoned 
him.  The government offer stated that he should pledge to not try to overthrow the 
government of Puerto Rico again.  He refused the offer but was declared mentally 
incompetent and set free nonetheless.  A year later he would again be sent to jail after 
Nacionalistas, Lolita Lebrón, Andrés Figueroa Cordero, Rafael Cancel Miranda and 
Irving Flores opened fire from the gallery of the House of Representatives in Congress 
wounding five congressmen.    On November 15, 1964, Albizu was again pardoned by 
Muñoz Marín. He died on April 21, 1965. He was buried in the Old San Juan Cemetery.  
See Díaz Soler, Puerto Rico, sus luchas por alcanzar  estabilidad económica, definición 
política  y afirmación cultural, 338-39; and Negroni, Historia militar de Puerto Rico, 
456-57. 
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Army, the only force the United States had available to thrust into combat, was just 40 
percent effective.614  The Eighth Army was not prepared physically or psychologically 
for battle in the summer of 1950. 615   This situation would change the role of Puerto Rican 
units within the U.S. military. 
Racial prejudice had kept Puerto Rican units from seeing combat during WWI 
and WWII.616  Major General Luis Raúl Esteves, a Puerto Rican West Pointer and 
adjutant general of Puerto Rico’s National Guard, declared in 1951:  “I was greatly 
discouraged [during WWII] when the blindness of the Federal Military Authorities in 
Puerto Rico denied us that opportunity [to fight].”   General Esteves thought that the 
Puerto Rican regiment in the U.S. Army, the 65th Infantry, was never trusted in combat 
because the federal authorities believed that “although the Puerto Ricans were valiant 
individuals, they could not be trusted in their collective abilities and valor.”617  This racial 
prejudice was part of mainstream tenets which, backed by pseudo science and popular 
writings, stated that the inferiority of colored races justified segregation at home and 
imperialism abroad- in essence, a dogma for domination and imperialism based on a 
racial hierarchy of power.  As part of the decolonization project, fighting in this war was 
in fact significant.  Not just because it was fought under the U.N. flag but because it 
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could very well undermine the basis for racial hierarchies of power- the inferiority of 
darker races- and prove to the Puerto Ricans themselves that they were not inferior to 
Continental Americans (specifically white people) or anybody else.  
On July 26, 1948, President Truman signed Executive Order 9981 “calling on the 
armed forces to provide equal treatment and opportunity for black servicemen.”618  In 
compliance with the executive order, the army reluctantly started to integrate its forces.  
Yet, as late as 1950, Puerto Ricans still did not receive any assignments that promised 
action.  As a result, they were not sent either to basic school or to the Army Command 
and Staff General Staff College, which trained company and field grade officers in the 
fundamentals and principles of higher command.619  The outbreak of the Korean War 
would bring a striking change to the mission of the Puerto Rican soldier in the U.S. 
military. 
A combination of factors convinced the military authorities to use Puerto Rican 
units, specifically the 65th Infantry Regiment, as first-line combat troops during the 
Korean War.  The gravity of the moment was the most important consideration.  There 
were two reasons why the U.S. Army did not assign the 65th Infantry to supporting roles 
during the Korean War as it had during the two world wars.  The first was the army’s 
lack of manpower.  The second was the regiment’s (and the Puerto Rico National 
Guard’s) performance during a training exercise, Operation Portrex, held recently off the 
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east coast of Puerto Rico and in Vieques Island.620  However, had there not been such an 
acute shortage of military personnel, Puerto Rican units might have had to fulfill the 
same supporting roles they had carried out in the previous wars.  
In Puerto Rico, the National Guard was activated; the 65th was mobilized, secretly 
ordered and embarked to Korea.  The Island’s participation in the Korean War was more 
significant than in previous wars since Puerto Ricans were entering this conflict very 
early, and they were going in as first-line combat troops.  Puerto Rican military officers, 
and many soldiers, saw the war as an opportunity to prove they were as good as or better 
than their Continental counterparts, and thus their participation became a fight for 
equality at the most personal level.   For political leaders in Puerto Rico, the outbreak of 
the Korean War gave them an opportunity to prove that their people were ready for self-
determination, that they had learned the ways of democracy and freedom, and were ready 
to fight in defense of what was popularly promoted as America’s values.  In a sense, 
military service would prove that Puerto Ricans were politically mature according to the 
parameters of the Western world.621  Consequently, the political leadership in Puerto 
Rico, regardless of partisan affiliation, actively supported the participation of tens of 
thousands of Puerto Ricans in the conflict.  
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Local leaders in Puerto Rico thought the war might also accelerate the 
decolonization process.  After all, the development of the political status of the Island and 
the role of Puerto Rico’s participation in the U. S. military had followed parallel paths.  
Moreover, P.L. 600, signed into law on July 30, called for Puerto Ricans to write their 
own constitution through a constitutional convention, and that document was to define 
both the status of the Island, and its relation to the United States.  The coming of the 
Korean War intensified the struggle between the political parties in Puerto Rico, which 
sought to promote their respective visions for the political development of the Island.  
Every legitimate political party had reasons to believe that supporting the war effort 
would promote their particular goals.  Consequently, all political factions, except the 
Nationalists, supported the war effort.       
Both the Estadistas and the Socialistas, who continued to propose ending the 
colonial regime through the full incorporation of Puerto Rico into the Union, supported 
participation in the war.  The leadership of these parties saw in the Korean War the 
opportunity to prove, not only to Americans but to Puerto Ricans themselves, that Puerto 
Rico was ready to join the United States on equal terms.  The rationale was that Puerto 
Ricans had learned the American ways and were willing to do their share for the Union, 
even if that meant dying in defense of the nation.  On the other hand, the 
Independentistas supported the war, because its leaders hoped to prove that if Puerto Rico 
became independent, it would not turn anti-American or Communist.  Just like their 
ideological antagonists, the leaders of the pro-independence movement also sought to 
demonstrate that Puerto Rico was politically responsible and mature.  Ironically, the 
champions of independence and the advocates of annexation pursued a common strategy 
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promoting their respective political goals through participation in the Korean War. The 
Nacionalistas orchestrated the only opposition to military participation.  But after their 
insurrection and the attempt to assassinate President Truman failed, Muñoz Marín 
succeeded in discrediting their movement.622  Consequently, the only voice opposing 
Puerto Rico’s cooperation with the U.S. military was silenced, and disgraced by its own 
deeds.   
The Populares had more reasons than anybody else to support Puerto Rican 
participation in the war. The military mobilization of tens of thousands of Puerto Ricans 
during WWII had provided economic relief and the means to launch the most 
comprehensive socio-economic restructuring in the Island’s history, and with local 
manpower and know-how.  WWII and military mobilization had in fact allowed the 
Populares to keep their promises of social justice.  Mobilizing the Puerto Ricans again 
carried the implicit promise that another generation of veterans could receive all the 
opportunities and benefits to which the WWII veterans were entitled, and use those 
benefits to join in the socio-economic restructuring of the Island.  For the Populares, 
however, who had moved to support a third way (the commonwealth), participating in the 
war also provided a battleground to test the viability of the new political status and 
promote its main discourse with regard to political and cultural identities.  Korea would 
be the arena where Puerto Ricans would show that Anglo-Saxon and Hispanic cultures 
(identified by the press and politicians as the two great cultures of the hemisphere) could 
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coexist, not just in one place, but in one body.623  Thus, throughout the war the PPD 
would vigorously call the Puerto Ricans to arms and use every opportunity to link the war 
effort with their own decolonization project, the socio-economic restructuring of the 
Island and the making of a new Puerto Rican for a modern Puerto Rico.  
Support for the war effort and the call to send Puerto Ricans to Korea started soon 
after the outbreak of hostilities.  In early August 1950, Fernós Isern, serving as Puerto 
Rico’s resident commissioner, declared in Washington that the Island was ready to field 
an army of 75,000 men to join the forces of the United Nations.624  Fernós Isern believed 
that if Washington asked for this volunteer force, the quota would be easily filled.  
Although Fernós Isern probably considered the economic situation in Puerto Rico when 
he calculated such a high number of volunteers, he did not mention it in his declarations.  
Instead, he stressed the patriotism of Puerto Ricans, asserting they would not fail to come 
to the defense of democracy and the nation.625   
Ordered to prepare the Puerto Rican 65th Infantry Regiment for duty in Korea, the 
commanding officer, Colonel William W. Harris, asked permission to recruit about 2,000 
volunteers to bring the regiment to 10 percent above war strength.  The Pentagon agreed, 
and Harris proceeded to solicit recruits over the radio and through the local press.  At 
first, Harris doubted he could collect all the men he needed but he soon was surprised to 
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find the streets and sidewalks leading to the recruiting and induction center at Fort 
Buchanan jammed with men waiting to get in.  In his memoirs, Harris stated, “We could 
have recruited fifty thousand if we needed that many.  We literally turned them away in 
droves after we reached our quota.”626  The fact that Governor Muñoz Marín publicly 
exhorted Puerto Rican youth to respond to the call of the 65th and to defend other 
peoples’ right to democracy because it was “our privilege...  …as our people has 
developed one of the best democracies in the world…” surely helped fill the ranks.627      
Any doubts Puerto Ricans may have had about joining the U. S. military were 
eased by the stance of the Island’s political parties.  The Puerto Rican press echoed the 
call to arms.  It might have done an even better job than the political leadership in linking 
participation in the U.S. military with decolonizing the Island.  Even as late as 1950, the 
press ran editorials in which the autonomous period of 1897 to 1898 stood as the 
minimum standard to which Puerto Rico should aspire.  Moreover, the press called for a 
greater degree of autonomy, which was to be accomplished by allowing Puerto Ricans to 
draft their own constitution.628  Waxing nostalgia for the Island’s brief taste of autonomy, 
a journalist wrote:  "Under the Autonomic Charter of 1897 we enjoyed a relative 
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sovereign life, until it was brusquely replaced by an intractable military regime as a 
consequence of the war of 1898."629  These calls for more autonomy appeared beside 
articles lauding the 65th Infantry (nicknamed the Borinqueneers in an English 
transliteration of Borinqueños), and citing the regiment as a possible catalyst in forging a 
new national identity.630   Moreover, these editorials ran alongside commentaries praising 
Muñoz Marín and Fernós Isern for their commitment to earn the right for the Puerto 
Ricans to write their own constitution.631   
The rationale behind these articles was that the Borinqueneers’ commitment to 
Korea as first-line troops “will help Puerto Ricans to come out of their complexes of 
insularism, and erase the marks of inferiority, which are the byproduct of hundreds of 
years of colonial type regimes."632  This statement adds another factor to explaining why 
support for military service, especially combat duty, was so widespread.  Fighting 
alongside U.S. and United Nation soldiers could help to prove, not only to Continental 
Americans but also to Puerto Ricans themselves, that they were the equals of their co-
citizens from the mainland.  Thus both the press and the political leadership thought it 
necessary to convince the people of Puerto Rico that they were ready to decide their own 
future.   
 On October 12, 1950, Puerto Rico learned that the 65th was fighting in Korea.  
Once the news got out, the day came to resemble a holiday more than anything else.  The 
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Island’s newspapers were full of stories, pictures of the 65th, and the ceremonies held 
previous to their departure.  The private sector joined the chorus with paid advertisements 
wishing the 65th a prompt return, and exhorting Puerto Rican soldiers to uphold the ideals 
of democracy and freedom.  In both leading newspapers, El Mundo and El Imparcial, the 
tone was the same.  The latter proclaimed, “As it was yet another symbol of the United 
Nations, under the American flag flies the flag of the 65th Infantry Regiment, this flag 
flies today in Korea.”633  The colors of the 65th came to represent not only the regiment, 
but Puerto Rico, “fighting alongside the peace-loving nations of the world.” 634    
Muñoz Marín, told the departing soldiers in a farewell speech published two 
months later in the press, that their fight was one for freedom and democracy.  He 
stressed that they were not fighting for a clichéd democracy but for a democracy that 
entailed a fight against “scarcity of economic means; scarcity of knowledge; scarcity of 
wisdom…’635   Governor Muñoz Marín had lost no time in linking participation in the 
war to the Populares’ platform which ever more openly prioritize economic freedom and 
social justice over political sovereignty.  The Island’s media also reminded Puerto Ricans 
what they were fighting for.  “This regiment (the 65th) goes again overseas in defense of 
our Nation’s freedom,” asserted El Imparcial.636  Another editorial in El Mundo stated, “ 
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It should bring great satisfaction to Puerto Rico that the military authorities in the United 
States found the 65th competent and qualified to actively take part in this vital endeavor 
that encompass so much for the Christian world.”637  Even before the 65th was mobilized, 
the press ran patriotic news and editorials that sought to comfort fathers and mothers 
"before the imminent probability that their sons will soon find themselves obliged to 
carry on their patriotic duties by participating in the conflict."638  Defense of the Nation, 
democracy, and freedom, mixed with patriotism and local pride in the narrative put 
forward by the Island’s press.   Surrounding this discourse was the call to decolonization 
and the creation of the new Puerto Rican.   
As political leaders and the press issued a call for fighting in defense of the 
Nation, Puerto Ricans responded en masse.  On several occasions the military authorities 
in Puerto Rico had to announce that they did not need more volunteers.  Even when the 
war had turned into a bloody stalemate and long lists of casualties appeared almost every 
week in the Puerto Rican press, the recruiting stations never lacked volunteers, at least 
not until 1953.639   Eventually, over 61,000 Puerto Ricans served in the U.S. Armed 
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Forces during the Korean War.  43,434 fought in the Korea, most of them with the 65th 
Infantry.  Of the latter group, 39,591 or roughly 91% were volunteers.640  Although 
                                                                                                                                                 
ninety-four Puerto Ricans became known on the Island and the Department of the Army 
decided to integrate the 65th that the number of volunteers declined.  During the Battle of 
Jackson Heights, which took place between October 25-29, 1952, men from A and F 
Companies left the battlefield without permission, and some of them refused to go back 
to the fight.  The next day, roughly thirty men from C Company also abandoned their 
positions.  Another damaging incident occurred on the night of November 3-4.  While on 
a combat mission, the 2nd Platoon, L Company, 3/65, divided into four groups, never 
reached its objective, and some of its soldiers refused to follow the platoon leader across 
a river. Thirty-nine more men were arrested, because of this incident.  On November 23, 
1952, a military court found First Lieutenant Juan E. Guzmán guilty of disobedience of 
orders and willful disobedience of the command to move his unit into combat.  The court 
sentenced Guzmán to five years of confinement, total forfeiture of pay, and dismissal 
from the armed forces.  On April 24, 1953, an army board of review upheld the decision 
of the court.  The rest of the men were tried in several mass trials between December 
1952 and January 1953. They were found guilty of willful disobedience of a superior 
officer’s command to return to a forward position, and/or of misbehavior before the 
enemy by running away. The sentences ranged between six-month to eleven years of 
confinement.  The sentences also included total forfeiture of pay and benefits, and 
dishonorable discharges.  Though the sentences were upheld by a military review in1953, 
the Secretary of Defense (under pressure from Puerto Rican groups and the Governor) 
later annulled them and the soldiers were returned to duty and assigned to other 
regiments.  The trials led to the integration of the 65th with Continental troops- a policy 
much resisted in the Island.  For a detailed account of the events leading to the court 
martial and of the trials themselves see, Harry Franqui-Rivera, “Hold to the Last Man,” 
62-89, “The Last of the Borinqueneers,”90-118, “Separate and Unequal,” 120-153 in 
Franqui-Rivera, Glory and Shame: The Ordeal of the Puerto Rican 65th U.S. Infantry 
Regiment During the Korean War.   
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Puerto Rico’s poor economic situation was partially responsible for a high enrollment 
during peacetime, other reasons compelled Puerto Ricans to join and then stay in the U.S. 
military.  Soldiers killed in action (KIA) received full military burials in Puerto Rico, 
some of which the governor attended.  The wounded (WIA) were welcomed home as 
heroes.  Those facts may explain why Puerto Rico sustained a high enlistment ratio, 
notwithstanding a high casualty rate among its troops.  Those men were praised as heroes 
because they died or were maimed defending the Nation.   
Puerto Rican leaders, the press, and the common folk continued to show their 
support for the war effort, and especially for the 65th’s soldiers throughout the conflict.  
On May 21, 1951, scarcely two weeks before the people of Puerto Rico voted to accept 
the provisions of P.L.600, roughly 300 hundred veterans of the 65th arrived in San Juan.  
This group was the first contingent of Puerto Ricans to finish their tour of duty under the 
U.S. Army’s rotation system.  They received an extremely warm welcome from both the 
leaders and the people of Puerto Rico.  The Governor declared the day a national holiday 
and hosted a ceremony to honor the returning “heroes and their families.”  Even a comic 
strip in a local newspaper followed the exploits of the Puerto Rican heroes.641  Avenues 
and plazas were named in honor of the regiment, while monuments went up to 
commemorate the dead.  The coat of arms of the 65th was painted on all the public buses 
in the capital, and on the sides of train engines and freight and passenger carts.  Groups of 
parents collected and sent tons of packages, containing Puerto Rican food, music, letters, 
and gifts to the Puerto Rican soldiers.  The private sector also showed its support.  
Serrallés, Inc., a Puerto Rican distillery, sent a thousand cases of rum.  Newspapers sent 
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free copies to Korea for distribution to the soldiers.  Lest the Puerto Rican soldiers in 
Korea forget what they were fighting for, Muñoz Marín had his speeches taped and sent 
to them.   
Some of the farewell messages from soldiers of the 65th embarking for Korea 
support Fernós Isern’s presumption that Puerto Ricans would respond patriotically to the 
call to arms.  “We will fight for our motherland until victory is achieved,” wrote one 
departing soldier.  “I will fight for the motherland until we secure victory and thus enjoy 
eternal peace and democracy,” vowed another Borinqueneer.642  Though at first glance 
these statements may read as the usual discourse of soldiers yet to see battle, it would be 
wise to consider the deep implications of such comments.  First they referred to Puerto 
Rico when talking about the motherland (usually patria or madre patria) but to the U.S. 
when referring to the Nation.  In a very direct way they were actually accepting the 
defense the American nation as their duty as Puerto Ricans.  Secondly; fighting in the 
war, as part of the United States military and the United Nations command, was 
perceived as a way to secure democracy and freedom at home, which went along with the 
Populares’ new ideology.   
That the leading newspapers handpicked the statements that more closely 
resembled the developing ideology behind the commonwealth formula is a possibility but 
it is more likely that Muñoz Marín and the Populares had started to adopt the views of 
the peasants and workers turned soldiers.  After all, in his previous three campaigns 
Muñoz Marín had to convince his constituents that social justice and not independence 
was his party’s priority.   Furthermore, the fact that these two newspapers, which more 
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often than not were at odds with Muñoz Marín, chose to present this narrative (which 
clearly benefitted the Populares’ plans) attests to the growing support for the 
commonwealth project.   
Puerto Ricans had responded to the call to arms, both by fighting and by 
supporting the Island’s fighting men.  More important, they had responded to a call to 
defend the United States, reaffirming that they considered themselves part of it.  But the 
call to arms also emphasized the attributes of Puerto Rico and its Anteamerican heritage.  
By responding to this call, Puerto Ricans evidenced their complex identities which allow 
them to be Puerto Ricans and Americans simultaneously and interchangeably, and to 
negotiate and synthesize cultural and political identities.  This in fact became the essence 
of the Commonwealth formula in its early days.  Thus, the Puerto Rican soldiers who 
went to fight in Korea, especially with the 65th Infantry, became national icons and the 
incarnation and champions of the commonwealth’s philosophical matrix.  These soldiers 
became an energizing element in the fight for decolonization.  Major General, Luis Raúl 
Esteves, the adjutant general of Puerto Rico’s National Guard, summarized the 
regiment’s initial service in Korea in an open letter to the men of the 65th.  He told the 
Borinqueneers: “With your conduct in Korea, you are destroying the discrimination that 
hurt us so much during the war [World War II]; you are writing a glorious page in our 
history . . . Puerto Rico is proud of you.”643   
By linking the Korean War and the active participation of the Puerto Rican soldier 
to the project of political decolonization, the PPD ensured the acceptance of P.L. 600.  
Furthermore, Muñoz Marín soon equated the battles being fought in Korea to those being 
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fought at home.  On May 28, 1951 he held a ceremony honoring the guardsmen, 
policemen, and firemen who fought the nationalist insurrection.  Addressing those about 
to be awarded medals for their service during the insurrection, Muñoz Marín declared 
that just as their brothers in Korea were doing, they had put “their lives between the 
assailants of freedom and peace and the people of Puerto Rico.”   The Nacionalistas, he 
argued, believed that they had the right to “impose their views on the people by violent 
means” and could not respect the will of the people as expressed through the electoral 
process.644  The Nacionalistas had hoped to derail the referendum and the Populares’ 
project of decolonization.  Ironically, their actions provided the Populares with the 
opportunity to link their project to local and global decolonization and democracy.    
On June 4, 1951, the people of Puerto Rico voted by a large majority to accept the 
provisions of P.L. 600.645 Following the referendum, the Puerto Ricans elected delegates 
to a constitutional convention on August 27.  The constitutional convention, led by 
Fernós Isern, convened in San Juan on September 17, 1951, and concluded its 
deliberations on February 6, 1952.  The constitution it adopted was submitted to the 
people of Puerto Rico in a referendum on March 3, 1952, and was passed by an 
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overwhelming majority.646  On April 22, 1952, in a special message, Truman 
recommended that Congress granted early approval of the constitution drafted by the 
convention and argued that such action would be evidence of the United States’ 
adherence to “the principle of self-determination and its devotion to the ideals of freedom 
and democracy.”647  The constitution was approved by Congress on H.J. Res. 430, and 
signed into law by the President on July 3, 1952.  Upon signing the constitution Truman 
reiterated the importance of the event for the free world.648  
 After the acceptance by the constitutional convention of the conditions of 
approval and the issuance of a proclamation by Governor Muñoz Marín, the Constitution 
of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico became effective on July 25, 1952, exactly fifty-
four years after the American invasion.  The date could not have been more symbolic, for 
the constitution was supposed to erase all traces of colonialism, including the anniversary 
of the Island becoming and American colony.  Many Continental politicians thought that 
the establishment of the Commonwealth showed that the United States was not only 
“disposed to increase the well being of Puerto Rican fellow citizens but was willing to 
allow them to define for themselves the relationship they would establish with the federal 
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union.”649    Truman remarked that the “American people should take special pride in the 
fact that the constitution was the product of the people of Puerto Rico.”650   These 
comments are representative of how important it was for the United States to prove its 
adherence to the principles of self-determination.  Soon afterwards, Muñoz Marín asked 
President Truman to stop submitting annual reports on Puerto Rico to the United Nations, 
a decision which led the international organization to remove the Island from the list of 
non-self-governing territories on November 27, 1953.651   According to both the Puerto 
Rican and the U.S. government, the Island had ceased to be a colony, and the U.N. had 
certified the end of the United States as a colonial power. 
  According to its preface, the new constitution was intended to promote the 
“coexistence in Puerto Rico of the two great cultures [Anglo-Saxon and Hispanic] of the 
American Hemisphere.”652  Puerto Rican soldiers fighting in Korea thought they were 
doing just that.  A copy of the constitution was sent to Korea before ratification along 
with a number of Puerto Rican flags.  One soldier commented, “We know and understand 
the things we are fighting for, but it is better to have a document of our own, stated in the 
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words of our people.” 653    Another Borinqueeneer added, “Now we have two 
Constitutions to defend.”654  It is significant that two corporals made these comments in 
1952, which means that they were not part of the 65th Infantry’s old guard but volunteers 
who joined the army after the war broke out.  They enlisted to defend the nation to which 
they felt they belonged, but they were also proud of having a document expressing the 
will of the Puerto Rican people.   
On August 13, 1952, exploding Chinese artillery rounds and the strains of the 
Puerto Rican national anthem, La Borinqueña, set the mood as a group of Puerto Rican 
soldiers proudly raised their homeland's flag beside the Stars and Stripes on a 
mountainous battlefield in South Korea.655  The soldiers commemorated the creation of 
the Estado Libre Asociado after half a century of direct U.S. colonial rule.  Colonel Juan 
César Cordero, the first Puerto Rican commander of the 65th U.S. Infantry Regiment, felt 
that all Puerto Ricans in the U.S. military, especially those in his regiment, had 
contributed more than their fair share to the creation of the commonwealth.   Addressing 
the troops in Spanish, Cordero stated:  “Today more than ever, we the Puerto Ricans have 
motives to feel highly proud of our citizenship.  Today we ceased to be group citizens 
taken by the hand and led by the rest of our co-citizens from the North.”  Cordero told his 
men that it was important that they continue to be American citizens, but he also 
emphasized that “we too have a constitution that emanates exclusively from our own 
will.”  He added, lest anybody forget how they had obtained their constitution, “Patiently 
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but armed with faith in the great democratic attitudes of our great nation, we hoped for 
the day in which, not only we were allowed to enjoy our individual freedom and our 
rights as individuals citizens, but also to determine our own destiny.”656  Cordero was 
mistaken in one respect.  The Puerto Rican soldier had not only waited, he had fought for 
such status and became instrumental in the battle for psychological, political, and socio-
economic decolonization.   The Puerto Rican soldier advanced the decolonization process 
by proving to Puerto Ricans that they were the equals of their “co-citizens of the North.”   
Cordero expressed the complex paradigm of Puerto Rican national identities that 
August 13 in Korea:  “For fifty-four years we, the Puerto Ricans, have lived under the 
political tutelage of our co-citizens of the North.  We have assimilated their entrepreneur 
spirit and industrial skills; and fed our soul and thoughts with the most sacred of men’s 
attributes: their admiration and respect for freedom, justice and equality.”  Puerto Ricans, 
in Cordero’s opinion, had assimilated and embraced what the United States represented, 
but without ceasing to be Puerto Ricans or “without adulterating our Hispanic heritage, 
nor have we soiled it with artificial trends of Sajonic assimilation: and without relegating 
our Hispanic culture, sentiments and traditions, which we conserve pure, like the most 
precious legacy of our gallant and noble ancestors.”657  
 Nevertheless, Puerto Ricans had assimilated trends from American culture.  It 
would have been impossible not to do so after half a century of U.S. rule and after going 
through the institutions set by the metropolis to Americanize its new subjects.  But the 
Puerto Ricans did not renounce their Anteamerican heritage but fused it with that of the 
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newcomers.  In the process, a new nationality identity slowly but surely emerged, finally 
becoming hegemonic during the Korean War.  The Puerto Rican soldier was instrumental 
in making the new national identity hegemonic.   The cultural and the political, the 
insular and the continental, the Puerto Rican and the American could, according to the 
soldiers’ and politicians’ discourse, coexist and strengthen each other.  The words of two 
Puerto Rican POWs may express this better.  Released after two years of imprisonment in 
a Chinese camp, Corporal Fernando Arroyo told a correspondent of the Pacific Stars & 
Stripes, “They (the Chinese) often tell me about big trouble and revolution in Puerto Rico 
because American [sic] exploits masses.  I tell them I am American and they are liars.”  
Master Sergeant Enrique R. Fernández, Arroyo’s prison mate, added: “We may come 
from Puerto Rico and speak a different language but the communists could not take away 
from us one thing, we are Americans.”658 
As discussed earlier, the historical juncture of 1898 gave way to the development 
of very complex national identities in Puerto Rico.  This process was furthered by the 
U.S. presence and active campaigns to Americanize the natives on the Island, but more 
importantly, by the active support given by Puerto Rico’s political leadership to 
cooperate militarily with the metropolis.  This, many thought, would bring about the 
decolonization of the Island, either by becoming a state of the union or an independent 
republic.  Paradoxically, military participation eventually made it easier for Puerto Ricans 
to embrace an identity that allowed them to negotiate between being Americans and 
Puerto Ricans or to be both simultaneously and hence, to embrace the Commonwealth 
status.  
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A heavy burden was placed on the Puerto Ricans during the Korean War because 
of the strong support of the war effort championed by political leaders and the press.  
Puerto Rico hailed the soldiers of the 65th as heroes, even before they reached Korea.  
Editorials talked about the role of the Puerto Rican soldier as a catalyst for forging a new 
modern Puerto Rican nationality.659  Military participation was equated with patriotic 
duty and the defense of the nation, and the men of the 65th were singled out as the 
quintessential example of what it meant to be Puerto Rican.  Consequently, the Puerto 
Rican community felt obliged to either volunteer for military service or actively support 
the war effort on the home front.  In short, many Puerto Ricans came to believe their duty 
to defend the American nation. 
Since the very early days of U.S. domination over the Island, politicians and the 
press sought to hasten the decolonization process by using colonial instruments, and in 
this case the metropolis’ military.  In the end, however, a midpoint was chosen when it 
became obvious that military participation had not moved Puerto Ricans toward either 
full assimilation or full rejection of American culture and values.  If the project of nation 
building through military service had passed from metropolitan to Creole control during 
WWII, during the Korean War such project became popularized.  As peasants and urban 
workers continued to join in mass the armies of the metropolis and to support the 
Populares’ project of social justice and the economic restructuring of the Island, their 
views with respect to identity, political and cultural, became hegemonic.  Unable to 
convince his constituency of the viability of independence, incapable of winning 
elections without the support of the masses, and aware of the significance of military 
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service (and federal aid and support) for the reconstruction of the socio-economic 
structures in the Island, Muñoz Marín and the Populares revived and championed a 
political status which they thought offered the space for development and growth- 
politically, culturally, socially and economically speaking.  When the Puerto Rican 
soldier became the embodiment of the Commonwealth formula, the political leaders 
involved in its design were in fact responding to the peasants and urban worker’s 
complex identities as reflected and empowered by their military service.  Among other 
things, their national identities compelled them to defend the “American Nation” to show 
their Puertorriqueñidad.   As such, the new status, at least for the time being, offered a 
space where most Puerto Ricans could feel comfortable.   
Former Governor of Puerto Rico, Rexford G. Tugwell predicted in 1958; 
 The [Commonwealth] Constitution might prove so satisfactory that it would  
 arrest furthest progress towards union, at least temporarily, and would also make  
 it impossible for Muñoz’s successors to press farther towards independence.660   
 The constitution indeed proved satisfactory to both American politicians and 
Puerto Ricans.  The United States was able to shield itself against charges of colonialism 
and to proclaim itself as the true champion of the free world.  In late 1952, the 
government of Puerto Rico asked President Truman to stop presenting annual reports on 
Puerto Rico before the United Nations, which led the international organization to 
remove the Island from the list of non-self-governing territories on November 27, 
1953.661  For a while, Puerto Rico became a miracle, a window for the underdeveloped 
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world to see what could be accomplished by aligning itself with the United States.  For 
Puerto Ricans the Estado Libre Asociado offered a high degree of sovereignty that few 
thought possible at the time while retaining its relation to the United States.  It also 
brought a respite to a people that had been fighting for a change in their colonial status 
for over fifty years.  Both Puerto Ricans and Americans grew comfortable with the 
Commonwealth, perhaps too comfortable, and over fifty years later the Island still has the 
same political status.662  
Epilogue: 
Those Puerto Rican soldiers, who celebrated the creation of the Commonwealth 
by raising the now legal Puerto Rican flag and by playing the national anthem in a 
forgotten hill in Korea, made another symbolic contribution to the emerging nation.  The 
Puerto Rican danza, "La Borinqueña", composed in 1867 as a Creole version of the 
European waltz and quickly banned by the Spanish authorities, had been for a long time 
the unofficial anthem of the Island.  In 1922, the director of the 65th regimental band 
adapted “La Borinqueña” to be used as the regiment’s march.   In July 24, 1952 that 
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the PPD until the elections of 1976, when the political system in the Island evolved into a 
two- party system.  All the while, the Independentistas continued their decline becoming 
a permanent minority.  See Bayrón Toro, Elecciones y partidos políticos de Puerto Rico, 
216-17, 225-28, 231-35, 245-252, 261-69.   
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version became the official anthem of the Estado Libre Asociado de Puerto Rico.  
Unbeknownst to these soldiers, their regiment, el sesenta y cinco had safeguarded that 
expression of Puertoricaness. 
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CONCLUSION 
Usually, when metropolitan powers and empires engage in transforming the 
socio-economic and political structures of the colonies or territories under their sphere of 
power, they call these projects “nation building” when in fact they are engaging primarily 
in “state building”.  Their efforts are better described as state-building because they focus 
on creating or reimagining the public and private infrastructures that should allow for a 
territory or country to operate according to the rules set by the hegemonic world power or 
coalition, which are considered as modern and thus desirable.  Among these structures 
that make a country or territory “modern” are; sanitary-health facilities, a bank system 
tied to western models, a public education system, political and judicial institutions that 
resembles that of the dominant power, and of course, a professional military.   
These institutions in fact serve to change the self-perception ( if not the loyalties) 
of individuals and native groups in such territories, and since it is the metropolis’ desire 
to do so, they are indeed engaging in nation building via state or institution building.  
Hence, metropolitan powers do engage in “nation building” but only because the 
structures they built or change in the colonies to create a state more in tune with the 
metropolis, ultimately alters the socio-cultural identities of  the colonial subjects and their 
national identities. 
It is worth considering that the metropolis is not really hegemonic in deciding 
what the colonial subjects are to become.  Local realities and idiosyncrasies more often 
than not alter the metropolis’ designs.  Institutions have to be adapted to such things as 
climate and geography, and more importantly, to cultural differences.  Moreover, as elite 
colonial groups become engaged in the nation building process (an inevitable process 
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since the metropolis needs them to secure the loyalty of the colonial masses)663 the 
metropolis is forced to negotiate with pre-metropolis or emerging colonial elites with 
regard to the socio-economic and political structures of the colony.   Laura Briggs has 
argued that  "…internal power relations of gender, race, class, age, and so on, can be 
worked out through the structure of colonialism (what structures are untouched by it) 
without being in any meaningful sense determined by them."664  I do agree with the first 
premise.  Even within colonial structures there is space to negotiate internal power 
relations, but I would add that these colonial institutions can also be turned around to 
resist the metropolis.  Furthermore, power relations are inevitably influenced by the 
metropolitan structures, but the colonial subjects have a say in altering the nature of these 
institutions too.  
To some extent the degree of colonial or criollo engagement with the 
metropolitan structures determines how liberal or at least how responsive to the colonial 
subjects’ needs the metropolitan policies towards its colony are.  The degree of criollo 
participation in state and nation building projects is in itself influenced by the needs of 
the metropolis.  And, during periods of crisis, metropolitan-colonial negotiations tend to 
                                                 
663Benedict Anderson has argued that vernacular languages, which had been 
chosen as language-of-states based on unselfconscious inheritance or convenience 
became tools to unify (or Russify) ethnically diverse empires.  In this regard German, 
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provide an army of indigenous clerks to run the colonies. Benedict Anderson, Imagined 
Communities, 86, 109-10. 
 
664
 Laura Briggs, Reproducing Empire, Race, Sex Science, and U.S. Imperialism 
in Puerto Rico, (Berkley, Los Angeles, and London: University of California Press, 
2002), 198. 
314 
 
accelerate. The need to rely on local elites to command the support of the colonial masses 
gradually leads to the Creolization of the institutions and projects set by the metropolis to 
control or assimilate their subjects.  When this happens, there is a chance that the nation 
building project of the metropolis falls into the hands of a native elite.  Depending on the 
nature of the native coalitions gaining control over these projects, there is also the 
possibility that eventually such projects and the institutions devised to carry them out, 
become popularized and that a very pluralistic polity supported by flexible and open 
national identities becomes hegemonic.     
As per our case, the more that Spain was able to exclude those born in Puerto 
Rico from the colonial administration and the military, the more repressive it became. As 
discussed in chapter one, the Spanish colonial administration tried since the early 
nineteenth century to restrain the power of colonial elites by reducing the presence of 
those born in the Island in the colonial militias.  However, it was not until the once vast 
Spanish Empire was reduced to Cuba, Puerto Rico, the Philippines and some smaller 
possessions, that the Spaniards were able to concentrate on closing all avenues to 
enfranchisement, especially the military, to los hijos de este país.  After the failed 
insurrection of Lares in 1868 and the final exclusion of the Puerto Ricans from the 
military, the liberal criollo political leadership moved towards autonomismo while the 
exiled leadership joined revolutionary juntas in the United States and continued to 
advocate for independence.   By the dawn of Spanish control over the Island, the Iberian 
metropolis also tried to keep the Island by passing the Carta Autonomica  de 1897, but 
this gesture came to late and only placated the criollo political elite as it did not change 
the daily dynamics in Puerto Rico.   
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Though the Spaniards were able to quench political insurrection until they finally 
lost the Island to the U.S., they had alienated themselves from the general population 
fueling the emergence of a distinct Puerto Rican national identity.  As a matter of fact, 
when the U.S. troops landed in Puerto Rico in 1898 the Spaniards could not rely on the 
loyalty of the islanders.  Four hundred years of history and dominance, however, are hard 
to erase.  The natives of Puerto Rico probably started to develop distinct national 
identities during the last third of the nineteenth century, and while the vast majority felt 
no loyalty towards Spain, they still retain a high degree of cultural affinity.    
Under United States’ rule, access to military institutions for the “hijos de este 
país” was reestablished while political participation- to a certain degree- was opened to 
the masses.  Soon after the U.S. seizure of the Island, Puerto Ricans started to replace 
U.S. continental soldiers.  From the beginning the new insular soldiers became elements 
of the United States Army tightly controlled by the American colonial administration.   
Additionally, the new metropolis gradually allowed for a higher degree of political 
participation eventually creating the space for mass electoral enfranchisement.  These two 
apparently disconnected trends facilitated the transfer of sovereignty over the Island from 
Spain to the United States, and, more importantly, they transformed the character of 
Puerto Rican nationalities.   The inclusion of Puerto Ricans in the armed forces of the 
new metropolis, and mass political mobilization, especially of the rural sectors, gradually 
led towards competing national identities.   
The U.S. embarked in a comprehensive build up of the public education system, 
(which was intended to Americanize and modernize the inhabitants of the Island 
according to the metropolis’ standards), and launched massive sanitary and relief 
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campaigns.  Although cultural affinity might have been absent between Puerto Ricans 
and Americans in 1898, the metropolis’ control of the education system allowed for the 
projection of American material superiority disguised as cultural supremacy.  
Furthermore, simultaneous sanitary and relief campaigns allowed for positive interaction 
between the new metropolis and its colonial subjects.  A special relation started to 
emerge between the military and Puerto Rico’s population as military doctors and 
engineers combed the mountains and towns of the Island building sanitary facilities, 
roads, and schools and launched massive health and relief campaigns.   
The fact that the military institutions, the political arena, and the public school 
system were opened to previously disenfranchised groups began to profoundly alter the 
islander’s national identities.  Participation in U.S. institutions provided unifying 
experiences for the Puerto Rican masses which allowed for the strengthening of their 
national identity but with an American touch.  Public schools offered a homogenized pro-
metropolis oriented experience for hundreds of thousands of Puerto Ricans while the 
opening of the U.S. military to groups previously excluded from it and other sectors of 
Puerto Rico’s society conferred these groups with a sense of inclusion.  Access to 
education and military positions also offered an opportunity for mobility and the chance 
to overthrow old socio-economic hierarchies, a phenomenon that led to the creation of 
upwardly mobile classes and neo-elites who owed their wellbeing and their political 
allegiance to the new metropolis.   
The early American attempts to create a new Puerto Rican via military service- 
which were supported by the criollo elite, including supporters of independence- were 
curtailed by the limited scope of the project.  The small size of the United Sates military 
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apparatus at the beginning of the twentieth century, limited the size of the military in 
Puerto Rico and its effect on the population.  Still, the re-mobilization of the Puerto 
Ricans began during the first years of U.S. rule as Puerto Ricans came to wear U.S. Army 
uniforms and replaced Continental troops garrisoning the Island.   
It was not, however, until the First World War, when over 18,000 Puerto Ricans 
served in the U.S. armed forces, that the U.S. had to heavily rely on the criollo elites to 
mobilize militarily and lead thousands of Puerto Ricans.  The chance could have not 
come at a better time for Puerto Rican politicians who had started to aggressively 
challenge colonial policies.  The First World War provided the grounds to retry the 
projects of Americanization and modernization via military service at levels previously 
unimaginable and with more players involved.   
The coming of the war temporarily brought to power the staunchly pro-American 
Republicanos who were the first to embrace President Wilson’s 100 percent 
Americanism discourse, and to tie it to their own political goal of federated statehood.  
By the war’s end, however, by turning President Wilson’s promise of ending the 
hyphenations in the American nation into a call for a “New Americanism” that promoted 
creating a new Puerto Rican out of Hispanic gallantry and Anglo-Saxon industrialism, the 
autonomistas within Unión had found an image they could use to sell as a third way, the 
Libre Asociación, to the general population.  This was in essence a return to Eugenio 
Maria de Hostos and Rosendo Matienzo Cintron’s early idea of Americanizing the Puerto 
Rican, which for them meant creating a modern political individual without losing the 
essence of Puertorriqueñismo,665 only this time, economic modernization superseded 
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political modernization.  The autonomistas had found a new philosophy and an agent to 
incarnate it.  There could be a space for the Anglo-Saxon and Hispanic cultures to 
coexist.  The Jíbaro would be that new man and Puerto Rico that new space.   
After the Armistice, however, the Jíbaro soldiers were quickly demobilized and 
returned to the hills and coastal valleys.  Neither the metropolis nor the colonial 
administration created vocational or educational projects to facilitate these soldiers’ 
readjustment into civilian society. The promises of a new Jíbaro, integrated into the 
economy as its driving force, and as the “new teachers of freedom and democracy,” 
remained unfulfilled.   The autonomistas of the 1920s were not able to fully exploit or 
develop their new popular philosophy, but the seed had been planted for the generation 
coming of age during the war, and they would retake this narrative decades later.    
The imposition of U.S. citizenship previous to U.S. entry into the war, the mass 
participation of Puerto Ricans in the U.S. military, the newly created Puerto Rico 
National Guard, and the willing support of the newly elected Puerto Rican legislature for 
the war effort, temporarily cemented U.S. control over the Island, and more importantly, 
over the islanders’ loyalty to the metropolis.  As some supporters of the metropolis 
argued during the war years, the unwillingness or inability of the vast majority of the 
Puerto Ricans to resist becoming American citizens and their determination to participate 
in the war reflected the impact that the institutions of the new metropolis had had on the 
Puerto Ricans.  That same institutional influence would lead the Puerto Ricans to expect, 
if not equality, at least  more political and socioeconomic opportunities.     
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The mass mobilization of the Puerto Rican peasantry and urban workers, and the 
initial enthusiasm shown by the inductees hid the fact that control over the military 
apparatus in the Island was no longer the exclusive prerogative of the American colonial 
administrators.  The traditional and emerging criollo elites, as well as the professional 
classes, had to be called upon to train and lead the massive army of peasants soldiering in 
the Island.  Out of sheer necessity, the metropolis broadly opened the officer’s corps to 
los hijos de este país providing in the process the tools for the local elites and emerging 
professional classes to attain and consolidate political power.   
criollo leaders, which for different reasons and with different goals in mind 
supported the war effort, by the war’s end, had succeeded in wresting exclusive control 
over the nation-building project via military service from the metropolitan authorities.  
The “Creolization” of both the military and the project of nation-building had begun.  
This situation, even if not immediately apparent in the post-war years, would eventually 
put the local elites in a better political position than they had been before the WWI.  
Oblivious to the transformation occurring in Puerto Rico, the metropolis was slow to 
respond to these challenges, and no major political changes would take place after 1917 
until yet another war, the Second World War rekindled the strategic importance of the 
Island. 
Before the outbreak of the Second World War Puerto Rico experienced natural 
disasters, the Great Depression, and the end of political stability.  The emergence of the 
Nationalist Party as a radical force under the leadership of Pedro Albizu Campos is one 
of the most striking characteristics of this period.   Albizu Campos, in Anderson’s jargon, 
was one of many colonial subjects who discovered the “limit of their inward ascension” 
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during his educational pilgrimage to the metropolis.  According to Anderson, awareness 
of their exclusion from the metropolitan power circles would become the basis for the 
colonial subjects to see themselves as “nationals” separate from the metropolis.666   
Initially staunchly pro-American, Albizu Campos would eventually lead his followers in 
a virulent anti-U.S. campaign in an attempt to create the Republic of Puerto Rico.  The 
Nationalists of the 1930s resorted to underlining the differences between Continental 
Americans and Puerto Ricans while emphasizing Hispanic traditions.  Recognizing the 
relevance of military traditions in the Island and the impact that military institutions were 
having on the population, the Nacionalistas created their own paramilitary units.    
The Nacionalistas’ failure to win the support of a sizeable portion of the 
population was also a rejection of their iconography and their emphasis on Spanish 
traditions.  After all, at the time, the majority of Puerto Ricans had been born under U.S. 
sovereignty, and those lucky enough to have been schooled had been exposed to a 
curriculum based on the New England public school model.  The Nationalist’s nostalgic 
discovery of the “Hispanic” past was an alien concept to the Puerto Rican masses of the 
1930s, except for the elites who still traced their lineage to the Peninsula.  Moreover, for 
all means and purposes, the Nacionalista “rediscovery” of the Island’s Hispanic past was 
incongruent with the drive towards progress and a modern Puerto Rico.  Both progress 
and modernization, and hints at industrialization, were at the core of federal efforts to 
improve Puerto Rico’s socio-economic condition.  The Nacionalistas could not compete 
with the metropolis’ material superiority which implied a vague promise of a better 
future.   Hence, the combination of violent acts, the lack of an alternative path forward, 
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the disconnection with the masses socio-economic realities, and the emphasis in Spanish 
tradition were as responsible for the Nacionalistas’ demise in the 1930s as was political 
persecution.   
Old metropolitan ideas regarding the impact of military training on Puerto Rico’s 
social and economic structures resurfaced during the Second World War.667  This was not 
a new theory.  Immediately after the 1898 invasion  and during WWI, military service 
had been consider as a builder of character and national identity and as a way to remake 
the Puerto Ricans in the Continental’s image.  But even in WWI, the metropolis’ nation-
building project, which heavily relied on modernizing the Puerto Rican via military 
service, had started to escape the hands of the metropolitan administrators.  History 
repeated itself during WWII as the plans of the metropolis- including type, size, and 
length of mobilization had to contend with an empowered Puerto Rican senate led by 
such a popular and skillful politician as Muñoz Marín.  Moreover, Muñoz Marín worked 
incessantly to make the Puerto Rican soldier an integral part of the socio-economic 
restructuring of the Island.   
By the end of the war, control of the nation and state-building project via military 
service was firmly in the Populares’ hands.  The U.S. military had envisioned service as 
a way to build a new Puerto Rican and a new Puerto Rico, as early as 1898- and most 
certainly during WWI.  This project, however, came to bear fruit when it was 
appropriated by Puerto Ricans.  Nonetheless, the military in Puerto Rico, be it the 
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National Guard or the regular Army units, remained part of the United States military and 
depended entirely of federal funds to function.  This could only allow for a third path as 
the Populares continue to employ the military for nation and state building.    The 
military relevance of the Island, the immense size of the U.S. military and the Puerto 
Rican contingent (with over 65,000 islanders serving in the U.S. armed forces), allowed 
for the Creolization of the military and of the agencies in charge of reconstructing the 
socio-economic structures of the Island.  Very tellingly, Puerto Rican military officers 
came to preside over many of these agencies and openly supported Muñoz Marín and the 
reconstruction effort. 
The first mobilization of the Puerto Ricans during WWII was more political in 
nature than military, and it happened in 1940 with the Populares first electoral victory.  
The second mobilization of the Puerto Ricans was, in fact, military as the Island became 
an integral part of the U.S. war effort and Puerto Ricans were called to arms.  This effort 
had strong economic impact in terms of federal monies transferred to Puerto Rico and 
unemployment relief.   The third mobilization was social in nature as the Puerto Rican 
soldiers moved from the fields to the classrooms and put to good use the skills learned 
while in the military and the benefits to which they were entitled through the G.I. Bill of 
1944.  WWII ended with the Island moving towards socio-economic restructuring very 
rapidly and with LMM beginning to accept the third way, the commonwealth.   
It was the Jíbaro who started to convince politicians of the third way, a hybridism 
that allowed for a political identity and a cultural one to coexist.  Muñoz Marín’s change 
of heart with regard to independence was thus Jíbaro inspired and popular in nature.  
Initially a tactical decision born out of the need of securing the vote of the peasantry and 
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urban workers which did not see independence as a solution to their everyday problems, 
the idea that the “Status no está en issue” became a kind of end in itself as political 
decolonization took a backseat and socio-economic decolonization became imperative.  
Many have branded this change as a sellout or the cooptation of the people’s will, but in 
fact Muñoz Marín was responding to the masses’ needs and will, which at this historical 
junction coincided with one of the greatest social reconfigurations in U.S. and Puerto 
Rican history.  When WWII ended and during the immediate post war years, the Island 
moved rapidly to achieve the socio-economic change envisioned by Muñoz Marín and 
the Populares.    
Benedict Anderson has argued that a final wave of nationalism occurred during 
the post war era, especially in Asia and Africa and that it was directly linked to the those 
colonial subjects who made the  educational peregrination to the metropolis and found 
out they belong to another “family”.  These nationalist movements seeking political 
independence were led by “lonely bilingual intelligentsias unattached to sturdy local 
bourgeois,” which read another language.  This intelligentsia, however, was able to 
“bypass print in propagating the imagined communities” not only to illiterate masses but 
to “literate masses reading different languages.”668  It is tempting to fit what happened in 
Puerto Rico into Anderson’s “final wave”.  After all, Muñoz Marín, the architect of the 
final commonwealth formula, for a time spoke a language different to that of the masses, 
at least symbolically.  Moreover, his campaigns were marked by the use of radio 
speeches to circumvent both the difficulties of traveling in the Island and illiteracy.   But 
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instead of asserting this formula, I propose that a different wave of nationalism visited the 
Island.   
Creolization of the military and other metropolitan institutions paved the way for 
another phenomenon, which I call “Popularization”.   As Creolization yields to 
Popularization, the former metropolitan institutions, originally intended to change the 
colonial subjects into something more attuned with the metropolitan master, can turn into 
tools for resisting complete assimilation.  This metamorphosis may occur when the 
metropolis finds itself in need of the colonial subjects’ manpower- as in WWII- and the 
military, and other metropolitan institutions have to open to the masses.  In this instance 
the military can become a type of megaphone for the masses to express their voices- and 
there is a real chance of altering both the metropolis and the criollo elites’ plans.  If the 
military and its project of nation and state-building had fallen in the hands of the criollo 
elites during WWII, the process of “Popularization” had already begun as the native 
political leaders owed too much to these soldiers.   
During WWII the Populares used military service to begin their project of social 
justice and succeeded in gaining control over metropolitan institutions.  As discussed 
earlier, Florencia Mallon has argued that the degree of military, paramilitary, and 
political mobilization of peasants and indigenous groups contributes to the depth of the 
liberal spirit of a country’s polity.  She believes that political groups considered as class 
not only sense a stake in nation state formation but also seek to participate on its design.  
Participation, she argues, is contested at the local level and filtered through regional 
politics until it moves towards the national level where negotiation continues and a 
contract is reached among contesting forces.  Mallon calls this stage hegemony, a process 
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that will continue endlessly as counter-hegemonic forces keep challenging the hegemonic 
entity or polity.669   Subaltern groups, she contends, have initiated projects for “collective 
identity based on a premise of citizenship available to all, and with individual 
membership beginning with the presumption of equality.”670  In other words, subaltern 
groups have taken the challenge of national democratic discourses and attempted to 
create their own version of a more egalitarian practice trying to make real the unfulfilled 
promises of nation and democracy.671   Mallon thus emphasizes the construction of 
alternative national projects, (popular, inclusive and liberal), through the political and 
military mobilization of peasants and other subaltern groups during periods of crisis.  
When subaltern groups are successfully integrated within the new hegemonic coalition, 
the popular sectors are incorporated into the country’s polity and economy and the state 
becomes a real negotiator between labor and capital while embarking on land reform.  
The combination of these factors attests to the liberal spirit of a hegemonic political 
alliance based in a national populist discourse.  By the end of WWII, the political and 
military mobilization of popular sectors in the Island started the drive towards a popular, 
inclusive and liberal national project and in the process the project of political 
decolonization would take another meaning. 
The next mobilization of the Puerto Rican happened after the military and the 
nation and state building projects had been creolized and took place during the Korean 
War, and during this war the military became fully popularized.  This mobilization had a 
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socio-political character nature and was essential in the creation of the Estado Libre 
Asociado in 1952.  Korea would become a propaganda war for sponsors of the third way 
which entailed a new Puerto Rican for a new Puerto Rico.  During this war, military 
service not only served as a path to political and socio-economic enfranchisement for the 
Puerto Rican peasantry and urban workers, it also allowed for their national identities to 
become hegemonic and to translate into the political realm by virtue of the Estado Libre 
Asociado. That is not to say that everyone welcomed the ELA or the philosophy behind 
it.  In fact, pro-Annexation groups, echoing the Independentistas in the Island, soon 
denounced it as a farce.672  But the ELA’s creation had a very popular, liberal, and 
pluralistic origin supported by an alternative conception of the Puerto Ricans’ national 
identities. 
The tens of thousands of Puerto Ricans turned soldiers during WWII and Korea 
had the opportunity to become part of an emerging or broadening middle class.  The 
masses cultural discourse was characterized by neither a rejection nor an acceptance of 
the 100% Americanism espoused by some metropolitan agents and native politicians, or 
the Hispanic revival of the nationalist movement.  Instead, their discourse was a hybrid 
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popular language which fused and accepted Americanism and Hispanismo, as well as 
other cultural influences, as they understood them.  The popular hybrid culture inched its 
way forward to eventually become the dominant cultural and political discourse.  Had 
tens of thousands of Puerto Rican peasants and urban workers not been mobilized for war 
and then enfranchised, such popular discourse would have had a hard time becoming 
politically hegemonic.   
This discourse was hard to accept by the nationalists.  For the Nacionalistas, the 
“Nation” could not survive; in fact it had no purpose at all if it did not have its own 
independent state.  Becoming an independent state to secure the survival of the nation 
went from being the means to becoming the end as Nacionalistas were willing to 
sacrifice every last Puerto Rican to obtain an independent Puerto Rico.  This narrow 
vision put them at odds with most Puerto Ricans.  Puerto Ricans obviously identified 
culturally with the Island - though the influence of fifty years of U.S. institutions was 
noticeable in every aspect of Puerto Rican life- but politically, they identified with the 
U.S.  In effect, even to this day Nacionalismo expresses itself in every possible cultural 
form but does not translate into political power.673  For the Nacionalistas the “Nation” 
was an ideal, a concept higher than the Puerto Ricans themselves.  For they imagine the 
Puerto Rican nation as a sovereign political entity, as a Republic.  The Populares on the 
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other hand came to consider the Puerto Ricans to be the “Nation”.  Thus, political 
sovereignty in the form of an independent state came second to the welfare of the people.  
In fact, when Muñoz Marín and metropolitan leaders backed the creation of the ELA, 
they were responding to the variegated essence of Puerto Rican national identities.   
Muñoz Marín and Albizu Campos were part of the intelligentsia that Benedict 
Anderson identifies as the future leaders of national movement of decolonization.  Albizu 
Campos, after his pilgrimage to the metropolis was never able to speak again the 
language of the masses for he never understood that many Puerto Ricans had come to 
adopt traits of American culture as their own.  Muñoz Marín, who was at heart a 
nationalist and a fervent Independentista, learned to speak the language of the people.  
And as a true nationalist, he put aside his personal preferences in favor of the people’s 
will who are after all the embodiment of the nation.  
The institutions and plans of the metropolis- and of the criollo elites- may have 
been changed by the masses, but in the process the masses were changed as well.  After 
fifty years of U.S. dominance, Puerto Ricans identities were divided into a very Puerto 
Rican cultural side (which mainstream mainly identified with Hispanic legacy), albeit 
with a heavy American influence, and a political identity attuned mostly with the precepts 
of Americanism.  Puerto Rican society- where the political meets the cultural- provided 
the space for these two identities to merge.  Nobody expressed the hybridism of Puerto 
Rican identities better than the Puerto Rican soldiers who thought their duty was to 
defend the American Nation, to which they thought they belonged, because it was their 
duty as Puerto Ricans.  In this regard we can then find Puerto Ricans serving in the U.S. 
military during the Korean War, with the overwhelming support of the population, who 
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were proud of their Puertoricaness and who saw no incongruence with proving their 
Puertorriqueñidad by defending the American nation and wearing a U.S. Army uniform.  
The colonial subjects going through these institutions- with the cheering of the criollo 
elites- found it hard not to be receptive to the metropolis’ tenets.  And thus, these soldiers 
who among many other things cited “freedom”, “democracy”, “fighting for our nation”, 
“defending our nation in peril”; had in fact adopted much of the metropolis’ creed, even 
if creolized or popularized, and even with the inherent contradictions of a colonial subject 
fighting for his nation while wearing the uniform of the metropolis. By bleeding 
alongside the soldiers of the United Nations in Korea, the Puerto Rican soldiers would 
become the heroes of the emerging nation. 
But as Mallon warns us, hegemony is always in contestation.  Soon after the 
creation of the Commonwealth, the criollo elites tried to create a sanctioned national 
identity to fit the new state’s official discourse.  Arlene Dávila has argued that that after 
Puerto Rico became a commonwealth, the PPD sought to counter the pro-independence 
movement, and thus secure the survival of the commonwealth, by appropriating the 
Nationalist Party’s icons and discourse.  The PPD’s appropriation of the nationalist 
discourse and imagery, Dávila argues, led to the neutralization of independence as a 
political option.674  Here she misses the point, for Muñoz Marín abandoned independence 
as an immediate political goal after he became disenchanted with the cold reception that 
the masses in Puerto Rico gave to the idea of independence in 1936.  He did not 
appropriate the symbols of Puerto Rican nationalism.  He identified them correctly and 
altered his political posture accordingly.  Moreover, he did so only after spending another 
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 Dávila, Sponsored Identities: Cultural Politics in Puerto Rico, XII, 207, 258 
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decade trying to secure independence for the Island, after realizing that important groups 
in the United States were starting to favor statehood for the Island, and recognizing that  
he would not command  the loyalty of the Puerto Rican peasantry and urban worker if he 
moved towards independence.  Most notably, Dávila has argued that the creation of the 
Racial Triad- the “brave and gallant” Spaniard, the “noble” Taino, and the “strong” Black 
African-  to encapsulate Puerto Rican culture and identities, was the ELA’s attempt to 
consolidate its position, and defeat the Independentista movement, by dominating  
cultural identities in the Island.  The racial triad, however, was not an attempt to move the 
Island away from independence or Puertorriqueñismo, but a last ditch effort to hinder 
further Americanization. In essence, the new state sponsored identity was intended to roll 
back half a century of American influence.  Nonetheless, the Popularization of the 
metropolis institutions meant that the criollo elite lost control over the Islanders’ national 
identities.   New national identities emerged in the Island, but they were and remain 
impossible to be controlled by the state. 
A word on the fate of the Jíbaro; 
As was the case for WWII veterans, the majority of the Puerto Rican soldiers who 
fought in Korea came from the mountains, sugar cane plantations and the urban working 
classes.   And, once more, the returning Jíbaro-Soldier would renounce subsistence 
agriculture or life as a sugar cane-cutter.  Many would become the technocrats and 
technicians of the Puerto Rican “industrial miracle” and would join a broadening middle 
class.  But they did not renounce their identity.  In fact many of those Jíbaro/soldiers, 
who went on to study and became professionals and/or remained in the National Guard, 
subsidized their plots of land with the income from their new professions.  Ironically, the 
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Jíbaro, a heavily romanticized figure to be sure and the quintessential icon of the 
Populares, and of modern nationalist and independent movements in the Island, survived 
as such in great part due to military service.  
  
332 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
Archives and Manuscripts Collections 
 
Archivo General de Puerto Rico (A.G.P.R.), San Juan, P.R.  
Fondo: Oficina del Gobernador, Serie: Correspondencia General 
 
The FBI Files on Puerto Rico Project.  Available from                                                                                                                                            
               http://www.pr-secretfiles.net; INTERNET.   
Federal Bureau of Investigation, Nationalist Party of Puerto Rico S.J. 100-
3.  
 
Fundación Luís Muñoz Marín, Hato Rey, P.R.   
Archivo Luís Muñoz Marín (A.L.M.M.) 
Serie 9: Gobernador de Puerto Rico, 1949-1964, Sección V: Artículos, 
Discursos, Mensajes, Declaraciones 
 
National Archives, Washington D.C. 
Guide to Federal Records.  Available from   
http://www.archives.gov/research/guide-fed-records/groups/350.htm; 
INTERNET. 
Records of the Office of the Secretary of the Interior.  Record Group 350.  
 
http://newdeal.feri.org/texts/578.htm: INTERNET. 
Information Research Section, Facts About Puerto Rico Reconstruction 
Administration 
 
Center for Electronic Records.  Available from   
http://www.nara.gov/nara/electronic/homensx.html; INTERNET. 
State-level Lists of Casualties from the Korean and Vietnam Conflicts.  
Record Group 330. 
 
Modern Military Records Branch, Army-AG  
Command Reports, 1949-1954.  Record Group 407.   
 
Puerto Rican-American Research Institute, Montgomery, Maryland. 
Findings and Conclusions of the U.S. Army Board for the Correction of Military  
Records. 
Review on the 65th Infantry Regiment Court-Martial.  Report by the Department 
of Army’s Center of Military History. 
 
Puerto Rico National Guard Museum, San Juan, P.R.     
 
Truman Presidential Museum and Library  
Harry S. Truman Papers. Available from 
http://www.trumanlibrary.org/hstpaper/presshst.htm; INTERNET. 
333 
 
Staff Members and Office Files: White House Press Release Files:      
1945-1953. 
 
U.S. Army Judiciary, Falls Church, Virginia  
  Finding and Conclusions of the U.S. Army Board of Review. 
 
Universidad de Puerto Rico, Río Piedras Campus 
Centro  de Investigaciones Históricas Proyecto Caribeño (C.I.H.P.C.)  
 Selected Documents of the Bureau of Insular Affairs 
 Selected Documents of the U.S. Department of War     
 U.S. Army Intelligence Reports on Subversive Activity in Puerto Rico 
 Puerto Rico National Guard Annual Reports 
 
Universidad de Puerto Rico, Mayagüez Campus  
Microfilm and Rare Books Collection.            
 
University of Massachusetts, Amherst  
W.E.B. Du Bois Library Microfilm Collection,  
Bureau of Insular Affairs and Insular Affairs Committee Congressional 
Hearings.                                                                                         
 
 
Privately Owned Papers 
 
65th U.S. Infantry Papers, John Scott Porterfield Papers, Maumee, Ohio. 
 
65th U.S. Infantry Papers, Luis Raul Rodríguez Papers, Miami, Florida. 
 
65th U.S. Infantry Papers, Tipper Cronkhite Papers, Little Rock, Arkansas. 
 
 
Interviews 
 
Avellanet Luis.  Interview by author.  Videocassette.  Hormigueros, Puerto Rico, 10 
August 2001. 
 
Nazario-Ortiz, Ernesto.  Interview by author.  Videocassette.  San Germán, Puerto Rico, 
10 August 2001. 
 
Mercado-Santana, Juan.  Interview by author.  Videocassette.  Barranquitas, Puerto Rico, 
6 August 2001. 
 
Morales, Jesús.  Interview by author.  Videocassette.  Mayagüez, Puerto Rico, 10 August 
2001. 
 
334 
 
Ortiz, Lupercio.  Interview by author.  Videocassette.  San Juan, Puerto Rico, 7 August 
2001. 
 
Pagán-Vélez, Teodoro.  Interview by author.  Videocassette.  Mayagüez, Puerto Rico, 13 
August 2001. 
 
Rodríguez, Jorge L.  Interview by author.  Videocassette.  Baranquitas, Puerto Rico, 6 
August 2001. 
 
Rodríguez, Luis R.  Interview by author.  Audiocassette.  Miami, Florida, 27 September 
2001. 
 
Rosa-Feliciano, Pascual.  Interview by author.  Videocassette.  Aguada, Puerto Rico, 9 
August 2001. 
 
Van Zandt Harry.  Interview by Tara Liston and Tara Kraenzlin.  Transcript.  New 
Brunswick, New Jersey, 11 March 1996, Oral History Archives of World War II, 
Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey, New Brunswick Campus.   
 
Vargas, Víctor.  Interview by author.  Videocassette.  Barranquitas, Puerto Rico, 6 
August 2001. 
 
 
Books 
 
Acosta, Ernest.  The Puerto Rican U.S. Army 65th Infantry Regiment.  Montgomery, 
Maryland: S.1 Regt. Recognition Committee, 1996. 
 
Ai Camp, Roderic. Generals in the Palacio: The Military in Modern Mexico.  New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1992. 
 
Álvarez Curbelo, Silvia. “La bandera en la colina: Luis Muñoz Marín en los tiempos de 
la guerra de Corea.”  In Luis Muñoz Marín, perfiles de su gobernación, 1948-
1964. San Juan, P.R.: Fundación Luis Muñoz Marín, 2003. 
 
Anderson, Benedict.  Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of 
Nationalism. Rev. ed.  London and New York: Verso, 2002. 
 
Anna, Timothy E. Spain and the Loss of America. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 
1983.   
 
Appleman, Roy B. U.S.  Army in the Korean War: South to the Naktong, North to the 
Yalu.  Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1966. 
 
335 
 
Ashford, Bailey K. A Soldier in Science: The Autobiography of Bailey K. Ashford. 1934.  
Reprint, Universidad de Puerto Rico. San Juan P.R.: Editorial de la Universidad 
de Puerto Rico, 1998. 
 
Ayala, Cesar J.  American Sugar Kingdom: The Plantation Economy of the Spanish 
Caribbean, 1898-1934. The University of North Carolina Press: Chapel Hill and 
London, 1999.  
 
Barreto, Roberto.  “Appurtenant [sic] and belonging… but not a part of”:   ¿Por  qué el 
gobierno de los Estado Unidos le negó  a los puertorriqueños el  derecho al 
gobierno propio?” In 1898: Enfoques y perspectivas: Simposio Internacional de 
Historiadores, Cuba, España, Estados Unidos, Filipinas y Puerto Rico. San Juan, 
P.R.: Academia Puertorriqueña de la Historia-First Book Publishing of Puerto 
Rico, 1997. 
 
Bayrón Toro, Fernando. Elecciones y partidos políticos  de Puerto Rico, 1809-2000, 
Nueva edición revisada y ampliada. Mayagüez, P.R.: Editorial Isla, 2000. 
 
Beisner, Robert L. From the Old Diplomacy to the New, 1865-1900. 2d ed. The 
American History Series. Arlington Heights Illinois: Harlan Davidson, Inc., 1985.  
 
Bergard, Laird W.  Coffee and the Growth of Agrarian Capitalism in Nineteenth-Century 
Puerto Rico. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983. 
 
Bernabe, Rafael.  Respuestas al colonialismo en la política puertorriqueña: 1899-1929.  
Río Piedras, Puerto Rico: Ediciones Huracán, 1996. 
 
Blair, Clay. The Forgotten War, America in Korea 1950-1953. New York: Times Books, 
1987. 
 
Briggs, Laura. Reproducing Empire, Race, Sex Science, and U.S. Imperialism in Puerto 
Rico. Berkley, Los Angeles, and London: University of California Press, 2002. 
 
Burnett, Christina  D., and Marshall Burke., eds.  Foreign in a Domestic Sense: Puerto 
Rico, American Expansion, and the Constitution. Durham: Duke University Press, 
2001. 
 
Butler, John Sibley. “African Americans in the Military.” The Oxford Companion to 
American Military History. Oxford University Press, 1999.  
 
Camuñas-Madera, Ricardo. Desplazamiento y revolución en el Puerto Rico del siglo XIX. 
San Juan, P.R.: Instituto  de Cultura Puertorriqueña, 2000. 
 
Campbell, Michael. “Imperialismo sin un imperio colonial”: Misioneros protestantes en 
Puerto Rico 1898-1914.” In  El impacto de 1898 en el oeste puertorriqueño. 
Cuadernos del 98 # 12. San Juan, P.R: Librería Editorial Ateneo, 1998-99. 
336 
 
 
Carroll, Henry K. Report on the Island of Puerto Rico. Washington: Government Printing 
Office, 1899.   
 
Cifre de Loubriel, Estela. Catalogo de extranjeros residentes en Puerto Rico en el siglo 
XIX. Río Piedras, P.R.: Ediciones de la Universidad de Puerto Rico, 1962. 
 
_________La inmigración a Puerto Rico durante el siglo XIX. San Juan, P.R.: Instituto 
de Cultura Puertorriqueña, 1964. 
 
Conn, Stetson and Byron Fairchild. The Framework of Hemisphere Defense. United 
States Army in World War II: The Western Hemisphere.  Washington, D.C.: 
Center of  Military History  United States Army, 1989. Available from http:/ 
/www.army.mil/cmh-pg/books/wwii/Framework/index.htm.  
 
Conn, Stetson, Rose C. Engelman and Byron Fairchild.  Guarding the United States and 
its Outposts.  Washington D.C.:  Center of Military History United States Army, 
2000. Available from http://www.army.mil/cmh-pg/books/wwii/Guard-
US/index.htm 
 
Cruz Monclova, Lidio.  El Grito de Lares. San Juan: Instituto de Cultura Puertorriqueña, 
1968. 
 
_________ ed. Obras Completas de Luis Muñoz Rivera, 1890-1900, Introducción, notas 
y recopilación del Dr. Lidio Cruz Monclova, 1ra edición. San Juan, P.R.: Instituto 
de Cultura Puertorriqueña, 1963.   
 
Dalifume, Richard M.  Desegregation of the U.S. Forces:  Fighting on Two Fronts, 1939-
1953.  Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1969.    
 
Dallek, Robert. Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 1932-1945. New 
York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995. 
 
Dávila, Arlene M.  Sponsored Identities, Cultural Politics in Puerto Rico.  Philadelphia: 
Temple University Press, 1997. 
 
Departamento de la Guerra: Dirección del Censo de Puerto Rico. Informe sobre el Censo 
de Puerto Rico, 1899. 1899. Reprint, San Juan Puerto Rico: Academia 
Puertorriqueña de la Historia, 2003 
 
Díaz Soler, Luis M.  Puerto Rico: Sus luchas por alcanzar estabilidad económica, 
estabilidad política y afirmación cultural, 1898-1996.  Isabela, P.R.: Isabela 
Printing Inc., 1998. 
 
Dolcater, Max W., ed.  3rd Infantry Division in Korea.  Tokyo: Toppan  Printing 
Company, 1953. 
337 
 
 
Domínguez, Jorge I. Insurrection or Loyalty: The Breakdown of the Spanish American 
Empire. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980. 
 
Duffy Burnett , Christina and Burke Marshall., eds.  Foreign in a Domestic Sense: Puerto 
Rico American Expansion and the Constitution. Durham/London: Duke 
University Press, 2001. 
 
Eisenhower, John S.D.  Strictly Personal. Garden City, New York: Doubleday & 
Company, Inc., 1974.  
Enamorado Cuesta, José.  Porto Rico, Past and Present. 1929. Reprint New York: Arno 
Press, 1975. 
 
Estades  Font, María E.  La presencia militar de Estados Unidos en Puerto Rico: 1898-
1918.  Río  Piedras, Puerto Rico: Editorial Universitaria, Universidad de Puerto 
Rico, 1986. 
 
Fernós López-Cepero, Antonio., ed., Documentos Históricos-Constitucionales de Puerto 
Rico, segunda edición ampliada.  San Juan, P.R.: Ediciones situm Inc. 2005. 
 
Ferrao, Luis Ángel. Pedro Albizu Campos y el nacionalismo puertorriqueño 1930-1939.  
Vol. II. San Juan, Puerto Rico: Editorial Cultural, Inc., 1990. 
 
Ferrer, Ada. Insurgent Cuba: Race, Nation, and Revolution, 1868-1898.  Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, c1999.   
 
Figueroa, Luis A. Sugar, Slavery, and Freedom in Nineteenth-Century Puerto Rico. 
Chapel Hill, N.C.: University of North Carolina Press, and San Juan, P.R.: 
University of Puerto Rico Press, 2005.  
 
Fith, J. Samuel. The Armed Forces and Democracy in Latin America. Baltimore: John 
Hopkins University Press, 1998. 
 
Foner,  Jack D. Blacks and the Military in American History. New York: Praeger 
Publishers Inc, 1974. 
 
Fredrickson, George M. Racism: A Short History. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
2002.   
 
García Muñiz, Humberto. “El Caribe durante la Segunda Guerra Mundial: El 
Mediterráneo Americano.” In Puerto Rico en las relaciones internacionales del 
Caribe. Río Piedras, P.R.: Ediciones Huracán Inc., 1990. 
 
García Ochoa, María Asunción.  La política española en Puerto rico durante el siglo 
XIX. Río Piedras, P.R.: Editorial Universidad de Puerto Rico, 1982. 
 
338 
 
Gautier Dapena, José A.  Trayectoria del pensamiento liberal puertorriqueño en el siglo 
XIX. San Juan, P.R.: Instituto de Cultura Puertorriqueña, 1975. 
 
Géigel Polanco, Vicente.  El Grito de Lares: gesta de heroísmo y sacrificio. Río Piedras, 
P.R.: Editorial Antillana, 1976.   
 
Gilbert, Martin. The First World War: A Complete History. New York: Henry Holt and 
Company, 1994. 
 
Gonzàlez, Luis José.  El país  de cuatro pisos y otros ensayos. (Colección: La nave y el 
Puerto) Río piedras, P.R.: Ediciones Huracàn, 1989. 
  
Gould, Lewis L. The Spanish-American War and President McKinley. Lawrence Kansas: 
University Press of Kansas, 1982.  
 
Government Printing Office.  Report of the Military Governor of Porto Rico on Civil 
Affairs.  1902.  Reprint, San Juan, P.R.: Academia Puertorriqueña de la Historia, 
Ediciones Puerto, 2003. 
 
Graff, Henry F., ed.  “American Imperialism and the Philippine Insurrection.” In 
Testimony of the Times: Selections from Congressional Hearings. Boston: Little, 
Brown and Company, 1969. 
 
Harris, W. W. Puerto Rico’s Fighting  65th U.S. Infantry: From San Juan to Chorwan.  
San Rafael, California: Presidio Press, 1980.  
 
Hermes, Walter G.  U.S.  Army in the Korean War: Truce, Tent, and Fighting Front.  
Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1966. 
 
Herwig, Holger. Politics of Frustration: The United States in German Naval Planning, 
1889-1941. Boston: Little Brown, 1976.  
 
Holden Robert H.  Armies Without nations: Public Violence and State Formation in 
Central America, 1821-1960.  Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 
2004.   
 
Hostos, Eugenio María de.  Los rostros del camino; Antología. San Juan P.R.: Instituto 
de Cultura Puertorriqueña. Programa de Publicaciones y Grabaciones, 1995. 
 
Jiménez de Wagenheim, Olga. El grito de Lares; sus causas y sus hombres.  Río Piedras, 
Puerto Rico: Ediciones Huracán, 1999. 
 
Johnson, John J. Latin America in Caricature. The Texas Pan American Series. Austin 
and London: University of Texas Press, 1980. 
 
339 
 
Kaplan, Amy, and Donald P. Ease., eds.  Cultures of United States Imperialism.  
Durham/London: Duke University Press, 1993. 
 
Kinsbruner, Jay.  Independence in Spanish America: Civil Wars, Revolutions and 
Underdevelopment. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2000.   
 
Knock, Thomas J. To End All Wars: Woodrow Wilson and the Quest for a New World 
Order. Princeton University Press, 1992. 
 
LaFeber, Walter. The New Empire: An Interpretation of American Expansion 1860-1898. 
Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1963.  
 
Lefebvre, Andrew.  “Puerto Rico: Quiet Participant.” In Latin America During World 
War II. Lanham Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, 2007. 
 
Langley, Lester.  The Banana Wars: An Inner History of American Empire 1900-1934. 
Lexington, Kentucky: The University Press of Kentucky, 1983. 
 
_________The United States and the Caribbean, 1900-1970. Athens: The University of 
Georgia, 1980 
 
Liss, Peggy K.  Atlantic Empires: The Network of Trade and Revolution, 1713-1826. 
John Hopkins Studies in Atlantic History and Culture. Baltimore: John Hopkins 
University Press, 1983.  
 
López Alves, Fernando. State Formation and Democracy in Latin America, 1810-1900. 
Durham  and London: Duke University Press, 2000.  
 
López Baralt, José. The Policy of the United States Towards its Territories with Special 
Reference to Puerto Rico. San Juan, P.R.: Editorial de la Universidad de Puerto 
Rico 1999.   
 
Loveman, Brian and Thomas M. Davies, Jr., eds.   The Politics of Antipolitics: The 
Military in Latin America.  Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, c1989.    
 
Luque de Sánchez, María D.  La ocupación norteamericana y la ley Fóraker: 1898-1904.  
Río Piedras, Puerto Rico:  Ediciones Huracán, 1986. 
 
Lynch, John. The Spanish-American Revolutions, 1808-1826: A Unified Account of the 
Revolutions that Swept Over South America and Central America in the Early 
Nineteenth-Century. 2d ed. Revolutions in the Modern World. New York: W.W. 
Norton and Company, 1986. 
 
Mahan, Alfred Thayer.  Influence of Sea Power upon History 1660-1783. Boston: Little, 
Brown and Company, 1890. 
 
340 
 
_________The Panama Canal and Sea Power in the Pacific:  An Original Study in Naval 
Strategy.  Albuquerque, N.M.: The American Classical College Press, 1911. 
 
_________Naval Strategy: Compared and Contrasted with the Principles and Practice of 
Military Operation on Land. Lectures Delivered at the U.S. Naval War College, 
Newport, R.I. Between the Years 1887 and 1911. Boston, MA: Little, Brown, and 
Company, 1911. 
 
_________ Lessons of the War with Spain and Other Articles. 1999. Reprint, Freeport, 
N.Y.: Books for Libraries Press, 1970.  
 
Maldonado, A.W.  Luis Muñoz Marín: Puerto Rico’s Democratic Revolution. San Juan, 
Puerto Rico: La Editorial Universidad de Puerto Rico, 2006. 
 
Mallon, Florencia.  Peasant and Nation: The Making of Post Colonial Mexico and Peru.  
Berkley: University of California Press, 1995. 
 
Mathews, Thomas. La política Puertorriqueña  y el Nuevo Trato. 3d ed.  Translated by 
Antonio J. Colorado.  San Juan, Puerto Rico: La Editorial Universidad de Puerto 
Rico, 2007. 
 
Marx, Anthony.  Faith in Nation: Exclusionary Origins of Nationalism.  Oxford & New 
York: Oxford University Press. 2003. 
 
____________ Making Race and Nation: A Comparison of the United States, South 
Africa, and Brazil.  Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998. 
 
McGregor, Morris J.  Integration of the Armed Forces, 1940-1965.  Washington, D.C.:  
Center of Military History, 1981.  
 
Morales Carrión, Arturo. Puerto Rico y la lucha por la hegemonía en el Caribe: 
Colonialismo y contrabando, siglos XVI-XVIII. Río Piedras, P.R.: Editorial 
Universidad de Puerto Rico, Centro de Investigaciones Históricas: Colección 
Caribeña, 1995. 
 
Moraza Ortíz, Manuel E. La masacre de Ponce. Hato Rey, P.R.: Publicaciones 
Puertorriqueñas, 2001. 
 
Morris, Nancy. Puerto Rico: Culture, Politics, and Identity. Westport, Ct: Praeger 
Publishing, 1995. 
 
Mossman, Billy C.  U.S. Army in the Korean War:  Ebb and Flow, November 1950-July 
1951.  Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, 1990.  
 
Muñoz Marín, Luis Discursos, 1934-1948, Vol. 1. San Juan, P.R.: Fundación Luis 
Muñoz Marín, 1999. 
341 
 
 
Muñoz Rivera, Manuel. ¿Hacia Donde Héroes? New York: Azteca Press, 1948. 
 
Muratti, Jose A.  History of the 65th Infantry, 1899- 1946.  (Microfilm)  San Juan: U.S. 
Army Forces Antilles, 1946.  Available from, U.S Army Military History 
Institute, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. 
 
____________ History of the 65th Infantry Regiment, the Borinqueneers.  San Juan: U.S. 
Army Forces Antilles, 1953. (Microfilm) Available from  U.S Army Military 
History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. 
 
Nadal, José R. Guardia Nacional, Sucesora de las Milicias Puertorriqueñas. Santurce, 
P.R.: Talleres Adria Luisa Monserrate, 1962. 
 
Navarro Rivera, Pablo. Universidad de Puerto Rico: De control político a crisis 
permanente 1903-1952. Río Piedras, P.R.: Ediciones Huracán, 2000.  
 
Negrón de Montilla, Aida.  La americanización de Puerto Rico y el sistema de 
instrucción pública, 1900-1930. 2d ed. San Juan: Editorial de la Universidad de 
Puerto Rico, 1990. 
 
Negroni, Héctor Andrés. Historia militar de Puerto Rico: en conmemoración del 
encuentro de  dos mundos. España: Ediciones Siruela S.A., 1992. 
 
Norat Martínez, José, ed. Historia del Regimiento 65 de Infantería, 1899-1960.  San 
Juan, Puerto Rico: La Milagrosa, 1960.  
 
O’Brien, Philip and Paul Cammack., eds. Generals in Retreat: The Crisis of Military 
Rule in Latin America.  Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1985.  
 
Office of the Chief of Military History.  The Army Lineage Book.  Vol. 2: Infantry. 
Washington D.C.: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1953. 
 
Ojeda Reyes, Félix. Vitto Marcantonio y Puerto Rico: Por los trabajadores y por la 
nación. Río Piedras, Puerto Rico: Ediciones Huracán, 1978. 
 
Padrón, Antonio E.  El 65 en revista.  New York: Las Americas Publishing Company, 
1961. 
 
Pagán, Bolívar. Historia de los Partidos Políticos Puertorriqueños (1898-1956). Tomo I. 
San Juan, P.R.: Academia Puertorriqueña de la Historia, 1972.  
 
Pérez Louis Jr., The War of 1898: The United State & Cuba in History and 
Historiography. Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1998. 
 
342 
 
Picó, Fernando.  1898; La Guerra después de la Guerra.  Rio Piedras, Puerto Rico: 
Ediciones Huracán, 1987. 
 
Pons, Frank Moya. The Dominican Republic, A National History. Princeton, N.J.: Markus 
Wiener Publishers, 1998. 
 
Potash, Robert A.  The army & Politics in Argentina.  Stanford, Ca: Stanford University 
Press, 1969-1996.   
 
Raffucci de García, Carmen I.  El gobierno civíl y la ley Fóraker: antecedentes 
históricos.  Río Piedras, Puerto Rico: Editorial Universitaria, Universidad de 
Puerto Rico, 1981. 
 
Rivera Ramos, Efrén.  The Legal Construction of Identity: The Judicial and Social 
Legacy of American Colonialism in Puerto Rico.  Washington D.C.: American 
Psychological Association, 2001.    
 
Rivero, Ángel Rivero. Crónica de la Guerra Hispanoamericana en Puerto Rico por 
Ángel Rivero, Capitán de Artillería. Madrid: Imprenta de los sucesores de 
Rivade- Neyra, 1922. 
 
Rodríguez Cancel, Jaime L. La Guerra Fría y el sexenio de la  puertorriqueñidad; 
Afirmación nacional y políticas culturales. San Juan Puerto Rico: Ediciones 
Puerto, 2007. 
 
Rodríguez Beruff, Jorge. “El Caribe durante la Segunda Guerra Mundial: El 
Mediterráneo Americano.” In Puerto Rico en las relaciones internacionales del 
Caribe. Río Piedras, P.R.: Ediciones Huracán Inc., 1990.  
 
____________  “Luis Muñoz Marín Y Rafael Leónidas Trujillo: Una pugna caribeña 
(1941-1961).”  In  Luis Muñoz Marín, perfiles de su gobernación, 1948-1964. San 
Juan, P.R.: Fundación Luis Muñoz Marín, 2003. 
 
Rodó, José Enrique. Ariel. Brevario de la Juventud.  Valencia, España: Editorial 
Cervantes, 1920.  The Project Gutenberg EBook. Availble from 
http://www.pgdp.net. 
 
Rosario Natal, Carmelo. Puerto Rico y la crisis de la Guerra hispanoamericana (1895-
1898). P.R.: Editorial Edil, Inc., 1989. 
____________ “Muñoz y Albizu: el choque en la víspera de la insurrección.” In Luis 
Muñoz Marín, perfiles de su gobernación, 1948-1964. San Juan, P.R.: Fundación 
Luis Muñoz Marín, 2003. 
 
Ross, Tenny. “El Ejercito en Puerto Rico.”  In El Libro de Puerto Rico. ed. by Eugenio 
Fernández y García.  San Juan, Puerto Rico: El Libro Azul Publishing Company, 
1923. 
343 
 
 
Rosario Natal, Carmelo. Luis Muñoz Marín  y la independencia de Puerto Rico, 1907-
1946. San Juan, P.R.: Producciones Históricas, 1994.   
 
Rouquié, Alain. The Military and the State in Latin America. Berkley: University of 
California Press, 1987.  
 
Santiago Valles, Kelvin A. “Subject People” and Colonial Discourses: Economic 
Transformation and Social Disorder in Puerto Rico, 1898-1947. Albany: State 
University of New York, 1994. 
 
Seijo Bruno, Miñi. La insurrección nacionalista en Puerto Rico, 1950. San Juan, P.R.: 
Editorial Edíl, 1997.  
 
Stepan, Alfred.  The Military in Politics: Changing Patterns in Brazil. Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1971.   
 
Stephanson, Anders. Manifest Destiny: American Expansionism and the Empire of Right. 
New York: Hill and Wang, 1995. 
 
Torres González, Roamé.  Idioma, bilingüismo  y nacionalidad: La presencia del inglés  
en Puerto Rico. Río Piedras, P.R.: Editorial de la Universidad de Puerto Rico, 
2002. 
 
Trask, David F. The War with Spain in 1898. Lincoln and London: University of 
Nebraska Press, 1996. 
 
Trías Monge, José. Puerto Rico, The Trials of the Oldest Colony in the World.  New 
Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1997.    
 
Tugwell, Rexford G.  The Arts of Politics As Practiced by Three Great Americans: 
Franklin Delano Roosevelt, Luis Muñoz Marín  and Fiorello H. La Guardia. 
Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1958. 
 
_________ Changing the Colonial Climate.  New York: Arno Press & The New York 
Times, 1970.   
 
_________The Stricken Island: The Story of Puerto Rico.  New York: Greenwood Press 
Publishers, 1968.   
 
U.S. Army Forces Antilles. The 65th Infantry Regiment, the Puerto Rican Regiment. San 
Juan: 1952. 
 
Vega, Francisco J.  ”La situación de las Iglesias en Mayagüez en torno a 1898.”  In  El 
impacto de 1898 en el oeste puertorriqueño. Cuadernos del 98 # 12. San Juan, 
P.R: Librería Editorial Ateneo, 1998-99. 
344 
 
 
Villahermosa, Gilberto N. Honor and Fidelity: The 65th Infantry in Korea, 1950-1953. 
Washington, D.C.: United States Army Center for Military History, 2009. 
 
Wagenheim, Karl and Olga Jimenez de Jiménez de Wagenheim., eds. The Puerto Ricans, 
a Documentary History. Updated and Expanded ed.  Princeton New Jersey: 
Markus Wiener Publishers, 2002. 
Walthall, Melvin Curtis.  We Can’t  All Be Heroes: A History of the Separate Infantry 
Regiments in World War II.  Hicksville, New York: Exposition Press, 1975.      
 
Wells, Henry. “La modernización de Puerto Rico: La política y los valores.” In Del 
cañaveral a la fábrica: cambio social en Puerto Rico. Río Piedras, P.R.: 
Ediciones  Huracán-Academia, 1994. 
 
Young, Warren L. Minorities and the Military: A Cross National Study in World 
Perspective.  Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1982. 
 
Zubok, Vladimir, and Constantine Pleshakov.  Inside the Kremlin’s Cold War: From 
Stalin to Khrushchev.  Cambridge Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1996. 
 
 
Unpublished Works 
 
Franqui-Rivera, Harry. “Glory and Shame: The Ordeal of the Puerto Rican 65th U.S. 
Infantry Regiment During the Korean War, 1950- 1953.” Master’s thesis, Temple 
University,  2002.  
 
Rosa-Vélez, Sonia M. Acquiring the American Spirit: Americanization Through 
Education and the Puerto Ricans in the U.S. Government Minority Boarding 
Schools, 1899-1930. Forthcoming. Copy in Author’s Library. 
 
____________ The Puerto Ricans at Carlisle Indian School: An Experiment in 
Americanization Through Education. Forthcoming.  Copy in Author’s Library. 
 
____________ ¿Qué pasó con los becados? La saga de los estudiantes puertorriqueños 
en la Escuela Industrial para Indios de Carlisle. Forthcoming. Copy in Author’s 
Library.  
 
 
Periodicals 
 
Darragh, Shaun M. “The Puerto Rican Military Forces.”  Military Review 58 (August 
1978): 46-53. 
 
Editorial.  In  American Review of Reviews: An International Magazine XLIX, no. 1 
(April 1914): 399-400. 
345 
 
 
Gribbin, William. “A Matter of Faith: North America's Religion and South America's 
Independence.” In The Americas, Vol. 31, No. 4 (Apr., 1975) Academy of 
American Franciscan History Stable, 470-487. Available from  URL: 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/980014. 
 
 
Manders, Eric I., & Milligan, Edward S.  “65th Infantry Regiment, The Borinqueneers.”  
Military Collector and Historian 47 (Spring 1995): 38-39.   
 
Martínez Cruzado, Juan C. “The Use of Mitochondrial DNA to Discover Pre-Columbian 
Migrations to the Caribbean: Results for Puerto Rico and Expectations for the 
Dominican Republic.” In  KACIKE: Journal of Caribbean Amerindian History 
and Anthropology. Available from http://www.kacike.org/MartinezEnglish.pdf.  
 
Negroni, Hector Andrés Negroni, “Hostos y su pensamiento militar”, Journal of Inter-
American Studies, Vol. 11, No. 2, Apr., 1969, 272-285.  
 
Tischler, Barbara L. “One Hundred Percent Americanism and Music in Boston during 
World War I.” In  American Music 4,  no. 2 (Summer, 1986): 164-176. Available 
from http://www.jstor.org/stable/3051979. 
 
Triandafyllidou, Anna. “National Identity and the 'Other.'” In Ethnic and Racial Studies 
21, no. 4 (July 1998): 593-612.    
 
Villahermosa, Gilberto.  “From Glory to Disaster and Back,” Army Magazine (September 
2001): 81-84. 
 
 
Newspapers 
 
El Águila de Puerto Rico. 1912-1920.  Universidad de Puerto Rico Mayagüez Campus, 
Microfilm and Rare Books Collection. 
 
El Buscapié. January 1918-December 1919. Universidad de Puerto Rico Mayagüez 
Campus, Microfilm and Rare Books Collection. 
 
Christian Science Monitor.  April 1943.  Universidad de Puerto Rico, Centro de 
Investigaciones Históricas, Proyecto Caribeño. 
 
La Democracia. (San Juan). 1918.  Universidad de Puerto Rico, Centro de 
Investigaciones Históricas, Proyecto Caribeño. 
 
El Diluvio. 1918-1920. Universidad de Puerto Rico Mayagüez Campus, Microfilm and 
Rare Books Collection. 
 
346 
 
El Imparcial de Puerto Rico: Diario Ilustrado.  1937-1954.  Universidad de Puerto Rico 
Mayagüez Campus, Microfilm and Rare Books Collection. 
 
Justicia. (San Juan). June 8 1918. Universidad de Puerto Rico Mayagüez Campus, 
Microfilm and Rare Books Collection.  
 
Periódico El Mundo (San Juan). 1918-1952.  Universidad de Puerto Rico Mayagüez 
Campus, Microfilm and Rare Books Collection. 
 
The New York Times, September 1909, November 1954. Available from 
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html; INTERNET;  and  
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,821365-2,00.html; 
INTERNET.  
 
Pacific Stars & Stripes, circa March 1952, Rodríguez Papers.   
 
The Porto Rico Progress. July 1918. Universidad de Puerto Rico Mayagüez Campus, 
Microfilm and Rare Books Collection.    
 
Puerto Rico World Journal, March, 1944. Universidad de Puerto Rico, Centro de 
Investigaciones Históricas, Proyecto Caribeño. 
 
The San Juan Star Sunday Magazine, September 1968, Universidad de Puerto Rico 
Mayagüez Campus, Microfilm and Rare Books Collection.   
 
El Tiempo. (San Juan). 1918-1919. Universidad de Puerto Rico Mayagüez Campus, 
Microfilm and Rare Books Collection. 
 
Times Herald. November 1950.  Universidad de Puerto Rico, Centro de Investigaciones 
Históricas, Proyecto Caribeño. 
 
 
 
 
